Faculty Book Display Case

School of Law

1970

Cases and Materials on Contracts
Robert Desiderio
University of New Mexico - School of Law, desiderio@law.unm.edu

Frederick M. Hart
University of New Mexico - School of Law, hart@law.unm.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/law_facbookdisplay
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Desiderio, Robert and Frederick M. Hart. "Cases and Materials on Contracts." (1970): 240 pages. https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/
law_facbookdisplay/195

This Book is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law
at UNM Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty
Book Display Case by an authorized administrator of UNM Digital
Repository. For more information, please contact amywinter@unm.edu.

Cases and Material on
CONTRACTS
by
Robert J. Desiderio
Assistant Professor of Law
University of New Mexico
and
Frederick M. Hart
Professor of Law
University of New Mexico

No rights reserved

1st Edition
1969-1970

I.

Introduction

Should a person always keep his word? For example, If you
pre· employed and have sufficient money to meet the needs of your
family, you may wel I sign a pledge to make a charitable ~ntrlbutlon each month to the United Fund or to some specific ~h~rlty.
If you lose your Job, or Incur unexpected expenses, fulfillment
of your promise might deprive your family of food, clothing, or
other necessities. ~r, look at another situation: a f~ther
promises to take his children to the circus. Just before they are
to depart, he receives a call from his employer asking him to come
to the office to complete some work. or again, a husband promises
to give his wife a certain allowance each week to run the household.
Is he bound to continue If he belleves that she Is not usfng the
money wIse f-y?
The law of contracts asks the same basic question with a
different twtst 1 The Issue Is not necessarily which promises
should be kept, but rather whfch promise should society enforce
and how should society enfor'ce them. But why fs society concerned
with whether people keep 'their promise? Is ft because people
ought to keep promises: It being a misuse of the communication
abf lltfes of humans to promise something and then not perform?
Is It for economic reasons: promises are necessary for the business
world to function smoothly? ls It to prevent disorder In the
community; to give people a method of righting a "wrong" other
than by beating the promise breaker over the head with a club?
Consider the fol lowfng article by Professor Farnsworth, 69
Col.L. Rev. 576 (1969).

I.

THE PAST OF PROMISE: AN IDSTORICAL
INTRODUCTION TO CONTRACT
E. AllAN FARNSWORTH*
INTRODUCTION

In Wiliiam Golding's compelling parable of the origins of society, Lord
of the Flies,1 a group of English schoolboys, stranded on a tropical island,
passes the time before rescue in hunting, building shelters, framing rudimentary rules of order, quarreling over vital possessions, and, in the end, fighting
and killing one another. But in their society they do not, as far as we are told,
bargain for the exchange of each other's promises. In this their experience
mirrors that of man as a whole, who has shown little concern with such
matters for most of his quarter of a million years ex.istence. Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr., casually dismissed inquiry into the origins of promise with the
observation that "to explain how mankind first learned to promise, we must
go to metaphysics, and find out how it ever came to frame a future tense."2
Yet both historians and anthropologists tell us that more than a future tense
was required before man began to use promises. An inquiry into how he
survived without promise, and how he came to use it, affords a useful perspective for the study of promise in our own society.
Every human society relies to some extent upon cooperation among
its members to achieve s9cial purposes. Ludwig von Mises put it concisely :
"Society is concerted action, cooperation."3 In order to obtain that cooperation, our own society puts its faith in a system that we call "capitalism" or,
with a touch of euphemism, "free enterprise." Although it has since been refined and revised, there is no more forceful statement of the central assumption of this system than that contributed in 1776 by Adam Smith:

[M]an has almost constant occasion for the help of his brethren, and
it is vain for him to expect it from their benevolences only. He will be
more likely to prevail if he can interest their self-love in his favour,
and shew them that it is for their own advantage to do for him what
he requires of them. Whoever offers to another a bargain of any kind,
proposes to do this. Give me that which I want, and you shall have

* Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. B.S., 1948, Univ. of Michigan; M.A.,
1949, Yale Univ.; LL.B., 1952, Columbia Univ. Because the first-year course in contracts
has traditionally laid heavy emphasis on techniques of precise legal analysis, beginning
law students have sometimes viewed the subject as divorced from the related disciplines
of anthropology, economics, history, philosophy and sociology which they may have encountered in college. That this is not so is demonstrated by a number of scholars who
have written of contract law from the perspective of one of those disciplines. In this
article I have tried to trace the development of our concept of contract as interpreted in
the works of at least some of these scholars. In the thought that the reader may not yet
have had a chance to sample the original work, I have, wherever appropriate, quoted the
writer's own words to suggest at least some of the flavor of his contribution.
1. w. GoLDING, LoRD OF THE FLms (1954).
2. 0. W. HoLMEs, JR., THE CoMMON LAw 251 (1881).
3. L. VoN MISES, HUMAN ACTION 143 (rev. ed. 1963).
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this which you want, is the meaning of every such offer; and it is in
this manner that we obtain from one another the far greater part of
those good offices which we stand in need of. We address ourselves,
not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of
our own necessities but of their advantages. Nobody but a beggar
chooses to depend chiefly upon the benevolence of his fellow citizens.4
Faith in free enterprise reached its zenith in nineteenth-century America,
which placed its trust in the dignity and creativity of the individual and in
the social utility of the wealth that he produced. It was through free competition, with maximum opportunity for individual choice and venture, that the
economic system could best take advantage of man's "self-love." The goal
was a society in which decision making was widely dispersed among its
members. In John Kenneth Galbraith's words, "capitalism, as a practical
matter rather than a system of theology, is an arrangement for getting a considerable decentralism in economic decision." 5 And the law was to serve that
goal. As expressed by James Willard Hurst, "the heart of the matter was
that law should define and guarantee a wider dispersion of the powers of
decision in the community; this it did by committing to private hands legally
protected control over the bulk of economic resources." 6
The mechanism devised to achieve this goal centers about transactions
called "exchanges," in which each party gives something in return for what
is given by the other party. Under the market principle, equivalence in these
exchanges is determined by the forces of supply and demand arising out of
the productivity and the value judgments of individuals. Their terms are
arrived at voluntarily by the parties themselves through the process referred
to as "bargain" by Adam Smith. Through this process, each party to an
exchange seeks to maximize his own economic advantage on terms tolerable
to the other party. Because of differences in value judgments and because of
the division of labor, it is usually possible for each of them to realize what
is for himself a substantial advantage. "When the baker provides the dentist
with bread and the dentist relieves the baker's toothache, neither the baker
nor the dentist is harmed." 7
Sometimes the bargain is for an immediate exchange of performances
by both parties:
Illustration 1. Seller delivers lumber to Buyer. In return, Buyer
gives Seller $5,000.
Sometimes one of the parties bargains not for the other's present performance,
but for his commitment to perform in the future :
4. A. SMITH, AN INQUmY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 19 (1811 ed., bk. 1, ch. II).
5.
K. GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM: THE CONCEPT OF COUNTERVAILING
POWER 200 (rev. ed. 1956).
6. W. HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY UNITED STATES 8 (1956).

J.
J.

7. L. VoN MisEs, supra note 3, at 666.
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Illustration 2. Seller delivers lumber to Buyer. In return, Buyer
promises to pay Seller $5,000 in 30 days.
And sometimes each party bargains for the other's commitment to perform
. in the future :

Illustrati01i 3. Seller promises to deliver lumber to Buyer in 30
days. In return, Buyer promises to pay Seller $5,000 on delivery of
the lumber.
Lawyers analyze such voluntary commitments as those in the last two illustrations in terms of "contract," which Sir Frederick Pollock aptly defined as
"a promise or set of promises which the law will enforce." 8 But before the
concern of the law with contract must have come the concern of man himself
with promise. How and when did that concern begin? We have become so accustomed in our own economic system to securing cooperation to achieve social
purposes by the use of promises given in exchanges arrived at through bargain, that it may be difficult even to picture a society unconcerned with
bargain, lacking in exchange, or ignorant of promise.

I. A

WORLD WITHOUT BARGAIN

Adam Smith supposed that "man has almost constant occasion for the
help of his brethren" 9 and that "the propensity to truck, barter and exchange
one thing for another" was "common to all men."10 Yet according to anthropologists it is possible for a society to exist with little cooperative activity,
or to engage in cooperative activity that is not centered about e.."<Cchange
based on bargain.
Most extreme are the "individualistic" societies,11 in which self-sufficiency is the rule and cooperation the exception. Probably no people has ever
tried to be as fiercely individualistic as Montesquieu's mythical Troglodytes,
who resolved "that each individual should attend to his own interests, without
troubling his mind about those of his neighbor."12 But there are societies in
which the struggle for survival in an inhospitable environment has bred a
self-sufficiency which makes cooperation of minor importance. So among
the Ammassalik, Greenland Eskimos who depend on the sea for survival,
each couple is an essentially self-reliant unit and there is little division of
labor or dependence on others.13 Tasks that one person can do, such as
routine hunting, are usually done alone. Even the longhouse, in which many
8. F. POLLOCK, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT 1 (12th ed. by Winfield 1946).
9. A. SMITH, sttPra note 4, at 19 (1811 ed., bk. 1, ch. II).
10. Id. at 17, 18.
11. Mead, Interpretative Statement, in COOPERATION AND COMPETITION AMONG PRIMITIVE PEoPLES 458 (M. Mead ed. 1961). Because this article is concerned with the role of
promise in the distribution of wealth, the emphasis here is on utilitarian, as opposed to
ceremonial, exchanges.
12. MONTESQUIEU, THE PERSIAN LETTERS 23 (Bassor11h, ed. 1897).
13. Mirsky, The Eskimo of Greenland, in M. Mead, si'[,r(I, note 11, at 51.
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families assemble by personal preference to share a single room for the winter,
is so arranged as to allow for a maximum of individual effort.
While there is a minimum of cooperation, there is also a minimum of
competition. Individual wealth consists largely of tools, weapons, boats, tents;
clothing and other necessities, made by the owner or his wife. Such inequalities
as do exist are generally in quality rather than quantity; a particularly
skilled workman will have a better kayak rather than a second one. Surpluses
would only hinder their mobile summer life, and even that vital commodity
food; obtained primarily from blubbery sea mammals, cannot be accumulated
in large quantities because of the absence of any method of preservation.
Among the Ammassalik, self-sufficiency has largely dispensed with the need
for cooperation.
Most primitive peoples, however, have a heavier dependence on cooperation than do the Ammassalik. Yet not all rely primarily on· exchange arrived
at through bargain to achieve it. Most of Montesquieu's early Troglodytes
perished, we are told, for when those in the highlands had drought, those in
the lowlands did not share, and when those in the lowlands had floods, those
in the highlands did not share. From the survivors there came a society of
latter-day Troglodytes, remarkable for their righteousness and their generosity.14 We are not told whether these qualities permitted them to dispense
entirely with bargain and exchange. Yet among "cooperative" societies, such
as the Zuni; an agricultural tribe of Indians of New Mexico, a high level of
cooperation is achieved largely by encouraging just these qualities and with no
substantial emphasis on such reciprocal transactions.15 The major focus of
Zuni life is religious, and respect comes not through economic betterment but
through the observance of ritual and through voluntary cooperation-sharing
food with the needy, helping in agricultural labor, and making gifts, particularly in connection with the religious ceremonies. The best known of these is
the shalako feast, at which much of a man's wealth may be distributed among
the community in order to bring supernatural blessing upon it. Individual
wealth, although it may be considerable, is therefore highly transitory and
competition for it is discouraged since it is valued only for the immediate
material comfort that it will bring. Sharing among one's fellows is said to be
widespread among more primitive societies, and particularly so among those
that must struggle for survival in a harsh environment,16 so that the sharing
of good fortune may afford insurance against poor times in an uncertain future.
How have such cooperative societies succeeded in maintaining the al14. MoNTESQUmu, s11Pra note 12, at 24-27. Cf. F. N. ROBINSON, THE COMPLETE
WoRKS OF GEOFFREY CHAUCER 537 (2d ed. 1957) : "Sometyme the world was so stedfast
·
and stable that mannes word was obligacioun."
15. Goldman, The Zuni Indians of New Mexico, in M. Mead, supra note 11, at 313.
See also R. BENEDICT, PATTERNS OF CULTURE 57-129 (1934).
16. M. GLUCKMAN, PoLITics, LAW AND RITUAL m TRIBAL SocmTY 70 (1965).
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truism necessary for a system based so largely on respect for sharing?
Montesquieu explained that his latter-day Troglodytes succeeded because
they "regarded themselves as one single family." 17 Similarly, among peoples
such as the Zuni, the individual is born into a closely-knit group in which he
has fixed affiliations with kin and clan. "He does his productive work with the
same people with whom he lives, plays, shares good and ill fortune, rears
children, celebrates weddings and mourns at funerals," 18 and has few purely
economic relationships with other men. It may be that no matter how freely
a gift may be given, it carries with it some obligation of an equivalent or an
increased return that can be ignored only at the cost of social disapproval
and loss of prestige.19 Yet "most of the transactions in which men and women
are involved, are not specific, single transactions involving the exchange of
goods and services between relative strangers. Instead, men and women hold
land and other property, and exchange goods and services, as members of a
hierarchy of political groups and as kinfolk or affines." 20 These matters, then,
are not determined primarily by voluntary undertakings made as a matter of
choice, which give rise to obligations that the law does not otherwise impose.
They are largely controlled by what is called "status." In Roscoe Pound's
words, "The main characteristics of status are that it is a condition which can
not be divested voluntarily, and that rights, duties and liabilities flow from or
are annexed to this condition of a person rather than his volition." 21 The
survival in our own society of this once dominant factor may be seen in the
laws of intestate succession, under which wealth is distributed at death according to notions of kinship and affinity.
A society, then, may secure cooperation through sharing based on obligations that are rooted in status instead of through exchanges based on bargains
that are rooted in competition. A man works not for personal gain but because according to his fellows and often his religion he ought to do so. And
wealth is distributed not through the operation of a competitive market but
according to established relations among men. As such a society comes to
depend on the land for survival, however, a shortage of land may generate
competition over its acquisition. And as a society moves beyond the level of
bare subsistence, the accumulation of a surplus may produce competition that
focuses on its distribution. Thus the ceremonial feast of the Indians of the
17. MONTESQUIEU, siepra note 12, at 28.
18. M. GLUCKMAN, siepra note 16, at 53.
19. M. HERSKOVITS, ECONOMIC ANTHROPOLOGY 155 (1952).
20. M. GLUCKMAN, siepra note 16, at 48-49. Von Mises distinguishes between "cooperation by virtue of contract and coordination, and cooperation by virtue of command and
subordination or hegemony." L. VoN MISES, siepra note 3, at 195.
21. Pound, The End of Law as Developed in J11ristic Thottght II, 30 HARV. L. REv.
200, 211 (1917). Some relations that partake of status have their origins, at least in
principle, in a voluntary undertaking. This was true of feudalism, which was conceived
of as rooted in contract, and it is still true of marriage, which is also said to be derived
from contract.
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Northwest Coast, the notorious potlatch, took on a very different aspect
from the Zuni shalako. The potlatch, rather than a religious ritual of cooperation, was a means of destructive competition in which rivals could be shamed
by a display so lavish and wasteful that they could not meet the obligation
to reciprocate.22 But the competition is still not centered on bargain. Its goal
is not to get the best of a bargain or to accumulate wealth for its own sake,
but to gain prestige thro~gh its conspicuous distribution. Since the primary
objective is not the goods themselves but prestige for the giver, the emphasis
is not on equivalence in the value of the objects exchanged, but on equivalence in the adequacy of the gesture. As Max Gluckman has pointed out
in relation to the ceremonial exchange of shell valuables among the Trobriand
Islanders, what has developed is a relationship
beyond the confines of trade: a man must try to outdo his ... partner
in generosity, not try to get the best of a bargain . . . . This is a
virtue in our own civilization, and has been for millennia; but we have
had available alternative uses for the use of wealth. There is virtually
no choice in a tribe, so that not only are generosity and charity admired, but also there can be no flamboyant living as an alternative.23
Contrary to the suppositions of Adam Smith, then, man has succeeded in
creating societies that do not rely on bargain as does ours, sometimes because
he feels scant need to achieve cooperation, and sometimes because he achieves
cooperation largely without exchange based on bargain. Yet all of these
societies are primitive. What of more advanced societies? In 1861 Sir Henry
Maine assured himself of immortality by asserting that "the movement of the
progressive societies has hitherto been a movement from Status to Contract."24
His dictum has stood the test of time, weathered some vigorous criticism,25
and found favor among contemporary anthropologists. 26 As a society begins to
become urbanized27 and commercialized, the role of promise increases ; indeed,
22. M. GLUCKMAN, sitpra note 16, at 60, 71; cf. Goldman, supra note 15, at 332.
23. M. GLUCKMAN, sztPra note 16, at 49, 51-52.
24. H. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 170 (1861).
25. See, e.g., M. R. COHEN, LAW AND THE SocIAL ORDER 69-88 (1933) ; R. PouNn,
INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY 53-68 (1923); Graveson, The Movement from Status
to Contract, 4 Mon. L. R.Ev. 261 (1941); PouNn, sitpra note 21, at 210-15. The sense in
which Maine used this phrase is suggested by his statement that "The movement of
progressive societies . • • has been distinguished by the gradual dissolution of family
dependancy and the growth of individual obligation in its place." Id. 168. Cf. note 21

si1Pra.
26. See, e.g., M. GLUCKMAN, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS AMONG THE BAROTSE OF NORTHERN RHODESIA 28 (2d ed. 1967) ; M. GLUCKMAN, THE !DEAS IN BAROTSE JURISPRUDENCE
171 (1965) ; E. A. Hoebel, Status and Contract in Primitive Law, in CRoss-CULTURAL
UNDERSTANDING 284, 287 (F. S. C. Northrop & H. Livingston eds. 1964); Redfield,
Maine's Ancient Law in the Light of Primitive Societies, 3 WEST. PoL. Q. 574 (1950).
See also E. A. HoEBEL, THE LAW OF PRIMITIVE MAN 327-29 (1954).
27. According to Hoebel, the shift "does not really become effective until after the
beginning of the urban revolution in full neolithic times. . . . For urbanization dissolves
the strength of the kinship tie." E. A. HoEBEL, THE LAw OF PRIMITIVE MAN 328-29
(1954). There is a German saying, "Stadtlitft 111acht frei"-"The city air makes you free."
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there are some striking similarities in the way in which this shift has manifested
itself in widely differing societies. We look first to the rise of bargain.

II.

THE RISE OF BARGAIN

Bargain begins with the transaction of barter, in which the parties bargain
for the immediate exchange of goods on both sides. Barter does not involve
promise, because neither party's performance is deferred so that there is no
commitment to perform in the future. It does, however, involve both exchange
and bargain. That these two concepts are not universally admired among
human kind may be seen from those cooperative societies such as the Zuni,
who rely on neither exchange nor bargain. The aversion of primitive peoples
to bargain and their tendency to revert to status, even in a commercial setting,
is further suggested by two examples from Africa. Where a Barotse, of Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia), barters regularly with an outsider they become
"friends" and then perhaps ''bloodbrothers," so that what begins as a trading
relationship is converted to one of quasi-kinship. 28 "Thereafter they do not
barter item for item, but they are under a general obligation to help each other
and to outdo each other in generosity, rather than to seek a good bargain." 20
And among the Sebei of Uganda, the parties to a particular type of cattle
exchange become "cattle-kin" and "acquire, besides the economic connection,
a social relationship that required mutual obligations with respect to their
interpersonal behavior."30 Nonetheless, the concepts of bargain and exchange,
as manifested in barter, are widespread and even the highly individualistic
Ammassalik are reported to "swap" everything from bone darts to wives in
much the same informal way as small boys do with picture cards, marbles a11d
knives. 31
When a society comes to regard a particular form of wealth as a medium
of exchange, that is to say as "money" or "currency," it may engage in what
we may call "cash" or "present sale," the present exchange of goods for an
amount of money that has been bargained for, as in Illustration 1. But although money has been substituted for goods on one side of the transaction,
its essence remains the same-there is exchange and bargain, but nothing
resembling promise.
Even where the seller is held responsible for the quality of his goods after
their delivery to the buyer, promise is not necessarily involved. With respect
to the extent of the seller's responsibility, primitive man may be credited with
a higher sense of obligation than his more modern counterpart. The Barotse,
we are told, see the sale "as involving the highest good faith, like transactions
28. M.

GLUCKMAN,

s1epra note 16, at 14, 49.

29. M. GLUCKMAN, THE IDEAS IN BAROTSE JURISPRUDENCE 174 (1965),

30. w. GoLDSCHMIDT, SEBEI LAW 192-93 (1967).
31. Mirsky, siepra note 13, at 60-61 (1937).
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among kinsmen,"32 and even if an animal dies some time after its sale, the
buyer may claim a refund of the price on the ground that there was, in effect,
a latent defect.33 But the Barotse do not see this as a consequence of a voluntary
undertaking by the seller, for "fraud and even innocent mistake are not treated
as a breach of agreement but as taking or spoiling a man's property,"34 which
in the case of fraud is treated as theft. The germ of promissory liability is not
to be found here; it is to be found instead in the rise of credit.

III.

THE RISE OF CREDIT

Credit comes when a need emerges for an exchange, like that in Illustration 2, in which only one party performs immediately while the other's
performance is to take place in the future. Among a people accustomed to
reliance on strong ties of kinship and affinity, credit may be slow in developing.
Within the circle of kin and affines, tradition may compel sharing rather
than exchange; outside of that circle, the trust in the other party, so necessary
for the granting of credit, may be lacking.
In some societies credit never becomes significant. According to Pollock,
"The law of contract holds anything but a conspicuous place among the institutions of English law before the Norman Conquest. . . . Anglo-Saxon society
barely knew what credit was . . . ."35 According to Karl Llewellyn and E.
Adamson Hoebel, practice among the Cheyenne Indians "shows relatively little
of that side of contract which looks to engaging for the :future...." 36 In other
societies its development is limited. Barend ter Haar has explained how the
Indonesian concept of magico-religious bond between a man and his land
precludes transactions in land except where "all disturbance of the normal
equilibrium is avoided by a simultaneous transfer of something equivalent on
the part of the receiving unit,"37 although other credit transactions flourish.
How, then, did credit begin?
One 0£ the most ancient instances of credit arose out of the blood feud.
The Germanic and Anglo-Saxon peoples provide a prototype.38 Where a
32. M. GLUCKMAN, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS AMONG THE BAROTSE OF NORTHERN
RHODESIA 443 (2d ed. 1967). In Gluckman's view, law must stress obligation rather than
right in handling disputes among kin in a tribal system in order to preserve already
strained relationships. M. GLUCKMAN, THE !DEAS IN BAROTSE JURISPRUDENCE 199 (1965).
That the buyer's rights were extensive in our early law too, see Hamilton, The Ancient
Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 YALE L.J. 1133 (1931).
33. M. GLUCKMAN, THE !DEAS IN BAROTSE JURISPRUDENCE 177, 189, 195 (1965).
34. Id. at 177 (1965). See also M. GLUCKMAN, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS AMONG THE
BAROTSE OF NORTHERN RHODESIA 442 (2d ed. 1967).
35. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 184 (2d ed. 1899).
36. K. LLEWELLYN & E. A. HoEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY 237 (1941).
37. B. TERHAAR, ADAT LAW IN INDONESIA 105 (Eng. Trans. 1948).
38. See generally, 2 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGUSH LAW 83-85 (4th ed.
1936) ; F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, sitpra note 35; 2 F. POLLOCK AND F. MAITLAND, THE
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 184-89 (2d ed. 1906); Hazeltine, The Formal Contract of
Early English Law, 10 CoLuM. L. REv. 608 (1910). The practice of composition to settle
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murderer, in order to buy off the vengeance of his victim's kinsmen, was
required to pay a larger wergild than he could immediately raise, he was
allowed to pay in instalments by giving security, which was forfeited if he did
not pay. Because of the strength of the ties of a family and friendship, primitive
man has generally preferred the security of persons to the security of property.39 Thus the security at first took the form of hostages, and only later
could goods of substantial value be substituted. Max Weber supposed that this
giving of security, which enabled the creditor to enforce the debt by self-help,
was designed to prevent the even more drastic self-help that might have
been required to enforce an unsecured debt. 40
Gradually the furnishing of hostages was replaced by the furnishing of
sureties who assumed personal liability to the creditor, and the pledge of
goods of substantial value gave way to the pledge of something of trifling
value. This formal procedure, involving a symbolic pledge and the furnishing
of sureties, came to be used not only for the settlement of feuds, but also in
legal proceedings ( an undertaking to appear in court, to furnish proof, to
satisfy judgment) and in engagements to marry. So strong was the underlying
notion of forfeiture, that originally it was not the debtor but the hostage or
surety who was regarded as liable to the creditor, with the debtor liable in
turn to the hostage or surety. Only when the debtor was allowed to be his
own hostage or surety did the liability come to be seen as one from the debtor
directly to the creditor. The debtor might then furnish no sureties, and the
traditional formalities began to be supplanted by others, including the spoken
pledge of faith and the proffering of the right hand. In Germanic custom it was
essential that the formalities be not only capable of being seen and heard, but
be actually seen and heard by witnesses. These formalities were not, however,
regarded as creating a fresh obligation by virtue of promise, but rather as confirming a liability which preceded them. The thread of development of these
formalities in Roman and early English law will be picked up shortly. But first
we must see how credit came to be used together with exchange arrived at by
way of bargain in a commercial setting. This step came with the transaction
of loan.
a grievance appears to be widespread in primitive societies. Sec, e.g., E. A. HoEDEL, THE
POLITICAL ORGANIZATION AND LAW OF THE COMANCHE !NDIANS 125 (1940).
To facilitate settlement, the state published a schedule of payments for various injuries.
An example from the laws of Ethelbert, of about 600 A.D., reads: "For each of the
four front teeth, VI shillings ; for each tooth which stands next to them, IV shillings,
for that which stands ne.;;:t to that, III shillings; and then afterwards, for each a shilling."
Quoted inc. McCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES 22 (1935).
39. The Romans, particularly in early times, are said to have preferred surety to
pledge, partly because of the solidarity of social groups. W.W. BucKLAND, ROMAN LAW
AND COMMON LAW: A COMPARISON IN OuTLlNE 324-25 (2d ed. by F. H. Lawson 1965).
40. M. WEBER, ON LAW IN EcoNOMY AND SOCIETY 116 (Rheinstein ed. 1954). It is
said that "originally hostages were delivered bound, and the whole terminology of the
law of obligations preserves the memory of this starting point." Pound, The Role of the
Will iii Law, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 {1954).
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Because of those same ties of kinship and affinity that generally impeded
the rise of credit, the loan, if it does arise, often appears first as a secured
loan, with a pattern of security very similar to that used for the wergild.
Paul Bohannan found the unsecured loan to be rare among the Tiv of
Northern Nigeria. Because of the tradition of sharing, one does not lend to
close kinsmen, "one gives to them" ; and because of lack of trust, one does
not lend to others, "one pawns to them."41 Furthermore, the commercial incentive to make the loan is often lacking, since some primitive peoples look down
on the taking of interest.42 Nevertheless, when special needs for credit occur,
the loan arises to meet them. Max Gluckman tells how in Africa a family may
require a loan in order to pay the bride-piece for one of its members, and in
order to meet such emergencies land is pledged or an individual is pawned
into "debt-slavery," being permitted to work off the debt.43 The loan may be
for use, and contemplate the return of the goods loaned, perhaps with an
additional payment for compensation. Or it may be for consumption, and
contemplate repayment by other goods, perhaps of greater value.
From the loan transaction, it is but a short step to the credit-barter or
the credit-sale, in which, as in Illustration 2, performance on one side is deferred, one party merely promising while the other actually performs. So
among the Tswana of Botswana, Isaac Shapera reports, a man might take an
ox for slaughter, or rafters or thatch for a hut, or some other commodity,
promising to replace it or to pay an equivalent price.44 In ancient times, the
Assyrians and Babylonians used two tablets to represent the credit-sale, one
for the sale and the other for the loan that made the sale possible. "Lacking
both money and writing, the Barotse had not achieved this sophistication,
though in discussing cases arising out of this kind of transaction they speak
of it as they do of a straightforward loan."45
From the delivery of goods on credit, it is but another step to the furnishing of services on credit. Exchanges involving services come when specialization of function in a society generates a demand for services. And since
services usually take time for their performance, while payment can be made
instantaneously, an exchange of services for payment cannot ordinarily be
made simultaneously. One party must look to the future and rely on the
other's credit.
41. P. BOHANNAN, JUSTICE AND JUDGMENT AMONG THE TIV 107 (1957).
42. I. ScHAPERA, A HANDBOOK OF TSWANA LAW AND CusTOM 245 (1938). Among
the Kapauku Papuans a promise to pay interest gave rise to a moral obligation, but not a
legal one. L. PosPisrr., KAPAUKU PAPUANS AND THEIR LAW 129-30 (1958). And, of
course, the early Christian Church disapproved of interest. But for examples of high
interest rates among some primitive peoples, see M. HERSKOVITS, EcoNOMIC ANTHROPOLOGY 228-29 (1952); E. S. HAYDON, LAW AND JUSTICE IN BUGANDA 237 (1960).
43. M. GLUCKMAN, supra note 16, at 74.
44. I. ScHAPERA, supra note 42, at 242.
45. M. GLUCKMAN, THE IDEAS IN BAROTSE JURISPRUDENCE 178 (1965).
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Illustration 4. Owner promises to pay Builder $10,000 if Builder
does specified work on his house. Builder does the work.
Illustration 5. Builder promises to do specified work on Owner's
house if Owner pays him $10,000. Owner pays him $10,000.
Among the earliest specialties to give rise to a demand for services is
"doctoring" or witchcraft by medicine men, shamen and sorcerers. 40 A more
important sort of service, at least among pastoral peoples, is caring for
animals. Bohannan recounts how the Tiv have perfected the practice of
"releasing" their goats to caretakers. To have them at home exposes them
to the claims of his kinsmen, while by widespread releasing one can say with
truth that all the goats in one's compound belong to someone else. The caretaker receives one kid in three as his compensation. 47 Other societies, for less
devious reasons, have developed comparable practices to provide for the care
of livestock. Among the Tswana, for example, a chief may entrust his cattle
to the care of the poor or of prominent commoners and their followers.
Similarly, one man may hire another to do special work, such as building or
roofing a hut, clearing a field or digging a well. 48
But the idea of loan still left man short of a conception of promise, for
the duty to which the loan gives rise is not generally regarded by primitive
societies as arising out of the debtor's word. To the primitive mind the debt
is recoverable, not because the debtor has promised to repay it, but because
he has received goods which, although they are in his custody, are still regarded as belonging to the creditor. Uuder this view, a breach by the debtor
is not a failure to perform a promise but a wrong with respect to property.
Frederick William Maitland spoke of "the vast gulf which to our minds
divide the 'Give me what I own' and 'Give me what I am owed/ " 40 and
according to Holmes, debts were not originally conceived of "as raised by a
promise," but "were a 'duty' springing from the defendant's receipt of property."50 Bohannan reports that among the Tiv the relationship between pledgor
and pledgee is not seen in terms of promise but in terms of debt.G1 Gluckman
confirms that this is equally true among the Barotse, whose concentration "on
the material elements involved in contract ... leads them to think of all contracts as involving debts . . . , and of their main remedy in terms of restitu46. There is a discussion of this type of transaction in E. A. HoEBEL, sttpra note 38,
at 125-28. See also I. SCHAPERA, supra note 42, at 256; I. SCHAPERA, THE BANTUSPEAKING TRIBES OF SouTH AFRICA 201-02 (1956). Among the earliest cases of contracts
for services in English law is one in 1360 arising out of a suit by a surgeon for curing an
arm. 2 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 38, at 388 n.5 (4th ed. 1936).
47. P. BOHANNAN, supra note 41, at 21.
48. I. ScHAPERA, supra note 46, at 248, 254. See also W. GOLDSCHMIDT, supra note 30,
at 207-14.
49. F. W. MAITLAND, THE FoRMs OF AcTION AT Co11t::110N LAw 38 (1936).
50. 0. W. Hou.rns, JR., supra note 2, at 264.
51. P. BOHANNAN, supra note 41, at 111-12.
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tion." 02 Indeed, according to Pollock, in English law " [t] he creditor sued to
recover money for centuries after the Norman Conquest, in exactly the same
form which he would have used to demand possession of land . . . . [T]he
foundation of the plaintiff's right was not bargain or promise, but the unjust
detention by the defendant of the plaintiff's money or goods." 53 Modem man
displays the same conception of the transaction when he refers to "his money"
in the bank, rather than the obligation that the bank owes him.
The same view carries over to transactions related to the loan, such as
those in Illustrations 2, 4, and 5, which are also seen only as giving rise to
debts, not to promises. Gluckman says that the Barotse, in discussing cases
arising out of credit-barter, "speak of it as they do of a straightforward loan:
it establishes a debt." 54 Similarly, where services are involved, "even when
servants sue their masters for their wages [ the Barotse] tend to argue not in
terms of the agreement to pay them wages but in terms of what has accrued
from their work, as if they have proprietary rights in this product, which the
employer has filched." 0 5
Gluckman gives some illuminating examples of the consequences of this
view of debt among the Barotse. If a man orders an article, such as a dugout,
to be made for him, he has an enforceable claim only if he has paid for it : if the
article has been made, he can recover it, and if it has not been made, he can
recover what he has paid. But if he has paid nothing, he has no remedy.
Similarly, if a man arranges to transfer goods in exchange for other goods,
he can claim the other goods if he has performed his part of the bargain. But if
he has not transferred his goods to the other party, he has no claim. There
must, in short, be some transfer of goods in order to create rights and obligations, 06 a requirement that Max Weber maintained was generally characteristic
of primitive societies in which legal thought was concerned only with wrongs,
such as misdeeds against goods, and not with intangible phenomena like
simple promises. 67 Gluckman notes Maine's statement that "a Contract was
long regarded as an incomplete Conveyance." 58
Since under this view credit is not seen as involving promise, there is
still no room for the exchange of promise for promise, as in Illustration 3, in
which performance on both sides is deferred and there is no immediate deliverance of property or performance of services. Concepb.tally, the sanctioning of a
52. M. GLUCKMAN, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS AMONG THE BAROTSE 442 (2d ed. 1967).
53. Pollock, Contract, in 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 35, 36 (11th ed. 1910).
54. M. GLUCKMAN, THE !DEAS IN BAROTSE JURISPRUDENCE 178 (1965).
SS. Id. at 194.
56. Id. at 180-82. Goldschmidt says that among the Sebei, "a man cannot take action
against another for withdrawal from a promise to perform provided that restitution of
the original consideration is made. W. GOLDSCHMIDT, siipra note 30, at 188.
57. M. WEBER, siipra note 40, at 120.
58. H. MAINE, supra note 24, at 321, quoted in M. GLUCKMAN, siipra note 54, at 183.
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purely consensual transaction consisting merely of the exchange of simple
promises requires a level of abstraction greater than that required for the recognition of either a formal acknowledgment of liability coupled with perceptible
ceremony, or a liability based on a debt arising out of a discernable return
performance. And practically, unless there is a market on which prices fluctuate, there is little economic need for parties to arrange for such an exchange
to take place in the future at a price fixed at present. If, in Illustration 3,
Seller should fail to deliver the lumber at the end of 30 days, Buyer will be
obliged to buy substitute lumber. But if he can still do so at the contract price
of $5,000, his loss is only the inconvenience of arranging the substitute transaction and the economic importance of the agreement to him is minimal. If,
however, the price of lumber has risen so that he must pay, say, $5,500 at the
later date, his loss will be increased by $500 and the economic importance of
the agreement to him will be at least that amount. Buyer's expectation is
that the transaction will protect him against such an adverse change in the
market. Because of the absence of such a market it is not surprising that,
according to Gluckman, such transactions in which there has been no performance on either side are not recognized in Barotse jurisprudence, and that
this appears to be true of Africa as a whole 59 and of primitive societies in
general. 60
Credit has developed, but the rise of promise considered as promise is
yet to come.

IV.

THE RISE OF PROMISE

The notion that a promise itself gives rise to a duty was an achievement
of Roman law. It came, however, through the development of a series of
exceptions rather than through the establishment of a general principle of
enforceability of promises. 61 The maxim evolved in Roman law that a naked
pact ( nudum pactum) did not beget an action. Although an agreement might
have moral efficacy, it was not legally enforceable unless it fell within a
limited number of categories that the law came to treat as exceptions to this
general rule. The story of the rise of promise in Roman law is the account
of the growth of these categories.
One of these categories, established in very early times, turned on formalities. A party could bind himself by a promise known as a "stipulation"
( stipulatio) if he observed the prescribed form of question and answer. The
59. M. GLUCKMAN, THE IDEAS IN BAROTSE JURISPRUDENCE 179-82 (1965). B11t sec
E. S. HAYDON, supra note 42, at 232 for an example of a bilateral contract for the sale
of goods said to be binding upon a mere handshake.
60. A. s. DIAMOND, PRIMITIVE LAW 401 (1950); w. SEAGLE, THE QUEST FOR LAW
256-57 (1941).
61. On contracts in Roman law, see generally F. H. LAWSON, A Co11tMON LAWYER
LooKs AT THE CIVIL LAw 113-37 (1955); W.W. BucKLAND, A TEXT-BooK OF RoMAN
LAW FROM AUGUSTUS TO JUSTINIAN chs. 10, 11 (2d ed. 1932).
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terms of the promise were framed not by the promisor but by the promisee,
who was then required to put them to the promisor in his presence as a
solemn question, typically asking "Spondesne?" ("Do you undertake?") to
which the promisor was to respond "Spondeo." ( "I undertake"). Although
the historical origins of the stipulation are uncertain, the most probable view
is that it arose in the procedural obligations undertaken in legal proceedings
which, as we have seen, are among the earliest forms of promise to have arisen
in many primitive societies.62 Although the participation of both parties was
needed, only one party was bound, and for this reason the stipulation was not
by nature well suited to bargains that resulted in an exchange of promises, as
in Illustration 3, where a pair of reciprocal stipulations would have been
required.
Nor could such transactions be brought within the category of "real"
contracts, another of the earliest types of enforceable agreements to be recognized in Roman law. Real contracts were those in which the handing over
of the subject matter made the promise binding. They were of four types, the
loan for consumption (the oldest of the four), the loan for use, the gratuitous
deposit, and the pledge. But the responsibility of the recipient under each
of these real contracts could be as easily viewed as arising out of debt as out of
promise. And since the validity of the contract depended upon delivery by
one of the parties, it was not adaptable to transactions, such as that in Illustration 3, where there was a simple exchange of promises with no performance on
either side.
To meet the need for a legal basis for such exchanges there evolved the
"consensual" contracts, in which the mere agreement of the parties was
binding. They differed from the stipulation in that they lacked its formalities,
for no particular form of words was required, and they could even be made
by correspondence. They differed from the real contracts in that agreement
alone without delivery sufficed to make them binding on both parties. But in
keeping with the pattern of evolution through the growth of exceptions, they
were limited to four types of commercially important contracts : 'Sale, hire,
partnership, and mandate. They did, however, include the specific transaction
of sale in Illustration 3. As F. H. Lawson put it:
It is as if the Roman jurists of about 100 B.C. had said "Go where
you will, you will find that almost everything [that men do in business] can be reduced to four processes : ( 1) shifting goods permanently from one man's estate to another for a money price; (2)
placing one person's property or services temporarily at the disposal
of another for a consideration usually in money; (3) the pooling of
property, skill, or experience by several persons for a common purpose; and ( 4) the gratuitous performance of a task by one person on
62. W. W. BucKLAND, S1tpra note 61, at 434. Even today, carefully worded clauses in
formal agreements are sometimes termed "stipulations" in this country.
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the instructions of another. Moreover the secure and rapid flow of
business requires that we should think of the relations implied in
these processes as commencing not from acts but from promises to
act."63
In contrast to the stipulation, in which the promisor was held only to
the obligation expressed in the question that had been put to him, the consensual contracts were regarded as imposing upon each party an obligation
to perform in "good faith." To implement this general obligation, the Roman
jurists formulated more precise sets of obligations that were then imposed
on the parties to the various consensual contracts. But with this accomplishment Roman jurists contented themselves and did not develop a general
basis for the enforcement of promises.
The furthest that the Romans went was the recognition, by the time
of Justinian in the sixth century, of the "innominate" contracts. These were
agreements under which one party promised to give or do something in exchange for a similar promise by the other party. They were severely limited,
however, because they were binding only when one of the parties had completed performance, and until that event either party could escape liability.
Nevertheless, they differed from both the real and consensual contracts in
that they were not confined to specified classes of transactions, and were
hence "innominate." Moreover, they differed from the real contracts in that
the enforceability of the promise turned on something by way of performance
given in exchange and called a quid pro quo. But neither the innominate nor
any of the other enforceable contracts resulted in the development of a general
basis for the enforcement of promises that would include a promise made in
exchange for another promise, where there had been no formalities and no
return performance.

v.

THE RISE OF A GENERAL BASIS OF ENFORCEMENT

The human mind is slow to generalize, and Roman law, having inherited
the tendency of primitive societies to view each type of transaction as a
distinct complex of rights, never fully rid itself of this proclivity. The development of a general basis for the enforcement of promises-a general theory of
contract, if you will-was therefore left to the great modern legal systems
that arose in Europe during the Middle Ages; the common law system that
grew up in England and the civil law systems that emerged on the Continent. 04
63. F. H. LAWSON, supra note 61, at 127.
64. For a brief discussion of its development in the civil law systems on the Continent,
see F. H. LAWSON, A COMMON LAWYER LooKs AT THE CML LAW ch. 4 (1955), The
following discussion of the common law development is based on C. H. S. FIFOOT,
HISTORY AND SOURCES OF THE COMMON LAW: TORT AND CONTRACT pt. 2 (1949);
HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 82-87 (4th ed.1936); 3
HoLDSWORTlI,
2
A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW ch. 3 (4th ed. 1935); 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND1 THE
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw ch. 5 (2d ed. 1899); Ames, Parol Co11lracls Prior to

w.

w.
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Curiously, the common law began at a less advanced stage than that
attained by Roman law. Roman concepts of contract were known in England
in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. But although they inspired the comparable evolution of a general theory of contract in the civil law systems of
the Continent, they exercised no significant influence on the common law.
The common law was thus able to chart its own peculiar course in the direction of a general basis for the enforcement of promises. As explained by
Pollock, "Ideas assumed as fundamental by this branch of law in modern
times and so familiar to modern lawyers as apparently to need no explanation
had perished in the general breaking up of the Roman system, and had to be
painfully reconstructed in the middle ages." 65
No legal system devised by man has even been reckless enough to make
all promises enforceable. In Morris Cohen's words:
It is indeed very doubtful whether there are many who would prefer
to live in an entirely rigid world in which one would be obliged to
keep all one's promises instead of the present more viable system, in
which a vaguely fair proportion is sufficient. Many of us indeed would
shudder at the idea of being bound by every promise, no matter how
foolish, without any chance of letting increased wisdom undo past
foolishness. Certainly, some freedom to change one's mind is necessary for free intercourse between those who lack omniscience. 66
But in framing a general tl}eory for the enforcement of promises, this goal
can be approached from two extremes. One can begin with the premise that
promises are generally enforceable and then create exceptions for promises
which it is thought undesirable to enforce. Or one can begin with the premise
that promises are generally unenforceable and then create exceptions for
promises which it is thought desirable to enforce. In the centuries following
the Conquest in England, both views had substantial support.
The former view, which laid emphasis on the force of the promise itself,
was held by the canon law, the law merchant, and equity. As for the canon
law, already in the twelfth century the Church allowed a Christian to pawn
his salvation, regarded a promise made with a pledge of faith as enforceable
and its breach as a mortal sin, and was moving toward the view that even a
simple promise, without a pledge of faith, was sacred and therefore enforceable.
As for the law merchant, the fair and market courts entertained numerous
actions, as commerce required, upon simple promises made by merchants.
And as for equity, the Chancellor held the view that the law of man must
accord with the law of God and, in his own words in the fifteenth century,
Assmnpsit, 8 HARV. L. REv. 252 (1894) ; Ames, The History of Assumpsit, 2 HARV.
L. REv. 1, 53 (1888); Hazeltine, The Formal Contract of Early English Law, 10
COLUM. L. REv. 608 (1910).
65. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, S1tPra note 64, at 184.
66. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REv. 553, 573 (1932).
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because a man was "damaged by the non-performance of the promise, he
shall have a remedy."67
The view that promises are not generally enforceable, which started from
the premise of Roman law that a mere agreement did not beget an action, was
held by the common law. Its choice was scarcely surprising. It accorded well
with the procedural niceties of common law courts, where recovery was not to
be had unless the claim could be fitted within one of the established forms of
action; and it suited the status-oriented society of the Middle Ages, which
was anything but conducive to the flowering of promise. Furthermore, there
was no great pressure for enforceability as contracts were not a significant
part of the business of the common law courts. At the end of the twelfth
century Ranulf de Glanville apologized for the scant treatment of the subject
in his treatise on English common law with the remark that "it is not the
custom of the court of the lord King to protect private agreements, nor does
it even concern itself with such contracts as can be considered to be like
private agreements."68
Nonetheless, it was the common law view that was ultimately to prevail.
It achieved its success less on its intrinsic merits than as a by-product of
the victories of the common law courts in their jurisdictional struggles with
their competitors. As for the canon law, through the Constitutions of Clarendon
of 1164, born of the quarrel between Henry II and Thomas a Becket, the
common law courts were able to deprive the Church of its jurisdiction over
breach of faith in temporal matters and to snuff out the attempts of the eccle~
siastical courts to implement their view that promises were in themselves
sacred. As for the law merchant, by the sixteenth century the common law
courts had begun their successful attempt to wrest jurisdiction from the com~
mercial courts and to stifle the view that simple promises made in commerce
should be enforced.09 And as for equity, although it alone among the three
competing jurisdictions was to survive the jurisdictional ambitions of the
common law courts, the Chancellor hesitated to intervene unless the common
law was wanting. It is a tribute to the ingenuity and flexibility of the common
law judges that they succeeded in moving fast enough to stay the Chancellor's
hand so that credit for the development of the general basis for the enforce~
ment of promises that we know today was theirs and theirs alone. The challenge
that faced them was to work within the framework of the forms of action, first
67. Anon. (1468) Y. B. Pasch. 8 Edw. 4 at £. 4, pl. 11, C. H. S. Fifoot, s11J,ra note
64, at 304.
68. R DE GLANVILLE, THE TREATISE ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF THE REALM
OF ENGLAND bk. 10, ch. 18 (G. D. G. Hall ed. 1965). See also bk. 10, ch. 8.
69. Lord Mansfield attempted to revive this view in Pillans v. Van Mierop, 97 Eng.
Rep. 1035, 1038 (K.B. 1765), where he said: "A nudum pactum does not exist, in the
usage and law of merchants. • • • In commercial cases among merchants, the want of
consideration is not an objection." But the House of Lords repudiated it in Rann v.
Hughes, 101 Eng. 'Rep. 1014n (H.L. 1778).
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to develop exceptions as the Romans had done, and then to so fashion these
exceptions as ultimately to achieve what the Romans had never achieved-a
general theory of contract. This challenge was met by the common law courts
in the course of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. "Surely," wrote James
Barr Ames, "it would be hard to find a better illustration of the flexibility and
power of self-development of the Common Law." 70 The achievement was all
the more remarkable in view of the fact that when _this development began, the
English law of contracts was little more advanced than that of many primitive
societies. How was it brought about?
One possible vehicle for this development might have been the formal
acknowledgment of liability that had early been the basis for the Roman
stipulation and that had its ancient origins in the Germanic and Anglo-Saxon
blood feuds. Out of this there grew up in England the common law action of
covenant, which appeared near the end of the twelfth century, and which,
had the trend been toward relaxation of formalities, might have served as the
basis of a general contractual remedy. This possibility was foreclosed, however,
when by the end of the following century the formality of the action was increased by the requirement that it be predicated on a writing under seal. With
this turn of events, any hope that covenant might serve as a general ground
for contractual liability vanished, since a sealed writing was little better suited
to an informal exchange of promises than the Roman stipulation had been.
Another possible avenue of evolution might have been through the concept of loan, familiar to most primitive societies. Out of this, by the end of the
twelfth century, had grown the action of debt, under which "the defendant
was conceived of as having in his possession something belonging to the
plaintiff which he might not rightfully keep, but ought to surrender." 71 He
was liable not because he had promised but because he had received a benefit
which he should be required to disgorge. Following this rationale, the action
of debt was broadened to allow recovery for personal services, where performance of the services was treated as analogous to delivery of a chattel. Finally,
the action came to be recognized as available to anyone who had conferred a
substantial benefit-called a quid pro quo in imitation of the Romans-against
the one who had received it.
Illustration 6. Builder promises to do specified work on Owner's
house in return for which Owner pays him $10,000. After receiving
the payment, Builder fails to do the work.
70. Ames, The History of Assumpsit, 2 HARV. L. REv. 53, 69 (1888). On equitable
jurisdiction in contract during this period, see W. Barbour, The History of Contract i11
Early English Equity, in 4 OXFORD STUDIES IN SocIAL AND LEGAL HISTORY 150-68
(P. Vinogradoff ed. 1914).
71, Ames, Parol Contracts Prior to Asszmipsit, 8 HARv. L. REv. 252, 260 (1894).
The actions of detinue (which was originally part of debt until it emerged from this earlier
composite form in the course of the thirteenth century) and of account will not be discussed here. Like debt, they too required performance by one of the parties.
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In this situation the action of debt was adequate to allow Owner to recover
from Builder. Since the promisor had unjustly received a benefit and the
promisee had unjustly sustained a detriment, usually identical with the bene·
fit, the result was both to prevent the unjust enrichment of the promisor and
redress the detriment suffered by the promisee. Lon Fuller and William
Perdue have styled the interest that is here protected the "restitution in·
terest." 72 But since it was clear that the benefit must have been actually conferred, and that a mere promise to confer it would not suffice, it was no better
suited than the innominate contracts of Roman law to the enforcement of a
mere exchange of promises, such as that in Illustration 3, under which there
had been no performance. Moreover, it carried with it the further inconvenience that the defendant might, in the case of a simple debt not under seal,
"wage his law," that is, undertake to deny the debt by an oath with oath·
helpers. How was the common law to break out of this mold ?78
The common law courts found the answer in the law of torts. They had
already recognized that liability in tort arose when a person undertook
(assmnpsit) to perform a duty and then performed it in such a way as to cause
harm. Suit could be brought on the special variety of trespass on the case that
came to be known as assumpsit. At the beginning of the fifteenth century it was
available only where there had been misfeasance in performance of the undertaking. This example was given in 1436: "If a carpenter makes a covenant
with me to make me a house good and strong and of a certain form, and he
makes me a house which is weak and bad and of another form, I shall have an
action 0£ trespass on my case." 74 In such cases of misfeasance it was not hard
to justify liability in tort. But might not the same remedy lie when there had
merely been nonfeasance, a failure to perform the undertaking? At first the
answer was no. In 1410 it was said: "Certainly it would lie [if the carpenter
had built the house badly], because he would then answer for the wrong which
he had done, but when a man makes a covenant and does nothing under that
covenant, how can you have an action against him without a deed ?" 76
Nevertheless, by the second half of the fifteenth century there was a growing tendency among the common law judges to make the first major extension
in the action of assumpsit by enforcing such promises even where there had
72. Fuller and Perdue, The Reliance faterest i,i Co11tract Damages: 1, 46 YALE L.J.
52, 53 (1936). The amount of recovery in debt at common law was not, however, limited
to the value of the benefit conferred, but could be any definite amount of moner. or goods
that the debtor had promised to pay. Ames, Parol Co11tracts Prior to Ass11111psit, 8 HARV,
L. REv. 252, 260 (1894). See also T. PLUCKNETT, A CoNcISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON
LAW 363 n.1 (5th ed. 1956).
73. The common law was able to surmount this difficulty, within the confines of the
action in debt, to the limited extent that a seller of goods was, by the latter part of the
fifteenth century, allowed to sue in debt although he had only promised to deliver and no
delivery had taken place. See 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, sitPra note 64, at 355-57; Ames, Parol
Co11tracts Prior to AssumPsit 8 HARV. L. R.Ev. 252, 258-59 (1894).
74. Y.B. 14 Hy. VI, at hs, 3 W. HoLDSWORTH, sitPra note 38, at 430.
75. Y.B. Mich. 11 Hy. IV, pl. 60, 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, s11pra note 38, at 433-34.
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been only nonfeasance. This inclination was encouraged by the fear that if
they did not do so the Chancellor would. But some limits had to be placed on
what promises would be enforced, for the judges were not about to allow
"that one shall have trespass for any breach of covenant in the world." 76 The
courts were therefore forced to find a test to distinguish instances where nonfeasance was actionable from those where it was not. Since the misfeasance
cases that had originally given rise to the action in assumpsit were characterized by a detriment incurred by the promisee in reliance on the promise,
it was natural to formulate an analogous test and to allow enforcement where
the promisee had changed his position on the faith of the promise, and had
been consequently damaged by its nonperformance.
Illustration 7. Builder promises to do specified work on Owner's
house in return for which Owner promises to pay $10,000 on its completion. In reliance on Builder's promise, Owner rents another house
and moves into it to permit Builder to do the work. Builder fails to do
the work.

Here the law's justification in protecting Owner is based on the detriment
sustained by him through his reliance on the promise, not on any benefit
received by Builder, and is less clear than in Illustration 6. To the extent
that the promisee has incurred expenditures in preparing for performance, or
has suffered loss by foregoing other opportunities, without conferring any
benefit upon the promisor, the broken promise has resulted in a waste that
cannot be undone by a simple reversal as in the case of recognition of the
restitution interest. Nevertheless, in a society that depends upon promises
for cooperation, there is justification in protecting those who rely on promises
by placing the cost of the waste occasioned by broken promises on those that
break them through requiring the party in breach to compensate the injured
party in an amount sufficient to put him in as good a position as he would
have been in had the promise never been made. This interest is called the
"reliance interest" by Fuller and Perdue. 77 But since some action in reliance
on the promise was required, this first major extension of the action of
assumpsit did not make a mere exchange of promises, without more, enforceable.
As the sixteenth century drew to a close, however, the common law
courts, conscious of the expanding jurisdiction of Chancery and anxious to
preserve their own powers, made a second major extension of the action of
assumpsit. Thus it was held that a party who had given only a promise in
76. Y.B. Hil. 3 Hy. VI, pl. 33, 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, siipra note 38 at 435.
77. Fuller and Perdue, supra note 72, at 54. "[I]n the early stages of its growth the
action of assumpsit was clearly dominated by the reliance interest, so much so that Ames
assumed, even in the absence of cases in point, that recovery in assumpsit must originally
have been limited to compensation for change of position." Id. at 68. But see Washington,
Damages iii Contract at Common Law, 47 L.Q. REv. 345, 371-79 (1959).
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exchange for the other's promise had, nonetheless, suffered a detriment by
having his freedom of action fettered, since he was in turn bound by his own
promise.
Illustration 8. Builder promises to do specified work on Owner's
house in return for which Owner promises to pay $10,000 on completion. Before Owner has done anything in reliance on Builder's promise, Builder repudiates the bargain.

The reasoning was, of course, circular, since the detriment to the promisee,
in this case the Owner, assumed that he was bound by his own promise, for
which only a promise had in turn been given. Nevertheless, by the end of
the sixteenth century the common law courts were enforcing exchanges of
promise, as in Illustration 8, where nothing had been done on either side.78
Since the promisee had neither conferred a benefit upon the promisor nor
incurred any detriment in reliance on the promisor's promise, it may seem
questionable that the law was justified in protecting the promisee by requiring
the promisor to compensate him for his disappointed expectations-that is to
say, for the advantages that he would have received had the promise been performed. Pound maintained that :
In a developed economic order the claim to promised advantages is
one of the most important of the individual interests that press for
recognition. If it is a task of the legal order to secure reasonable individual expectations· so far as they may be harmonized with the
least friction and waste, in an economic order those arising from
promises have a chief place.... It is a presupposition of the whole
economic order that promises will be kept .... The social order rests
upon stability and predictability of conduct of which keeping promises
is a large item.79

This interest of the promisee is called the "expectation interest" by Fuller
and Perdue.80
And yet why, merely because the parties have exchanged promises, should
the law protect one party's ephemeral expectation where the other attempts
to repudiate before the former has done anything in reliance on the promise?
It is doubtful that the promisee's sense of grievance and his temptation to
redress the wrong himself are strong enough to warrant enforcement of the
promise to keep tlie peace. True, our society enjoys a sophisticated market
economy, in which prices fluctuate and the expectation created by a promise
to perform in the future is something of value. But this argument is also
circular since such a promise is something of value precisely because the
78. Strangborough v. Warner, 74 Eng. Rep. 686 (Q.B. 1588).
79. Pound, Individ11al Interests of S11bsta11ce-Pro111ised Adva11tages, 59 HARV. L.
REv. 1, 1-2 (1945).
80. Fuller and Perdue, s11pra note 72, at 54. The expectation interest in the case of a
sealed, as opposed to a simple, promise was of course enforced in the action of covenant
at a much earlier date.
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law does enforce it. A more convincing explanation is that offered by Fuller
and Perdue, which is, in essence, that protection of the expectation interest is
justified because it is the most effective way of protecting the reliance interest.
Agreements can accomplish little, either for their makers or for
society, unless they are made the basis for action. When business
agreements are not only made but are also acted on . . . economic
activity is generally stimulated. These advantages would be threatened by any rule which limited legal protection to the reliance
interest. Such a rule would in practice tend to discourage reliance.
The difficulties in proving reliance [especially when it consists in
foregoing other opportunities to enter contracts] and subjecting it
to pecuniary measurement are such that the business man knowing,
or sensing, that these obstacles stood in the way of judicial relief
would hesitate to rely on a promise in any case where the legal
sanction was of significance to him. To encourage reliance we must
therefore dispense with its proof. For this reason it has been found
wise to make recovery on a promise independent of reliance, both in
the sense that in some cases the promise is enforced though not relied
on ( as in the bilateral business agreement) and in the sense that
recovery is not limited to the detriment incurred in reliance. 81
They recognize that this has "a quasi-criminal aspect, its purpose being not
so much to compensate the promisee as to penalize breach of promise by
the promisor," 82 but contend that this is warranted at least with respect to
some promises. On this ground the extension of the action of assumpsit to
include the mere exchange of promises can be justified.
The action was to experience yet one more important extension. The
procedure in actions of assumpsit, in which the plaintiff was entitled to a jury
trial, was more favored by creditors than that in actions of debt, in which the
defendant could resort to wager of law. The next step in the common law's
development of the law of contract was to permit assumpsit to supplant debt.
By the middle of the sixteenth century, it had been recognized that an action
in assumpsit could be brought against a defendant who, being already indebted (indebitatus), expressly undertook (assumpsit) to pay a particular
sum. This action was called one in "indebitatus assumpsit," to distinguish it
from the older "special assumpsit." Toward the end of the century, it began_
to be held that a debt alone, without a subsequent express promise, would
support such an action. The final triumph of this view came at the beginning
of the seventeenth century in Slade's case in which, on a jury finding that
81. Fuller and Perdue, supra note 72, at 61-62. As the authors point out, "the force
of the argument will depend entirely upon the existing economic environment. It would
be most forceful in a hypothetical society in which all values were available on the
market and where all markets were 'perfect' in the economic sense. In such a society there
would be no difference behveen the reliance interest and the expectation interest. The
plaintiff's loss in foregoing to enter another contract would be identical with the expectation value ,of the contract he did make. The argument that granting the value of the
expectancy merely compensates for that loss, loses force to the extent that actual conditions depart from those of such a hypothetical society." Id. at 62.
82. Id. at 61.

598

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:576

"there was no other promise or assumption, but only the said bargain,"83 all
the judges of England resolved "that every contract executory imports in itself
an assumpsit." 84 The creditor was at last assured of the benefits of jury trial in
place of wager of law and was freed of the technicalities of pleading in debt.
Over the course of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the common
law courts had succeeded in evolving a general basis for the enforceability
of promises through the action of assumpsit. During the sixteenth century
the word "consideration," which had earlier been used without technical
significance, came to be used as a word of art to express the sum of the
conditions necessary for an action in assumpsit to lie. It was therefore a
tautology that a promise, if not under seal, was enforceable only where there
was "consideration," for this was to say no more than that it was enforceable
only under those circumstances in which the action of assumpsit was allowed.
In this fashion, however, the word "consideration" came to be applied to the
test of enforceability of a simple promise and to be used to distinguish those
promises that in the eyes of the common law were of sufficient significance
to society to justify the legal sanctions of assumpsit for their enforcement.
It was, to be sure, neither a simple nor a logical test. Bound up in it
were several elements. Most important, from the qitid pro quo of debt by way
of indebitatus assmnpsit, had come the idea that there must have been al1
exchange arrived at by way of bargain. This precept has remained at the
core of the concept of consideration down to today.Su From the same source
had come the notion that there must be a benefit to the promisor, while
from the reliance of special assumpsit came the notion that there must be a
detriment to the promisee-both notions that have proved less durable than
those of exchange and bargain. The requirement of an exchange accorded well
with what has been called the "theory of equivalents," under which an abstract
promise is enforceable only when supported by an equivalent.so And in a society
based on free enterprise it is scarcely surprising that courts declined to meddle
in the determination of equivalence, leaving that to the parties themselves. The
focus of the law was on the process by which the parties determined equivalence, with. bargain as the touchstone. The doctrine of consideration provided
no ground for the enforceability of gratuitous promises, for which nothing is
given in exchange, but it took good care of the bulk of economically vital
commercial agreements.
The Elizabethan judges, though the choice was not consciously
83. Slade's Case, 4 Co. Rep. 92 b, 76 Eng. Rep. 1074 (Q.B. 1602),
84. Id. at 1077.
85. According to the Restatement Second, "To constitute consideration, a performance
or a return promise must be bargained for," which means that "it is sought by the
promisor in exchange for his promise and is given by the promisee in exchange for that
promise." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 75 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1965).
86. See R POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 144-46 (rev.
ed. 1954).
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present to their minds, were impelled by every tradition of the common law to prefer the principle of bargain. , .. The large commercial
interests of the new age sought a general sanction not for charitable
gifts but for business enterprise. In such an environment it is not
surprising that the judges should have required some material inducement to the defendant's undertaking, 87
As a cornerstone for the law of contract, the doctrine of consideration has
been widely criticized, and it would be foolhardy to attempt to defend it
through an exercise in logic. It can be understood only in the light of its
history and of the society that produced it. Yet in view of the difficulty that
mankind the world over has had in developing any general basis at all for
enforcing promises, it is perhaps less remarkable that the common law developed a theory that is logically flawed than that it succeeded in developing any
theory at all.
EPILOGUE

Thus supported by a general theory, contract law reached its zenith in
the nineteenth century as the legal underpinning of a dynamic and expanding
free enterprise economy. It was not merely by chance that Maine's famous
dictum about the progression from "Status to Contract" was uttered in 1861.
Hurst concluded that the years from 1800 to 1875 were above all else the years
of contract in American law.ss "Contract expressed energetic self-interest.
Contract law expressed the nature of contract by insisting that men assert
their interests, push them, and fight for them, if they were to have the help
of the state."s9 "Nineteenth-century lawmaking in the United States gave its
energy more continuously and more devotedly to building, extending, and
implementing the market than to any other institution in the society. . . .
The market took on legal definition mainly in the law of contract, and quite
naturally in the temper of the time the law of contract dominated the nineteenth century legal order." 90
Philosophically, contract was supported by the will theory, which had its
hegemony during the same century. It emphasized the power of the will of
the parties, who were viewed as acting in a kind of legislative capacity, so
that the enforcement of a contract by the state merely implemented a form of
private law established by the parties.91 Morris Cohen has well stated its
underlying assumption :
87. C. H, S. FIFOOT, HISTORY AND SOURCES OF THE CoMMON LAW; TORT AND CoN398-99 (1949), For more on the early meanings of "consideration," see W. BARBOUR,
s11pra note 70, at 59-65.
88. J. W. HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH
CENTURY UNITED STATES 18 (1956).
89. J.
HURST, LAW AND EcONOMIC GROWTH: THE LEGAL HISTORY OF THE
LUMBER INDUSTRY IN WISCONSIN 1836-1915, at 301 (1964).
90. Id. at 285.
91. Fuller and Perdue, s11pra note 72, at 58.
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According to the classical view, the law of contract gives expression
tb and protects the will of the parties, for the will is something inherently worthy of respect....92 Contractualism in the law, that is,
the view that in an ideally desirable system of law all obligation
would arise only out of the will of the individual contracting freely,
rests not only on the will theory of contract but also on the political
doctrine that all restraint is evil and that the government is best which
governs least. This in turn is connected with classical economic optimism that there is a sort of pre-established harmony between the
good of all and the pursuit by each of his own selfish economic gain.93
But by the end of the century the tide in favor of contract had begun to
turn. In Hurst's words,
Throughout the enthusiastic nineteenth-century expansion of contract, two sobering strains of doctrine attested that the courts never
wholly lost sight of the fact that their enforcement of promises involved delegating the public force in aid of private decision making.
. . . By enforcing a contract, the public power supported the decisions
the agreement represented and so far inescapably shared moral responsibility for the social consequences.94
Contract simply provided opportunities for the realization of men's wants; it
did not shape those wants. 95 "The cautious sense that contract alone was not
a sufficient organizing principle for society never quite deserted us." 00
Now, in the twentieth century, the tide has been reversed. According to
Friedrich Kessler,
The individualism of our rules of contract law, of which freedom
of contract is the most powerful symbol, is closely tied up with the
ethics of free enterprise capitalism and the ideals of justice of a mobile
society of small enterprisers, individual merchants and independent
craftsmen. . . . With the decline of the free enterprise system due
to the innate trend of competitive capitalism towards monopoly, the
meaning of contract has changed radically. 97
Na than Isaacs has argued that "the question is not so much one of status and
contract as it is of a broader classification that embraces these concepts :
standardized relations and individualized relations," 98 and that in this sense
there is now a "distinct veering back to status."00
92. Cohen, s11pra note 66, at 575.
93. Id. at 558.
94. J. W. HURST, s11Pra note 88, at 11.
95. ]. W. HURST, s11pra note 89, at 297.
96. ]. W. HURST, s11pra note 88, at 76.
97. Kessler, Cqntracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43
CoLUM. L. REV. 629, 640 (1943). Furthermore, as Fuller and Perdue point out, "The
enormous growth of the corporation •.. has meant a further decrease in the importance
of contract as an organizing force, since the corporation and vertical integration tend to
substitute for an organization resting on contract one resting on the relation of superior
and inferior . • . ." FULLER & PERDUE, s11pra note 72, at 63 n.13.
98. Isaacs, The Standardizing of Contracts, 27 YALE L.J. 34, 39 (1917).
99. Id. at 40.
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Other changes have accompanied the standardization of relations that
has been caused, at least in part, by this concentration of private power. Some
of the decline in the importance of contract in achieving social purposes has
resulted from a diminution in the extent to which society's material resources_
are subject to the control of individuals. In socialist countries such as the
Soviet Union, all or at least a substantial part of productive wealth is owned
by society as a whole and the right of private property is limited largely to
consumption goods. Even in the so-called capitalist countries, possibilities for
private ownership are limited. Such limitations vary from one country to the
next. Cornelius Vanderbilt was able to amass a fortune in the United States
out of railways, because they could be privately owned ; he would have had no
such opportunity in Germany, where the railways were always publicly owned.
In contrast, the family of Thurn and Taxis became one of the most powerful
in Europe through the private ownership of a postal system ; while they would
have been denied this opportunity in the United States, where the postal
service has always been public. 100 Whatever the precise limitations, to the
extent that state ownership of a society's material resources comes to replace
private ownership, the role of contract is diminished.101
Even without assuming ownership in itself, a society may severely restrict
the freedom of the individual to contract. It may even write the contract itself,
as for example many of our states have done for contracts for fire insurance
and the federal government has done for ocean bills of lading. The French have
used the term "contractual dirigism" to refer to a regime in which the state
makes contracts for people instead of allowing the parties to make them
themselves.102 "Legal regulation is substituted for contractual regulation. The
contract is no more than the submission of the parties to an obligatory
regime."103 Short of wholesale dictation of terms, the state may use a variety
of techniques to influence private agreements. It may, for example, stipulate
particular terms with the balance left to agreement, as has been done with
life, accident and health insurance; or it may merely prohibit or refuse to
enforce particular terms, as in the case of laws fixing minimum wages or
maximum interest rates. By methods such as these, entire industries, such as
those engaged in communications, transportation, banking and insurance, have
been brought under regulation. And, at the very least the state may endeavor
to insure that those who are engaged in those areas where there is relatively
100. 1 R. ELY, PROPERTY AND CONTRACT IN THEm RELATIONS TO THE DISTRIBUTION
OF WEALTH 80-83 (1922).
101. That socialist countries do use the institution of contract for state enterprises, see
Grossfeld, Money Sanctions for Breach of Contract in a Commimist Economy, 72 YALE
L.J. 1326 (1963).
102. 2 L. JossERAND, CoURs DE DRoIT CIVIL PoSITIF FRAN!;AIS §§ 402-05 (3d ed.
1939). See also R. POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 161-63 (rev.
ed. 1954).
103. 2 M. PLANIOL, TRAITE ELEMENTAIRE DU DROIT CIVIL § 446 ( 4th ed. by G. Ripert
and J. Boulanger 1952).
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little governmental intervention ( such as sale of goods) do in fact bargain in
acceptable ways and are not so powerful as to allow coercion to substitute
itself for bargain. It may, for example, prohibit undesirable trade practices and
limit the concentration of economic power.
Most of these changes have come from the legislatures rather than the
courts. Taken together they have spawned a plethora of contracts that are
now regarded as within special fields of law that are separate and distinct
from the general law of contract. There is, for instance, the collective bargaining agreement which is regarded as within the separate province of labor law,
the insurance policy which is regarded as within the separate province of
insurance law, and even the contract for the sale of goods which is often
regarded as within the separate province of commercial law. These are
delineated from an amorphous residuum that has been left largely to the judicially developed principles of general contract law.
It was not, of course, inevitable that contracts such as the collective
bargaining agreement, the insurance policy and the contract for the sale of
goods should be considered as appropriate subjects for separate fields of law
outside of the general law of contracts. They might have been embraced
within it and considered merely as species of the genus contract. That this
did not happen was, at least in good part, the result of pedagogical circumstances.
In the first place, contract law was a parvenu as compared to such areas
as tort law or criminal law, and it did not become the subject of important
treatises until the nineteenth century.104 Contracts scholars then struggled
manfully to fashion an orderly body of doctrine from the flood of case law
that had been only a trickle two centuries before. It is scarcely surprising that
their attention focused on those generalities that were common to most
contracts rather than on those particularities that were peculiar to a few.
Samuel Williston, in the first edition of his monumental treatise on contracts
published in 1920, deplored the tendency to treat such subjects as insurance
as outside the scope of contract law, and sought to "treat the subject of
contracts as a whole, and to show the wide range of application of its
principles."105
Furthermore, since the creative forces of contract law had traditionally
been judicial rather than legislative, the tendency was to regard contract law
as essentially case law. In the accepted division of labor between judges and
legislators, it was the former who were charged with the declaration of general
principles and the latter with specialized deviations. It was thus no accident
that when in 1871 Christopher Columbus Langdell published the first of the
104. See L. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT LAW IN AMERICA: A SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
17-18 (1965).
105. S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS iii (1st ed. 1920).
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casebooks that were to revolutionize the method of law teaching, it was a
casebook on contracts.106 When the adaptations of the law to special conditions
came through legislation, contracts scholars tended to regard them as dehors
the law of contracts. This view is still reflected in the introduction to the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, which explains that it
attempts [no] comprehensive statement of the rules governing particular types of contracts, [ n] or of the impact of modern legislation
on the law of contracts.... Legislative changes in the law of contracts
are incorporated in the Restatement of this Subject only where substantially similar legislative rules have been adopted in most of the
States.... Various types of contracts are subjected to government
regulation in varying degrees of detail .... But no effort is made here
to state comprehensively the rules governing statutory obligations imposed on contracting parties regardless of their assent.107
This concentration of contracts scholars on a residual core of generalities
has occasioned some sharp criticism:
Contract law is abstraction-what is left in the law relating to agreements when all particularities of person and subject matter are
removed. . . . By definition, no revolution [in nineteenth-century
contract law] could take place because contract law acted as a residual
category, its content determined mainly by what law did in other
respects affecting economic behavior. Instead, types of transaction
marched in and out of the area of contract.108
This criticism is, of course, directed at the conception of contract law held
by contracts scholars rather than at the law itself. To the extent that they
have viewed related transactions as marching in and out of the area of
contract, they might better have disregarded the "boundaries" of the area
and devoted their time to "examining the territory on both sides."109 Happily,
the advent of the Upiform Commercial Code,11° with its emphasis on the
contracts problems arising out of the sale of goods, has provided contemporary
contracts scholars with an occasion for just this type of examination.
A related criticism goes to the supposed failure of contracts scholars to
give adequate attention to the economic and social significance of contract law.
"An exposition of 'current' contract law will typically tell nothing of the
economic importance or unimportance of particular precepts; whether they
are adhered to in practice or not; whether they pertain to living issues or to
rare or peripheral situations."111 Some of the reluctance of contracts scholars
to inquire into the economic importance of contract law may be due to the
fact that such inquiry reveals an erosion, an erosion resulting from the com106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

C. LlNGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CoNTRACTS (1871).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACTS 1, 3-4 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1964),
L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 104, at 20, 23.
Treitel, Book Review, 33 U. CHI. L. REv. 418, 423 (1966).
The Code is now law in 49 states.
L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 104, at 10.
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bination of two circumstances. The first is that, particularly because of its
growth during the nineteenth century, contract law came to be identified with
free enterprise and the competition of the market. As the state, usually through
the legislature, began to intervene through restrictions on freedom of contract
in particular areas, it naturally chose those areas in which the market
mechanism was thought to be inadequate, shrinking the scope of application
of traditional contract law but leaving its identification with free enterprise
and the competition of the market largely untouched. The second
circumstance is that it is in those very "unmanaged" portions of our economy,
where the market mechanism works well by itself with little or no need for
regulation, that the compulsion afforded by legal sanctions is least. By affording legal sanctions for the enforcement of promises, society hopes to make it
more likely than it would otherwise be that promises will be kept; private
decision is supported by public force. Max Weber defined
the existence of a right as being no more than an increase of the
probability that a certain expectation of the one to whom the law
grants the right will not be disappointed.... To the person to whom
something has been promised the legal guaranty gives a higher degree
of certainty that the promise will be kept.112
But legal sanctions are only one of several types of compulsion that contribute
to the honoring of promises.
John Henry Wigmore spoke of two other kinds of sanctions : "ethical"
and "social," in addition to "jural."118 Sometimes the most important is the
ethical compulsion arising out of "the personal moral sense; e.g., the pressure
of conscience." Equally important may be the social compulsion arising out
of "the potential action of some portion of the community . . . as feared,
admired, or respected by the individual; e.g., the felt pressure of public sentiment." "To say 'it pays to be honest' is wrong emphasis'. The clearer view is
that it is highly dangerous, economically, to be dishonest."114 Sebei law, for
example, is said to be weak in legal sanctions for the enforcement of promises
and performance may consequently be long delayed. Such force as promises
have is "ensured by mutual interdependence, by the operation of a market in
which each party to the contract had an ultimate interest in preserving his
public reputation; his very survival in the community, and certainly his social
112. M. WEBER, supra note 40, at 98.
113. Wigmore, The Scope of the Co11tract-Co11cept, 43 CoLUM, L. REv. 569 (1943).
For a good discussion of sanctions, see H. HAVIGHURST, THE NATURE OF PRIVATE CONTRACT 45-92 (1961).
114. H. SCHERMAN, THE PROMISES MEN LivE BY 70-71 (1938). The author points
out that at one time men relied on fear of the gods, but that the State has replaced
the Church in this respect. Id. at 72-73. Societies have various means to trigger the
compulsions that do not proceed from the State. Thus it is said that the Chinese creditor
might threaten suicide and the Indian creditor might starve himself on the debtor's doorstep. Schapera notes that the man who engages a magician for "doctoring'' may be
induced to pay out of fear that the magician will undo his "doctoring'' or bewitch his
defaulting clients. I. ScHAPERA, supra note 46, at 202; M. Weber, supra note 40, at 114.
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and economic advancement, depended on his fulfilling the legitimate obligations
he had incurred." 115 Much the same can be said of ours, or any other society
for that matter, since as expressed by Eugen Ehrlich, "the individual is never
actually an isolated individual ; he is enrolled, placed, embedded, wedged into
so many associations that existence outside of these would be unendurable .
116
• • •"
Furthermore, as Harold Havighurst has pointed out, the very nature
of contract is such that non-legal sanctions take on special importance, since
"the opportunity to injure a man by breaking a contract is open only to those
with whom he has chosen to deal.... A man by selection can limit the circle
of those in a position to hurt him by failing to keep a promise."117
The relative importance of legal and non-legal compulsions will vary
according to the circumstances. Non-legal compulsions will be relatively important when two merchants deal on an established market. The ethical
compulsion will be strong because the relationship is reversible in that each
party realizes that their roles might be reversed in some subsequent transaction-"that the same duty you owe me today, I may owe you tomorrow."118
And the social compulsion will be strong because the relationship is continuing,
so that even should a dispute arise, each party has an interest in engaging with
the other in further transactions in which future dependability will be judged
by past performance. For these reasons the compulsion of legal sanctions is
relatively less significant than would be the case, for example, when a landlord
and a tenant execute a lease of an apartment. The ethical compulsion will
be weaker because the relationship is not reversible and neither expects to
assume the opposite role in another transaction. And the social compulsion
will be weaker because should this transaction provoke controversy, neither
party will be likely to have an interest in dealing with the other in the
future and there will be no occasion to look to past performance as a guide
to reliability. Here the relative significance of the compulsion of legal sanctions
is relatively greater.
In short, as a result of the combination of these two circumstances, the
area of principal applicability of contract law is one in which the significance
of legal sanctions is likely to be comparatively slight, and where, in consequence, disputes are brought before the courts relatively infrequently. This is
borne out by the fact that the typical contracts casebook draws heavily upon
disputes that arise outside of established markets, such as those that stem from
family transactions,119 and upon those that arise when an established market
115. w. GoLDSCHMIDT, SEBEI LAw 221 ( 1967).
116. E. EHRLICH, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 62 (Eng.
trans. 1936).
·
117. H. HAVIGHURST, SltPra note 113, at 69-70. He points out that there are exceptions, e.g., the settlement of a tort claim. Id. at 79.
118. L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 23 (1964).
119. Classics are: Earle v. Angell, 157 Mass. 294, 32 N.E. 164 (1892) (aunt and
nephew); Di Cicco v. Schweizer, 221 N.Y. 431, 117 N.E. 807 (1917) (fiance and prospec-
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suffers an abnormal dislocation, such as those that are occasioned by the
outbreak of war.120
It must be borne in mind, however, that the law's particular concern is
the resolution through its procedures and sanctions of precisely those disputes
that cannot be resolved by other means. As Karl Llewellyn emphasized, "This
work of the law machine at the margin, in helping keep the level of social
practice and e..'{l)ectation up to where it is, as against slow canker, is probably
the most vital single aspect of contract law. For in this aspect each hospital
case is a case with significance for the hundreds of thousands of normal
cases."121 It would be absurd to suppose that an analysis of such disputes
would yield a reliable picture of the economy, and it is scarcely surprising
that the case law focus of contract law tends to emphasize problems of only
marginal economic importance. Fortunately, the advent of the Uniform Commercial Code, with its comprehensive statutory formulation of rules for the
settlement of disputes arising out of contracts for the sale of goods, has helped
to shift the focus, at least in this area, from those disputes that characteristically
turn up in court to those that are settled out of court, but nevertheless with
some attention to legal rules as well as business expediency. In addition there
is a growing interest among contracts scholars in empirical research, to determine the actual impact of legal doctrine in practice, and to consider the reshaping of legal rules in the light of these findings.
Finally, there can be little doubt that the field of contract law, however
conceived, now must share a stage on which, in the days of the nineteenth
century, it held the undisputed center. Indeed, few would wish a return to the
time of unbridled free enterprise in which contract played the principal role.
This is not to say, however, that less attention should be given to the foundations of this vital subject. As a perceptive contracts teacher wrote several
decades ago,
The law school curriculum of the twentieth century will probably
show a diminishing relative emphasis on the various branches of
commercial law. The clearer formulation and teaching of its fundative in-laws); Hamer v. Sidway, 124 N.Y. 538, 27 N.E. 256 (1891) (uncle and nephew);
Balfour v. Balfour, [1919] 2 K.B. 571 (C.A. 1919) (husband and wife).
120. Examples are: Lloyd v. Murphy, 25 Cal. 2d 48, 153 P.2d 47 (1944) (World
War II) ; Tsakiroglou & Co. v. Nobles & Thor! [1961] 2 All E.R. 179 (closing of Suez
Canal). For an indictment of current contracts teaching and research, see Friedman and
Macaulay, Contract Law and Contract Teaching: Past, Present, and F11t11re, 1967 Wxs.
L. REv. 805, which appears in slightly different form as Contract Law and Co11lract
Research, 20 J. LEGAL En. 452 (1968). Havighurst mentions five sorts of circumstances
in which non-legal sanctions fail: "(1) The debtor dies .•.• (2) Evil men without
conscience and not responsive to any relevant social pressures suceeed in entering the
circle of the trusted ...• (3) The debtor is subject to little competitive pressure. , ••
(4) The debtor, because of insolvency or for some other reason, finds it impossible or
difficult to perform.... (5) Controversy develops [as, for example, over the meaning of
language]." H. HAVIGHURST, supra note 113, at 74-75.
121. Llewellyn, What Price Contractr-An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J. 704,
725 n.47 (1930).
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mental principles will tend to make this possible without sacrificing
any of its substance, and will enable it to take its proper place in the
law of the more complex age that is to come.122
The objective of this article has been to provide a perspective that will make
this possible.
122. Gardner, An Inquiry Into the Principles of the Law of Contracts, 46
43 (1932),

REV,
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L.

NOT E S

Practically speaking, however, does traditional contract doctrine
have the Importance we attach to it? The principle setting of the contract Is the executive's office or the businessman's shop. Is contract
doctrine realistic when the setting Is considered? Does ft recognize
what In fact ts business practice? Should it? Just what Is the role
of contract ~octrlne in a modern industrial society?
Professor Macaulay who has faced these questions is emphatic. He
believes that traditional contract law, and the teaching of It, ls
economically Irrelevant and unrealistic. Consider the following excerpt
from L. Freedman and S. Macaulay, Contract Law and Contract Teaching:
Past, Present, and Future, 1967 Wisc. L. Rev. 805, 812:
Ill.

CRITICISM OF OUR TRADITION

The alm of e9ucatlon Is to teach significantly. But contract doctrine,
and the problems this doctrine Is concerned with, are arguably not significant In a number of senses. The problems themselves are not e'!!Pirlcally
significant. They do not concern many parties or mean much to the social
order. In some Instances, the problems are rare In occurrence or litigation C.!:...9.., the problem whether an acceptance to an offer is Irrevocable
when dropped In a mal lbox). Or the problem Is only "common" If posed In
terms highly abstract; while in terms of concrete situations, the problem
Is too complex to be solved by general principles. Or the problems are not
In fact solved through the use of contract; that Is, actual case law uses
contract doctrine only as ratlonalizatlon, or (even more significant)
parties typically or almost Invariably use means other than contract doctrine
to work out difficulties that occur during bargaining or during the lffe
cycle of a contract. We will explore all of these matters in some detail.
Perhaps l.ack of significance Is Inherent In the traditional ty-concelved
sphere of contract law. Insofar as the subject matter of contracts Js the
goverance of economic exchanges In the business world, when problems become
socially slgnlficant enough to be lltlgated with any frequency, they tend
to be "removed" to new areas of the law where contract doctrine ts either
Irrelevant or plays a minor role. No contracts problem in a concrete sense
--one that Is frequently lltlgated and which deals with one specific typesttuation--lasts more than two generations. The fundamental concepts of
traditional contract law--offer, acceptance, consideration, and the like-are Instruments far too general and abstract to regulate current, socially
slgntftcant business problems.

When problems reach the threshold of public

or general business concern, they are solved or at least coped with by other
means--by legtslatlon, for example. Thus Insurance statutes, labor laws,
and antitrust leglslatlon cover vital aspects of transactions once fully
or largely within the ancient domatn of contract. Other problems simply
die out or are drafted out of existence by organized business Interests.
Contracts casebooks, for example, lovlngly preserve many construction34.

•

(

r

/

contract.cases that, whatever "fundamental" Issues they may raise, are·
obsolete as construction-contract cases because the construction business
is no Io.nger conducted that way. Standard I zed forms and modes of trans- ·
acting business have made It fmposstbfe for many great contract cases to
recur In their precise, contextual form--yet It ts context which breathes
life Into law. Without context, what remain are puzzles in dead languages.

•
·

· Even where contract doctrine has not been displaced, It plays a very
restricted role in governing business transactions as compared with Its
press notices. This body of law Is said to support the exchange operations
of our economy because without It reliance on promises, plans about the
. future, and rationa I a I locations of the costs of uncertal nty wou Id be a 11 ,
but Impossible. This sounds important, and it would be if contract doctrine
served such a function. But the case ts overstated.
At the outset, what do we mean when we talk about contract law?
Professors of contract law usually are concerned with the fol lowing kinds
of apparently significant problems:

•

(I)

Defining the point of formation of a contract, that point
at which one cannot back out of an arrangement without
being liable for damages;

(2)

Establishing criteria by which one party may Invoke legal
sanctions, or prevent the other party from invoking them,
in ways that wil I prompt bargains to be made so that their
content Is socially desirable as measured by some standard;

(3)

Aiding the performance of contracts by defining obligations
through Interpretation and gap-ff I ling and by providing
incentives to perform through the potential aval labi I ity
of a cause of action for damages; and

( 4 > Compensating one who has s'uf fared t nJ ury, as def Ined by
the Iaw of contract remed Ies. •
This ts what goes on In law schools. But what goes on In business
offices, In lawyer's offices, and in the courts? Most businessmen fn most
Industries plan transactions and settle disputes in ways that make these
classic functions of contract law largely Irrelevant. In most kinds of
transactions, buslnessmen1 are very unlikely to worry about whether the
contract they are negotiating is cast In proper form to make It legally
enforceable. Thus, they are not often Interested In the point of formation
or the criteria for gaining legal sanctions, two of our favorite law school
problems. For example, if the contract Is to last over any period of time,
businessmen are likely to clutter up the arrangement with clauses that
leave matters "to be equitably agreed upon" later. They are likely to be
extremely vague about whether they are making r:offers'' In a legal sense.
Moreover, they are very I lkely to start performing before al I of the
necessary contract "forma I itles 11 are comp 11 ed wl th. Fina I ly, many bus Inessmen assume they have the right to cancel a contract before significant,
tangible rel lance has occurred, and many assume that replacement, repair,
or rel lance damages are, or ought to be, the I lmit of I fabf 11,ty; one who
35.

would seeK conseqt.ientla1 d·emages Is asking for somethf ng he has not yet
earned.
r
If a lawyer Is Invited to the negotiations, he ls unlikely to let his
cl tent begin work with no more than an agreement to agree or on the basis
of an oral side promise addfng to and modifying a written contract. However,
very frequently a lawyer wll I not be Invited to the party. Modern purchasing agents ·and sales managers feel quite able to dispense with the
annoyance of legallstlc advice, as do many other business officials who
conduct negotiations and commit their organizations. By and large, the
Iawyer Is ca 11 ed In on Iy ff bus Inessmen foresee potent Ia I ant Itrust or tax
prob Iems, If they .need a t It Ie examined, or If they perce Ive the Iawye r
as skilled In the use of language. Even when the lawyer Is asked.to look
over a contract that has been worked out by businessmen, often he must
approve one that may not be Iega 11 y enforceab Ie. . His c I Ient and the other
party may want to leave a vital contingency "to be equitably agreed." To
force them--=i=o-work out all allocations of risk at the outset mlght expose
some of the strains In the relationship that the process of negotiation had
hidden. As a result, the cl lent might lose the deal, and usually this risk
Is too high a price to pay for the few benefits of a legally enforceable
contract. Also, at times, lawyers whose cl lents wteld great economic power
work hard to keep contracts from being legally enforceable In order to be
sure that the other party gets no rights against their cl lent. The automobile manufacturers specialize In this kind of arrangement.
While this lack of concern about contract law Is probably more comrron
In planning sales of shelf goods than In elaborate financing arrangements
between a group of lenders and a borrower of large sums, the lack of concern
about contract very frequently can be seen In al I \kinds of transactions at
the stage of performance and settlement of disputes. Even when much expensive legal work has gone Into drafting an elaborate and legally enforceable
contract, the document Is very often burled In a forgotten flle folder while
the bus I nessmen, brokers, bankers, agents, and others 11 work th I ngs out" on
the telephone, In conferences, or on the.golf course. One Important businessman said In the course of an Interview, "If something comes up, you get the
other man on the telephone and deal with th.e problem. You don't r>"'ad
legal lstlc contract clauses at each other lf you ever want to do business
again. One doesn't run to lawyers If he wants to stay in business because
one must behave decently. 11

••

•

Typically, lawyers are brought Into the dispute settlement process
only as a last resort. And this ls true even In large corporations where
legal advice Is readily aval fable at no extra cost. The house counsel
and the business lawyer In private practice spend time on taxation, antitrust, fair trade, and the Robinson-Patman Act, not on offer and acceptance
or constructive conditions. Thus most businessmen, and many business
lawyers also, are not very concerned about gap-fill Ing and remedies for
breach of eont"ract--the other two problems of orthodox contract teaching

and research.
And why Is contract doctrine not central to business exchanges?
Briefly put, private, between-the-parties sanctions usually exist, work,
and do not Involve the costs of using contract law either In lltlgatton or
as a ploy In negotiations. To begin with, business relattonshlps rarely
36.
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generate the kinds of problems considered by academic contract law~ There
·1 s a constant pressure to standa.rd Ize bus I ness and reduce recurrl ng patterns
to a routine •. Routine and form create widely shared expectations so that
people can understand who ts to do what, quite apart from the wo.rds of a
formal contract. Then, too, business un.its are organized to carry out
their commitments. An executive must stop a whole organization If he wants
to breach an agreement, and many members of that organization wf ii have ·
reasons of thel r own to want to perform. For example, safes employees, who
must deal with purchasing agents on a face-to-face basis represent the
Interests of the customer within the seller's organization; financial
employees represent the bankers who have loaned It money.
Businesses of al I kinds have tended to develop stable economic relationships. Therefore, the two businesses Involved in any kind of deal are
likely to be Interlocked beyond the fact of a particular contract. No one
disagreement would Justify Jeopardizing a total relatlonshlp. Personal
relationships may exist across all levels of the two organizations Involved.
Executives, for example, are likely to know each other socially: one
behaves differently with friends than with strangers. Today, If not in the
past, most people In most kinds of businesses share a norm of honoring
commltments unless there is an extraordinary reason not to~ And most
importantly, there are relatively few one-shot, but significant, deals.
A businessman usually cares about his reputation. He wants to do business
again with the man he Is deal Ing with and with others. He wl 11 have a
harder time getting business if he lsknownas a 11 chlseler, 11 one who wfll
not keep his word, or even one who always demands the letter of his rights
and wl Ii not "work things out.'; And reputations have a way of becoming
known: business has an effective Intelligence system.

•

Not only Is contract law not needed in many situations, Its use may
have, or may be thought to have, highly undesirable consequences. Detal led
and carefully planned arrangements may create undesirable exchange relationships. A businessman often wants to create a kind of partnership for
a I imlted purpose, with a great deal of sharing of losses and Joint
responslbl llty for problems hard to foresee. He wll I leave gaps in his
contract, since an attempt to make an airtight contract at the negotiation
stage may encourage the other party to be equally a stickler for the letter
of the barga In rather than a member of the team. Use of contract doctrl ne
may be a positive I labl I ity in maintaining an ongoing relatlonshlp.
Coercion (and even a tacit threat to sue Is coercive> Is inconsistent with
an atmosphere of trust and cooperation in the face of adverse circumstances.
.

•

Once there ls a serious dispute, most businessmen are eager to cut
thetr losses and move on to the next transaction. A salvage operation
wtll not Interest them unless they are convinced that It will offer a good
return on the necessary Investment In it. Unfortunately for contracts
teachers, this Is not often the case. Horeover, In situations where disputes are fairly frequent, substitutes for contract I itlgatlon tend to
appear--modes of arbitration or mediation, either formally or Informally
fostered by trade associations, the good offices of various governmental
agencies, or even by the efforts of flnanctal Institutions with Interests
In both parties.
·
37.
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. / Wht ,le .ii t ts hnp¢>,rt!9rff to :See th~f~tr,c:t,Jaw very ftequ9:ntly p'1ays
no real role In 1>uslne&s for aJ I of the reaso~:we have· j-ust·'dl,scussed,
It is a I' so lmporta nt tci ~~ .that·
Jo}e rt does.. p Iay Is not ·The one
usually emphasrzed rn contf".acts courses" or· research. On the one hi:md,
doctrl ne often b'ecomes s~thlrig to draft around, so I ts Impact rs avol ded
In those types of transactions where ar1 attorney Is a II owed to be f n on
the planning stages. Frequently this Is, done through the drafting of
business forms, such as the American Institute of Architects' forms for
resldentlal building const'ruction or the new purchase orders and acknowledgements that attempt to repea I muoh of the Un r form Commerc Ia I Code. On
the other hand, sometimes contract law may suppor:-t private Informal means
of solving problems. In some situations the chance that one party might ·
sue for breach of contract or that he might win such a suit may be part of
the total picture of dlplomancy, bluff, and leverage leading to a settlement.
In other situations, contract doctrine may serve the loophole function. One
party can assert a techn(cal doctrinal argument as part of his effort to
undercut hrs obltgatlon and defeat the expectat(ons of the other. We have
very I rtt'le systematically gathered knowledge about such functions of contract. What evidence we do have Indicates that these roles are not common.
The costs to one's reputation and business relationships of threatening to
sue or using a loophole are extremely high. If supper.ting private means of
solving problems ts the real function of contract doctrine, as some s~emto
have asserted, much more needs to be known: How does the process work?
What effect does contract doctrine have In what kinds of situations? What
Is the significance of the many situations where contract doctrine plays
no such role? The burden of going forward with the evidence now rests on
those who wou Id stand on th Is J ustH icat Ion for the trad It Iona I approach
to contracts teaching and research.

+n:~

Of course, we recognize that In some kinds of situations classic
contract doctrine does serve to solve problems that matter to the parties.
And one must concede that frequency Is not the sole criterion of signifl. cance. However, frequency Is an Important one. Surveys of the typical
kinds of cases In which contract doctrine solves such problems prompt us
to ask whether or not these problems are Important enough to call for the
Investment of al I the Intellectual effort that has gone f nto refining
contract doctrine In the abstract. The evidence we have indicates that
the common kinds of appellate cases are: atypical or freak business
transactions; economically marginal deals both In terms of the type of
transactions and amounts Involved; high-stake, zero-sum speculations; deals
where there Is an outsider interest that does not allow compromise; and
faml ly economic transactions. Clearly the cases In the reports today i\
seldom flt the model either of the horse trade or the modern bureaucratic
transaction. Romanticized versions of the functions of contract law seem
.to flt the tacts poorly. Moreover, the legal response called for by ·
actua'I I lttgatlon usually has t lttle or nothing to do with the concepts
of offer and acceptance, Impossibility, conditions, or the other categories
typical ty thought to be part of "contracts" as we see It in law school.
Rather, these cases cal I for interpretation of language and rational Jor
ethical al locations of losses. A sense of fairness and rretlculous' attention
to the.particular facts of the case, rather than concern with 11 general
prfnclples of contract law," are the guiding stars of decision.
38.

•

So much for the restricted role of contract. Yet even In those few
areas where contract doctrine or contract problems are clearly or potentlally
significant, legal education and research do not now provide relevant theory
and satisfactory solutions to current problems. This Is inevitable In the
I ight of our minimal commitment to discovering the actual consequences of
the operation of the legal system. For example, Uniform Commerclal Code
section 2-207 attempts to solve the problem of the "battle of the forms";
It requires that sellers read all orders carefully. or, In effect, grant full
warranties subject to a llabillty for consequential damages. This ls a
warranty that Industrial sellers almost never give voluAtarlly. To avoid
section 2-207, business would have to train a large staff to read an Immense
volume of small print. No wonder many house counsel find this Code provision
bizarre. The section was apparently drafted without assessing costs and
without balancing against them the advantages the section might afford. A
related sin, prompted at least partla'l ly by our traditions of legal education
and research, ls that we overlook problems--even soclally Important problems
--untl I they are embalmed in an appellate case. It was traditional case law 1
that made the draftsmen of the Code feel they had to do something about the
battle of the forms. Conversely, case law orientation has led to the neglect
of the whole range of consumer problems. Our categories make It difficult
for us to consider the actual operations of the large modern business
corporation when it offers Its wares In the market. Of course, we all know
that corporations use contract doctrines In order to leglslate unilaterally
Most of us know about such "contracts of adhesion," at least since Professor
Kessler's excellent article,2 but where are the studies of the patterns
actually used and the careful analysis of the desirability or undeslrabilfty
of each?3 For example, consumer warranty disclaimers In small print existed
long before the now famous Henningsen case,4 they are still widely used In
the sale of products other than automobiles. Even after that landmark
decision has been Immortalized In many of the casebooks, there is yet to
be published a study of the actual impa~t of the case on auto safety, Injured
consumers, car prices, or the practices of manufacturers. It also seems
likely that the parol evidence ruJ_e and the procedural and practical restrtctions on the law of fraud support the exploitation of the poor by
, certain kinds of businessmen; conversely, certain tricks of offer and
acceptance often can be used to bail a legal aid client out of a contract
for pots and pans. Yet where Is the research Into this kind of practice?
Where are the proposals for reform based on a realistic assessment of potential gains and costs? Or their rebuttals? What casebook really devotes
any effort to thls kind of problem?

•

[Footnotes are renumbered--some have been omitted.]
I.

f:...a.,

Poel v. Brunswick-Balke-Col lender Co., 216 N.Y. 310, I 10 N.E.

619 (1915).

2.

Kessler, Contracts of Adheslon--Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract,
43 COLUM. L. RE. 629 (1943).

3.

For one such analysis, see Macaulay, Private Leglslation and the Duty
to Read--Buslness Run by IBM Machine, The Law of Contracts and Credit
Cards, 19 VANO. L. REV. 1051 (1966).

4.

Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
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Whtie studying th~ follow.Ing matertals, <ask y6urselfr Cl) whether the
authors are c;orrect Jn the statements that businessmen tend to wait untfl
the I ast mf nute before brl ngf ng In\ the lawyer (there Is op f n f on to the
contrary) and C2) assuming that they are correct,'whether you agree with
fhese general conclusions concerning their relevance of contract doctrine
I n today I s society •

.illlli.
•

•
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I I.

"FREEDOM" OF CONTRACT

Private volition Is the core around which the Idea of contract is
centered. This core is the expression of a basic tenet on which our underlying polftical and economic structure is grounded: the freedom of choice-a belief that the lndivldual alone should determine his future. He decfdes
what he wants and plans to provide for these wants~ He insures against
future risks. The contract Is the means through which he does this planning.
The employee who enters Into the employment contract, the Insured who purchases a lffe insurance poltcy, and the lessee who enters into a lease
agreement are using the contract to determine, as best he can, some aspect
to their future. If you consider the business corporation as an fndlvldual,
you wf I I see how the free·enterprfse system Is based on freedom of contract.
Obviously, a belief in freedom of contract does not preclude restrictions and controls on lndtvldual volition. From the time that courts and
legislature said that the parties to a contract must be "competent" and of
"fu I I age, 11 or that contracts In restra r nt of trade are f nva I Id, the t nd I vldual 1 s freedom to contract has been restricted so that some broader social
or economic. goal can be attained. Contemporary consumer protection laws
restrict the merchant's as well as the consumer's freedom to contract. The
extent of the restriction in this and other areas depends upon the political,
socla.l, economic and religious climate at the time the question arises.

•

The cases In this section ii lustrate some of the situations in which
the freedom versus control dichotomy arises. They are intended only as)an
introduction. Add to this introduction as you study subsequent cases.
When reading these cases, ask yourself the following questions: What
are the circumstances behind the freedom versus control Issue? What is the
court's reasoning for enforcing or not enforcing the agreement? What rs
the effect of the decision? Was the decision "just"?
One ftnal note. As you read the cases In these materials, notice the
many and different sltuatlons In which you find the contract. What connection does the Wal I Street atmosphere of Guttman, p. 42, have to the .labor
setting of Mabley, p. 47? How does Mabley relate to Balfour v. Balfour,
p.101? When the string you are using to tie the cases together becomes
strained, remember that the principles of contracts cannot be studled without considering the circumstances which gave use to this principle. Keep
In mind the following words of Professor Sharp and Kissler:
• • • [a] monistlc approach serves only to distract the real role

•

which contract has played In the evolution of our society. It
results in more or less lifeless abstractions and achieves at
best a "formal," but not "a substantial" rational tty. A real lstlc
understanding of the law of contracts can be achieved only through
an awareness of the different functions fulfil led by the various
kinds of contract in our society. This diversity of functions
leads Inevitably to a polytheism of ideals governing the law of
contracts. A pluralistic, approach may help to explain the many
tensions and Inconsistencies which become apparent upon a close
41.

study ot"the case h,w !3nd y,hlch cannot b~ explained satf.sfactorf ly
under a mon f st I c ap~rdva I •
F. Kessler and M. Sharp, Contracts:

Cases and Materlals I ( 1953).

•

GUTTMANN v. ILLINOIS CENTRAL R.R. CO.
189 F.2d 927 (2d Ctr. 195r>
[Foofnotes are renumbered--some have been omitted.]
FRANK, Circuit Judge.

***

. \ The 1ssue then, Is whether ttie d I rectors cou Id va 11 d Iy dee Iare a
dividend on the conrnon stock ln,1950 without directing that there should
be pald Ctn addition to preferred dividends on the preferred for that year)
alleged arrears of preferred dfvfdentjs, the amount of which had been earned
In 1942-1947 but remained undeclared and unpaid. To put It dlfferently,
we must dee I de whether (a) the d f recto.rs had the· power to dee Iare such
alleged arrears of dividends on the preferred and Cb) whether they "abused"
their discretion In declarJng any dividend on the common without ordering
the payment of those alleged arrears.
Our lode-star Ts Wabash Raf lway Co. v. Barclay, 280 U.S. 197, 50 S.Ct.
106, 74 L.Ed. 368, which dealt with the noncUf!lulatlve preferred stock of an
lndlana rat I road corporation. There were no control I Ing Indiana decisions
or stcrtutes on that subject. The United States Supreme Court was therefore
oblfged to Interpret the contract according to Its own notions of what the
contract meant. We have a stml lar problem here, since there are no 11 llnols
declsf'ons or statutory provisions which control or guide us. Absent such
decisions and statutes, we must take the Wabash oplnlon as expressing the
correct Interpretation of the rights of non-cumulatfve preferred stockholders
of this II II nots company. For the qlfference between the language of the
preferred stock here an.d that In Wabash seems to us to be of no moment.

·•
· ./

In the Wabash case, plalntlffs, holders of non-cumulative preferred
stock, sought an Injunction preventing the defendant rallroad company from
paying dividends on the common stcckl unless It first paid dividends on the
non-cumulatrve preferred to the extent that the company;ln previous years,
had had net earnings avallable for that payment and that such dividends
remained unpaid. The Court decided against the plalntlffs. It spoke of
the fact that, In earlier years, "net earnings that could have been used
for the payment were expended upon Improvements and additions to the
property and equipment of the road"; It held that the contract with the
preferred mean that ttJf those profits are justlflably applied by the
directors to capita! Improvements and no dividend Is declared within the
· year, the c Ia lm for that year Is gone and cannot be asserted at a Iater date."

I.

And on a class of preferred stock havtng rights junior to those of the
preferred stock held by the plalntlffs.
42.
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We take that as a ruling that the d I rectors were Ieft wI th · no di s.cret Ion
ever to pay any such dlvidend. For i f they had had that discretion, It
would surely have been an "abuse" to pay dividends on the common while
disregarding thB esserted claim of the non-cumulative preferred to back
dividends. Indeed, the plaintiff In the Instant case contends that a pay~
~. ment of common dividends, whenever there ls such a discretion, constitutes
an unlawful/diversion"; and such a "diversion" would be an "abuse" of
discretion.
Pl al ntl ff, however, seeks to I lmf t the effect of the Wabash ru II ng to
Instances where the net earnings, for a given year .. which could have been
paid to the noncumulative preferred, have once been expended JustifJably for
"capital improvements" or "additions to the property or equipment. 11 He
would have us treat the words "non-cumulative" as if they read "cumulative
if earned except only when the earnings are pal.d out for capital additions."
He argues that the Wabash ruling has no application when net earnings for a
given year are legitimately retained for any one of a variety of other
corporate purposes, and when In a subsequent year It develops that such
retention was not necessary. We think the attempted distinction untenable.
It ascribes to the Supreme Court a naive over-estimation of the Importance
of tangibles.(because they can be touched and seen) as contrasted with intangibles. Suppose the directors of a corporation Justlflably invested the
retained earnings for the year 1945 In land which, at the time, seemed
essential or highly desirable for the canpany 1 s future welfare. Suppose
that, In 1948, It turned out that the land so purchased was not necessary
or useful, and that the directors thereupon caused it to be sold. Plaintiff's position canpels the implied concession that the proceeds of such a
sale would never be available for payment of so-cal led arrears of unpaid
non-cumulative preferred dividends, and that the directors would forever
lack al I discretion to pay them. We fall to see any intel liglble difference
between (I) such a situation and (2) one where annual earnings are properly
retained for any appropriate corporate purpose, and where in a later year
the retention proves wholly unnecessary.3 There ts no sensible ground for

•

2.

This becomes the more evident when It rs noted that the plaintiff asserts
that "non-cumulative" means In effect, "cumulative ff earned." For
directors have no discretion to pay common dividends without paying
arrears of cumulative preferred dividends.

3.

The attempted distinction would also cane to this: (a) The noncumul.atlve
preferred irrevocably loses al I rights to a dividend as of a given year,
if the earnings for that year are invested Tn fixed capital, but (b)
has an f nchoate rf ght in the form of a sort of cont I ngent credit ff
those earnings are reasonably retained for future investments which are
never made and which thereafter show up as wholly unnecessary. This is
to say that the preferred take the risk of loss of a dividend as of a
year In which It is earned when there Is a reasonable need for a present
capital Investment, but no such risk If there ls a present reasonable
11 l<e I l hood of a need for such an I nvestment f n the future, wh I ch Iater
appears undesirab.le. We see no ratlonal basis for such a distinction.
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s Ing u ng: oof I egl t trnate cap I ta I out t ays, once made, as the so Ie cause of
the Irrevocable desfructlon"of, the claims of the preferred.· We/do not
belleve\that the Supreme Court gave the contract with the preferred such an
Irrational Interpretation. It simplf happene.d that In tf:1e Wabash case the
· earn I ngs had been used for cap I ta I a'dd I ti ons: and that, accord Ing I y, the
court happened to mention that particular purpos'e. Consequently, we think
that the Court, In referrf ng to thisit fact, d Id not Intend It to have any
significance ••• i
I

•

Here we are Interpreting a contract Into which uncoerced men entered.
Nothing in the wording of that contract would suggest to an ordinary wayfaring person the existence of a contingent or Inchoate right to arrears of
dividends. The notion that such a right was promised ls, rather, Jhe Invention of lawyers or other experts, a notion stemming from considerations
of fairness, from a 'policy of protecting Investors In those securities.
But the preferred stockholders are not--llke sat lors or Idiots or Infants-wards of the judiciary. As courts on occasions have quoted or paraphrased
ancient poets, it may not be Inappropriate to paraphrase a modern' poet,
and to say that "a contract Is a contract is a contract." To be sure, It is
an overstatement that the courts never do more than carry out the Intentions
of the partlEls: In the triterest of fairness and justice, many a judge-made
legal rule does Impose, on one of the parties to a contract, obligations which
neither party actually contemplated and as .to which the language of the
contract is silent. But there are limits to the extent to which a court
may go in so i nterpo'I atl ng rl ghts and ob Ii gatl ons Which were never In the
parties' conterriplatlon. In tht.s case we consider those I imlts clear.

***
From the point of view of the preferred stockholders, the bargain they
made may well be of a most undesirable kind. Perhaps the making of such
barga Ins shou Id be p reverited: But, l f so, the way to prevent them Is by
legislation, or by prophylactic ndmlnlstratlve action authorized by legislation, as In the case of the S. E. <;;. in respect of securities, including
preferred stocks, whether cumulative or ncn-cumu!atlve, issued by pun I le.
utl lity holding companies or their subsidiaries.
The courts are not empowe'red
to practice such pr.eventlve legal medicine,' and must not try to revise,
extensively, contracts already outstand"ing and freely made by adults who
are not lncompents.
Aff I rmed.

4.

See In the Matter of The North American Company, 4 S.E.C. (1939) 434,
462 (dissenting opinion).
There It Is pointed out, Inter alia, that the provisions of many cumulative preferred stocks create bargains that are most undesirable,
but which the courts nevertheless enforce.
There are those who think that no sort of preferred stock should be per~
mltted because, among other things, of the unavoidable perplexities which
they frequently .occasion for conscientious directors owing al leg lance
to classes of stockholders with interests often fn conflict.
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NOTES
Cl) A share of stock represents an ownership and financial Interest In
a corporation. Each share gives to the holder of It, the shareholder or
stockholder, a proportionate Interest In three rights: Cl) the right to
profits In the form of dividends; (2) the right to assets after al I creditors have been pald when the corporation is dissolved; and (3) the right
to elect the board of directors and to pass on major chamges In the corporation. The shareholder's right to dividends does not arise, however, unti I
dlvldends are declared by the board of directors; it does not arise wherever
profits are earned unless the articles cf Incorporation make dividends
mandatory. This is essential to a case llke Guttman in which the directors
did not, and were not required by the articles, to declare dividends. The
plaintiffs were arguing that even though the articles did not make the
declaration of dividends mandatory, the law should. What was the basis of
plaintlffs' argument?

•

Generally, shareholders are grouped Into two classes: common and preferred. To understand the difference between the two, you must first realize that the relatlonship between a shareholder and his corporation Is
essentlal ly contractual. The shareholder contributes money or property to
the corporation in return for the rights mentioned above. He also agrees
to accept the risk of loss, that Is, a loss of his investment should the
corporation fal I. In this respect, he differs from the creditor. The
common shareholder can gain and lose the most. He agrees to contribute
money to the corporation on condition that after all creditors and preferred
shareholders are paid, he Is entitled to the remainder. The more profitable
the corporation the more the common shareholder stands to gain. If the
corporation goes bankrupt, the common shareholder usually loses everything ..
The preferred shareholder stands one step above the common shareholder.
He is "preferred 11 over the common shareholder. The preference usually extends to dividends and assets; he wl I I receive set amounts of dividends and
assets on liquidation before the common shareholders are entitled to anything. In return for this preference (risk protection), preferred sharehQlders usually are not entitled to vote for directors. It is not dlfflcult to realize that preferred shareholders purchase their stock In the
hopes of collecting dividends annually. Dividends are to them Interest
payments. So that preferred shareholders can collect dividends for years
in which they have not been declared, the cumulative preferred stock was
Introduced. What this means is that when directors do declare dividends,
cumulatlve preferred shareholders are entitled to their annual dividend for
any year In which directors have not declared dividends before common
shareholders are entitled to anything. For example, assume that a cumulative preferred shareholder Is entitled to $1 dividend per year. Assume
further that directors have not declared dividends for 1968 and 1969 and
that in 1970, the directors declare demands In the amounts of $5. The
preferred shareholder is entftled to the first $3, $1 each for 1968, 1969 and
1970. As Guttman indicates, a non-cumulative preferred shareholder Is only
entitled to $1, and the common shareholders, the remaining $4. Obviously,
only the best companies can market non-cumulative preferred stock •
.45.
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IS non-cumu I atrve. prefe,:-red stock
l yJpreferred stock? Doesn ft
the holds:-- of It.take the rlsks1 of common wlthcut the benefits of preferred?
As Guttman I I lustrates directors mlcJht not declare dividends for a number
of years to the detriment of the non-cumulative preferred shareholder. Is
it reasonable to expect that the rreferr~d shareholders understood that
they mloht, In effect, lose their preferred position if the corporation
could not pay dividends In a particular year? Even assuming that the
preferred shareholders might expect to lose·out when the corporation
couldn't pay dividends, Is It fair td permit the corporation to deliberately
refuse to pay dividends when the corporation had sufficient profit&? ·
Should the law ''step in" and remedy the situation? Should non-cumulative
preforred stock be out I awe·:!?

'r;a,
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•
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(2) A position somewhat dlfferi:rnt from G.uttman has been taken by the
courts .In New Jersey. See Sanders v. Cuba R.R. Co. 21 N.J. 78, 120 A.2d
849 ( 1956). "Under the New Jersey vlew,1 the board has the rllscretion to
pass a dividend which might have been paid to the non-cumulative preferred
share ho Iders but~ If it does, a d Iv I dend cred It to the extent that the fund
was capable of paying such a dlvld~nd results. From such dividend credits,
divld~nds In arrears on non-cumulative shares must first be paid before
common shareholders are entitled to any. But earnings which have been
retained for corporate uses and upon which there Is a 'dividend credit'
may be partially or entirely lost In carrying on the business and, If they
are, the non-cumulative preferred shareholders have no claim upon subsequent
earnings to replenish what had previously been a dividend credit." N.
Lattin, The Law of Corporations (1959).
The difference In the two approaches Is I I lustrated by the following
language from Justice Jacob's opinlon in Sanders:
It may be acknowledge~ that New Jersey's dividend credit rule has
not generally been accepteo by the other states or In the federal
courts. See Wabash Ral lway Co. v. Barclay, 280 U.S.· 197, 50 S.Ct.
106, 74 L.Ed. 368 (1930); Joslin v. Boston Maine R.R., 274 Mass.
551, 175 N.E. 156 (Sup.Jud.Ct.1931); Norwich Water Co. v. Southern
R. Co., I I Va.L.Reg.N.S. 203 (1925); Note, Dividend Credits for Noncumulative Preferred Stock, 17 U.Chi .L.f-ev. 740 (1950); N6te,
Rights of Preferred Stockholders as to Passed or Accumulated Dividends In Going Concern, 27 A.L.R.2d 1073, 1116 (1953). In the recent
case ot Guttman v. I I llnols Central R. Co., 189 F.2d 927, 930 (2
Cir., 1951), certiorari denied 342 U.S. 867, 72 S.Ct. 107,' 96 L.Ed.
652 (1951), Judge Frank expressed the view that nothing In the terms
of the ordinary non-cumulative preferred stock .contract points tei
"a contingent or inchoate rl!-)ht ,.to arrears of dividends" and that
the contrary notion Is an ln~entlon "stemming from considerations
of fairness, from o policy of protecting investors In those securities." Thorn seems to be I lttle doubt that equitable factors
did play a significant part In the development of N~w Jersey's
doctrine. In the Wabash Rat lway case, supra, Justice Holmes stated
that there was a common understandinn that dividends which were
passed (though there were profits from which they could have been
declared) were forever gone Insofar as non-cumutatlve preferred
46.
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stock was concerned; but he referred to no supporting materials and
there are those who have suggested a.dtametrfcally opposite understanding. See Lattin, Non-Cumulative Preferred St.ock, 25 I 11.L.Rev.
148, 157 (1930). This much ts qutte apparent--tf the common stockholders, who generally control the corporation and wtll beneftt
most by the passing of the dividends on the preferred stock, may
freely achieve that result without any dividend credit consequences,
then the preferred stockholders wl 11 be substantially at the mercy
of others who wt I I be under temptation to act in their own selfInterest. See Note,.Dlvfdend Rights of Non-Cumulative Preferred
Stock, 61 Yale L.J. 245, 251 (1952); Note, Right of Non-Cumulative
Preferred Stockholders to Back Dividends Earned But Unpaid, 74
U.Pa.L.Rev. 605, 608 (1926). \1/hlle such conclusion may sometimes
be compel led by the clear contrectual arrangements between the
parties there Is no just reason why our courts should not avoid It
whenever the contract Is silent or Is so general as to leave adequate room for Jts construction. In any event, New Jersey's doctrine has received wTde approval Tn legal wrTtTngs and there does
not seem to be any present dlsposltion In this court to reject It
or limlt fts sweep In favor of the Supreme Court's approach In the
Wabash Rallway case. See Frey, The DTstrlbutlon of Corporate
Dividends, 89 U.Pa.L.Rev. 735, 750 (1941); Berle, Non-Cumulative
Preferred Stock, 23 Col.L.Rev. ~58 (1923); Lattin, supra.
What position Is "fairer"?
MABLEY & CAREW CO. v. BORDEN.
129 Oh to St. 375, 195 N. E. 697 ( 1935)
Action by Ida C. Borden against the Mabley & Carew Company. The Court
of Appeals reversed a judgment of the Court of Common Pleas for defendant
and certified the c;:ise to the Supreme Court for revlew.--[Edttorlal
Statement.]
Judgment of Court of Appeals affirmed.
Ida C. Borden brought an actTon In the court of common pleas of Haml 1ton county against the Mabley &Carew Ccmpany, alleglng In her petltlon
that Anna Work, her sister, now deceased, was and had been for some years
an employee of such company and that It promised and agreed In wrlting to
pay to such person as was designated by Ann.a Work on the back of a certltlcate issued to her a sum equal to the wages received by her from the company
for the year next precedTng the date of her death. The plaintiff In error
further alleges that she Is the person designated on the back of the certlfl' cate; that Anna Work continued In the employ of the company untTI the date
of her death; that her wages for the year preced T ng were $780, .and she
prays judgment for fhls amount with interest from the date of the death of
Anna Work.
The Mabley & Carew Company In effect denies these al legations and
states afflnnatlvely that lf the cer,--tlflcate was Issued as claimed, It was
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Issued voluntarl ly and gl"at'ultousty and without. consideration, .and was
Issued to Anna)Work and acceptf::id by her with the express understanding that
it carried no legal obligation.
A reply was filed, denying the affirmative allegations of this answer.
The case came on for tr I a I In the court' of. common p Ieas and at the cone I us I on of the plaintiff's evidence the trial court sustained a motion directing a verdict for the Mabley & Carew Company.
Mott9n for new trlal was overruled, judgment was entered and error
was prosecuted to the Court of Appeals of Ham! lton county, which court
reversed, set aside and held for naught the judgment of the court of common
pleas. The Court of Appeals, finding that ft~ decision was In conflict
with the decision In the case of Black v. W. S. Tyler Co., 12 Ohio App. 27,
certf fle.d the case to this court ,for review and final determination.
1

.

~

The fol !owing rs a copy of the certificate upon which the action was
predicated:
J

"No. 378.

"The Mabley & Carew Co.
"To Mrs. Anna Work.
"In appreciation of the duration and faithful character of your services heretofore rendered .as an employee of this Company, there wl I I be
paid In the e'{ent of your death, if st-I 11 an/employee of this Company,
(except under those circumstances which would give rise to an obllgatlon
on the State of Ohio under any Workmen's Compen·satf on Act to re lmburse
your Estat€ for your death,) to the party or parties designated by you on
the back of this certificate a sum equal to the wages you have received
from this Company for the year next preceding the day of your death, but
In no event to exceed the sum of Two Thousand Dollars.
"The Issue\ and del Ivery of this certificate Is understood to be purely
voluntary and gratuitous on the part of this Company and Is accepted with
the express understanding that It carries no legal obllgatfon whatsoever
or assurance or promise of future employment, and may be withdrawn or dJscontlnued at any time by this Company.
"The Mabiey & Carew Co.
"Adolph C. Weiss, Secy.

"Cf nc I nnat I , Oh Io, Dec. 24, 1919 .''
lndorsement:
Date,
"The Mabley & Carew Co.
"Gentlemen:--lt Is my desire that you make al I benefits payable under
this Certificate to the fol lowing and In the proportions here Indicated:
Relation to
Proportion
Address
Benet I cl ary
Name
SI ster
Mrs. Ida ·Borden
"SI g na t u re ••••••••• ,. ...............
'
."
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LeBlond, Morrissey, Terry &GfldayrandJ. Paul McQueen, all of Cincinnati, for platntlff In error.
Jultus R. Samuels, of Cincinnati, for defendant In error.
STEPHENSON, Judge.
It ls contended by the Mabley &Carew Comoany that there Is no proof
of the designation of Ida C. Borden as beneflcfary under the certfffcate
fn question.
The nam& appears on the back of the certificate and, whtle It ts
typewritten, ft ls certainly a sufficient designation, taken In connection
with the fact that Anna Work had It In her possession until her death.
There ls Just one question In this case, and that Is the consideration
for the Issuance of this certlflcate. It ls true that Anna Work could not
maintain an action on thls certlflcate In her lifetime, as no right of
action existed ln her favor; but that fact did not rrevent It from befng
enforceable, after her death, In the hands of Ida C. Borden.

•

This certificate was not a pure gratuity on the part of the Mabley &
Carew Company, as there was a provision In the certificate to the effect
that the payment would not be made In the event of death unless Anna Work
was stl II an employee of the company. This was an fnducement to Anna Work
to continue In the employ of the ccmpany. That rs not the only consfderatlon,
as It ts expressed at the outset that the company appreciates the duration
and falthful character of the services of the employee theretofore rendered.
The employee, by vfrtue of the Issuance of the certfffcate, had a rfght
to expect that the person nomfnated by her would, In the event of her death,
receive the amount designated by the certlflcate. This was certalnly an
lncentlve to remain In the servlce of the company.
It Is not a tenable proposition that, because Anna Work had no enforceable right during her life, her beneficiary could take no more than she
had. We think the learned Court of Appeals was right In holding that Anna
Work, by continuing In the service of the company until her death, created
a binding obligation upon the company to pay to her deslgnated beneficiary
the sum mentioned In the certificate.
It Is stated In the certificate: "The Issue and delivery of this
certificate ts understood to be purely voluntary and gratuitous on the.
part of this Company." That was a part of the contract so far as Anna Work
was concerned. She had no right that she could possfbly assert, as she
had to die before the right would ripen In any one.

•

The case of Zwolanek v. Baker Mfg. Co., 150 Wis. 517, 137 N. W. 769,
44 L. R. A. CN. S.) 1214, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 793, pronounces the law relatlve
to certificates of this character In Its true light as we see tt. The
court there said, 150 Wis. at page 521 of the opinion, 137 N. W. 769, 772:
49.

, I

"Wh I Ie. the prect f c~ In Jtf ated by the · def en·dant I 15 benef I cf a I to I ts
employees, It Is not dlfffcult to see wher~fn ft rs also beneffclal to
the emp foyer. It tends to Induce emp Ioyees to rema In cont I nuous Iy In the
employ of the same master, and' to render efffcf'ent services, so as to
mlnfmfze the poss I bl I fty of dfscharge. It also tends to rel feve the
employer of the annoyance of hfrfng and breaking in new men to take the
place of those who might otherwise voluntarily quit, and to Insure a full
working force at times when jobs are plentiful and labor is scarce."
True, Anna Work, by reason of this certificate, was under no obligation
to continue in the service of the Mabley & Carew Company if she did not
see fit so to do; neither was the company, by reason of the certificate,
obligated to give her continuous or definite employment. But neither of
these facts In any wise affected the right of the beneficiary, so far as
Anna Work was concerned after this contract was exe~uted.
We find no case exactly on all fours with the one before us; but we

do find a number of cases that support the finding made by the Court of

Appeals herein. The subject Is well digested and thoroughly discussed In
an annotation In 28 A. L. R., beginning at page 331.
It Is a well-known proposition of law that a contract should be given
that construction that wl I I uphold It and preserve to the parties thereto
their rights ff the same can be done without doing violence to language.
, We find no trouble In upholding this contract.
·
The Judgment of the Court of Appeals Is hereby affirmed.
J~dgment afffrmed~
NOTES
Cl) Did Mabley & Carew Co. premise Anna Work that It would pay her
beneficiary? Does a person have the freedom not to enter Into a contract?
Consider the foflowlng cases and the language frcm MacCabe v. Consolidated
Edison Co., 30 N.Y.S.2d 445 (1941); Involving an employee's rights under
a retirement plan:

"ln·thls state, the rule Is settled that, unless a definite
period of service ts specified tn the contract, the hiring ts at
wt 11; and the master has the right to discharge and the servant to
leave at any time." Watson v. Gugino, 204 N.Y. 535, at 541, 98 N.E. IS,
20, 39 LR.A., N.S., 1090, Ann. Cas. 19130, 215. We know today that
thfs freedom of contract which the law pronounces Is often an
economic fallacy. Yet a court of first Instance must follow the
precedents. If the hiring can be terminated at wlll, and provision
for an employee's retlremont Is not embodied In a jurtdfcally
recognizable obligation of the employer, then whatever provision
may be made Is, In the eye of the law, not a right but a gift.
(2) In Guttman the court fat led to find an obi lgatlon to pay dividends , \
while In Mabley the court, notwithstanding the defendant's words,
50.
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concluded that the defendant had obligated Itself to pay death benefits.
Can the cases be reconclled7
BOSTON ICE CO. v. POTTER
123 Mass. 28 (1977)
Contract on an account annexed, for Ice sold and delivered between
Aprl I I, 1874, and Apr I I I, 1875. Answer a general dental.

•

At the trlal In the Superior Court, before Wllklnson, J., without a
jury, the plalntlff offered evidence tending to show the dellvery of the
fee and Its acceptance and use by the defendant from Aprl I l, 1874, to
Aprl I I, 1875, and that the price claimed ln the declaratfon was the market
price. It appeared that the fee was delivered and used at the defendant's
residence In Boston, and the amount left dally was regulated by the orders
received there from the defendant's servants; that the defendant, In 1873,
was suppl led with Ice by the platnttff, but, on account of some dissatisfaction with the manner of supply, terminated his contract with It; that the
defendant then made a contract with the Citizens' Ice Company to furnish him
with tee; that some time before Aprll, 1874, the Citizens' Ice Company sold
Its business to the plaintiff, with the prtvl lege of supplying tee to Its.
customers. There was some evidence tending to show that the platnttff
gave notice of this change of business to the defendant, and Informed him
of Its Intended supply of lco to him; but this was contradicted on the part
of defendant •
The judge found that the defendant received no notice from the plalntlff
untl I after all the Ice had been delivered by It, and that there was no
contract of sale between the parties to this action except what was to be
lmplled frcm the delivery of the lee by the plalntlff to the defendant and
Its use by him; and ruled that the defendant had a right to assume that the
tee In question was delivered by the Citizens' Ice Ccmpany, and that the
plaintiff could not maintain this action. The plaintiff alleged exceptions.
ENDICOTT, J. To entitle the platnttff to recover, It must show scme
contract with the defendant. There was no express contract, and upon the
facts stated no contract Is to be Implied. The defendant had taken lee from
the plaintiff In 1873, but, on account of some dissatisfaction with the
manner of supply, he terminated his contract, and made a contract for his
supply with the Citizens' Ice Company. The plalntlff afterward delivered
lee to the defendant for one year without notifying the defendant, as
the presJdlng judge has found, that It had bought out the business of the
Citizens' Ice Company, until after the delivery and consumption of the tee.
The prestdlng judge has decided that the defendant had a rJght to
assume that the tee In question was deltvered by the Citizens' Ice Company,
and has thereby necessarily found that the defendant's contract with that.
company covered the time of the delivery of the tee.
There was no prlvlty of contract established between the platntlff and
defendant, and without such prtvlty the possession and use of the property
wilt not support an lmpfted assumpslt. Hiiis v. Snell, 104 Mass. 173, 177.
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And no presumptlon of assent can be tmplled from the reception and use of
the Ice, because the defendant had noxnowledge that ft was furnished by
the plaintiff, but supposed that he recelved tt und~r the contract made
w1th the Clttzens' Ice Company. Of'thls change he was entltled to be Informed.
A party has a right to select and determl ne wt.th whom he wl 11 contract,
~nd cannot have another person thrust upon him without his consent. It
may be of lmportance to him who performs the contract, ,as when he contracts
with another to paint a plcture or wrtte a book, or furnish articles of
a particular kind, or when he ref Tes upon the character or qualities of an
lndlvldual, or has, as In thts case, reasons why he does not wish to deal
with a partfcular party. In al I these cas~s, as he may contract with whom
he p I eases, the su ff 1c Iency of h1s reasons for so do 1ng can not be I nqL! i red
Into. If the defendant, before receiving the lee, or during Its delivery,
had received notice of the change, and that the Cltlzens' Ice Company could
no longer perform Its contract with him, It would then have been his un~
doubted right to have resclnded the contract and to decline to hove It
executed by the plalntlff. But this he was unable to do, because the
plaintiff fal led to Inform him of that which he had a right to know.
Orcutt v. Nelson, I Gray, 536, 542. Winchester v. Howard, 97 Mass. 303.
Hardman v. Booth, I H. & C. 803. Humble v. Hunter, 12 Q.B. 310. Robson
v. Drummond, 2 B. & Ad. 303. If he had received notice and continued to
take the lee as delivered, a contract would be Implied. Mudge v. Oliver,
I Al ten, 74. Orcutt v. Nelson, ubl supra. Mitchel I v. Lapage, Holt N.P. 253 •

There are two English cases very similar
Schmaling v. Thomlinson, 6 Taunt. 147, a firm
dants to transport goods to a foreign market,
employment to the plaintiff, who performed It
defendants, and It was held that he could not
services from the defendants.

to the case at bar. In
was employed by the defenand transferred the entlre
without the prlvlty of the
recover compensation for his

•

The case of Boulton v~ Jones> 2 H. & N. 564, was cited by both parties
at the argument. There the defendant, who had been ln.the habit of dealing with one Brocklehurst, sent a written order to him for goods. The
plaintiff, who had on the s~me day bought out the busln~ss of Brocklehurst,
executed the order without giving the defendant notice that the goods were
supplied by him and not by Brocklehurst. And It was held that the plaintiff could not maJntaln arr"actlon for the price of the goods against the
defendant. It ls said In that case that the defehdant had a right of setoff against Brocklehurst, with whom he had a running account, and that Is
alluded to In the opinion of Baron Bramwell, though the other judges do
not mention It.
The fact that a defendant In a p~rtlcular case has a claim In setoff against the orlglnal contracting party shows clearly the Injustice of
forcing another person upon him. to execute the contract without his consent,
agafnst whom his set-off would not be avaf lable. But the actual existence
of the claim In set-off cannot be a test to determine that there Is no Implied assumpslt or prlvlty between the parties. Nor can the non-existence
of a set-off ra 1se an I mp II ed ass umps t t. If there Is such a set-off, It Is
52.
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sufficient to state that as a reason why the defendant should prevail; but
It by no means fol lows that because ft does not exist the plafntlff can
maintain his action. The right to maintain an action can never depend
upon whether the defendant has or has not a defense to It.
The Implied assumpslt arises upcn the dealings between the parties to
the action, and cannot arise upon the dealings between the defendant and
the original contractor, to which the plalntlff was not a party. At the
same time, the fact that the right of set-off against the original contractor
could not, under any circumstances, be aval led of In an action brought
upon the contract by the person to whom It was transferred and who executed
ft, shows that there Is no prlvlty between the parties In regard to the
subject matter of this action.
It ls, therefore, fmmaterfal that the defendant had no claim In setoff against the Citizens' Ice Company.
We are not called upon to determine what other remedy the plaintiff
has, or what would be the rights of the parties If the Ice were now In
existence.
Exceptions overruled.

•

KLORS, INC. v. BROADWAY-HALE STORES, INC.
359 U.S. 207 (1959)
Mr. Justice BLACK delfvered the opinion of the Court.
Klor 1 s, Inc., operates a retal I store on Mission Street, San Francisco, California; Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., a chain of department stores,
operates one of Its stores next door. The two stores compete In the sale
of radios, television sets, refrigerators and other household appliances.
Claiming that Broadway-Hale and 10 nattonal manufacturers and their dtstrlbutors have conspired to restrain and monopollze commerce In violation
of§§ I and 2 of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§§ I, 2, 15 U.S.C.A. s§ I, 2, Klor's brought this aTtion for treble damages
and injunction In the United States District Court.

I.

Sectton I of the Sherman Act provfdes:

"Every contract, combination

In the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, In restraint of trade

or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, Is
declared to be i I legal * * *." Section 2 of the Act reads, "Every
person who shal I monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine
or conspire with any other person or persons to monopolfze any part of
the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign natfons,
shall be deemed guJlty of a misdemeanor***." Section 4 of the
Clayton Act, 28 Stat. 731, 15 U.S.C. § 15, 15 U.S.C.A. § 15, states,
II
Any person who sha 11 be t nj u red f n hIs bus I ness or property by reason
of anything forbidden ln the antitrust laws may sue therefor*** and
shal I recover threefold the damages by him sustained** *. 11
53.

In support of Its clalm Klor's made the followlrlg allegatlons: George
Klor start$d an appliance store some years before 1952 and has operated It
ever since either lndlvld~al ly or as Klor's, Inc. Klor's ls as well
equipped as Broadway-Hale to handle all brands of aprltances. Nevertheless,
manufacturers and distributors of such wel I-known bra·nds as General Electric,
RCA, Admlral, Zenith, Emerson and others have conspired among themselves
and with Broadway-Hale either not to sel I to Kl or's or to sel I to It only
at discriminatory prlces and highly unfavorable terms. Broadway-Hale has
used Its "monopollstlc" buying po~er to bring about this situation. The
business of manufacturing, dlstrlbuttng and self Ing household appliances
Is In Tnterstate commerce. The concerted refusa·I to deal with Klor's has
seriously handicapped Its ablllty to compete and has already caused It a
great loss of profits, goodwl I I, reputation and prestige.
The defendants did not dispute these allegations, but sought summary
judgment and dlsmlssal of the complaint for fal lure to state a cause of
actlon. They submltted unchallenged affidavits which showed that there were
hundreds of other household appliance retal lers, some within a few blocks
of Klor's who sold many competing brands of appllances, Including those
the defendants refused to sel I to Kt or's. From the al legations of the complalnt, and from the affldavlts supportlng the motion for summary judgment,
the Dlstrlct Court concluded that the controversy wa.s a "purely private
.quarrel 11 between Klor's and Broadway-Hale, whlch dld not amount to a
"public wrong proscribed by the [Sherman] Act." On this ground the complaint
was dismissed and summary judgment was entered for the defendants. The
Court of 'Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ·afflrmed the summary judgment.
255 F.2d 214. It stated that "a vlolatlon of the Sherman Act requires conduct
of defendants by w~lch the public Is or conceivably may be ultimately
Injured." 255 F.2d at page 233. It held that here the required publlc
Injury was ml ss Ing sf nee "T~ere was no charge or p·roof that by any act
of defendants the price, quantity, or quality offered the publlc was affected,
nor that there was any Tntent or purpose to effect a change In, or an Tnfluence on, prices, quantity, or quallty * * *." Id., at page 230~ The
holdlng, If correct, means that unless the, opportunltles for customers to
buy In a competitive market are reduced, a group of powerful businessmen
may act In concert to deprive a sl.ngle merchant, llke Klar, of the goods he
needs to compete effectlve.ly. We 'granted certlorarl to consider this
t.mpor+ant question In the Admlnlstratlon of the Sherman Act. 358 U.S. 809,
79 s.ct. 23, 3 L.Ed.2d 54.
We thlnk Klor's al legations clearly show one type of trade restraint
and public harm the Sherman Act forbids, and that defendants' affidavits
provide no defense to the charges. Section I of the Sherman Act makes
I I Iega I any contract, comb 1not Ion or consp I racy In restra 1nt of trade, and
§ 2 forbids any person or ccmblnatlon from monopolizing or attempting to
monopollze any part of interstate commerce. In the landmark case of Standard 01 I Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. I, 31 S.Ct. 502,
55 L.Ed. 619, this Court read§ I to prohibit those classes of contracts
or acts which the common law had deemed to be undue restraints of trade
and those which new times and economic conditions would make unreasonable.
Id., at pages 59-60, 31 S.Ct. at pages 515-516. The Court construed§ 2
as maklng "the prohlbltlons of the act al I the more complete and perfect
54.
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by embracing all attempts to reach the end prohibited by the 1st section,
that ts, restraints of trade, by any attempt to monopolfze, or monopollzatlon
thereof***." Id., at page 61, 31 S.Ct. at page 516. The effect of
both sections, the Court said, was to adopt the common-law proscription of
all "contracts or acts which Jt was considered had a monopolistic tendency
***"and which Interfered with the "natural flow" of an appreclable amount
of Interstate commerce. Id., at pages 57, 61, 31 S.Ct. at page 514; Eastern
States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600, 609,
34 S.Ct. 951, 953, 58 L.Ed. 1490. The Court recognized that there were
some agreements whose valldlty depended on the surrounding circumstances.
It emphasized, however, that there were classes of restraints which from
their "nature or character" were unduly restrictive, and hence forbidden
by both the common law and the statute. 221 U.S. at pages 58, 65, 31 S.Ct.
at page 515. As to these classes of restraints, the Court noted, Congress
had determined Its own criteria of publlc harm and It was not for the courts
to decide whether In an lndlvldual case Injury had actually occurred. Id.,
at pages 63-68, 31 s.ct. at pages 517-518-519.
Group boycotts, or concerted refusals by traders to deal with other
traders, have long been held to be In the forbidden category. They have not
been saved by allegatlons that they were reasonable In the specific circumstances, nor by a fallure to show that they "fixed or regulated prices,
parcel led out or I fmlted production, or brought about a deterioration In
quallty." Fashion Originators' Gui Id v. Federal Trade Commission, 312
u.s. 457, 466, 467-468, 61 s.ct. 703, 707, 85 L.Ed. 949. Cf. United States
v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 47 S.Ct. 377, 71 L.Ed. 700. Even
when they operated to lower prices or temporartly to stimulate competition
they were banned. For, as this Court said In Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph
E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211, 213, 71 S.Ct. 259, 260, 95 L.Ed. 219,
"such agreements, no less than those to fix minimum prices, cripple the
freedom of traders and thereby restrain their ablllty to sell In accordance
with their own Judgment." Cf. United States v. Patten, 226 U.S. 525, 542,
33 s.ct. 141, 145, 57 L.Ed. 333.
Plalnly the allegatlons of this complalnt dlsclose such a boycott.
This Is not a case of a slngle trader refusing to deal with another, nor
even of a manufacturer and a dealer agreeing to an exclusive distributorship. Alleged In this complaint Is a wide combination consisting of manufacturers, distributors and a retailer. This combination takes from
Klor's Its freedom to buy appliances In an open competitive market and
drives It out of business as a dealer In the defendants' products. It
deprives the manufacturers and distributors of their freedom to sell to
Klor's at the same prices and condftlons made avallable to Broadway-Hale
and In some Instances forbtds them from selllng to It on any terms whatsoever.
It Interferes with the natural flow of Interstate commerce. It clearly
has, by Its "nature" and "character,"
"monopolistic tendency." As such
It Is not to be tolerated merely because the victim Is Just one merchant
whose business fs so smal I that his destruction makes llttle difference
to the economy. Monopoly can as surely thrive by the elimination of such
small businessmen, one at a time, as It can by driving them out In large
groups. In recognition of this fact the Sherman Act has consistently been
read to forbid all contracts and combinations "which 'tend to create a

a
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monopoly,'',' whether "the tendency Is a creeping one1' or "one that proceeds
at full gallop." International Salt Co. v. United.States, 332 U.S. 392,
396, 68 s.ct. 12, ,s~ 92 L.Ed. 20~

•
'

The Judgment of the Court of Appeals. ls·reversed and the cause Is
remanded to the District Court for trlal.·
Reversed.
NOTES
The fol towing excerpt from Note, Proving Injury to Competition ·in
Private Antitrust Suits Provoked by Concerted Refusals to Deal, 68 Yale
L.J. 940-55 (1959), brlefly describes the background ·of the Klor's case:
To win a private antitrust suit, the lndlvldual competitor
who brings one must demonstrate that his Injury was occasioned by
an Injury to competition. A slmllar rule applies when the Government sues on account of harm to a competitor, but Injury to competition Is then more readf ly established, for federal agencies
ordlnarlly contest only those practices which are felt throughout a
given market. A private claJmant, on the other hand, Is tempted
to as~ert that an Injury to him Is of Itself sufficiently harmful
to competition to violate the antitrust statutes; should the ass~rtlon stand, he would come wlthln section 4 of the Clayton Act, which
provides that "any person who shall be Injured In his business
or property by reason of anything forbidden In the antitrust laws"
may recover treble damages frcm the person vlolatlng the laws.
The courts, however, ·have long been hostl J.e to cl alms which would
turn this section Into a vehlcle for redressing tortl.ous business
practices •. At one time, a section 4 complalnt was consldered defective If It fal led to allege "publ le Injury" In addition to private loss. Although this formallsm Is no longer a prerequisite to
a treble-damage suit, the courts continue to view antitrust leglslatlon as designed excluslvety to protect mar.kets from "undue I Imitations on competitive condltlons"--and not .as a safeguard against
Individual, economic loss. Private recovery fol lows only upon a :
showing that damage to the plaintiff proximately resulted from such
statutory Infractions as price-fixing, tying agreements, and unreasonable restrictions on market entry. Also open to attackare
attempts at monopollzatlon and restraints tending to modify the
comp'etltlve characteristics of a market.
One business practice which frequently provokes private antitrust
action Is denying a trader access to his customers or suppllers.
When such denial results from the Independent, uni lateral action
of Individual customers or suppliers, the antitrust laws generally
countenance the consequences on the theory that a sing le entrepreneur, acting alone, may fashion his business relationships as
he sees f It. When, however, a refusa I to dea I Is u.ndertaken by a
group of competitors acting In concert to coerce a trader, the
courts are quick to outlaw the refusal. Supreme Court dictum has

56.

•

•

categorized boycotts of this type as Illegal per se, and decisional
law condemns them w_lth I lttle examination of their purpose or anticompetitive effeGts. At a minimum, concerted refusals to deal are
prlma facle Illegal and can be Justified only If Intended to achieve
ends unconnected with antitrust policy. This antipathy toward group
boycotts springs In part from the view that antitrust leglslatlon
seeks to promote;free access to markets, and In part from the concluslon that anyi'effectlve boycott, by arttflclally control I Ing
market structure, tends to usurp governmental functions or to create
a monopoly for the boycotting parties. In vlrtually all of the reported cases, additional elements may also have Influenced the decisions. Typically, the boycotting group wielded substantial market
power, and the p(lrsons harmed constituted either a large group of
producers whose &utput, If restricted, would affect prices, or an
open-end class of competitors who had refused or might refuse to
comply with the 6oycotters' demands. Thus, until recently, the
courts had not passed on a concerted refusal to deal directed against
a slnglo trader so small that his ellmlnatlon would not In Itself
affect market price.
A group boycoft against a single trader may well underlie the
section 4 case of Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc.,
now before the federal· courts. Plalntlff Klor's Is a smal I retal I
outlet In the Mission District of San Francisco; defendant
Broadway-Hale owns a chain of department stores one of which
adjoins Klor's. The complatnt alleged that Broadway-Hale had Induced
the other defendants--ten leading radio, televlslon and appliance
manufacturers and their regional dlstrlbutors--not to sell their
products to Klor's. According to a further allegatlon, BroadwayHale purchases such a great volume of these products that It enjoys
sufficient ollgopsonlstlc power to cause the manufacturers to
boycott Klor's on pain of loslng Broadway-Hale's business. Without
denying these allegatlons, the defendants moved for summary Judgment
upon affidavits showing that Klor's could stllf satisfy Its requirements by buying from other manufacturers; that many hunrlreds of reta I I dea I ers se I l app If ances In the San Francl sec area; and that,
In the Mission District alone, over fifty retall outlets carry the
products of the defendant manufacturers.
The district court, In granting summary Judgment for defendants,
characterized th~ complaint as evidencing "purely a private quarrel"
which does not gfve rise to a cause of action under the antitrust
laws. (1956 Trade Cas. 72048 (N.D. Cal.).] On appeal, the Ninth
Circuit affirmed: [255 F.2d 214 (9th Ctr. 1958)] It reasoned that
treble-damage actions serve to Implement antitrust pollcy, and that,
whl le an at legation of "pub I le Injury" Is no longer vita I to a
private complalnt, "The purpose of the ant'ltrust statutes ts to
protect the 'pubj I c' from the harm whl ch fol lows f rem concerted or
monopollsttc conduct designed to acquire control of a market, usually
ccmpetl ti ve, to wh 1ch the pub II c must u ttlmate ty resort. • • •"
Turnlng to the alleged unlawful restraint, the court held that the
refusals to deal were not per se Illegal because the defendants
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neither attempted to secure monopoly power nor sought to control
prices. The court further ruled that a boycott could not be deemed
·to restrain trade unreasonably absent a "ch:arge or proof that by any
act of defendants the price, quantity, or quallty [of goods]
offered the publlc was affected." And the large number of substitute
retan outlets. aval ·lable to consu~rs Indicated that "there has
been no conduct by. whl£h the 'publlc' could concelvably suffer
lnji.,ry • • • • "

tit·

RITCHEY v. GERARD
48 N.M. 452, 152 P.2d 394 (1944)
THREET, Justice.
Appe I Iant brought a su It number 6244 on the cl v I I docket of the DI str Ict
Court within and for McKlnley County, New Mexico, to revive a Judgment
theretofore entered by that court In cause No. 4959. By a trlai amendment,
appellee Interposed the defonse that the Judgment In cause No~/4959, being
based upon a promissory note containing cognovlt provisions Tn contravention of 1941' Comp., Secs. 19-916 and 19-918, Is void.
The findings of fact and concluslons of law made by the trlal court are
to be found In the Judgment as follows, to-wit:
"That on the 26th day of May, 1943, In cause No. 6244 In the District
Court of t he County of McKlnley, State of New Mexico, the plalntlff R. C.
Ritchey f 11ed a complalnt against the defendant E. J. Gerard for the purpose of renewing and reviving a Judgment heretofore entered on tha 3rd day
of June, 1935, In cause No. 4959 of the District Court within and for the
county of McKlnley and State of New Mexico;
"That the Judgment sought to be revived was based upon a certain
complaint fl led In cause No. 4959 on the 29th day of .Aprl I, 1935, wherein
the p I a Int I ff recovered Judgment from the def~ndant on a certa In prom I ssory
note dated January 27th, 1934; and th~t said note upon which Judgment was
obtained was a cognovlt note;
"That In said cause No. 4959 a surr.mons was duly Issued and served
upon the defendant E. J. Gerard, who, however, falled to appear or otherwise answer said complalnt In the time required by law, and Judgment was
obtained against him by default.
"From the facts so" found, the Court concludes as a matter of law:
"I. That the Court has Jurisdiction of this cause and the parties
to this action;
"2. . That cause 6244, wh I ch Is an act Ion to rev Ive the Judgment heretofore found for the plcilntlff, being based upon an actfon orlgfnalty upon a
cognov It note, shou Id.· be d Ism I ssed f
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"3. That the Judgment entered In cause 4959, being based upon a
cognovft note, Is vdfd and of no force and effect."
Based upon the forego Ing f Ind I ngs of .fact and cone 1us Ions of I aw, the
trfal court entered Its Judgment declaring the Judgment In cause No. 4959
null and void and dismissing appellant's cause of action No. 6244.
From this Judgment appellant appeals, assigning error.
upon by appellant for reversal of this case are as follows:

Points rel fed

"I. The court erred In concluding that an action to revive a Judgment
orfgfnal ly based upon a cognovft note should be dismissed.
"2. The court erred In declaring the Judgment rendered In cause No.
4959, being based upon a cognovft note, void."
The question here Is, does the fnclusfon In a promissory note of a
cognovft provision, which Is declared to be unlawful under the Statutes
of New Mexico, make void the entire contract?
Sections 19-916 and 19-918, supra, are respectively as follows:
"It shall be unlawful to execute or procure to be executed as part of
or In connection with the execution of any negotiable Instrument, or
other written contract to pay money, and before a cause of action thereon
shal I have accrued, any contract, agreement, provision or stfpulatfon
giving to any person or persons a power of attorney or authority as attorney
for the maker or endorser thereof, In his name to appear In any court of
record, and waive the service of process In an action to enforce payment
of money clafmed to be due thereon, or authorizing or purporting to authorize
an attorney or agent, howsoever designated, to confess Judgment on such
Instrument for a sum of money to be ascertained In a manner other than by
action of the court upon a hearing after notice to the debtor, whether with
or without an attorney fee, or authorizing or purporting to authorize any
such attorney to release errors and the right of appeal Ing from such Judgment, or to consent to the Issue of execut Ion on s.uch Judgment. Any and
al I provisions herelnabove declared to be unlawful, contained In any contract, stlpulatfon or power of attorney given or entered Into before a
cause of action on such promise to pay, shall have accrued, shall be void."
"Any negotiable Instrument, or other written contract to pay money,
which contains any provision or stfpulatfon giving to any person any power
of attorney, or authority as attorney, for the maker, or any endorser, or
assignor, or other person I fable thereon, and In the name of such maker
endorser, assignor, or o~her obi Igor to appear In any court, whether of
record or Inferior, or to waive the Issuance or personal service of process
In any action to enforce payment of the money, or any part claimed to be
due thereon, or which contains any provision or stipulation authorizing or
purporting to authorize an attorney, agent or other representative be he
designated howsoever, to confess Judgment on such Instrument for a sum of
money when such sum Is to be ascertained, or such Judgment Is to be rendered
or entered otherwise than by action of court upon a hearing after personal
59.

serv Ice upon the debtor, whether wI th or WI tllout' attorney's fee, or wh Ich
contains any provision dr stlpulatlon°authorlzlng or purporting to authorize
any such attorney, agent, or representative to release errors, or the right
of appeal,from any Judgment thereon, or consenting to the Issuance of
execution on such Judgment, Is hereby designated, defined and declared to be
a cognovlt note. Any person, natural or corporate, who directly or lndlrectly
sh8II procure another, or others, to execute as maker, or to endorse, or
assign such cognovlt note, or whoever being the payee; endorsee, or asslqnee
thereof shall accept and retain In his possession any such Instrument, or
whoever shalt conspire or confederate with ano-t:her, or others, for the
purpose of procuring the execution, endorsement or assignment of any such
instrument, or whoever shall aTtempt to recover upon or enforce within this
state any Judgment obtained In any other state or foreign country based
upon any such Instrument, shall be deemed gt:il lty of a misdemeanor and
upon conviction shall be fined fn any sum not less than fifty dollars
($50.00), and not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500.00), to which may
be added fmprt sonment for not
less than th I rty 00) days.".
'
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These sections were apparently taken from Chapters 66 and 227 of the
1927 Session Laws of the State of lndlana, which appear In Burns' Code as
Sections 2-2904 and ~2906, as they are In the exact language of the lndJana
statute, except the last sentence In Sec. 19-916, supra, and the last
sentence 1n Sec. 2-2904, .supra, which read respect1vely as fol lows:
~
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"Any and a 11 prov Is Ions hers f nabove dee I ared 'to be un Iawfu I , conta I ned
ln any contraC't, stlpulatlon or power of attorney given or entered Into
before a cause of action on such promise to pay, shall have accrued, shall
be void."
"Any and all contracts, stlputatlons and powers of attorney given or
entered Into before a cause of action on such promise to-pay, shall have
a.ccrued, sha I.I be vol d."
The statutes of the State of Indiana have been construed by the courts
of that State on sever a I occas f ons. The Iast express I on '1 s to be found In
Simpson et al. v. Fuller, Ind.App., 51 N.E.2d 870, 872. In this case
appellants brought suit to recover upon a condltlonal sales contract whlch
contained a cognovlt clause as defined by the laws of that State. Appellee5
demurred to the complaint on the ground that the contract contained a co~novlt clause and\ was therefore void and unenforceable, as being In vlotatfon
of the sections of the lndlana Code, supra. The trial court s.ustalned the
demurrer and dismissed appellants' complaint. Upon appeal the Appellate
Court of lndfana sa1d:
"Section 2-2906, Burns' (Sec. 398, Baldwln 1 s), Is a penal statute and
should be construed as such. Under It Instruments containing cognovlt
provisions are not d~clared void by express terms. The statute merely
/defines a misdemeanor and prescribes a penalty therefor. It must be construed strictly and cannot be extended or enlarged beyond Its express
provisions.
60.
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"Nor does It appear that Section 2-2904, Burns' (Sec. 399, Baldwin's),
Is Intended to make v.old entire contracts contaln1ng, among other provisions,
cognovlt clauses. It. only Is Intended to make void contract provisions
g Iv Ing power of attorney wI th author I ty to con·fess Judgment on such
Instrument for a sum of money to be ascertained In a manner other than by
action of the court upon a hearing after notice to the debtor. A .study of
this section Impresses us that the purpose and Intent of the legislature
as thereby and therein expressed Is to prevent Judgments from being obtained without notice or service of process by virtue of a power or authority
executed prior to the accrual of a cause of action.
"In the Instant case we are confronted with a contract containing,
In addition to the cognovlt clause, several provisions and agreements, al I
of them wholly within the law. Does the Inclusion therein of the cognovlt
clause make void the entire contract? We think not. Where an agreement
founded on a legal consideration contains several promises, or a promtse tQ.
do several things, and a part only of the things to be done are Illegal,
the promises which can be separated, or the promise, so far as It can be
separated, from the lllegallty, may bo val Id. Thus, where a contract Is
made up of severa I covenants and agre·ements, and one covenant Is I I lega I,
If the Illegal covenant can be eliminated without destroying the symmetry
of the contract as a whole, the courts wlll do so and enforce the remainder.
Jordan v. Kittle, 1928, 88 Ind.App. 275, 150 N.E. 817.

•

"In the Instant case the cognovlt clause In the contract under consideration Is separable without In any wise affecting the remainder of the
contract. Nor did appellants attempt to act under the cognovlt provision.
From the record It appears that appellants fl led their complatnt In due
form and process Issued thereon. From the showing of the complaint appellee
Is Indebted to appellants on a contract and appellants seek relief In a
manner wholly legal.
"Appel lee's demurrer to the second paragraph of complaint should have
been overruled. Other questions here presented are fully resolved by
the foregoing oplnlon.

***
Appel lee argues that the note In cause No. 4959, being In direct contravention and In vlolatlon of Sec. 19-918, supra, was void and of no effect,
and the Judgment based thereon also ls void and of no force and effect.
This argument would carry much weight If we were here dealing only with
Sec. 19-918, supra. In Third National Exchange Bank of Sandusky Ohio et al.
v. D. B. Smith et ux., 17 N.M. 166, 125 P. 632, 635, we said:
"We think the authorities uniformly hold that an act done In vlolatJon
of a statutory prohibition Is void, and confers no right upon the wrongdoer."

•

We also recognized In the same case an exception to this rule:
"We are aware that the rule above stated Is subject to the qualification that when upon a survey of the statute and from Its subject-matter,
6I•
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and the mJschlef,sought to'be preven;ed, It-appears that the Legr,rature
rntended·that the vl.olatton of the statutory prohlbltfon should not render
a contract vo Id , effect must be g I ven to that rntentl on * * *."

•

1

See, also, Delgado et at. v. Dolgado, 42/N:M. 582, 82 P.2d 909,
118 A.LR. 1175.

To arrive a:t the true legrslatlve Intent ,the two Sections, viz.:
Sec. 19-918 rs a
criminal statute and should be construed as such. Under It a promissory
note or other Instruments contatnrng cognovrt provlsrons are not declareEl
void by Qx~ress terms. This section of the statute defines a cognovlt
note and makes It a misdemeanor for any person, natural or corporate to
deal with such notes as fol lows":
·
19-916 ,and 19-918, supra, must be construed together.

"Any person, natural or corporate, who dlrectly or Indirectly shall
procure another, or others~ to execute as maker, or to endorse, or assign
such cognovlt note, or whoever being the payee, endorsee, or assignee
thereof sha I I accept and reta In In h Is posses$ Ion any such Instrument,· or
whoever shal I conspire or confederate with another, or others, for the
purpose of procuring the execution, endorsement or assignment ot any such
Instrument, or whoever shal I attempt to recover upon or enforce within this
state any Judgment obtained In any other state or foreign country based
upon any such . Instrument, sha 11 be deemed gu 11 ty of a mI sdemeanor and upon
conviction shal 11 be flned In any sum not less than fifty dollars ($50.00),
and not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500.00), to which may be added
Imp r I sonment for not Iess than th I rty <30) days."

•
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Sectl. on 19-916, supra, 'does not make void the entire contract ,contalr.lng, among other provisions, cognovlt clauses. It Is manlfest by referring
to the last sentence of that section, that It Is only Intended to make
void the provisions giving power of attorney with authority to ·confess Judgment on such Instruments for a sum of money to be ascertained lria
manner ether than by action of the court upon a hearing after proper servicB
of process. A study of this section loads us to the conclusion that the
purpose and Intent of the leglslature, as therein expressed, Is to prevent
Judgment from b,elng obtalne.d without notice or service of process by virtue
of a power of attornoy executed prior to the accrual of the cause of action.

\

In the case at bar the note, upon which the Judgment In cause No. 4959
was based; contained In addition to the cognovlt clause other provisions
legal In every respect. Does the lncluslon therein of the cognovlt clause
make void the entire note?, Wo think not~ In Simpson v. Fuller, supra,
and Jordan v. Kittle, 88 Ind.App. 275, 150 N.E. 817, It Is said:
"Where an agreement founded on a legal consideration contains several
promises, or a premise to do several things, and a part only of the things
to be done are I I legal, the promises which can be separated, or the promise,
so far as It can be separated, from the I I legal lty, may be val Id. Thu~,
where a .contract Is. mpde up of several covenants and agreements, and orie
covenant ls I I legal, If the ti legal covenant can be el lmlnated without
destroy Ing the symmetry of the contract as a whole, ttle courts wt 11 do so
and enforce the/remainder."
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In the Instant case the cognovlt clause In the note Is separable
without In any wise affecting the remafnder of the note and the obligation
of appellee to pay. It Is admitted by appellee, and the trial court so
found, that the appellant did not attempt to procure a Judgment by virtue
of the cognovlt clause fn the note. It appears from the flndfngs of the
trlal court that In cause No. 4959, appellants fl led their complaint and
summons was duly Issued and served on appellee, who falled to appear or
answer within the time required by law and Judgment was rendered against
him by default. There Is no contention that appellee was not Indebted to
appellant upon tho note In suit In cause No. 4959, and It aftlrmatlvely
appears that appellant obtained Judgment upon said note In a legal manner
and as provided by law.

•

It Is Interesting to note that the Indiana statute Is more susceptlble
to the construction contended for by appellee than Sec. 19-916, supra, of the
New Mexico laws. The lndlana statute declares that any and all contracts,
stlpulattons and powers of attorney given or entered Into before the cause
of action shall have accrued, shal I be void. Under Sec. 19-916, supra, ft
Is provided that any and all provisions declared unlawful, contained tn a
contract given or entered Into before the cause of action shall have accrued,
shall be void; yet the construction placed upon the lndlana statute by
the Courts of that State, as to the Intent and purpose of the teglslature,
was to make void only those provisions In a contract which provide for
Judgment without notice or service of process by virtue of the power or
authority executed prior to the accrual of the cause of action •
The trial court was In error In declaring the Judgment In cause No.
4959 void and dismissing appellant's cause of action.
The Judgment wlll be reversed. The cause wlll be remanded with directions to set aside the Judgment, and proceed with the cause not Inconsistent
herewith. It Is so ordered.
SADLER, C. J., and MABRY, BICKLEY, and BRICE, JJ., concur.
NOTES
(I) It Is a general rule that a contract which purpose Is to violate
some rule of law or publlc pol Icy Is Itself II legal and therefore void.
Section 512 of the Restatement of Contracts defines the "Illegal bargain"
as "a bargain ••• [which] formation or tts performance Is criminal,
-tort lous. or otherw I se opposed to pub 11 c po 11 cy." Wager Ing agreements and
bribery agreements aro obvious examples of this rule.
Does Ritchey v. Gerard fall squarely within the meaning of this definition? Why has the cognovlt clause been outlawed In New Mexico and many
other states?
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l~'OLF v, MARLTON CORP.

57 N.J. Super •. 278, 154 A.2d 625 (App.Div. 1959)
FREUND, J .A.O.

Plalntlffs, husband and wife, Instituted this.action In the Camden
County Court to recover a deposit of $2,450 which they made under a contract
to purchase a house to be built for them by the defendant, The Marlton
Corporation. The sale was never consummated, and the defendant bullder
eventually sold to a third party the hane which had been Intended for the
Wolfs. The theory of the action Is that plaintiffs were at all times ready,
wtlllng, and able to comply with the b~lldlng contract but that the bullder
uni laterally and unjusttflably terminated the contract without returning the
down payment. The County Court Judge, sitting without a jury, concluded In
a written opinion that It was the defendant who refused to perform under
the contract and that consequently a Judgment ln favor of plalntlffs was
dictated. The Marlton Corporation (hereinafter "the builder") appeals.
The agreement of sale, entered Into by the parties on March 8, 1957,
cal led for the construction of a dwel I Ing In defendant's housing develop·
ment In Haddon Township upon the fol towing .terms:
"Cash at signing of th .. s agreement (Inclusive of any
$2,450.00
deposit heretofore paid)
* * *' • ~ * * * * * *
2,450.00
An addltlonal cash payment on or before house closed In
3, I 00.00
Cash at flnal seftlement
16,500.00
Bond and mortgage In the sum of 25 yr. conv. 5-1/2%
Total Purchase Price

*

*

*

*

*

.*

*

*

•

$24,500.00
'*

*

*

"Should Buyer fall to make payment of any additional moneys as herein
mentioned, or fat I to make settlement as herein provided, the sum or sums
paid on a~count may be retained by Seller either on i3Ccount of the purchase
price or as compensation for the charges.and expenses whlch Seller has
susta I ned, as Se II er may e Iect, In wh Tch Iatter case th Is contract sha II
become nu I I and vo Id and a 11 cop Ies· hereon sha 11 be returned to the Se 11 er
for cance 11 atl on."
·
·
It Is undisputed that the bul Ider had completed the "closlng In" of
the house sometime In June 1957 and that plaintiffs dtd not make the second
payment. Their fallure In this respect Is attrrbuted to the conceded
fact that they were never personally notified by the bullder that the house
had been "closed In." After reviewing the testimony, the trral Judge
stated In his opinion that th'e case presented a "slmple question" as to
whether "the plalntlffs were entttled to a notice that the house was closed
rn or whether the defendant, without giving such notice, could clalm a
default***." He concludad that the agreement of sale contemplated the
giving of such notice. Defendant does not, on appeal, cha I lenge this portlon of the opinion below. • • •
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The alternattve ground brlefed on behalf of the bu11der as basts for
a reversal ftxes upon a matter of far greater Import. The point ls captioned: "Buyers breached the agreement of sale by preventing Its performance through threats to resell the house to an undesirable purchaser and
to ruin defendants' bullding business If defendants carried out the contract."
The factual basis for the argument raised Is not developed systematlcally In the briefs. As to those events which contributed to a mutual
unwtlllngness to perform the contract, we are compel led to reconstruct them
piecemeal from the briefs, the opinion of the trial judge, and such portions
of the testimony the appellant has seen flt to submit. It appears that the
eventual collapse of negotiations had lts genesis In marital difflcultles
between the plaintiffs experienced In the summer of 1957. Apparently because of this, plaintiffs Instructed their attorney that they would like
to get out of the agreement of sale. The attorney In turn informed defendant's sales agent, Irving Gltomer, that there were "certain problems here,"
and that plaintiffs would ltke "to get the money back."
Mr. Gltomer testified that he spoke with plaintlffs 1 attorney on at
least three occasions during July and August of 1957. In one such conversation, the attorney told him the Wolfs were ready, wllllng and able to
purchase the home, even if the terms were cash 6 but, as Mr. Gitomer testified:

•

"[T]his conversation was coupled with the fact that they were
reluctant to do It, but, if they had to do It, they would go through
with the sale, and that a subsequent resale would be arranged to
a purchaser who would be undesirable in our tract, and that we would
not be happy wt th the resu Its."
Martin Field had but one telephone conversation
ney, which was In the second week of September. The
possibility of a settlement, Field agreeing to honor
cellation if defendant were al lowed to retain $1,000
Field testified as to what then ensued:

•

with plalntlffs' attortwo discussed the
the request for canof the $2,450 deposit.

"[H]e reiterated in very strong and clear terms that If we did not
accept his offer [of $450] It would be the sorriest move that I
ever made In my building career. I accepted it as a threat, and I
felt that at this point It was imposslble to go ahead and continue
with this thing. The threat was made In the terms that, 'It's all
right •. If you are going to force us--you have got us over a barrel,
and, Jf you are going to force us to make thls settlement, we wt II
make the settlement, but It wlll be the last settlement that you'll
ever make, and lt wlll be the last tract that you will ever but Id in
New Jersey, and It wl II be the last house that you will sell Jn
this tract,' and he continued, he named a few of the attorneys who
llved in the tract, and said, 'Don't have the fellows who live in
your tract tell me I shouldn't do It. It doesn't make any difference
to me. I'm tel I Ing you what I 1m going to do. I'm going to do ft,
and It will be the sorriest thing that you have ever done.' At
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this point~ although" I had offered to refund $1..,450,•.00, ft became
apparent that he was using this as leverage to drive us down to the
$450.00 flgure, and I told him tlO, tha.t we wou,ldn 1 t do ft, and that's
where the th i ng was I eft."

•..·
.

The first question asked of Field on cross-examination was:
"Desplte this conversation of which you speak~ Mr. Field, you
never notified the people to cc,ne to a settlement or clostng of
this thing, did you?"
He rep 11 ed:

"I wzsn't golng to make a closing after someone threatened to
ru In my bu I Id i ng career."
Subsequently, by letter of December 30, 1957, the bullder's counsel
advised the attorney that by reason of plalntlffs' "material breach" of the
contract, It had become 11 null and void 11 and that defendant would retain the
down payment. The letter assigned as the cause of termlnation, "among
other reasons," plaintiffs' failure to make the second payment. At the
oral argument defense counsel (pro hac vice), who had prepared this letter
for 'the but Ider, stated that he h,ad advisedly used the phrase "among other
reasons" because he d id not deem J t d 1screet to make wr Itten reference to
the threat that had actually been made and to which Field testified.
Based upon this letter, which platntlffs maintain consfltutedtthhed
•t
first breach of contract, suit was Instituted for the recovery of
e epos1 .

•

We have already stated the basts upon which the County Court entered
judgment In favor of the plaintiffs. But contrary to the assertlon In
plalntlffs' brief that the court found as a fact that the builder's refusal
to consummate the sale was not justified by any threats, we do not read
the opinion below as reaching any express determtnatton on whether the'
threats, assuming they were made; justified the bulldor In declarlng a
breach and refusl ng further performance .. The court cl tad what lt ca I led
"the so cal led threat"--not in relation to whether there exfsted any
justlffcation for the bul lder's course of conduct, but rather to Ind le.ate
that the bui Ider was admittedly unwl II Ing to perform under the contract
and therefore would not be heard to contend plaintiffs should have made th~
second payment; the question of justiflcatfon for the buf lder's actfon in
rescinding seems not to have been adjudged. Moreover, even if the opinion
ls to be construed as contafnlng an implied determination on the Issue, we
do not conceive that such would be a finding of fact, as distinguished from
the determination of a legal issue. Whether duress exists In a partfcular
transaction is generally a matter of fact, but what in given circumstances
wit I constitute duress Is a mat-ter of law. Accordingly, the scope of
appellate Inquiry as to the correctness of the trial result Is not so
limited as plalntlffs suggest.
It is clear that where one party to a contract, by prevention or
hindrance, makes it Impossible for the other to carry out the terms thereof,
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the latter may regard the contract as breached and recover his damages
thereunder from the first party. Tanenbaum v. Francisco, 110 N.J.L. 599,
604-605, 166 A. 105 (E. & A. 1933); Hanig v. Orton, 119 N.J.L. 248, 252,
195 A. 812 (Sup.Ct. 1938); 4 Corbin, Contracts (1951), § 947, p. 813.
It Is also clear that ff the performance ls prevented by physical threats,
the threatened party may deslst from performing, treat the contract as
breached, and recover damages. He need not seek police protection or a
judicial order to shield him In his performance of the contract. Kroop v.
Scala, 5 N.J.Misc. 89, 135 A. 501 (Sup.Ct. 1927). The builder directs our
attention to the last-cited case In particular. There a house owner had
threatened a painting contractor that "If he went Into the house to work
he would cut his head off." 5 N.J.Misc. at page 90, 135 A. at page 501.
The court held the contractor was entitled to terminate the contract and
to recover his profits; he was not obliged to run the risk that the owner
would carry out his threats. Defendant urges that, except for the degree
of sophistication, there ls no real difference between a threat to cut one's
head off, there, and a threat to cut one's business head off, here.
Plaintiffs contend, however, that threats to do bodily Injury Involve
an obviously distinguishable form of coercion and that the present case
ls not one In which a party has physically prevented the other from carrying out the terms of a contract. We read I ly assent to the latter part
of this argument; defendant was not physically prevented from enforcing the
contract. But a distinction depending on the kind of pressure exerted
carries little weight. "[D]uress Is tested, not by the nature of the
threats, but rather by the state of mind Induced thereby In the victim."
Rubenstein v. Rubenstein, 20 N.J. 359, 368, 120 A.2d I I, 15 (1956). See
also Wise v. Midtown Motors, Inc., 231 Minn. 46, 42 N.W.2d 404, 20 A.L.R.2d
735 (Sup.Ct. 1950); 17 C.J.S. Contracts§ 175, p. 534, text at note 60.
And In the present case, when plalntfffs 1 attorney threatened the builder
that he would be ruined If the Wolfs were to be held to the bargain, the
Impress was the same as If physical pressure had been exerted. In the
light of the Rubenstein case, It Is significant, and perhaps crucially so,
that defendant was as effectively prevented from forcing the Wolfs to.comply with the contract as If a more Immediate form of coercion had been
employed.
Yet It was not Indicated In the Rubenstein case that a party Ts to be
relieved of the consequences of his action In al I Instances where the
pressure used has had Its designed effect, Tn al I cases where he has been
deprived of the exercise of his free wT I I and constrained by the other
to act contrary to his lncllnatlon and best Interests. So much ls evident
from the court's qual1flcatlon that "the pressure must be wrongful, and
not all pressure Ts wrongful." 20 N.J. at page 367, 120 A.2d at page 15.
It Ts also evident from the reference to 5 WT llfston, Contracts (rev. ed. 1937),
§§ 1606, 1607, pp. 4500, 4503. That authority, Jn language more nearly
appropriate to the facts here, states:
"Save under except Iona I cl rcumstances, the threatened act must
be wrongful; ft ls not enough that the person obtaining the benefit
threatened Intentionally to Injure the business, provided his
threatened act was legal; and certainly there ls no broad doctrine
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forbidding a person from1 ·taklng advantage of the adversity of
another to drive a hard ba'rgatn." Ibid.,, S 1618, p. 452-3.
In this regard, plalntlffs assert that, once they bought the house,
they had a legal right to set I to whomever they wished. They rely on the
fami II ar genera I ru Ie to the effect that a threat to do what one has a Iega I
right to do does not constitute duress. See, e.g., Smith v. White, 125 N.J.L.
498, 500, 16 A.2d 628 (E. & A. 1940); Standard Radio Corp. v. Triangle
Radio Tubes, Inc., 125 N.J.L. 131, 14 A.2d 763 (Sup. Ct. 1940); 17A Am.Jur.,
Duress and Undue Influence,§ 18, p. 580. Compare Id.,§ II, p. 572, text
at note 14. That proposition, however, Is not an entirely correct statement
of the law of duress as It has developed In this jurisdiction. Under the
modern view, acts or threats cannot constitute duress. unless they are wrongful; but a threat may be wrongful even though the act threatened Is lawful.
We have come to deal, In terms of the business compulsion doctrine, with
acts and threats that are wrongful, not necessarily In a legal, but In a
moral or equitable sense. See, generally, Woodside Homes, Inc. v. Town of
Morristown, 26 N.J. 529, 544, 141 A.2d 8 (1958); S. P. Dunham & Co. v.
Kudra, 44 N.J.Super. 656, 131 A.2d 306 (App.Div. 1957); Annotation, 79 A.L.R.
655 (1932).
The leading case In this State on the subject of morQI duress Is Mii ler
v. Eisele, I I I N.J.L. 268, 275-276, 168 A. 426, 427 CE. & A. 1933), where
the court quoted approvingly the definition of duress set forth In the
Restatement, Contracts,§ 492(g), p. 941:
"Acts or threats cannot constitute duress unless they are wrongfu I, even though they exert such pressure as to prec I ude the exerelse of free judgment. But acts may be wrongful within the meaning
of this rule though they are not crlmlnal or tortious or In violation of a contractual duty. Just as acts contracted for may be
against publlc policy and the contract .vitiated for that reason,
though the law Imposes no penalty for doing them, so acts that Involve abuse of legal remedies or that are wrongful In a moral sense,
If ·made use of as a means of causing fear, vitiate a transaction Induced by that"fear, though they may not In themselves be legal wrongs."
Further lnstruGtlve Is the decision In Hochman v. Zlgler's Inc., 139
N.J .Eq. 139, 143, 50 A.2d 97, 100 (Ch. 1946). In that case, when the lease
of a smal I businessman expired, the lessor refused to renew. The lessor
said, however, that he would lease to a purchaser of the business If the
tenant could find one. The tenant proceeded to find a buyer who agreed to
pay $7,800, but the lessor refused ·to execute a lease with the buyer unless
the tenant paid over to him $3,500 of the purchase price. The tenant, whose
buslness was worth but a mere $500 If forced to liquidate, succumbed to
the lessor's pressure. Notwithstanding that the defendant-lessor had the
undoubted legal right to refuse to execute a lease, the court concluded that
any defense on this ground was but a 11 mere legalism." The lessor was
"compe 11 ed to d I sgorge, 11 the court stat Ing:
11

Judgment whether the threatened action Is wrongful or not Is
colored by the object of the threat. If the threat Is made to Induce
the opposite party to do only what Is reasonable, the court Is apt
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to consider the threatened action not wrongful unless it Is actionable in itself. But ff the threat is made for an outrageous purpose, a more critical standard is applied to the threatened action."

***
The sale of a development home to an "undesirable purchaser" Is, of
course, a perfectly legal act regardless of any adverse effect It may have
on the fortunes of the developer's enterprise. But where a party for
purely malictous and unconscionable motives threatens to resel I such a home
to a purchaser, specially selected because he would be undesirable, for the
sole purpose of Injuring the but lder 1 s business, fundamental fairness requires the conclusion that his conduct in making this threat be deemed
"wrongful,'' as the term is used In the law of duress. In our judgment,
wrongfu I pressure was brought to bear on the defendant; he was thereby compe I led to forego the right to hold plaintlffs to the contract they voluntarily signed.
As we noted above, If one party prevents another from perfon,ilng a
contract, the latter may treat the contract as breached, and recover damages.
There Is no reason why, In the application of this rule, economic or moral
duress should not be treated as the equivalent of physical duress. We
therefore hold that ff the threats were In fact made and ff the defendant
actually believed that they would be carried out, and Fleld 9 s wl II was
thereby overborne, defendant was justified In treating the contract as
breached and ts entitled to recover whatever damages resulted therefrom.
We have decided that the interests of justice cal I for a remand of
this case to the County Court. This disposition ts made necessary by the
circumstance that the record on appeal is somewhat obscure In several
respects, now to be discussed. There ls first the question as to whether
the trlal judge gave credence to the testimony of defendant's representatives
concerning the making of the threats by plaintiffs' attorney. The opinion
of the court makes reference. to a "so ca 11 ed threat, 11 but th Is term I no Iogy
does not clearly make known what the actual findings of the trlal judge
were In this respect. This Important factual issue should not be pen11ltted
to remaln in doubt. Attention should also be directed to the question of
whether or not the defendant's wi II was really overborne; that ls, whether
Fteld actually believed plaintiffs' attorney would carry out hls threat
and whether Field was actually fearful of the result.

*

**

Moreover, should the trial Judge decide In defendant's favor on the
issue of actual duress, there remains for adjudication the actual amount by
which defendant was damaged by reason of plaintiffs' breach. Although the
agreement of saie provides for liquidated damages, such provision Is operative only upon the contingency that the buyer fat led to make additional
payments or fal led to make settlement, neither of which, as we have seen,
ts the gravamen of the defense. It wll I therefore be necessary for the
court, upon remand, to deten11ine, from the present record If it can, whatever damages defendant sustained as a result of plalntlffs' breach.
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***
The judgment Is remande.d for further proceed I ngs not I neons I stent
with this opinion.
NOTES
(I) What Is the basis for concluding that a contract Is unenforceable
because of duress? Is It because the "Injured" party was denied freedom of
choice? Or Is It because of a social policy against the Inequality of·
bargaining positions? Is the unconscionable contract I I lustrated in the
Williams.case, which follows, merely an extension of the duress doctrine?
(2) Note, Economic Duress After the Demise of Free Will Theory:
Proposed Tort Analysis, 53 Iowa L. Rev. 892-900 (1968):

A

When one party wrongfully threatens another with severe economic
loss If he does not enter a proposed contract, and the threatened
party acquiesces solely because of the wrongful threat, the injury
to the threatened party may be redressed through the Iega I doctrine
of economic duress. This doctrine may be used as an affirmative
defense In an action to enforce the coerced contract as the basis for
a restitution suit to recover payments made under the coerced contract
or as support for a tort action for damages resulting from the coerced
contract. The limits of the doctrine, however, are not clear, and
the courts have not used consistent standards for a finding of
duress. It is the function of this Note to Investigate the purpose
of the economic duress doctrine and to formulate analytical crlteri.a
applicable to al I economic duress cases.
Duress arose at common law as an adjunct to tort law. Rel lef was
Initially restricted to cases In whlch a transfer of property resulted
from threats of physical violence or the actual Imprisonment of the
victim. The courts further. requl red that the threats or pressures
be sufficient to overcome the wl 11 of a man .•of "ordinary firmness."
These restrictions were gradually relaxed, and the doctrine of duress.,
was extended Into the area of eyonomlc pressure, although Its relationship to tort law was maintained. The first economic pressure
recognized as duress was the wrongful detention of another's property.
This crude economic pressure, Independently wrongful as a tort, was
Iabe I Ied "duress of goods," and It rep resented a great advance In
the development of economic duress.
American courts In the nineteenth century ex;panded the concept
of duress to Invalidate transfers Induced by more subtle economic
pressure. Guided by the rationale of equity courts in undue Influence
cases and by the preval ling subjective wil I theory of contracts,
the courts eventually rejed'ed the "ordinary firmness" test in, favor
of a subjective test for duress. Under this test, agreements were
held to be voidable for lack of free contractual consent if the court
determined that the threats or actions of the stronger party actually
overcame the victim's wll I. Since the early twentieth century, most
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American courts have used this subjective test in cases of both
economic and physical duress.
The free wll I concept, however, has serious shortcomings. Because both normal contracts and those formed under duress result
from a choice between alterhatlve evi Is, It Is Impossible to distinguish one situation from the other on the basts of any difference
In the freedom of the consent. The free wl I I test, therefore, has
little analytical value In ttself, and many writers have. begun to
equate a finding of duress to a moral Judgment on the fairness of
the alternatives presented by the threatening party •. These writers
have presented many different standards for determining whether the
pressures exerted rise to the leve~ of duress. One authority focused
on the ~'essentl a I and suff I cl ent" elements of duress, wh I ch he found
to be the wrongfulness of the threats and the Inadequacy of alternative legal remedies open to the threatened party at the time of the
threats. Another writer rejected these factors and argued that the
requ Is i tes. for a find Ing of duress shou Id be unequa I barga In Ing
positions of the parties and a disproportionate exchange resulting
In unj~st enrichment to the stronger party.

,'

The theoretl ca I confusion surround Ing the duress area is reflected In the judicial decisions. Courts appear to give controlllng weight to a variety ;Of factors, Including relative bargaining
positions of the parties, adequacy of alternative legal remedies,
gravity of the threatened evil, wrongfulness or I I legality of the
threats, fairness of the resulting bargain, and ratification by the
allegedly coerced party. Some courts have held that there can be no
duress If the victim nad an opportunity to consult with a lawyer,
If he had time for deliberation and reflection between the time of
the threats and the time of the agreement, if he had knowledge of
a II the facts, or if the ove rwhe Iml ng pressure was the resu It of
external circumstances. A few courts have decided duress cases
with9ut resort to any theoretical or analytical framework, and others,
recognfzlng the fluidity and vagueness of the duress doctrine, have
concluded that each case must be decided solely on, Its own facts.
These discrepancies In decisional factors employed, together with
the ambiguity of the common free wlll test, have contributed to lack
of predictabi flty, Inaccurate use of precedents, confusion between
the functions of judge and Jury, and timidity in the extension of
the duress doctrine.
II.

Purpose and Classlflcation of Duress Doctrine
A.

Purpose

The analytical confusion In the duress area reflects a confusion
concerning the purpose of the duress doctrine. Clarification of
this purpose will facllftate classification of duress as a tort,
conTract, or quasl~contract action, and allow the use of an established analytical scheme for deallng,wlth duress cases. Several
theories have been advanced to explain the purpose of the duress
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doctrine. Roscoe Pound thought the purpose was to protect an Individual's Interest fr the exercise of his free wl II. This theory,
however, does not adequately reflect the principles underlying duress.
Duress law does not compensate the lndivld~al for every Infringement
of his right to exercise his free .wl 11. No recovery Is al lowed
unless an economic loss results. Furthermore, even when a loss resu~ts, Pound's theory does not help to determine If it should be
compensated, because his theory rests on the unsupportable premise
that free wl I I Is present in the normal contract case and absent in
cases involving duress. Both normal and coerced contracts result
from a choice between aJternatlve evils, and al I contracts Involve
some degree of coercion. Under a strict application of Pound's
theory the wrongfulness of the pressures should derive solely from
their tendency to deprive a victim of hfs free wl I I. However, most
courts require an external showing that the pressure exerted was
wrongful, independent of a showing of Its tendency to deprive the
victim of his free wil I.
Another theory, advanced by John P. Dawson, states that the purpose of a duress action is to prevent unJust enrichment resulting
from unequal bargaining positions. The concept of unjust enrichment,
however, focuses on wrongful retention of benefits, ignoring the
wrongfu 1.ness of the means used to obta In the benef Its. Thel"e may
be unjust enrichment through a disproportionate bargain without
wrongful threats, but recovery In that case, through restitution
of the excessive benefit, Is logically unrelated to duress. The
concept of duress applies only to situations In which the means
used to obtain a benefit are wrongful. The coercer Is unjust~y
enriched because the means employed to gain enrichment are wrongful,
and the prlncfple of unjust enrichment applies only as a corollary
to the primary culpability princlple.
Another writer, Kenneth S. Carlston, has argued that the purpose
of the duress doctrine Is to insure substantial equality in bargaining
position, thereby protecting the·bargalning process. This purpose,
however, when applied to economic duress, Is difficult to distinguish
from Carlston 1 s formulation of the purpose of antitrust law~ Both
aim at control ling abuses in the exercise of economic power .. Carlston's
analysis leaves unclear what should be the proper scope of the legislative antitrust remedy in relation to the judicial remedy of
duress. If both duress doctrine and antitrust law aim at controlling abuses of economic power, It Is necessary to distinguish the
situation to which each properly applies.
A complete description of the purpose of economic duress doctrine,
therefore, should properly describe the interest to be protected,
accounting for the requirement that the coercing pressure be wrongful, and distinguish the duress doctrine from antitrust law. It has
been established that the duress doctrine does not protect the
personal interest In the exercise of the free wl I I. Two possible
protectable economic interests, however, can be Isolated: the
economic Interest which Is threatened by the threatened alternative
72.
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to the agreement, and the economic interest which is damaged by the
coerced agreement. It is clear that the doctrine of economic duress
protects only the latter economic interest, because the threat is
never carried out where the duress is effective. The compensation
is measured by the degree of injury caused by the coerced agreement.
The wrongfulness of the coercer's conduct derives from the fact
that the threatened party was forced to accept the contract, not
from any inherent wrongfulness of the act threatened. Ordlnarl ly
a party may threaten to do what Is lawful; however, a coercer's
threats may be wrongful even though the threatened action would have
been legal. The key factor, therefore, must be the fact that the
threatened action is an unreasonable alternative to an injurious
contractual demand in a bargain situation. The wrongfulness of the
coercer's conduct must be related to the unreasonableness of the
alternatives which he presents to the weaker party In a bargaining
situation. The Inherent wrongfulness of either alternative Is relevant only insofar as it shows the unreasonableness of the alternatives.
The purpose of the duress doctrine, therefore, ls to prevent a
stronger party from offering an unreasonable choice of alternatives
to a weaker party In a bargain situation.

•

This formulation of the purpose of duress doctrine permits a distinction between the scope of judicial duress doctrine and that of
legislative antitrust law. This distinction depends on the different
Interests protected by the two doctrines. Antitrust law aims at
protecting the general societal interest in the maintenance of competition In a free market from the anticompetltTve accumulation of
monopolistic economic power. Duress actions protect an individual's
economic interests from the unreasonable exercise of economfc power
In a bargain situation. The different Interests protected lead to
different requirements for a successful action fn the two fields.
Proof of an antitrust violation requires a showing that competition
was reduced by the anticompetitive action. Proof of duress, on the
other hand, requires a showing that an Individual's economic interests
were injured. Similarly, different standards of wrongfulness apply
in the two areas. In antitrust law, the wrongfulness of the defendant's conduct derives solely from its tendency to decrease competition. The reasonableness of the means used to reduce competition
is not decisive. In duress actions the wrongfulness of the coercer's
conduct derives from the unreasonableness of the means used to force
the other party into an Injurious contract. Thus, consistent with
the different wrongfulness standards, a party may be guilty of an
antitrust violation because an anticompetitive practice has a
coercive effect, but be innocent of duress because the alternatJves

he presents in the tndtvldual bargain situations are reasonable.
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WILLIAMS v. WALKER-THCMAS Ft.JRNITURE CO.
350 F.2d, 445 (D.C.Clr.; l965)

J. SKELLY WRIGHT, Circuit Judge:
I

'

,

Appel lee, Walker-Thomas Furniture Company, operates a retaf I .furniture
store In the District of Columbia. During the period from 1957 to 1962 each
appel I ant in these cases purchased a number of household items from Walker-_
Thomas, for which payment was to be made In lnstal lments. The terms of
each purchase were contained ln a printed form contract which set forth the
value of the purchased item and purported to lease the Item to appellant
for a stipulated monthly rent payment. The contract then provided, In
substance, that title would remain in Walker,..Thomas until the total of all
the monthly payments made equaled the stated value of the item, at which
ttme appellants could take title. In the event of a default In the payment
of any monthly installment, Walker-Thomas could repossess the Item.
The contract further provided that 11 the amount of each periodical installment payment to be made by [purchaser] to the Company under this present
lease shal I be inclusive of and not in addition to the amount of each
installment payment to be made by [purchaser] under such prior leases, bl I Is
or accounts; , and a I I payments now and hereafter made by [purchaser] sha 11
be credited rorata on all outstandin leases, bills and accounts due the
Company by purchaser at the time each such payment is made.
(Emphasis
added.) The effect of this rather obscure provision was to keep a balance
due on every item purchased unti I the balance due on al I Items, whenever
purchased, was liquidated. As a result, the debt Incurred at the time of
purchase of each Item was secured by the right to repossess all the Items
previously purchased by the same purchaser, and each new f tem purchased
automatically became subject to a security Interest arising out of the
previous dealings.
'
On May 12, 1962, appel Iant Thorne purchased an Item described as a
Oaveno, three tables, and two lamps, having total stated value of $391.10.
Shortly thereafter, he defaulted on his monthly payments and appellee sought
to rep levy al I the items purchased since the first transaction fn 1958.
Similarly, on Apri I 17, 1962, appal I ant WI I If ams bought a stereo set of
stated value of $514.95.1 She too defaulted shortly thereafter, and
appel lee sought to rep levy all the items purchased since December, 1957.
The Court of General Sessions granted judgment for appel lee. The District
of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed, and we granted appellants' motion
for leave to appeal to this court.

Footnotes have been renumbered--some have been omitted.
I.

At the ttme of this purchase her account showed a balance of $164
still owing from her prior purchases. The total of al I the purchases
made over the years in question came to $1,800. The total payments
amounted to $1,400.
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Appellants' prfncipal contentJon, rejected by both the trial and the
appellate courts below, is that these contracts, or at least some of them,
are ,unconscionable and, hence, not enforceable. In its opinion in Williams
v. Walker-Thomas _Furhiture Company, 198 A.2d 914, 916 {1964), the District
of Columbia Court of Appeals explained its rejection of this contention as
fol lows:
"Appel I ant's second argument presents a more serious question.
The record reveals that prior to the last purchase appel Iant had
reduced the balance in her account to $164. The last purchase, a
stereo set, raised the balance due to $678. Significantly, at the
time of this and the preceding purchases, appellee was aware of
appellant's financial position. The reverse side of the stereo
contract listed the name of appel lant 1 s social worker and her $218
monthly stipend from the government. Nevertheless, with full
knowledge that appellant had to feed, clothe and support both herse If and seven ch ll dren on th Is amount, appe I lee sold her a $514
stereo set.

e

'

"We cannot condemn too strongly appel lee's conduct. It raises
serious questions of sharp practice and irresponslble business
dealings. A review of the legislation in the District of Columbia
affecting retai I sales and the pertinent decisions of the highest
court in this jurisdiction disclose, however, no ground upon which
this court can declare the contracts in question contrary to
publlc pol Icy. We note that were the Maryland Retail lnstal lment
Sales Act, Art. 83 §§ 128-153, or Its equlvalent, in force in the
District of Columbia, we could grant appellant appropriate relief.
We think Congress should consider corrective legislation to protect
the public from such exploitive contracts as were utilized In the
case at bar."
We do not agree that the court lacked the power to refuse enforcement
to contracts found to be unconscionnble. In other jurisdictions, it has
been held as a matter of common law tha-t unconscionable contracts are not
enforceable. Whl le no decision of this court so holdtng has been found, the
notion that an unconscionable bargain should not be given ful I enforcement
is by no means novel. In Scott v. United States, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.)
443, 445, 20 L.Ed. 438 (1870), the Supreme Court stated:
"* * * If a contract be unreasonable and unconscionable,
but not void for fraud, a court of law wl I I give to the party who
sues for Its breach damages, not according to its letter, but only
such as he is equitably entltled to.***"
Since we have never adopted or rejected such a rule, the question here presented is actually one of first Impression.
Congress has recently enacted the Uniform Commercial Code, which
specifically provides that the court may refuse to enforce a contract which
it finds to be unconscJonable at the time It was made. 28 D.C.CODE § 2-302
(Supp. IV 1965). The enactment of this section, which occurred subsequent
75.
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to the contracts here tn suit, does nbt mean that the common'law of the
District of .Columbia was otherwise at the time of enactment, nor does It
p rec I udet tlid.e co urttf ran adop +t ng a s Imt I I a.r rtu Ie ti n thee exe rel se of its
powers o eve 1op he c(lllmon 1aw for he Dis r 1c of .olumbia. In fact,
in view of the absence of prior authority on the point, we consider the
congressional adoption of S 2-302 persuasive authority for fol lowing the
rationale of the cases from which the section is expllcttly.derlved. Accordingly, we hold that where the element of unconsclonabf lfty ts present at
the time a contract Is made, the contract should not be enforced.

•.

Unconscionablllty has generally been recognized to Include an absence
of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract
terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party. Whether a meaningful choice ls pres~nt In a particular case can only be determined by consideration of al I the circumstances surrounding the transaction. ,In many
cases the meaningfulness of the choice Is negated by a gross inequality of
bargaining power. 2 The manner in which the contract was entered Is also
relevant to this consideration. Did each party to the contract, considering his obvious education or lack of It, have a reasonable opportunity to
understand the terms of the contract, or were the Important terms hidden in
a maze of fine print and minimized by deceptive sales practices? Ordinarily,
one who signs an agreement without full knowledge of its terms m!ght be
held to assume the risk that he has entered a one-sided bargain.

2.

See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., supra Note 2, 161 A.2d at
86, and authorities there cited. Inquiry Into the relative bargaining
power of the two partle~ ts not an Inquiry wholly divorced from the
general question of unconscionabf llty, since a one-sided bargain fs
itself evidence of the Inequality Qf the bargaining parties. This
fact was vaguely recognized in the common law doctrine of Intrinsic
fraud, that ls, fraud which can be presumed from the grossly unfair
nature of the terms of the contract·. See the oft-quoted statement of
Lord Hardwlcke tn Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen, 28 Eng. Rep. 82,
100 ( 1751):

" ***[Fraud] may be apparent from the. intrinsic nature and
subject of the bargain Itself; such as no man In his senses
and not under deluslon would make***."
And cf. Hµme v. United States, supra Note 3, 132 U.S. at 413, 10 S.Ct.
at 137, where the Court characterized the English cases as "cases In
which one party took advantage of the other's ignorance of arithmetic
to impose upon him, and the fraud was apparent from the face of the contracts." See also Greer v. Tweed, supra Note 3.
3.

See RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS 8 70 ( 1932); Note', 63 HARV. L. REV. 494 { 1950).
See also Daley v. People's Bui ldlng, Loa;;-,;-savtngs Ass'n, 178 Mass. 13,
59 N.E. 452, 453 (1901), fn which Mr. Justice Holmes, wh,1/e slttrng on
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, made this observation:
"***Courts are less and less disposed to Interfere wtth parties
making such contracts as they choose, so long as they interfere
with no one's welfare but their own.*** It will be understood
that we are speaking of parties standing ln an equat position where
neither has any oppressive advantage or power***."
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But when a party of lfttle. b~rgalnlng power, and hence llttle real choice,
signs a canmerclally ,unreasonabte contract with little or no knowledge of.
Its terms, It Is hardly llkety that his consent, or even an objective manifestation of his consent, was ever given to al 1. the terms. In such a case
the usual rule that the terms of the agreement are not to be questioned
should be abandoned and the court should consider whether the terms of the
contract are so unfair that enforcement should be withheld.
In determining reasonableness or fairness, the primary concern must
be with the terms of the contract considered In light of the circumstances
existing when the contract was made. The test Is not slmple, nor can It be
mechanically applled. The terms are to be considered "In the tight of the
general canmerc!al background and the canmerctal needs of the particular
trade or case." Corbin suggests the test as being whether the terms are
11
so extreme as to appear unconscionable according to the mores and business
practfces of the time and place." I CORBIN, .2.e_. cit. supra Note 2. We
think this formulation correctly states the test to be applied lnrthose
cases where no meaningful choice was exercised upon entering the contract.
'
Because the trlal court and
the appellate court dl.d not feel that
enforcement could be refused, no findings were made on the possible unconsclonablltty of the contracts In these cases. Since the record Is not
sufftctent for our decf ding the Issue as a matter of law, the i;:ases must
be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

So ordered.

••

DANAHER, Circuit Judge (dissenting):
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals obviously was as unhappy about
the situation here presented as any of us can possibly be. Its opinion tn
the WI I II ams case, quoted In the majority text, concludes: "We think Congress should consider correctfve leglslatlon to protect the public'from
such exploitive contracts as were utilized In the case at bar."
My view Is thus surrmed up by an able court which made no finding that~
there had actually been sharp practice. Rather the appel Iant soems to havo
known precisely where she stood.
There are many aspects of public policy here Involved. What Is a
luxury to some may seem an outright necessity to others. Is publlc oversight
to be required of the expenditures of relief funds? A washing machine,
e.g., tn the hands of a relief cllent might become a fruitful source of
income. Many relief clients may well need credit, and certain business estab i I shments wI I·~ take I ong chances on the sa I e of Items, expect Ing the I r

pricing pollcles will afford a degree of protection commensurate with the
risk. Perhaps a remedy when necessary wt II be found within the provts1ons
of the "Loan Shark" law, D.C.CODE SS 26-601 et~· (1961).

4.
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Comment, Uniform Commercial Codes 2~307.
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· I mentlon1 suqh 1J1attars· ori1y ,to. empl;lasfze the des.1tt.abftlty/pf a cauttcus
approach to any such 1 protHem,. perttcularly since .the law fpr so long .has
al lowe~ parties s~h gre,at iatltu.de hr making their qwn contracts..' I dare .
say there musf ann~ally be thousands upon thousands of Installment credit .
transactions fn this Jurlsdfctfon, and one can only speculate as .to the
effect, the decision tn these cases wllJ have.

It

1

I Join the District of Columbla Court of Appeals In Its disposition
of the Issues.
LEFF, UNCONSCIONABILITY AND THE COOE--THE EMPEROR'S NEW CLAUSE
1
115 U. Pa. L .Rev. 485, 547-59 ( 1967)

***
The Cases ·11 usrng" 2-302
• • • Strtctly speaking, only orie reporte\::l case rel Jes upon section
2-302 <;>f. the Code even as an a I ternatl ve ground of ho Id Ing. 1 In Ame.r I can
Home lmtrovement, Inc. v. Maciver, [105 N.H. 435, 201 A.2d 886 ( 1964)]
the pla nflff ·was fn the business of sel lfng and tnstal ffng home Improve.:.
ments •. It agreed with the defendant to "furnish iand lnstal I 14 combination
windows .and one door" and "fllntcoat the sfde wells" on de'fendant's h.ome,
all for $1,759.00 .. Since the defendant w~s apparently unwllllng or.unable
to pay cash, the plalntlff undertook to arrange lbng-term financing, and
· furnished defendant with an application to a flnance company (apparently
In some way allfed or aff.lllated with the plelntlff). This application
was shortly "accepted," and defendant was notified In writing thathfs paymen"ts.0 for the Improvements would be $42.81 per month for stxty months
(a grand total of $2,568.60) which Included "prfhclpal, Interest and lffe
and dtsabf lfty Insurance.'' Plaintiff commenced work, but after ft had
comp rated on I y a neg 11 gt b I e port I on of the job It was asked by defen.dant
to stop and It complied, thereafter suing defendant for damages for breach
of contract.

a

•·.

On these facts, the New Hampshire court, need never have reacht3d any
unconsctonabl llty question
There was, fn effect In .the Jurisdiction a
"truth-In-lending" statute 2 which applfed to the transaction. The court

.,.Footnotes
I.

2.

have been r~numbered--some have been omitted •

This. Is not strictly true, perhaps. One Referee In Bankruptcy recently
held two 1ecurlty agreements 11 unconscfonable," purportedly relying on
UCC S 2-302. Mafter of Elkins-Dell Mfg. Co. (E.O. Pa.); Matter of
Dorset Steel Equipment Co. CE.O. Pa.), both described at 39 Ref~ J.
115-16 ( 1965). On appeal, the\Dlstrfct Court remanded both cases for
further factual development, but declJned speclflcally to hold 8 2-302
applicable to nbnsales agreements. In re Elklns-Dell Mfg. Co., 253
F. Supp~ 864, 873 n.4 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 8 399-B:2 (Supp. 1965) forbids the extens~on of
credit unless at the time thereof.,the borrower Is furnished
78.
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could have relied upon that statute to strike the contract, and Indeed did
so as an alternative ground of decision. But the court most speclflcally
made It a point not to rest Its decision solely upon the disclosure statute.
It said:
There ts another and Independent reason why the recovery should
be barred In the present case because the transaction was unconscionable. "The courts have often avoided the enforcement of
unconslonable provisions In long printed standardized contracts,
In part by the process of 'lnterpretatlon 1 against the parties
using them, and In part by the method used by Lord Nelson at
Copenhagen." I Corbin, Contracts, s. 128 ( 1963}. Without using
either of these methods reliance can be placed upon the Unifonn
Commercial Code CU.C.C. 2-302(1}} [quotation of section omitted].
Inasmuch as the defendants have received little or nothing of
value and under the transaction they entered Into they were paying
$1,609 for goods and services valued at far less, the contract should
not be enforced because of Its unconscionable features. This ts not
a new thought or a new rule In this jurisdiction. See Morrl I I v.
Bank, 90 N.H. 358, 365, 9 A.2d 519, 525; "It has long been the law
In this state that contracts may be declared void because unconscfon11
able and oppressive.
Al I right, then. As of the time of writing, the only case which has
re II ed upon sect Ion 2-302 as a bas Is of dee 1s I on has dee I ded that II unconsci onab I e11 means "too expensive." And certainly there Is no Immutable prlnclple
displayed In fixed stars that would make that particular meaning of unconsclonable lnconcetvable. I have earlier suggested that In fact that was
the primary meaning of unconsctonabl llty In some of the early drafts of the
Code, and that It was I t s ~ meaning as used by courts of equity. Certainty the Idea that a s t ~ l y disproportionate exchange should be
voidable has not destroyed the commerce of the many jurisdictions which
utl llze a laeslo enormls doctrine In one fonn or another. On the other

a clear statement In writing setting forth the finance charges,
expressed In dol tars, rate of Interest, or monthly rate of
charge, or a combination thereof, to be borne by such person
In connection with such extension of credit as originally
scheduled.
The court concluded reasonably ehough that the requirements of this
statute had not been met by the plaintiffs, and that
In the circumstances of the present case . • . the purpose
of the disclosure statute will be Implemented by denying
recovery to the plaintiff on Its contract and granting the
defendants' motfon to dismiss.
IO~N.H. at 439, 201 A.2d at 888.
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hand one may c~rtalnl\/ specylate on wh~ther th~ legts,-atu('fS whfch have
f Iocked to embrace the C'ode wouJI d 'have' been wf I If ng to adopt a 1provf sf onwh f ch frankly and openly declar~d that overcharges of some large but unspec If I ed degree cou Id be I nva 1.f dated by courts on an ad hoc bas Is, at
least as part of a commercial code.
------Let us assume, however, that a system of Jurisprudence ought to have
some way to deaf with transactions In which one party Is gfvfng up vastly
more than he Is getting, and that this purpose Is at feast one of those
that section 2-~02 Is designed to serve. Even given that assumption, one
has stf I I to ask whether the best way to Inject that supervisor~ power
Into the law Is to subsume ft under a high-level abstraction like ''unconscfonabf I tty." After al I, a laesf o enormls type of statute Is not very
hard to draft, as either a flat-percentage or a "grossly-too-much" provision. The decision In the Maciver case exposes the weaknesses of abstraction so delfcfously that It Justifies esurfent consideration. Let me quote
the court's total discussion o f ~ the contract was unconscionable.
In examfn fng the exhibits and agreed facts In this case we
find that to settle the principal -debt of $1,759 the defendants
signed Instruments obffgatlng them to pay $42.81 for 60 months,
making a total payment of $2,568.60, or an Increase of $809.60
over the contract price. In rel lance upon the total payment the defendants were to make, the plaintiffs pay a sales commission of
$800. Counsel suggests that the goods and services to be furnished
the defendants thus had a value of $959, for ~hlch they would pay an
addftfonal $1,609.60 computed as follows:
1

i

$ 959.00

"Value of goods and services
Commission
'
Interest and carrying charges

800.00
809.60

Tota I Payment.

1,609.60
$2,568.60 11

This Is breathtaking economics. Note first of all the court's assumption
that the seller's cost of distribution Chis presumably-fast-talking salesman's commission) Is no part of the "value" of the goods to the purchaser,
so that It must be total Iy e II mI nated from any ev_a Iuat Ion of the fa I rness
of the exchange. On this reasoning, the salary of sales staff Is not a
factor fairly to be considered when d~cfdfng the fairness of a retail price.
{This ls not to say that a grotesquely uneconomic form of distribution
enriches one who purchases from the distributor; It does, however, su~gest
that life Is not so easy that the commission may simply be "drilled out"
of the "value" In evaluating the fairness of the exchange.)
Then we come to the treatment of the
by the court.

11

fnterest and carrying charges"

Here It seems that It rs enough for the Judge that the amount

certainly looks llke a great deaf. He makes absolutely no attempt to work ·
out what the true effective yearly rate of Interest Is for this five-year
pay out. Actually tt works out to a bit over 18% per annum. This may seem
high, but It Is not out of I lne wf-th the rates permitted under statutes
80.

e.,·

...
which regulate fnstal.lment purchases and loans, not to mention rates·
charged where not regulated. The Important matter, however, rs not whether
this rate Is "fair" or not; ft ts that the court In this case went on
nothing but guesswork to reach Its decision, examined none of the relevant
cons I de rat Ions and was· encoura ed. b 2-302 to behave In ust that wa •
Had the section been In ~ss a strac terms, per aps an examination of the
relevant factors would have taken place. It does seem that a judge who ls
forced to recognize by the form of the statute upon which he Is relying
that he Is supposed to evaluate the actual economic exchange ts llkely to
feel called upon to see what that exchange In fact Is, and how It accords
with contemporary practices. When the key evaluative word, however, Is a
description of the judge's own state of mind rather than of the .situation
which might be Justified In producfng such a state, the likelihood that the
court wt II even examine the relevant questions Is sever.ely lessened.
As noted earller, the Maciver case ts the only one reported which has·
relted upon 2-302 as a basis of decision. One very recent case, however,
which has attracted substantial· attention from the commentators, ·clearly
would have been decided on the basis of 2-302 had the statute been tn
effect at the time of the relevant transaction, and In fact was decided as
If the section were the law of the Jurisdiction. In that case, WI I I tams v.
Walker-Thomas Furniture Co .•
For those of us who
Justice (and which of us
unimaginable. But there
the Code's) methodology.
describe:

have an Instinctive and lnfalllble sense of
does not), any other result In this case ts
are grounds for qufbbllng about the court's (and
Judge Wrtght found unconscf onabf I tty easy to

Unconsctonabllfty has generally been recognized to Include
an absence of meanlngful choice on the part of one of the parties
tcgether with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to
the other party • . • • [In the footnote which supports this statement, citation ts to Henntngsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,
32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960), and Campbel I Soup Co. v. Wentz.
172 F.2d 80 (3d Ctr. 1948) only.] In many cases the meaningfulness
of the choice Is negated by a gross lnequallty of bargaining power.
That ts, there Is Immediate recognition that unconsctonabf I tty has to have
two foci, the negotiation which led to the contract and that contract's
terms. As for the procedura I aspect, w_h I Ie there Is no fl nd t ng that th Js
was the only credit furniture store open to Mrs. Wt 11 f ams, or that even ff
It were not, they all had substantially the same contract (which was the
.situation In the Henningsen case so heavl ly rel led upon by the court>,
one may assume that the form Mrs. Wllllams signed was essentially the only
kind of form open to her. A person's "relevant market" may fairly be the
one he can ~asonabfy be expected to know about or dare to use. In other
words, the local stores may be a local person's relevant market because of
his Ignorance, and ff they are all as one on something, as to him they are
a monopoly. And besides, In this case the court made an almost-finding of
contracting procedures which went beyond the mere use of a form or even of
a contract of adhesion, which reached, In fact, at least some level of
quasi-fraud. Judge Wright asks:
81.

Did each party to the contract, conslderlng his obvious education or lack of It, have a reasonable opportunity to understand
the terms of the contract, or were the Important terms hidden In
a maze of fine print and minimized by deceptive sales practices?
There was apparently no problem with the answer, for after giving llp service
to the "usual rule" that one who signs an agreement ls bound to all of Its
terms, he sal d:
But when a party of llttle bargaining power, and hence little real
choice, signs a commerclal ly unreasonable contract with llttle or no
knowledge of Its terms • . . . the usual rule . • . should be abandoned. •
It is hard to fault the court's argument on the procedural unconsclonabl llty
aspects of this case. Whl le It might sometimes be difficult to decide
whether a species or level of bargaining ought to protect a contract from
section 2-302, It Is not dlfflcult here. If the unconsclonabl llty section
ls to be applicable to any contract, It must be to one "bargained" as this
one was.
But there Is rio need to labor this point. Finding that the bargaining
procedure Involved wll I not Insulate the contract from Judicial scrutiny,
under section 2-302 Is only the first and less dlfflcult step In the process
of using that section. Once one decides that the contract fs vulnerable
to Judi cf al meddling, there stl II remains to be decided whether the provision
or contract Is '"unconsclonable. 11 For that determination Judge Wright also
articulated a test:
In determining reasonableness or fairness, the primary concern
must be with the terms of the contract considered In lfght of the
circumstances existing when the contract was made. The test Is not
s I mp Ie, nor can It be mechan I ca II y app II ed. The terms are to be
considered 11 ln the llght of the general commerclal background and
the commerclal needs of the particular trade or case" [citing "Comment
Uniform Corrmerclal Code sec. 2-307," but obviously meaning 2-302].
Corbin suggests the test as being whether the terms are "so extreme
as to appear unconscionable according to the mores and business
practices of the time and place." • • . We think this formulation
correctly states the test to be applied In those cases where no
meanlngful choice was exercised upon entering the contract.
How does that test apply to the WI II lams facts? What Is It about Mrs.
Wllllams 1 contract which Is "unconsclonable"? Surprlslngly, the answer Is
not clear, even about what In the contract Is bad. It seems, however, that
there are two posslbl titles. First, It may be that the provision by which
each Item purchased became security for all Items purchased was the objectionable feature of the contract. Or It might be that the furniture company
sold this expensive stereo set to this particular party which forms the
unconsclonabl llty of the contract. If the vice Is the add-on clause, then
one encounters the now-famlllar problem: such a clause Is hardly such a moral
outrage as by Itself meets Judge Wrlght's standard of being "so extreme as
82.

to appear unconsclonable according to the mores and business practices of
the time and place." The lower court In the WI II lams case cal led attentlon,
for Instance, to a Maryland statute regulating retal I Installment sales
under which Mrs. WI II lams might have been relieved, noting with regret
that the statute was not In effect In the District. What was not pointed
out by the lower court (and certainly not by the upper court) was that the
State of Maryland had found nothing I I legal per se about add-on provisions,
In fact speclflcal ly permitting them and setting out to regulate them In
some detal I. Of the thirty-seven Jurisdictions which have statutes regulating
retal I Installment sales, only one has a provision making add-on clauses
lmpermlsslble. In such circumstances It does seem a bit much to flnd "so
extreme as to appear unconscionable according to the mores and business
practices of the time and place" an add-on clause In the District of Columbia
which Is used and statutorily permitted almost everyplace else, Including
contiguous Maryland. One's gorge can hardly be expected to rise with such
,nice geographic selectivity.
If one Is not convinced that the unconsclonabl llty Inheres In the addon provision, It may be argued that It Inheres In the contract as a whole,
In the act of having sold this expensive Item to a poor person knowing of
her poverty. This Is quite clearly the primary significance of the case
to some of the commentators. That Is the kind of action which the Maryland
statute does not deal with, nor do any of the statutes llke It: the unconsclonabl llty of aiding or encouraging a person to live beyond his means
(without much hope of eventual success). Wei I, why not make that "unconscionable" for purposes of section 2-302? After al I, In this case
Walker-Thomas did know for a fact that Mrs. WI I I lams was on rel lef; they
knew her Income and needs with great particularity: $218 per month and
seven children. This case does not present any of the sticky close
questions of how much of what a seller would have to know (or Inquire about)
before being deemed to know that the buyer shouldn't buy. Moreover, what
Mrs. WI I Iiams bought this time was a stereo record player. No one could
argue that such an article Is a 1'necesslty" to a rellef cllent, and thus
the dissenting judge's suggestion that "what Is a luxury to sane may seem
an outright necessity to others" hardly applles In this case. Who can
doubt but that this purchase was a frl I I? So In this case al I we would
have ls a holding that one cannot enforce a contract pursuant to which one
has sold luxuries to a poor person (or at least one on rel lef) with knowledge
or reason to know that he wt I I not be able to pay for them. This Is Just
another class distinction, and distinctions among persons on the bases of
the "class 11 to which they belong, that ls, on the basis of some common suprapersonal characteristics, Is exceedingly common In the law (not to mention
life). Such a process immensely slmpllfles decision by llmltlng the required Inquiry to the person's membership In the class. Once that determination Js made, a certain legal result wl II flow. The classic Instance
Is the majority-minority dichotomy. Persons under twenty-one cannot, as a
general rule, make self-binding contracts. This may be considered a
shorthand form of a syl loglsm which would go something like (a) persons
lacking sufficient probity ought not to be al lowe-d to bind themselves; (b)
al I persons under twenty-one lack sufficient probity; (c) persons under
twenty-one cannot bind themselves. This I I lustrates some of the strengths
and weaknesses of the class system. The rule Is easy to administer because
83.

a party's age Is much easier to determine than·hls probity. The dfffl.cutty
is that the eas Ier the c Iass I.fl cail-1 on the fess II ke Iy tt 1s to be accurate,
because classes are, In fact, hardly ever whol!y hanogeneous. In our case,
for Instance, the "minor premise" Is fa'lse; not al I persons under twentyone lack sufficient probity to bfnd themselves.
When faced with the dlfflcultles Inherent In deciding the bargaining
fairness of any given transaction, the equity courts 1 In working out their
unconsclonabl I lty doctrine, slml tarly leaned heavl ly on relatively gross
classlflcattons. In effect, they seem contlntually to have taken a kind of
sub rosa judicial notice of the amount of power of certain classes of people
to take care of themselves, often without too much Inquiry Into the actual
Individual bargaining situation. And It Is arguable that sometimes they
were wrong; not all old ladles or farmers are without defenses. Put briefly,
the typical has a tendency to .become stereo-typical, with what may be unpleasant results 8Ven for the beneficiaries of the judicial benevolence.
One can see It enshrined In the old English equity courts' jolly treatment
of English seamen as members of a happy, fun-loving raee (with, one supposes,
a fine sense of rhythm), but certainly not to be trusted to take care of
themselves. What effect, If any, this had upon the sailors Is hidden behind
the judicial chuckles as they protected their loyal sai for boys, but one
cannot help wondering how mary sal Iors managed to get credit at any reasonab Ie pr Ice. In other words, the benevo Ient have a tendency to co Ion i ze,
whether geographically or legally.
Far more economically significant and widespread as an example of the
Chancellors' temptation toward stereotypical Jurisprudence Is found In the
expectant-heir cases. The most Important thing about expectant-heir cases
Is that there are expectant-heir cases, classifiable separately as such I~
treatises. The Chancellors did not find unfalrnes~ In the price and refuse
to enforce, because they had no conception of how an expentancy had to be discounted for risk; that kind of sophistication came early. They just set 9ut
to protect heirs from the ful I effect of their tendency to llve beyond thelr
governors' life expectancies. This was easy to do; It was r~re that a Judge
had to enter Into too long a discussion of the actual facts, or to face the
real basis of his easy declslcn In the battle between his (there but for
the grace of God) grandson and the most-llkely-Jewlsh moneylender. After
al I, he had the rubric "unconscionable" with which to explain (to himself
and to the public) that decision.
Thus, when one asks why a court (I.Ike the District of Columbia Court
In the WI I Iiams case) ought not be allowed to subsume its social decisions
under a high-level abstractl9n like 11 unconsclon3 blllty," one may point to
the equity cases so many other commentators have pointed to, but for a
different reason. One may suggest that first (and less Important) It tends
to make the true bases of decisions more hidden to those trying to use them
as the basis of future planning. But more Important, It tends to permit
a court to be nondlscloslve about the basis of Its decision even to itself;

the class determination ls so easy and so tempting (and often so heartwarming). More particularly with respect to the WI II lams case concept that
the poor should be discouraged from frl I I-buying, no legislature In America
could be persuaded openly to pass such a statute, nor should any be permitted
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to do.so sneakfly. ·If the selling of f,:-lt'ls to the p9or fs,to be discouraged, If the tradftlonal mtddfe-class vlrtues of thrift and chi Id care
are to be foster:-ed fn the deserving poor by a cornmerclal statute, If one
wants to protect a class, Improvident by definition, from the depredations
of another cl ass, J t Is .at Ieast arguab te that one shou Iq Just up and do so-but clearly. ThlS ts not to suggest, for a momemt, anything as.stupid as
that some 11 freedom-of-contractf' concept ought to prevent, for Instance,
the statutory lnterdlctlon ot an ,efeven-hour,day. It Is only to say that
'when you forbid a contractual practice, you ought to have the polltlcal
. nerve to do so with some understand Ing (and some dl-sclosure) of what you,
a re do I ng • 3
·
Conclusion

•

I have attempted to describe In some detall the pathology, develop,mental, morphological and functional, of section 2-302 of ·the Code and Its
of.flclal and unofflclal commentaries. The gist of the tale Is slmple: It
Is hard to give up an emotlonally satisfying Incantation, and the way to
keep the glow without the trouble of the meaning Is continually to Increase
the abstraction level of the drafting and explaining language. If for one
reason or another (In this case the desire to forward the passage of the
whole Code} .the academic convnunfty ts generally friendly to the drafting
effort, a single provision In a massive Code may get by even ff It has,
rea I ly, no rea I Ity referent, and a 11 of its exp Ianatory mate rt a I ranges
between the Irrelevant and the misleading. That this happened with respect
to 2-302 the few cases using It are beginning to show more and more clearly.
The world Is not going to come to an end. The courts wll I most likely
adjust, encrustlng the Irritating aspects of the sectVon wtth a smoothlng
nacre of more or less reasonable applications, or the legislatures may act
If things get out of hand. Commerce In any event ls not going 'to grind to
a halt because of the weaknesses In 2-302. But the lesson of Its drafting
ought nevertheless to be learned: It Is easy toe.say nothing with words.
Even If those words make one feel all warm Inside, the result of sedulously
preventlng thought about them ts likely to lead to more trouble than the
dra.ftsmen 1 s cozy glow Is worth, as a matter not .only of statutory elegance
but of effect In the world being ,rtlgulated. Subsuming problems Is not as
good as -solving them, and may tn fact retard solutlons tnstead. Or, once
more to quote Karl Uewel lyn (to whom, after al I, the last word j~stly
belongs}, "Covert tools are never rel Table tools."

/3.

In Henningsen v. BIQOmfleld Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69
( 1960}, ·q>nttnual ly cited In the WI 11 lams case (see 350 F.2d at 448
n.2, 449 tin.6 & 7, 450 n.12)" It Is most significant that the court
did not have 8 2-302 to work with. It was forced, therefore, to face
the relevant policy questions, which It did In a many-paged opinion.
In other words, In Henningsen the New Jersey court was forced to talk'
s:,out the tras ts for t ts decl s Ion; In WI 111 ams and Macl ver the courts
were most partlcularly enabled not to.
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DAVIS &_ CO. 'v. :MPR3AN

Pf7 Ga. 504, 43 s.E./732 C1903)

'1 ·

\

LAMAR; J. , Davfs & Co. emp toyed Morgan for one I year at $40 per month·.
Afi"er the contract had been In fprce for some Hme, Morgan recelved an
offer of $65 per month,from a company fn Florlda, ~nd mentioned the fact
to Davis, saying that of course he woufd not go without consent. Davis
fnsfst,s that he then said, ff Morgan would stay out the balance of the term,
and work satisfactorily, he would give hfm·$t20 at the end of the year:
Morgan says that Davis stated, "I wf II add $10 a month from the time you
began, and owe you $120 when your time ls up." Davis & Co. dlscharged Morgan two or three weeks before the end of the term, because the latter had
gone to Florlda for several days without their consent. Morgan Insists that
h~ told Davis that he was going and the latter made no objection. He
claimed that he was discharged without proper cause, and brought suit for
the extra compensation promised. The jury found a verdict In his favor,
and, the court having refused to grant a new trial, Davis & Co. excepted.
If the promise contemplated that Davis & Go. were to pay Morgan $10
per month for that part of the year which had already passed, and as to
which there had been a settlement, It was manffestly nudum pactum; for a
past transaction, the o_bflgatlon of which has been fully satisfied, wfll not
sustain a new promlse. Gay v. Mott, 43 Ga. 254. And the result Is practfcally the same whether Morgan or Davis was correct In the statement of the
conversation. Both proved a promise to give more than was due, and to pay
extra for what one was already legaHy bound to perform. The employer,
therefore, received no consideration for his promise to give the addftfonaf
money at the end of the year. Morgan had agreed to work for 12 months at
the price promised, and lf during the term he had agreed to receive less, the
employer would stl I I have been I fable to pay him the full $40 per month.
On'the other hand, the employer could not be forced to pay more than the
contract price. He got no more services that he had already coritracted to
receive, and according to an almost unbroken line of decisions the agreement,
to give more than was due was a nudum pectum, and void, as ha'{lng no
consideration to support the promise. The case Is something llke that of
Bush v. Rawllns, 89 Ga. 117, 14 S.E. 886, where the landlord agreed to give
the tenant certain property If he would pay his rent promptly; and It was
held that s'uch a promise was a gratuity, and void, as without consideration
to support ft. And see Tatum v. Morgan, 108 Ga. 336, 33 S.E. 940(2);
Clv. Code 1895, § 3735. It ls also within the prlnclpf'e.of Stf lk v. Myrfc,k,
2 Campbel I, 317, where Lord El lenborough held that an agreement to pay seamen
extra for what they were bound by their artfcfes to do was void. And so In
Barlett v. Wyman, 14 Johns. 260, a slml lar rultng was made In a case where
a master agreed to give more wages If the seamen would not abandon the
ship. See, also, Ayres v. C.R. I. Ry. Co., 52 Iowa, 478 3 N. W. 522.
There are cases holding that a new promise Is binding where one of the
parties to a contract refuses to perform, and, to save a loss, the Innocent
party agrees to pay more than the original contract prTce, If the actor
wt 11 perform as orlglnal ly agreed. Goebel v. Linn, 47 Mich. 489, 11 N. W.
284, 41 Mi. Rep. 723. But even if that I lne of cases should not be disregarded as tending to/encourage a breach of contract, they do not affect
the rights of Morgan here, because he does not bring hfmself within their
1

'

1
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rul Ing. Had there been a rescission or fonnal cancellatJon (Vanderbl It
v. Schreyer, 91 N. Y. 402 > of the o Id contract by m.utua I consent• and If a
new contract with. new terms had been made; or ff there had been any change
fn the hours, services, or character of work, or other consideration to
support the pranlse to pay the Increased wages It would have been enforce"".'
able. But, as It was, Morgan proved that Davis pranlsed to pay more for
the performance of the old contract than he had orlglnally agreed. Such a
promise was not binding.
It was argued that the moral obllgatlon would support the promise
here, and undoubtedly there are cases In which such consideration has been
held to be sufficient. For example, that arising from the duty of a father
to support his bastard chi Id. Hargraves v. Freeman, 12 Ga •. 342. At one
ti me Lord Man sf I e Id was quoted as havl ng sa Id that a 11 prom I ses dell berate I y
made shou Id be he Id b Ind Ing, but Lord Denman, In Eastwood v. Kenyon, I I
·
· Ado I. & E. 438, at.tempts to show that this was either a mt squotatlon, or
that, If such a doctrine could have been deduced from whatever he said, the
court had refused to fol low It fn Lfttlefteld v. Shee, 2 Barn. & Ad, 811.
The cases holdlng In confonnlty with Lord Mansfield's supposed statement,
while set out In Hargrove v. Freeman, supra, are not adopted as law, be. cause the court finally held that the prlnclple to be adduced from the
general current of authorities ts that, for a moral obllgatlon to constftute
a sufficient consideration to support an express promise, lt must be
founded upon an antecedent valuable consideration, though respectable
authority can be adduced on the "other slde. 11 In an agreement by one partner
to pay the other for extra work (Gray v. Haml.1, 82 Ga. 375, 10 S. E. 205,
6 L. R, A. 72); In the promise by a landlord to refund to tenant's money
paid by them for worthless fertilizer (Parrott v. Johnson, 61 Ga. 475);
and In the agreement by a brother to account to a sister for her interest
as an heir at law In land which he had Improperly Induced the father to
convey (Brown v. Latham, 92 Ga. 280, 18 S. E. 42l>--the court recognized
that there was a moral obligation to support the promise, but In each of
the cases there was sanethlng very close akin to a legal obllgatlon or to
a trust. In Pf ttman v. EI der, 76 Ga. 371, t t was shown that an agreement
to pay a debt barred by the statute of llmttatlons, or discharged In bankruptcy, was not supported by what was formerly cal led a "moral ob•l lgatton,"
but by the antecedent obligation; the new pranlse to pay amounting simply
to a waiver of the statute or of tne discharge. Clv. Code 1895, § 3658, i
defines a good consideration to be such as Is founded on natural duty and
affectton or "on a strong moral obltgatlon." In the fight of the authorities, however, the strong moral obllgatlon here referred to seems to be one
s~pported either by sane antecedent legal obligation, though unenforceable
at the time, or by some present equitable duty. The sectfon, however, does
not relate to the moral obllgatlon which Inheres In every promise. Austel I
v,, Humphries, 99 Ga. 416, 27 S. E. 736. Whf le al I courts recognize the
obltgatlon arising fran any undertaking, they are, from the necessity of
the case, forced to hold that naked promises must depend for their performance solely upon the wlll of the pranlsor, and not upon the trlbunals
which are organized to perfonn the "duty of government to protect person·
9nd·property, 11 and In pursuance thereof to award money damages for breaches
of contracts. Ctv. Code 1895, 8 5699. But they cannot enforce promises
binding on the conscience, except In those cases where some pecuniary
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damage ,flows from the b(e,ach, dr ~here, fn.__,.addJtlon,to th~ iJT1or:at .obligation,
1
the'promlse Is also
supported by a GQns1defatl¢>n .. ; When\ 9ne (recelves a
1
na,ked .promJ-se, an,d such promtse ls broken, he ls 110 worse off than he was. ;
He gavenottilng for M, he has lost nothl99 by It, and on· Its breach he
has suffered no damage. ~ognlzable by courts. No benefit accrued to him who
made the promise, nor ;did any Injury flow to him who received It. Such
promises are r:iot made within the scope of transactions Intended to confer
rights enforceable at law. They are llghtly made, dictated by generosity,
curtesy, or Impulse, often by ruinous prodigality. To enforce them by a
Judgment 11'1 favor of those who gave nothing therefor would often bring such
Imperfect obllgatlons Into c()!Tlpetltl6n with the absolute duties to wife ahd /
children, or. Into competition' with debts for iproperty actually received,
and make the' I aw an• Instrument by wh I ch a man cou Id be forced to be generous
before he was just. Both under the civil and the common law, courts were
prohibited from enforcing contracts without consideration, and relegated
the pe rformanca of such p roml ses so I e I y to those who made them ..
Judgment reversed, All the Justices concurring, except LUMPKIN,
absent on account of sickness.
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NOTES
The doctrine of consideration will be taken up later. Simply stated,
It means that an agreement Is unenforceable unless the promises confers a
benefit on the promiser or Incurs a detriment as the Inducement to the
.
promise. Gratuitous promises, that Is, promises unsupported by consldoratto:i,
are not enforceable In law. Is not the law of contracts Itself placing a re'strlctlon upon the freedom to contract? Why shouldn~t Davis & Co. 1 s
promise to pay Morgan a larger salary be enforced?
On the other hand, Is not thts case I Ike the Wolf case In that there
is an element of duress? Suppose that an employer had sought out a certain
engineer to develop a new process. Suppose further that the employer had
hi rod the engineer under a five year contract .• After the first year, the
engineer, knowing that the employer could not afford to let him go, Informs the employer that unless th.e employer lncreases his salary substantially, he, the engineer, wt 11 quit. The employer agrees to the Increase,
but then refuses to pay the engineer the additional amount after the engineer
performs. Should the engineer be able to enforce the agreement for the
addltlonal salary?
A final restriction, which Is slml lar to consideration restriction,
Involves the requirement that certain contracts, though valid, wt II not
be enforced unless there Is a written memorandum evidencing the agreement
and signed by the party against whom enforcement ts sought. The law requir"."
Ing a writing Is known as 1 the Statute of Frauds. · Included w.lthtn the
statute are contracts for the sale of land, contracts which cannot be performed within one year. contracts for the sale of goods for a price In
excess of a certain amount~ An I llustratlon of this Is found In Section
2-201 of the Uniform Commercial Code:
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Cl) Except as otherwise provided In thfs section a contract for
the sale of goods for the price of $500 or more Is not enforceable
by way of action or defense unless there Is some wrltlng sufficient
to Indicate that a contract for safe has been made between the parties
and signed by the party against whom enforcement ls sought or by his
authorized agent or broker. A writing Is not Insufficient because
1.t omits or Incorrectly ptates a term agreed upon but the contract
Is not enforceable under this paragraph beyond the quantity of goods
shown ln such writing.
L. FULLER AND R. BRAUCHER, BASIC CONTRACT LAW (1964) 796:
SECTION 3.--THE PURPOSE OF THE STATUTE
When a leglslature says that the validity of a transaction depends upon
the observance of certatn formaltttes, th1s n~qulrement may be Imposed for.
a variety of reasons. Some of these have been su99osted In the readings
prevfously presented under the tltle, "The Function of lAgal FormaHtles"
(supra, pp. 151-155), In contract law, Austin discerned t~o prlncfpal
reasons for requiring formalltles: I) "to provide evidence of the existence
and purport of the contract, In case of controversy," and 2) "to prevent
Inconsiderate engagements." Was the Statute of Frauds Intended to serve
both of these purposes or only the first?
·
Certainty It was Intended to serve the first. It was an act to ~"event
"frauds and perjuries" and stated tn Its preamble that It was atmf)d at
"many fraudulent practices whfch are corrmonly endeavore.<I to be upheld by
perjury, and subornation of perjury." To handicap the plaintiff who might
seek to estab II sh a contract by per ju red test I mony I the Statute requ I red
him to found his case on a written memorandum signed by the defendant. In
thts respect the purpose of the Statute was evldentlary. It sought a trustworthy memorial of the transaction and Its terms.

I

On the other hand, ft ts clear that the Statute could also have had
another purpose, that whfch Austin described as preventing "Inconsiderate
engagements." When a man cannot be bound until he has '51gned a writing,
a procedure has been established that wlll tend to prevent him from slipping
Into a legal undertaktng without a full appreciation of what he Is doing.
The writing serves as a warning or deterrent against hasty action.
If the draftsmen of the Statute of Frauds had this second object fn
mind, they have left no trac£ of It In the historical records of the time
or In the Ianguage of the act they drew •. On the other hand, the judges who
have Interpreted the Statute have occasionally assumed that It had as a
col lateral and secondary purpose that of Insuring dellberatlon In the making
of contracts. Thus the court In Warden v. Jones, 1057, 2 De. Gex & J.
76, 83-84, said:·
"The law has ••• wisely forbidden [oral proof of_ contracts In consideration of marriage; Section 4(3) supfa]. Persons are so llkely to be
led Into such promises lnconslderately, hat the law has wlsely required
them to be manifested by writing
"
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Exp re~s f ons tendtng ,tc,ward the s~e thoCJght· wl J:I be found Jn eases
Involving other sections of the Statute, p~rtlcularly the 1'-suretysh Ip"
section. (Section A<2>t supra 8 2.)
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On the other hand, 'there 1:1re holdfngs that can b~ justified only on
the view that the sole purpose of the Statute Is to Insure reJlabJe
evidence of the cqntract. Thus, a number of cases have hetd that a letter,
setting forth the agreement but repudiating It may serve as a memorandum
to charge the wrl ter ,of the letter. ' CC 8 /511; WS 579; RSC S 209.)

90.

\

The Substance of a Promise
Since the law of contracts ts concerned with promises, It ts necessary
to conslder what constitutes a promise. ·The lln~ between promise, prediction
and statement of fact ts not always.clear, and some concepts such as
warranty have picked up spectal meaning to the lawyer. Consld~r the
fol lowing materials.
Section 2 of the Restatement of Contracts II
l

Sec. 2.

PROMISE; PROMISOR; PROMISEE; BENEFICIARY.

CI> A promise Is a man I festatl on of 1ntentton to act or ref ra In
from acting -In a specified way, so made as to justify a promtsee In understanding thata commitment has been made.
I

(2)

The person manifesting the Intention is the promlsor.

(3). The person to whom the manifestation ts addressed Is the
prom I see.
(4) Where performance will benEflt a person other than the
promlsee, that person Is a beneficiary.

Comment:
a .. Acts a~dresulting relations. 11 Promlse 11 as used In the Res-t.a-tement of this Subject denotes the act of the promfsor. lf by virtue of
other operative facts there Is a legal duty to perform, the promise Is
a contract; but the word "p.romlse" Is not I lmlted to ac-ts having legal
effect. Like 11 contract,n however, the word "promise" Is commonly and quite
properly also used to refer to the complex of human relatlons which results
from the promlsor's words or acts of assurance, Including the Justlf led expectations of the promlsee and any moral or legal duty which arises to
make good the assurance by performance. The performapce may be spec If Jed
either in terms describing the action of 'the promisor or In terms of the
result which that action or inaction ts to bring about.
b. Manifestation of intention. Many contract disputes arise because
different people attach different meanings to the same wqrds and conduct.
The phrase "manifestation of intention" adopts an external or objective
standard for interpreting conduct; It means the external expres$1on of
Intention as distinguished from undisclosed Intention. A promiser mc.'$nlfes1"s
an Intention If he berteves or has reason to bel I eve that the promlsee wt 11
Infer that Intention from his words or conduct. Rules governing cases
where the promisee cou Id reasonably draw more than one Inference as to the
promiser's Intention are stated in connection with the acceptance of offers
(see Secs. 21 and 21A), In.Chapter 9 on the scope and meaning of contract's,
and In Chapter 17.011 mistake.
c.

Prom I se of act ton by th I rd person; guaranty.
I

Words are often used which In terms promise action or Inaction by a third
person, or which promise a result obtainable only by such action. Such
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words are commonly ~nd~rs;tood as a promise of conduct by the promlsor which
1
wl 11 be sufffcrent to brl ng a~out the action or Inaction or result, or to ·
answer for harm caused by fa 11 ure. An example Is a guaranty that a third
person wt 11 perform his promise. Such words constitute a promise as here
def lned only If they Justify a promfsee In an expectatlon of some action or
Inaction on the part of the promlsor.
d.

•

Promise of event beyond human control; warranty.

Words which In terms promise an event not with In human control are ordl narl ly
to be interpreted as a promise to answer for harm caused by the failure. of
the event to occur. An example Is a warranty of an existing or past fact,
such as a warranty that a horse Is sound, or that a ship arrived fn a foreign
port some days previously. Such promises are often made when the parties
are Ignorant of the actual facts regarding/which they bargain, and may be
dealt with as ff the warrantor could cause the fact to be as he asserted.
It Is then Immaterial that the actual condition of affairs may be Irrevocably
fixed before the promise Is made.
Words of warranty, 11 ke other conduct, must be Interpreted In the I fgnt
of the circumstances and the reasonable expectations of the partfes. In an
lnsurc,nce contract, a "warranty" by the Insured is usually not a promise at
a I I ; It may be mere I y a rep resent at ion of fact, or, more common I y, the fact
warranted Is a condition precedent to the Insurer's duty to pay (see Sec.
260). In the sale of goods, on the other hand, a s lml lar warranty normally
also Includes a promise to answer for damages (see Uniform Commercial Code
Sec. 2-715).
·

A
~

1;11 us trat Ions :
I • A, the bu I Ider of a house, or the inventor of the
mat~rlal used In part of Its construction, says to B, the
owner of the house, 11 t warrant that this house w111 never
burn down." This Is In effect a promise to pay for harm
If the house should burn down.
· 2. A, by a charter-party, undertakes that the "good
ship Dove A l,'1 having sailed from MarselJles a week ago
for New York, shal r take on a cargo for B on her arr Iva I
In New York. The statement of the quality of the ship and
the statement of her time of sal 11 ng from Marse I I I es are
In effect promises to pay for.harm If the statement ·,s
untrue.
e.

Illusory promises; mere statements of Intention.

Words ofpromtse which by their terms make performance entirely optional with
the "promiser" whatever may happen, or whatever course of conduct In other
respects he may pursue, do not constitute a promise. .Although such words
· are often referred to as forming an 11 lusory promise, they do not fal I within
the present definition of promise. They may not even manifest any intention
on-the part of the promlsor. Even If. a present lnte~tlon Is manifested,
the reservation 9f an option to change that .Intention means that there can
be no promlsee who Is Justified In an expectation of performance.
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On the other hand, a promise may be made even though no duty of
performance can arise unless some fact exists or some event occurs (see
Sec. 250). Such a conditional promise Is no less a promise because there
Is .sma I I I Ike I Ihood .that any duty of performance w111 ar Ise, as In the
case of a promise to'lnsure against fire a thoroughly fireproof bul I ding.
· There may be a promise In such a case even though the duty to perform
depends on a state of mind of the promisor other than his own unfettered
wish (see Sec. 265), or on a~ event within the promiser's control.
I 11 ustratl on:
3. A says to B, "I will employ you for a year at a
salary of $5,000 If I go Into buslness." This Is a promise,
even though It Is wholly optional with A to go_into business
or not.
·

f. Opinions and predictions. A promise must be distinguished from a ,
statement of opinion or a mere prediction of future events. The distinction',
Is not usually difficult In the case of an informal gratuitous opinion,
since there is often no manifestation of Intention to act or refrain from
acting or to bring about a result, no expectation of performance and no
consideration. The problem Is frequently presented, however, whether words
of a seller of goods amount to a warranty. Under Uniform Commercial Code
Sec. 2-313(2) a statement purporting to be merely the seller's opinion
does not create a warranty, but the buyer's reliance on the seller's ski II
and Judgment may create an implied warranty that the goods are flt for a
particular purpose under Uniform Commercial Code Sec. 2-315. In any case
where an expert opinion Is paid for, there is likely to be an implied
promise that the expert wf 11 act with reasonable care and ski I I.
A promise often refers to future events which are predicted or assumed
rather than promised. Thus a promise to render personal pervlce at a particular future time commonly rests on an assumption that the promiser wl I I be
alive and wel f at that time; a promise to paint a bul Iding may stml larly
rest on an assumption that the but ldi ng wl 11 be in existence. Such cases
are the subject of Chapter 14 on lmpossibi I ity. The promiser may of course
promise to answer for harm caused by the failure of the future event to
occur; If he does not, such a fal lure may discharge any duty of performance.
111 ustratlon:
4. A, on seeing a house of thoroughly fireproof
constructJon, says to B, the owner, "This house wi 11
never burn down." This Is not a promise but merely
an opinion or prediction. If A had been paid for his
opinion as an expert, there might be an lmpl ied promise
that he would employ reasonable care and ski II in
forming and giving his opinion.
Restatement of Contracts .I def lned 11 promise 11 as "an undertakl ng, however
expressed, either that something shall happen, or that something shat I noT.
happen, In the future. 11 Is the definition In Restatement 11 an Improvement?
Why? Consider the following excerpt from Gardner, An Inquiry into the
Principles of Contract, 46 Harv. L. Rev. I, 4 (1932).
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The reader can doubtless recognize a promise without the aid of
deffnitlon; but since we are to study Its consequences a brief survey
of Its characteristics Is required. In the first place, a promise does
not differ from other predictions either In the fact that It arouses
expectations or In the strength and precision of the expectations that
are aroused. Citizen A opens his morning paper and learns that astronomer
X says that there will be an eclipse of the sun visible In a neighboring
city on August 31, 1932, beginning at 3:29:17 p.m. He also learns that
candidate Y says that he wil I, If elected, reduce the mUnlclpal payroll
and pay no regard to party services or afflllatlons In appointments to
municipal posts. Citizen A probably has complete confidence in the fulfillment of astronomer X's prediction, and he may or may not have confidence
In the assurance of candidate Y. But, whether his faith In candidate Y
Is large or I lttle, he would probably speak of his assurance as a promise,
a name which he would never think of applying to the prediction of astronomer
X. What, then, ts the essential difference between these two predictions?
It seems to I ie in the character of the causal. relationship asserted between
the fact predicted and the prediction Itself. Astronomer X says that he
makes his statement because he is compelled to make It by the facts. Candidate Y says that certain events will happen because they are compel led to
happen by his word. Either statement may be true; events may prove either
to be false. The essence of a promise Is that it asserts the power of the
speaker's mind over the future; a prediction asserts the power of the future
over the speaker's mind.

J
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'Either kind of assertion may, of course, be conditional, that Is,
limited by one or more contingencies which are neither promised nor foretold.
Candidate Y's promise Is conditional on his election, and the prediction
that an eclipse wi II be visible in a certain city ls conditional on the
absence of clouds. And It Is to be observed that every promise ts always
conditional on one contingency which is neither promised nor predicted,
namely, on an act of wll I by someone other than the promlsor. A man may
vow himself to ilfelong celibacy, to the pursuit of medicine, or to the
discovery of the North Pole, and thereby affirm the power of his present
wlll over all his future conduct in the most emphatic terms. But such
assertions are not promises, at least not in any sense which concerns the
common law. To be of interest to lawyers a promise must concern at least
two persons; It must assert not only that the speaker has a power over the
future but that he confers a part of this power on someone else. We may
therefore, propose the fol low Ing tentative definition:
A promise Is an assertion that someone other than the speaker
possesses, by force of the assertion, some power over the future
which he did not previously possess.
It would be Interesting to compare this with the American Law lnstttute's
definition and to examine their respective merits and defects. That
discussion, however, must be reserved for another place. For the present
it is sufficient to point out that the definition here submitted has at
least the practical advantage of yielding, by lmplicatlon, a definition
of "promtsee":
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A promisee is a person to whom the speaker attributes some power which
fs asserted by the promise to exist.
The term "promfsee 11 Is not defined in the Restatement, and to the present
writer It does not seem easy to determine In precisely what sense that
term is used.
We must now notice two of the most persistent sources of dlfflculty
In the law of contracts: first, the fact that words frequently mean
different things to the speaker and to the hearer; second, the fact that
promise and prediction are often lnextrlcably mixed up In the same phrase.
When mercant A promises to merchant B that he will deliver 125 bales
of cotton "ex Peerless," both parties understand this as an assertion that
B, by virtue of the promise, possesses a power to command cotton which he
did not previously possess. But to A this may mean a power to obtain cotton
from a ship which sailed from Bombay In October, while to B It may mean a
power to obtain cotton from an entirely different vessel whlch left Bombay
two months later.
There are, In fact, two distinct assertlons--the one
uttered and the one heard--and legal consequences may conceivably be predi·
cated on either, on neither, or on both. This becomes vividly apparent
whenever parties are negotiating at a distance so that the utterance and the
hear Ing are separated by an apprecl ab Ie Interval of time. Most of the controvers les which have arisen from this kind of situation revolve about the
question whether the utterance or the hearing of some promlse ts to be given
control I Ing force.
Even if both A and B refer to the same Peerless, A's assertion Is a
compound of promise and prediction; B's power to command cotton Is asserted
to exist partly because A's word binds him to a certain course of conduct
and partly because A expects the Peerless to arrive. No one understands
A to assert, however, that the Peerless wll I come in because he promises
that it will. That part of his assertion Is a prediction of the same order
as that of astronomer X. The promissory part of an assertion about the
future Is confined to that portion of the events predicted which are
asserted to be under the promlsor's control.
It wI 11 be conven Ient to pause at th Is po Int to def I ne four phrases
which w I I r be · used henceforth throughout this essay as terms of art. By
"apparent promlse 11 Is meant the promise as heard and understood by the promIsee-- In the I 11 ustrat Ive case Just stated the promise to de I i ver cotton
from that Peerless which sal led In October from Bombay. By 11 actual promise"
is meant the promise as uttered and understood by the promisor--the promise
to del Iver cotton from the December Peerless. By "power predicted" is meant
the entire power which any expression either wholly or partly promissory
attributes to the promlsee--ln our Illustration the power to obtain cotton
at the time when the designated vessel would normally arrive. By "power
asserted" ts meant that portion of the power predicted which the promlsor.
purports to be Cl".eatlng by force of the promissory utterance. In the illustrative case the power asserted is limited by the continued existence of the
cotton and possibly by other facts as well.
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So much for the anatomy of a promise. Let us now consider Its function,
for the characteristics that make it a useful instrument In the conduct of
affairs. To the promiser the chief importance of a promise may often
reside In Its consequences to his own moral Integrity and self-respect.
But to others its chief Importance is -in Its value, and by this is meant
its value to the promisee. The value of a promise Is the product of two
factors: Ci) the value of the power predicted, measured by the promlsee's
desire for It, and (2) the credit of the promise, measured by the promisee's
faith that the promiser's assertions and predictions will prove true. The
value of the power predicted rather than of the power asserted ls properly
taken as the first factor, first, because the promisee is normally not
conscious of any difference between them, secondly, because even if he Is
conscious of such difference he bases his econom1c calculations on the
assumption that it Is the expected which will happen and that he wil I possess
not merely the power asserted but the predicted power as well. As for the
second factor: the extended debate which has revolved about the question
of how one promise can serve as consideration for another seems frequently
to proceed on the concealed assumption that the credit of a promise Is
derived from the prospect of being able to bring a suit upon It and that
the value of a promise Is therefore conferred upon It by the law. ln\thls
assumption a modicum of truth seems to be compounded with a large alloy of
error. The credit of a promise results from the promisee's belief that
the promiser wll I be both able and wl 11 Ing to perform It; and while this
belief may perhaps be strengthened In some cases by the promisee's knowledge that he has the coercive weapon of a lawsuit In his pocket, the smaller
the Importance of this factor the higher the credit of the promise Is apt
to be.
Finally, It should be noted that every promise has a cost, or negative
value, to the promiser, dependent on the expected cost of performance and
the probabl lity that it wl II have to be performed. But unless the promise
Is for the payment of money this cost need not be equal to the positive
value of the promise to the promlsee, and It Is possible that the cost and
value may differ very widely In amount.
Consider whether the following statements be "promises" under
Restatement I or under Restatement II:
I. A on seeing a house of thoroughly fireproof construction
says to B, the owner, "This house wi 11 never burn down."
2. A, the builder of a house, or the Inventor of the
used In part of i~s construction, says to 8, the owner of
house, "I warrant that this house will never burn down."
Is In effect a promise to be answerable for any proximate
If the house should burn down; . • .

material
the
This
harm

3. A, by a charter-party undertakes that the "good sh Ip
Dove A I," having sailed from Marseilles a week ago for New York,
shal I take on a cargo for 8 on her arrival In New York.
4. A. says to B, n1 wi 11 employ you for a year at a salary
of $5000 if I go into business. i;
5. A says to B that he wl I I employ him for a fixed term at
such salary as A sees fit to pay.
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,\ In 11 lustratlon I of R~sfatement 11, why Is the concluslon stated
In terms of a promise to pay for harm if the house burns? Is thls,the
"promise" that A makes o,:- is It the promlse that the law holds him to?
Can the ·law give any other remedy for breach of this promise?
Hawk Ins v. McGee
84 N.H. 114, 146 Atl. 641 ( 1929)
As sumps It aga Inst a surgeon for breach of an a 11 eged warranty of. the
success of an operation. Trial by jury. Verdict for the plalntlff. The
. writ also contained a count In neg I Jgence upon whlc.h a nonsuit was ordered,
without exception.

I .,

•

Defendant's motions for a nonsuit and for a directed verdict on the
.count in assumpslt were denied, and the defendant excepted. During the
argument of p Ia Int I ff' s counse I to the jury, the defendant c Ia Imed certa In
exceptions, and also excepted to the denial of his requests for Instructions
and to the charge of the court upon the question of damages, as more fully
appears In the opinion. The defendant seasonably moved to set aside the
verdict upon the grounds that it was Cl) contrary to the evidence; (2) against
the weight of the evidence; (3) against the weight of the law and evidence;
and (4) because the damages awarded by the Jury were excess Ive ••. The court
denied the motion upon the first three grounds but found that the damages
were excessive, and made an order that the verdict be set aside, unless
the plaintiff elected to remit al I In excess of $500. The plalntLff having
refused to rem It, the verd 1ct was set as Ide 11 as excess Ive and agaf nst the
weight of the evidence," and the plaintiff excepted.
The foregoing exceptions were transferred by Scammon, J.
are stated In the opinion.

The facts

Ovlde J. Coulombe and Ira W. Thayer, both of Berlin, for plaintiff.
Matthew J. Ryan and Crawford D. Henlng, both of Berlln, for defendant.
BRANCH, J. I. The operation In question consisted In the removal of a
considerable quantity of scar tissue from the palm of the plaintiff's right
hand and the grafting of skin taken from the plaintiff's chest In place
thereof. The scar tissue was the result of a severe burn caused by contact
with an electric wire, which the plaintiff received about nine years before.
the time of the transactions here Involved. There was evidence to the
effect that before the operation was performed the plaintiff and his father·
went to the defendant's office, and that the defendant, In answer to the
question, "How long wl 11 the boy be In the hospital?" rep I led, "Three or
four days, not over four; then the boy can go,home and It wll I be Just a
few days when he wilt go back to work with a good hand. Clearly, this and
,other te.stlmony to the same effect would not justify a f lndlng that the
doctor contracted to complete the hospital treatment In three or four days
o~ that the plaintiff would be able to go back to work within a few days
thereafter. The above statements could only be construed as expressions
of opinion or precttcttons. as to the probable duration of the treatment and
plaintiff's resulting dlsabl lity, and the fact that these estimates were
97.
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th!~e
fhe def,f4ant aJso s~ld ~efore. ttte operatfon was decided upon, 11! \wl f I
guaran,tee to make the hand a hundred; per cent perfect or· a\tlundreo per
cent 90od hand. 11 The platn,tlff was present when these words were alleged
to have been spoken, and, If they are to be taken at their face value, lt
seems obvious that proof of their utterance would establ lsh the giving of,
a. warranty In accordance with his contention.
·

.,

Th.e defendant argues, however, that, even If these words were uttered
by h Im, no reasonab I e man would u.nderstand that they were used wl th the .
I ntentl on
entering "Into any contractua I re I at I on whatever," and that
they cou Id reason ab I y be understood on I y 11 as h Is express I on f n strong
language that he believed and expected that as a result of the operatton
he would give the plaintiff a very good hand. 11 It may be conceded, as the
defendantt contends, that, before the quest I on of the mak t ng of a contract
should be submitted to a Jury, there Is a pre I tmlhary question of law for
•the trlal court to pass upon, I.e. "whether the words could possibly have
the meant ng imputed to them by the party who founds his case upon a certa In
interpretatlon, 11 but It cannot be held that the trial court decided this
question erroneously \Jn the present case. It Is unnecessary to determlne
at\.thls tlme,whether the argument of the defendant, based upon ncommon
knowledge ot the uncertainty which attends at'I surgical operatlons,n and
the Jmp rob ab 111 ty that a surgeon wou Id ever contract to make a damaged
part' of the human body "one hundred per cent perfect," wou Id,
the absence
of counterval I Ing constderations, be regarded as conclusive, for there were
other factors in the present case which tended to support the contention of
the plafntiff. There was evidence that the defenc.iant repeatedly. 'soil cited
from the plat nttff's father the opportunity to perform this operation, and
'the theory was advanced by p I a Int I ff' s· counse I in the cross-exam I nat.l or:i of
defendant that f)e sought an opportunity to "experiment on skin grafting,"
In which .tie had had little previous experience. If the Jury accepted this
part of p.l a Intl ff' s content I on, th'ere wou Id be a reasonab I e bas Js for the
further conclusion that, If defendant spoke the words attributed to him,
he d Id so wI th the Intent I on that they shou Id be accepted at· the Ir f_ace va I ue,
as an Inducement for the granting of consent to the operation by the
plaintiff and hfs father, and there was ample evidence that they were so
accepted by them. The question of the making Of the alleged contract was
properly submitted to the jury.

or

Jn
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2. The substance of the charge to the jury on the question of.damages
appears in the fol lowing quotation: "If you find th~ plalntlff entitled to.
anything, he ts entitled to recover for what pain and suffering he has .been
made to endure and for what Injury he has sustained over and above what
I nJ ury he had before. 1~ To th Is Instruct I on the defendant seasonab I y
; excepted.. By It, the Jury was permitted to conslder;two elements of damage:
<T> Pain and suffering due to the operation; and (2) positive. Ill effects of the operation upon the plaintiff's hand. Authority of any specific
rule of damages In cases of thts kind seems to be lacking, but, when tested
by general principle and by analogy, It appears that the foregoing lnstruc.:
tlon was erroneous.
/

/'

''By 'damages,' as that term ls used In the I aw of contri:'lcts, Is 1ntended
compensation; for a breach, measured In the terms of the contract.n D~wls
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v. New England Cotton Yarn Co., 77 N.H. 403, 404., 92 A. 732, 733. The
purpose of the law Is "to put the plalntiff In as good a poslt:ion as he
wou Id have been In had the defendant kept h Is contract. 11 3 W1111 ston
Cont. Sec. 1338; Hardie~Tynes Mfg. Co. v. Easton Cotton 011 Co., 150 N.C.
150, 63 S.E. 676, 134 Am. St. Rep. 899. The measure of recovery "Is based
upon what the defendant should have given the plaintiff, not what the
plaintiff has given the defendant or otherwise expended." 3 WII liston Cont.
Sec. 1341. "The only losses that can be said fairly to come within the terms
of a contract are such as the parties must have had In mind when the contract was made, or such as they either knew or ought to have known would
probably result from a failure to comply with its terms." Davis v. New
England Cotton Yarn Co., 77 N.H. 403, 404, 92 A. 732, 733, Hurd v. Dunsmore,
63 N. H. 171 •
I

The present case Is closely analogous to one In which a machine Is
but It for a certain purpose and warranted to do certain work. In such cases,
the usual rule of damages for breach of warranty In the sale of chattels ts
appl led, and It is held that the measure of damages is the difference
between the value of the machine, if It had corresponded with tho warranty
and its actual value, together with such incidental losses as the parties
knew, or ought to have known, would probably result from a failure to comply
with Its terms. Hooper v. Story, 155 N.Y. 171, 175, 49 N.E. 773; Adams
Hardware Co. v. Wimbish, 201 Ala 548, 78 So. 902; Isaacs v. Jackson, etc.,
Co., 108 Kan. 17, 193 P. 1081; Paducah Hosiery Miiis Co. v. Proctor, 210
Ky. 806, 276 S.W. 803; Pioneer Co. v. McCurdy, 151 Minn. 304, 186 N.W. 776;
Christian, etc., Co. v. Goodman, 132 Miss. 786, 96 So. 692; Hardie, etc.,
Co. v. Easton, etc., Co., 150 N.C. 150, 63 S.E. 676, 134 Am, St. Rept. 899;
York Mfg. Co. v. Chelten, etc., Co., 278 Pa. 351, 123 A. 327; General Motors,
etc., Co. v. Shepard Co., 47 R.I. 88, 129 A. 825; Cavanagh v. Stevens Co.,
24 S. D. 349, 123 N. W. 681 ; Foutty v. Cha Imax Co., 99 W. Va. 300, 128 S.\E.
389.

The rule thus appl led Is wel I settled In this state. "As a general
rule, the measure of the vendee 1 s damages Is the difference between the value
of the goods as they would have been If the warranty as to qua I ity had
been true, and the actual value at the time of the sale, Including gains
prevented and losses sustained, and such other damages as could be reasonably
anticipated by the parties as likely to be .caused by the vendor's failure
to keep his agreement, and could not by reasonable care on the part.of the
vendee have been avoided." Union Bank v. Blanchard, 65 N.H. 21, 23, 18 A.
90, 91; Hurd v. Dunsmore, supra; Noyes v./ Blodgett, 58 N.H. 502; P.L. ch'!'.
166, Sec. 69;, subd. 7. We therefore conclude that the true measure of the
plaintiff's damage in the present case Is the difference between the value
to him of a perfecT hand or a good hand, such as the Jury found The
defendant promised him, and the value of his hand In Its present condition,
Including any lncfdental consequences fairly within the contemplation of
the parties when they made their contract. I Sutherland, Damages (4th Ed.)!
Sec. 92. Damages not thus I tmited, although naturally resulting, are not
to be given.
The extent of the plaintiff's suffering does not measure this difference
in value. The pain necessarily Incident to a serious surgical operation
was a part of the contribution which the plaintiff was will Ing to make to
his Joint undertaking with the defendant to produce a good hand. It was a
99.

legal detriment suffered. by h.fm 'Wn!Ch constituted a ipart of the consideration
given by him for the contract .• Jt represented'a part of.the prfce which
he was willing to pay for a good hand, but It furnished no test of the
value of a good hand or the difference between the value of the hand which
the defendant promised and the one which resulted from the operation.

e

It was also erroneous and misleading to submit to the jury as a sepc:rate
element of damage any change for the worse In the condition of the plaintiff's
hand resulting from the op~ration, although this error was probably more
prejudicial to the plaintiff than to the defendant. Any such II I effect
of the operation would be Included under the true rule of damages set
forth above, but damages might properly be assessed for the defendant's
failure to improve the condltlori of the hand, even If there were no evidence
that Its condition was made worse as a result of the operation.
It must be assumed that the trial court, In setting aside the verdict,
undertook to app I y the same ru I e of damages wh Ich he had prev Ious ty g Iven,
to the jury, and since this rule was erroneous, It ls unnecessary for us to
consider whether there was any evidence to justify his finding that all
damages awarded by the jury above $500 were excessive.
3. Defendant's requests for fnstructlons were loosely drawn, and were
properly denied. A considerable number of Issues of fact were raised by
the evidence, and It would have been extremely mis leading to Instruct the
jury In accordance with defendant's request No. 2, that "the only issue on
whl~h you have to pass Is whether or not there was a special contract
between the plaintiff and the defendant to produce a perfect hand." Equally
Inaccurate was defendant's request No. 5, whic~ reads as fol lows: "You
would have to find, In order to hold the defendant liable In this case,
that Dr. (McGee and the p Ia Intl ff both understood that the doctor was
guaranteeing a perfect result from this operation." If the defendant.said
that he would guarantee a perfect result, .and the plaintiff relied upon that
promise, any mental reservations which he may have had are Immaterial.
The standard by which his conduct Is to be judged Is not Internal, but
external. Woburn Bank v. Woods, 77 N.H. 172, 89 A. 491; Mcconnel I v.
Lamontagne, 82 N.H. 423, 425, 134 A. 718; Eleftherlon v. Great Falls Mfg.
Co. 83 N.H. ----, 146 A. 172.

~

·

Defendant's request No. 7 was as fol lows: "If you should get so far
as to find that there was a special contract guaranteeing a perfect result,
you would sti.11 have to find for the defendant unless you also found that
a further operation would not correct the dlsabl I tty claimed by the
plaintiff." In view of ,the testimony that the defendant had refused to
perform a further operation, it would clearly have been erroneous to give
this Instruction. The evidence would have justified a verdict for an amount
suffl,clent to cover the cost of such an operation, even If the theory underlying this request were correct.
4. It is unlikely that the questions now presented In regard to the
argument of plaintiff's counsel wl 11 arfse at another trial, and therefore
they have not been considered.
New trlal.
MARBLE, J., did not sit; the ot~ers concurred.
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What promlses did the physician make In relation to the operation?
Why did the court not consider the representation that the boy could return
to work fn three or four days a promise? What was It? Could a reasonable
man ln the position of the boy or the boy's father have understood fhts as
a nconvnitment?"
Can a promise be made with the understanding that It shall not be
legal fy enforceable? Consider the fol lowing two cases.
Rose and Frank v. Crompton
2 K.B. 261 (1923)
In thls case, a written agreement between two businessmen contained the
folJowtng clause:
This arrangement is not entered Into, nor Is this memorandum
written, as a format or legal agreement, and shall not be subject
to legal Juristdlctlon ln the law courts either In the United
States or England, but ft Is only a definite expression and
record of the purpose and Intention of the thre~ p~rtfes concerned
to which they each honourably pledge themselves with the fullest
confidence, based upon past business with each other, that It
wt I I be carried through by each of the three parties with mutual loyalty
and friendly cooperation.· The contract was held not to be enforceable
by a court action.

The Mabley & Carew Co. v. Borded
129 Ohi.o St. 375, 195 N.E. 697 (1935)
Infra.
Notes
To what extent Is a determination of whether an utterance Is a promise
dlsposltlve of these cases? Apparently, a non-promise cannot be a contract,
but what considerations go Into a detennlnatlon of whether a group of words
constitutes a promise? Do ru1es like those in the Restatement help in making
these determinations. or do they merely solve the easy cases which could be
as we I I so Ived by the app I ic~ Ion of common sense.
Consider the fol lowLng case. Are there different gradations of
promises? Is this an instance of a "promise" that does not evidence a
sufflcJent ''commitment" to be a promlse in the ey" 1 of the law? Is the
promise of the husband similar to those of one who offers to sel1 his
automob I Ie for a pittance because he Is angry over the/ way In wh t ch · ft ts
runn f ng, or who makes an offer to se 11 someth t ng in jest? To what extent
Is total lty of the circumstances surrounding the words spoken a factor In
determining whether a "promise" has been made?
Balfqur v. Balfour
Court of Appeal, 1919.
. [1919] 2 K.B. 571.
The plaintiff sued the defendant Cher husband) for money which she
claimed to be due In respect to an agreed allowance of 3Q.E a month. The
al ieged agreement was entered into under the fol lowing circumstances • .The
IO I •
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parties were marrleiLlh August, '1900. The husband a civil engineer, had
a post- under the Government of Caylon as Director of I rrlgatton, and after
the niarrlage he and his wife went' to Ceylon, anc( lived th~re. together unttl
the year 1915, except that In 1906 they paid a short visit to this country,
and in 1908 the wt fe came to Ei:ig~and In order, to undergo an' operatl,on,
after which she returrred to Cey I on. In November.. 1915.. she came to th Is
country with her husband, who was on leave. They remained In England untl I
August, 1916, when the llusband's leave was up and he had to return. The)
wife however on the doctor's advice remained In England. On August,8, 1916,
the husband being abput to sail, the alleged parol agreement sued upon was
made. The plaintiff, as appeared from the Judge's note, gave the fol lowing
evidence of what. took place: "In August, 1916, defendant's lefa:)ve was up.
I was suffering from rheumatic arthritis. The doctor advlse'd my staying
In Engl and for some months, not to go out ti 11 November 4. On August S my
husband sal led. He gave me a cheque from 8th to 31st for 24£, and promised
to glve me 301_ per month till I returned." Later on she said: "My husband
and I wrote the figures tog~ther on August 8: 341 shown. Afterwards he said
30t't." In cross-e><aml natl on she sa Id that they had .not agreed to 11 ve apart
until subsequent differences arose beiween them, and that the agr~ment of
August, 1916, was one which might be made by a couple In amity. Her husband
in consultation with her assessed her needs, and said he would send 30J,.
per mo('.lth for her ma I nte.nance. She fUrther sa Id that she then understood
that the defendant would be returning to England In a few months, but that
he afterwards wrote to her suggesting that they had better remain apart.
In March, 1918, she commenced proceedings for restitution of conjugal rights,
and on July 30 she obtained a decree nlsl. On December ,16, 1917, she obtatn~d
an order for a I I mony.
Sargeant, J. he Id that the husband was under an ob 11 gatl on to support
his wife, and the parties had contracted that the extent of that obligation
should 'be defined In terms of so much a ronth. The consent of the wife
to that arrangement was a sufficient consideration to const,tute a contract
wh I ch cou I d be sued upon.
·

•

He accordingly gav~ Judgment for the plaintiff.
The husband appealed.
1

[The concurring opl nlons of Warrington, L. J •. ., and Duke,., L. J., are
omitted.]
·
ATKIN, L. J. ,'The defence tq this action on the alleged contract Is
that the defendant, the husband, ~ntered into no contract wtth his wife,
and for the determl nation of that ft Is necessary to remember that there
are agreements between parties which do not result in contracts within the'
meaning ot .that term tn our law. The ordinary example ts where two parties
agree to take a walk together, or where there is an offer and an acceptance
of hosp I ta 11 ty. Nobody wou Id suggest in ord f nary c I rcumstances that those
agreements resu It In what we know as a contract., and one of the rost usua I
forms of agreement "\o#h I ch does not constl tute a contract appears to me to be
the arrangements which are made beiween husband and wife. It IS' quite .
common, and ft ts the natural and Inevitable result of .the relationship of
husband and wife, that the iwo spouses should make arrarigements beiween
1
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themselves--agreements such as are in dispute In thts actfon--agreements
for allowances, by which the husband agrees that he will pay to his wife
a certain sum of money, per week, or per month, or per year, to cover
either her own expenses or the necessary expenses of the household and
of the children of the marriage, and In which the wife promises either
expressly or Impliedly to apply the allowance for the purpose for which
It Is given. To my mind those agreements, or many of them, do not result
in contracts at al I, and they do not result tn contracts even though there
may be what as between other parties would constitute cons)deratlon for
the agreement. The consideration, as we know, may consist either in some
right, Interest, profit or benefit accruing to one party, or soma forbearance,
detriment, toss or responsibility given, suffered or undertaken by the
other. That Is a well-known definition, and ft constantly happens, I think,
that such arrangements made between husband and wife are arrangements In
which there are mutual promises, or in which there Is consideration In
form within the definition that I have mentioned. Nevertheless they are
not contracts, and they are not contracts because the parties did not Intend
that they should be attended by legal consequences. To my mind It would be
of the worst possible example to hold that agreements such as this resulted
in legal obligations which could be enforced In the Courts. It would mean
this, that when the husband makes his wife a promise to give her an allowance
of 30s. or 2-fl. a week, whatever he can afford to give her, for the maintenance of the household and chlldren, and she promises so to apply it,
not only could she sue him for his fal lure In any week to supply the allowance
but he could sue her for non-performance of the obi lgatlon, express or
Implied, which she had undertaken upon her part. All I can say Is that
the small Courts of this country would have to be multiplied one hundredfold
If these arrangements were held to result tn legal obligations. They .are
not sued upon, not because the parties are reluctant to enforce their legal
rights when the agreement is broken, but because the parties, In the
inception of the arrangement, never intended that they should be sued upon.
Agreements such as these are outside the realm of contracts altogether. The
common law does not regulate the form of agreements between spouses. Their
promises are not sealed with seals and seal Ing wax. The consideration that
really obtains for them Is that natural love and affection which counts for
so little In these cold Courts. The terms may be repudiated, varied or
renewed as performance proceeds or as disagreements develop, and the principles of the common law as to exoneration and discharge and accord and
satisfaction are such as find no place In the domestic code. The parties
themselves are advocates, Judges, Courts, sheriff's officer and reporter.
In respect of these promises each house ts a domain Into which the King's
writ does not seek to run, and to which his officers do not seek to be
admitted. The only question in this case is whether or not this promise
was of such a class or not. For the reasons given by my brethern It appears
to me to be plainly established that the promise here was not Intended
by either party to be attended by legal consequences. I think the onus was
upon the plaintiff, and the plaintiff has not established any contract. The
parties were I t ·1 t ng together, the wI fe Intending to return. The suggesti en
Js that the husband bound h I mse if to pay 30.f.. a month under a 11 cl rcumstanc·:;is 1
and she bound herself to be satisfied with that sum under all circumstances,
and, although she was In Ill-health and alone In this country, that out of
that sum she undertook to defray the whole of the medical expenses that
might fal I upon her, wha,tever might be the development of her illness, and
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tn whatever expenses It might Involve her.· To my mind neither party
contemplated such a result: q think that the parol evidence upon which
the case turns does not es tab II sh a contract. I th I n.k that the I etters
do not evidence such a contract, or amp I lfy the oral evidence which was
given by the wife, which ts not In dispute. For these reasons I think
the Judgment of the Court below was wr<;>ng and that this appeal should
be al lowed.
·
Express Warrantf es and the Uniform Corrmer<;lal Code
Contracts for the sale of goqds are governed by Article 2 of the
Uniform Commercial Code which Is a "code 11 or statute originally drafted by
a group conmlssfoned by the An:ierlcan Law Institute and the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. See the Introduction
to the Uniform Commercial Code and pages I through 9. The UCC has now been
adopted by a.It states except Louisiana. Some states have, however, changed
particular sections so that the lew Is not completely uniform throughout
the country.
Since the UCC has been passed by several state leglslatures, ft Is
binding on the courts. But, as Is true with all statutes, the courts do
have the power, and responsfblllty, of "lnterpretfng" thercode. Thus, In
a particular controversy brought before the court where the UCC Is control I Ing, the court 1 s must apply the UCC to the facts and determJne the
Intent of the legtslature In enacting the applicable provisions. Much has
been written on the role of courts where a case ts controlled by a statute
and there wlll be reference to this question throughout the course.
lnltlal ly, It might be helpful to read the fol !owing article: Hart, U,CC
Brief No. 2: Interpretl ng the Uni form Commercl al Code, 12 Prac. Lawy. No. 7

e

-

p. 39 (1966).

During the past decade, the fate of the Uniform Conmercial Code has
been In the lap of state leglslatures. Controversy has arisen over Its
adoption and over amendments th.at would diminish Its uni formfty am::mg the
states and destroy Its Internal cons{stency. Now that almost every Jurisdlctlon has accepted the Code, its protagonists have victory In si~ht'and
attention ts shifting to the courts, which ~Ill manage Its future and test
the wisdom of Its draftsmen and advocates.
A convincing argument can be made for the proposition th~t appellate
decisions reflect pr Imart ly those situations where I ittle or no preventive
law was practt~d. Accordlngly, they may be a poor barometer of the Code's
efficiency In expediting the run-of-the-ml II business deal.
If buslnessmen, assisted bY their lawyers, can arrange and plan thelr
transactions so as to avoid llttgatlon, then the Code is successful. It ls
true that the Code wtll be tested by the commercial community and the
lawyer tnvolved In counsellng, but It must also be effectfve In settling
disputes that arJse from the abnormal or Just plafn sloppy business deal.
Once. there Is I Jtigatlon, at least one of the parties ts destf ned to
rea 11 ze Iass than he had expected when the barga f n was struck and the Iaw
must app"ortlon the loss.
104.
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Importance of Decided Cases
The effect of reported decisions goes beyond the settlement of disputes
between the parties to the transaction. They will Influence the legal
community's satisfaction with the Code and they wt II affect sought-for
uniformity of application among the states.
The
to other
guide to
that the

narrow decision In a reported case Is qufckly extended by the bar
slml lar situations. The rationale of the opinion Is used as a
future planning of commercfal transactions and to predict the path
law Is travel I Ing.

The uniformity of the Code
upon uniform Interpretation In the
adopting states. An undesirable decision leaves courts In sister states
the unattractive choice of perpetuating a mistake or of adopting a different
Interpretation that cuts Into the sameness of the Code.
Just as the Code establishes rules of law for society, the cases
decided under the Code wf I I establish rules of law. The courts wlll fll I
the gaps and decide questions that the legislature obviously did not consider.
In another decade we wl 11 be talking about the nun I form Commercial Code
as Interpreted," and the body of commercial law wt 11 again be decisional
as wel I as statutory.
Attitude of Courts
There Is some reason to be apprehensive about the fate of the Uniform
Commercial Code as It enters Judicial arenas. On the whole, American courts
have not been very successful In dealing with statutes. The great talent
and skll I that Anglo-American lawyers and judges exhibit in the very
difficult art of discovering and using case law makes their general ineptitude In using statutory material difficult to understand.
It would seem that the abl llty to analyze cases by extracting Issues,
by differentiating between dicta and ratio decldendl, by utilizing a court's
rationale to limit or expand the consequences of a decision, and by using
dlsslmllar case patterns to formulate an argument and the synthesis of a
body of tort or contract law out of the myriad reports of lltlgatl9n Is a
much more exacting intellectual task than the Interpretation of stetutory · .
rules. Yet Karl Llewellyn, an almost unrestrained admirer of the "common
law tradition," found our system stl 11 wanting in Its abl I lty to cope
adequately with statutory problems.
Role of Court vis-a-vis Legislature

e

Several writers have pointed to the tendency of American courts to
overemphasize the valid proposition that the legislature is the.supreme
lawmaker as the basic cause of this difficulty. These same writers have
Insisted that courts must recognize their role as lawmakers even where the
legislature has acted.
Th Is does not mean that the courts may overru Ie a statute where the Ir
Judgment differs from that of the legislature, but It does mean that courts
should accept the leglslatlve rule much In the same way as they accept
105.
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case-rules from decisions previously reported. Reflecffon upon the number
of 'cases where a court has overruled a prior case Indicates the narrow
area In which a,codrt mtgnt even be tempted to decide dtrectly contrary to,
· the wording of .,a statute.
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The arguments of these wr I ters wI 11 · not be repeated here. The Ir
conclusions are accepted. If legislative-made rules are to operate the
same as court-made rules, the role of the court In Interpreting or construing statutes Is not much different from Its place In deciding cases
where no statute Is Involved.
This fs the touchstone of the Uniform Commerctal Code. Although It
contains I lteral fy hundreds of rules to govern commercfal transaction I ftfgetfon, stl 11 It recognf zes, probab fy more than any other statute/ the
continuing need for development of the law. Consequently, ft affords the
courts the opportunity for expanding Its provisions.
Section 1-102
It Is easy to neglect the Importance of section 1-102 which states the
p'urposes of the Code and rules for Its construction. The section states
that the Code "shal I be I fberal fy construed and appl led to promote Its
underlying purposes and policies."
Purposes

•

The stated purposes are:
To simplify, clarify, and modernize the law governing
commercial transactions;
To permit the contlnued expansion of commercial practices
through custom, usage, anq agreement of the parties; and
To make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions.
Offf.clal Comment
The necessary generality of these commands seemingly makes the section
of llttle practical or concrete use.
Nor does the Offlcfal Comment to the section appear to help.
states that:

It

This Act Is drawn to provide flexlblllty so that, since ft
As Intended to be a semi-permanent piece of legislation, It wil I
provide lts own machinery for expansion of commercial practices.
It Is Intended to make It possible for the law embodied In this
Act to be developed by the courts in the light of unforeseen and
new circumstances and practices. However, the proper construction of the Act requires that Its Interpretation and application
be I Imlted to Its reasons •
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Emphasis
In spite of Its general Jty, this sectl,on (and the accof!1Panylng Comment)
affords the advocate/ and th e Judge a key to rl nterp retat Ion of the Code. It
tells, and In statutory 1 lang1,1age.tbat Is Itself a co~nd, how the Code
draftsmen believed their act should be handled by the courts.
1

Specif lcaUy, the section emphasizes:
The pol Icy behind the various. rules;
The need for Improvisation by the courts In those cases,
which will be the vast majority of litigated disputes, where
the Code provides no specific clear-cut answer to the Issue
presented; and
The deslrabl llty of uniform construction among the states.
Sources of Polley

'

.•

How a ~ourt f fl Is a gap In the Code, or prov I des for changes In commercl a I practices, wl II be determined to a large extent by Its understanding
of the pol Icy behind those sections of.the Code that are analogous or similar
to the issue presented. It wt 11 also be determined, .to a lesser extent,
by the Importance that the court puts upon uniformity. Several comments
are appropriate concern Ing the methods that can be app JI ed when search Ing
for pol Icy, sln~e the Code provides some distinct avenues of approach that
are unique to American statutes.
Off I ci a I '{:omments
The draftsl'l'\0n' of the Code have written Comments to each of Its sections~
These are reprinted In most compllatlons, state codes, and services that
reproduce the Code. They are not statutory language because they were not
passed by the legislature of any state, nor are they leglslatlve history
because they were not necessarily considered by state legislatures. They
· -have great uti,llty and Importance In construing the Code, however, as they
do present a commentary by the draftsmen on the purposes, pol lcles, and
intent of the various sections.
In the 1952 draft of the Code, section t-102(3)(f) speclflcal ly provided
that the Comments "may be consulted in the construction and appllcatlon or
this Act but If text and commentconfllct, text controls." This sectl.on was
·omitted from the 1958 and subsequent editions oft-he Code. The reason given
by the draftsmen for Its omission was slmply that, at the trme the .1958
edition was first reteased, The new comments were not completed.

, 1

It wou Id seem that the spl rt t of former section 1-102( 3}(f) should
cont I nue to preva I I In us,e of the Comments. ·
Drafting History
The first Integrated draft of the Uniform Commercial Code was released
by The American Law lnstttute and the National Conference of Commissioners
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on State 1 Laws
J949. _1Tijfs Jtaft was ~ver'ap}ro~dby the; bbdfes of these\
two ins fil tut I orts, a,nd !'IU,Srous changes,, we~ , mad~- be.fore the se,,c:ond draft was released ln.1952. -Th~ 1952-oraft was approved by t~ America-n I.aw
I nstf tute and th,& 'NatJonal 'Conference. , tt weis al_so i ndorsed by· the -Amerlcan
Bar Association. Changes were again made in 1953,. 1957, t,958, ra_nd 1962.
Changes In a ~tatute
famf I far tools of statutory construction, but
/there ~re some pecul iarlttes surrounding the Code that shoul~ be noted.
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In the first place, the changes referred to were not made by the states
(although m::>st of the states that adopted the Code early subsequently
amended the Ir Code to accord wl th the changes made by the ctr:aftsmen). They
- were made by The Ameri9an Law l.nstitute and the National Conference coumlttees _
working on the Code. Hence,J thJs is not legislative history In the tradl-_
tional sense. However, the changes may often, though not always, throw
I i ght on the current Code· prov Is ions.
- Secondly, It should be'rnenttoned that the 1949 draft was somewhat
prematurely released fo~ reasons unconnecteg with its completion. Thus
changes ,made frbm 1949 -to 1952 are not necessarily Indicative of any new
·thinking.
Finally, perhaps more valuable than the changes themselves are the
comments of the draftsmen that accompany the -alterations. These w~re orlglnal ly published tn various paperback reports of the study coumtftees ·
and are now found in at ,feast one of fhe services covert ng the Code:
SENDER'S UNIFORM COMMERCIA~ CODE SERVICE, REPORTER-DIGEST (Matthew Bender
& Co., Albany, New York).
-·
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State Variations
Although variations In the Official Text of the Code t~at are made by
many of the states do not seem to be a likely source of Information' as to
the Code's meaning, they sometimes have valu~ In construing the Code. This
is especlally true where the variation ls one that has been noted by the
Permanent Editorial Board (see below) In Its Report Number 2 released In
:1965. Tbts report not only lists the variations, adopted by the first 30
'states enactt ng the Code, but It aJ so cQnta Ins a comment by1 the Permanent
Edltort~I Board tndlcattng why a variation was rejected and was not
incorporated In the Offtclal Text.
Permanent Editorial Board
In ord~r to assure periodic review of Code provisions and case develop...
ments under:- lt, The ~merican Law Institute and the National Conference have
establ I shed a Pe'rmanent Edi tori al Board for the. Uniform Commerci~I Code,
) charged with the responslbi I fty of keeping abreast of Cod& adop'tfons, state
· variations, and decided cases. This Board has been Issuing annuaf,, reports,
and __ has been considering suggest~d amendments of the Offtclaf Te~t_ of the- 1 ,
Code. "the Board ha.s a I so -volunteered to submit atnlcus briefs on Code cases
when requested by a court. The work of the Boa rd often Is va t1Jab IE~, t n
ind f cat Ing riew deve I opments a~ we 11 'as l n ~Id Ing (In construct I on of ·eodeprov ts ions.
.
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UNIFORMITY
Out-of-State Cases
An Important command of section l-102 Is that the Code be Interpreted
so as "to make uniform the law among the various jurlsdtctlons. 11 Perhaps
the most Important aspect of this mandate is what It tells us about the
use that a court (and advocate) should make of out-of-state cases. The hope
of the draftsmen, as well as that of the legislatures that enacted section
1-102, ts that widespread enactment of the Code would lead to the development of a body of corrmerclal law common to the nation, not simply common to
one state. This wl II be achieved only If cases correctly decided In one
Jurisdiction are followed in other jurisdictions.
Pre-Code Cases
As the Code increases the value of out-of-state cases, tt decreases the
value of cases decided In a state prior to the Code. These cases are not
interpretative of the Code. If a state follows a particular pre-Code view
simply because of these prior cases, the sought-for uniformity and the whole
point of the Code wl JI often be missed.
CONCLUSION
If the Uniform Commercial Code Is to aid businessmen and make a substantial contribution to American Jurisprudence, lawyers and Judges must
approach construction of Its provisions with the same Inventive spirit with
which they regard case law. If the Code gives no specific answer to an
Issue, they must -search for a result that is fair between the parties and
In keeping with the basic policies of the Code.
As noted, the sources of policies are diverse: the statute itself, the
drafting history, offlcial comments, state variations, reports of the Permanent Editorial Board, and the writings of those who helped draft Its
provisions. None, except the statute where It Is clear, Is control I Ing.
But each contributes to an understanding of the Code, and each should be
consulted as an aid to a practical, common-sense, result that will be consonant with businessmen's reasonable expectations.
For the past two decades, many have labored to give our legal system
a comprehensive and workable statute that wl 11 11 slmpl lfy, clarify, and
modernize the law governing convnerclal transactions." Section l-102(2)(a).
By Its open-ended provisions, the draftsmen and consultants expressed
great confidence In the abl lity of the bench and bar to expand the Code's
provisions by Judicial decree. It can only be hoped that this will be
done.
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Consider carefully Section 2-313 of the Uniform Connnercial Code and
the Comments thereto. Does "promise'; as used in § 2-313 have the same
connotation as npromise': in the Restatement of Contracts? Is a description
of the goods sold that is contained in the contract for sale a ,:promise11
that the goods delivered will conform to that description. What is the
difference between nprornise" and "affirmation of fact?''
Section 2-313 states that ;'any affirmation of fact or promisen can
become a warranty. But, the section provides for some flexibility by also
providing that (1) 1'sellers I talk11 does not become a warranty (subsection
(2)); and (2) a promise or affirmation must form a part of the 11 basis of
the bargain 11 in order to constitute a warranty. See also Section 2-208 2nd
Comment 5 to Section 2-313. How do you determine whether a particular collection of words is a warranty under Section 2-313? Is it any easier to make
this determination under the statutory language of Section 2-313 than it is
under the Restatement or under the cases previously studied? Consider
whether the following phrases should be construed as warranties under§ 2-313
or promises under the Restatement:
a.
b.
c.
d.

Winston taste good as a cigarette should
These raincoats will sell like hotcakes
This product is the same as you ordered, but
made by a different manufacturer
Regular price: $159

The Code also provides for :'implied 1 ' warranties. See §§ 2-:-314 and
2-315. Are the implied warranties npromises 11 by the seller that are implicit
in the deal? Are they nirr.plied" in fact, i.e. somehow arise because of the
common understanding of the parties; or are they "implied 11 in law, i.e.
obligations imposed by the law in an attempt to do justice? Are they
1
i" contract'
or : tort''? Consider the case of Sylvia Coal Co. 2 Inc. v. Mercury
Coal & Coke Co., that follows. Is not the only issue in this case a question
of what the seller promised?'
SYLVIA COAL CO., INC. v. MERCURY COAL & COKE CO.
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, July 11, 1967
156 SE2d 1
(Syllabus by the Court]
1. Where there is a conflict in the evidence with regard to whether
an express or implied warranty exists, the question is one for jury determination as to whether or not either or both of such warranties exist in
the sale of the goods or product.
2. Ur.der the Uniform Co~.mercial Code the buyer can be held to pay
a reasonable price where there has been no price fixed for the goods or
product sold.
3. nwhere, in a suit in assumpsit, the verdict is for plaintiff in
an amount less than he is entitled to recover, such verdict will not be set
aside and a new trial awarded for that reason alone, on defendant's motion,
110.

if the plaintiff is willing to accept the verdict of the jury." Syllabus
I, Blair-Parke Coal and Coke Company v. Fiedler-Davis Fuel Company, 98
W. Va. 374.
4. "The fact that a sample Is exhibited does not necessarily make
the transaction a sale by sample. The contract must evince Intention to
contract by sample.;, Syllabus I, American Canning Co. v. Flat Top Grocery
Co., 68 W. Va. 698.

5. There can be no sale by description under Code, 46-2-314, as
amended, where the buyer selects the goods or product sold.
6. The price to be paid for goods or products sold may be considered
by a jury In connection with the quality Intended as to whether an lmpl led
warranty of merchantabl lity exists.
7. An Implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose under Code,
46-2-315, as amended, does not come Into being unless the buyer rel Jes on
the sel ler•s ski II or judgment In connection with the matter or goods
purchased.
8. An Instruction containing the word 11 may 11 tell Ing the jury that
it may find a verdict for one of the parties Is a permissive and not a
binding instruction, and it is not error to give such instruction even
though it omits certain details relative to the elements of the matter
involved if other instructions given by the court Instruct the jury fully
and fairly with regard to the matter.
BERRY, Judge. This ls a civi I action Instituted in the Circuit Court
of Preston County by the Sylvia Coal Company, Inc., hereinafter referred
to as Sylvia or plaintiff, against the Mercury Coal & Coke Company, a
Corporation, hereinafter referred to as Mercury or defendant, to recover
the sum of $3,548.37 for 1419.35 tons of coal delivered by the plaintiff
to the defendant at $2.50 per ton. The jury returned a verdict In favor
of Sylvia In the amount of $1,000 and after the judgment was entered thereon
by the trial court a timely motion to set aside the judgment was overruled
and final judgment was entered Apri I 5, 1966. Upon application to this
Court an appeal and supersedeas were granted November 14, 1966, to the
judgment of April 5, 1966. The case was submitted for decision upon
arguments and briefs on the Aprl I Special 1967 Docket of this Court.
The facts In this case are highly confllcting. The plaintiff contends
one thing with regard to the contract of the sale of coal and the defendant
contends another.

Both rely on the Uniform Commercial Code which was

enacted into law by the legislature of this State In 1963 and consists of
Chapter 46 of the Code of West Virginia at the present time. This ls ona
of the first cases presented to this Court Involving the provisions of the
Uniform Commercial Code, and particularly that portion which deals with
the three usual types of warranty occurring In sales under the Code, namely,
express 1 rnerchantabi I ity, and fitness for a particular purpose.
Sylvia was operating a coal mine in Preston County in August, 1964, undsr
the supervision of Albert Phi I lips. Mercury was operating a coke production
111.

plant in Preston County and was owned principally by Wayne H. Fortney.
The Mercury Coke operation had been operated by Mr. Fortney for some time
and he was experienced in the production of coke from coal largely purchased
by him from Preston County producers. The Sylvia mine had Just been recently
opened and Mr. Fortney, who had known Mr. Phi lltps for about 15 years,
visited the Sylvia operation about August 16, 1964, at which time he stated
he cal led on Mr. Phi I lips to discuss obtaining the services of Mr. Phi lllps
to reopen the Morgan coal mine which was partly owned by Mr. Fortney and
had been closed by reason of a fire. The first coal taken from the Sylvla
mine had been dumped in two large piles near the mouth of the mine. Mr.
Phil I ips admits having some previous discussion with Mr. Fortney with regard
to the reopening of the Morgan mine and also some discussion after his visit
to the Sylvia operation, but does not recal I any detailed discussion with
regard to the Morgan mine at the time the controversy over the purchase of
the coal in question in this case is Involved.
Mr. Phillips stated that when he came out of the mine Mr. Fortney was
looking at the coal pl les and inquired about a purchase of that coal. Mr.
Fortney stated that they first discussed the problem of the Morgan mine and
that then one or the other of them discussed the purchase of the coal located
In the coal pi le near v1here they were standing. Mr. Phi 11 lps testified that
when Mr. Fortney Inquired about the coal contained in the coal pile that he
told him it was a substandard quality and contained considerable slate and
rock. He said that Mr. Fortney told him he was making a cheap grade of
coke and would pay $2.25 to $2.50 a ton for that coal and nothing was said
about the ash content. No analysis had been made of the ash content of the
coal piles located near the opening of the Sylvia coal mine. However, an
analysis had been made of coal taken from another part of the Sylvia mine
which showed about 9 or 10% ash which Mr. Phi I lips stated that he told Mr.
Fortney about and showed him the analysls. It was suggested elther by Mr.
Phi I lips or Mr. Fortney at that time that if the coal located in the coal
pl les were run through a tipple to clean it, that would improve the quality
and Mr. Fortney said he could use it If that was done. There was a tipple
about two miles from the Sylvia coal mine and at the direction of Mr. Phil lips,
In accordance with the agreement with Mr. Fortney, 1546.24 tons of coal from
the coal pi le at the Sylvia mine were hauled to the tipple nearby and run
through the tipple and about 127 tons of rock and slate were picked out of
the tonnage from the picking table when It was run through the tipple
leaving 1419.35 tons of coal which was delivered to the coke yard of Mercury
on August 17th and 18th. The cost to Sylvia in the hauling and cleaning
of the coal was $1588.09.
On August 18th Mr. Fortney came to the Sylvia mine and told Mr. Phi I lips
to stop loading any more coal from the coal mine until an analysis was made
of the coal. However, at that time Mr. Fortney, after looking at the same
coal pJle, again ordered three more truck loads and personally directed
the highlift operator how, when and where to obtain the coal from the coal
p 11 es.
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Several days later Mr. Phi I lips went to Mercury coke plant where Mr.
Fortney advised him that an analysis of the coal showed that It was about
33.8 to 35.6% ash and showed him a sample of the coal which he had unsuccessfully endeavored to make coke from. Mr. Fortney then told Mr. Phll lips in
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effect that he did not want the coal that had been delivered and that If
Phil I fps could sell It he would load It free of charge. It was Mr. Phi II lps'
contention that the coal In question was purchased by Mr. Fortney and he
was not Interested In the further disposition of It. Mr. Phil llps had never
been engaged In the producing of coke In his experience In the mining of
coal and had never been engaged In the sale of coal for any purpose and
although he knew very I lttle about the making of coke, he stated that he
would not consider coal wlth 35% ash content suitable for making coke. Witnesses who were engaged In the purchase and sale of coal and who testlfled
In behalf of Mercury stated that it was the custom of the coal business for
unacceptable coal to be rejected at the point of destination because the buyer
as a general rule does not see the coal until It is del lvered and has no
opportunity to ascertain If It was what he ordered until It was delivered.
The defendant also lntroduced evldence that coal with over 30% ash was not
suitable for coking purposes and that good quality coal for coking purposes
sells for around $4.50 to $7.00 a ton and that the most suitable coal is
around 8 to 10% ash for coke. It was also Indicated that the prior Inspection
of the coal before It was delivered would have some bearing on the right to
reject the coal.
Mr. Fortney's testimony was In conflict with that of Mr. Phlll fps In
many instances. He testified that he used coal with up to 16% ash to produce
coke for which he paid $2.25 to $3.00 a ton and that he had paid up to $7.00
a ton for coal with 8% ash to produce good coke. He testified that he told
Mr. Phi I lips that he would pay $2.25 for 16% ash content, $2.50 for 14% ash
content and $2.75 for 12$ ash content and that he asked what the analysis of
the coal being opened up was, that Phil llps showed him a bag and said It was
a sample, and that It was around 9-1/2% ash. Fortney Interpreted this as
applying to the pl les, as that was the only coal out of the mines. He also
said he told Phil lips that he would not buy coal that was over 16% ash and
that Phi lllps stated that he would del Iver coal not over 16% ash content for
$2.50 a ton.
There Is very I lttle conflict In their statements with regard to the
cleaning and delivering of the coal. Fortney said he visited the tipple on
August 18th where the coal was being cleaned and that he was not satisfied
with the way the rock and slate were being picked from the coal and asked
that the tipple be slowed down so that they could get more of the rock and
slate out but was advised that It had been slowed down as much as possible.
He asserted that after he visited the tipple where the coal was being cleaned
he asked Phil I ips not to send any more untt I he got an analysts back. He
stated that Phi II lps suggested that there were three or four more trucks to
load and he told him to go ahead and load and del Iver them and admitted that
he personally directed the high Ifft man where to place the shovel In the
coal to load the trucks. He said that he agreed to take the addtttonal
truck loads of coal in order to keep the truck drivers from losing work.
At the conclusion of the plalntlff 1s evidence and at the conclusion of
al I the evidence the defendant moved for a directed verdict on the ground
that the evidence clearly showed that there was an express warranty and an
imp I led warranty of merchantabll lty and of fltnessrfor the particular use
for which the coal was sold and that there was no evidence that the breach
of these warranties had been waived. These motions were overruled. After
the entry of Judgment on the verdict a motion was again made under Rule 50,
RCP for a judgment in favor of the defendant or In the alternative under Rule
59, RCP for a new trial, all of which were overruled.
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Several errors are rel led on for reversal, which In their essentials
are: Cl} The plaintiff did not prove any agreed price for the coal, (2}
there was no evidence to support the verdict of the Jury In the amount of
$1,000, (3) the uncontradlcted evidence established the existence of Implied
warranties of merchantability and of fitness for a particular purpose and an
express warranty, breaches of which were not waived, (4) that the motions
for a directed verdict and to set aside the verdict and judgment and enter
a Judgment for the defendant or grant a new trlal should have been sustained,
(5} that Instruction 2 of the plaintiff which was given by the court was
Improper, and (6) that the evidence with regard to the cost of cleanlng and
delivering the coal was improper.
The contentlon,of the defendant that the evidence establishing express
and implied warranties is uncontradlcted Is without merit, as the record clearly
shows that these matters were virorously in dispute. The evidence of the
plaintiff Indicates that there was neither an express nor implied warranty while
the evidence of the defendant Indicates that there were both an express and
one or more Implied warranties. At the pre-trlal conference an agreed statement of facts by the parties contained In an order entered by the trial court
on November 15, 1965, clearly shows that the evidence was in direct conflict
that the evidence of plaintiff would be that the coal was purchased without
any warranty, express or Implied, and that the defendant would contend that
there was an express warranty with regard to the ash content and an Implied
warranty with regard to the merchantability of the coal. The express warranty
relied on by the defendant ls that the plalntlff warranted the coal to be less
than 16% ash. The plaintiff specifically denies that any such warranty was
made and asserts that the coal was bought by the defendant after an Inspection
of the coal and that the defendant's buyer saw and knew what he was getting,
and not only that, but In addition after more than 1400 tons had been delivered
he ordered more of the same coal. Also, the plalntlff contends he agreed to
take the coal after It was cleaned and the rock and slate picked from It.
It has always been true, both before the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code and after its adoption, that where there Is a conflict In the evidence
with regard to whether an express or Implied warranty exists the question is
one for the Jury to determine as to whether or not such warranty exists In
the sale of the goods or product. 46 Am. Jur., § 348; 67 ALR2d 619, 626;
Kemble v. Wi ltlson, 92 WVa 32, 38, 114 SE 369; Kirk v. Stlneway Drug Store
Co., 38 I I I App 2d 415, 187 NE2d 307; De Graff v. Myers Food, Inc., Bucks
County (Penn) 19 D & C2d 19, [I UCC Rep I 10] 2 Bender's Uniform Commercial
Code Service, Reporter Digest 2-185, Sec. 2-315. See Offlclal Comment I,
Michie's West Virginia Code 46-2-315; Official Comment 5, Mlchle's West
Virginia Code 46-2-316.
The content I on of defendant that the p I a f ntl ff did not prove the pr Ice
for 1>1h I ch the coa I was to be sold Is a I so wI thout merit. The evl dence of the
plaintiff indicated that the price would be about $2.50 and that is what he
contended should be paid for the sale of the coal, and even If there had been
no price fixed under the Uniform Commercial Code the buyer can be held to pay
a reasonable price. Code, 46-2-305, as amended; Kuss Machine Tool & Die Co.
v. EI-Tronlcs, Inc., 393 Pa 353, 143 A2d 38.
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The contention that the coal In question in the stock plle or coal pile
was sold by sample of some coal that the plaintiff had analyzed Is disputed
by the evidence of the plaintiff because Mr. Phil I lps stated that the sample
was taken from good coal mined from the mine and analyzed as 9 or 10% ash
content, and he asserts that he clearly stated to Mr. Fortney that the coal
In the stock pile was substandard coal and that the sample and statements
made as to It were not In any way made a part of the basis of the contract
to purchase the coal as an express warranty under Code, 46-2-313, l(a) and
Cc), as amended. In any event this question, as wel I as the question of the
express warranty that the coal In the stock pl le was less than 16% ash ls a
question for Jury determination. See Official Comment 3, Mlchle's West
Virginia Code 46-2-313. This matter is clearly covered in the first syllabus
of the case of American Canning Co. v. Flat Top Grocery Co., 68 W Va 698, 70
SE 756, In the fol lowing language: "The fact that a sample Is exhibited does
not necessarily make the transaction a sale by sample. The contract must
evince Intention to contract by sample."
There Is no question In this case but that the defendant Inspected the
coal In question before It was cleaned and delivered which could exclude an
express warranty If he relied upon his examination rather than affirmations,
descriptions and samples, and which could exclude Implied warranties covering
patent defects which his buyer's ski II ought to have disclosed to him, and
the question of what effect his examination had Is, with confllctlng evidence
or evidence which may be Interpreted more than one way, a Jury question.
Likewise, there can be no sale by description under Code, 46-2-314, as amended,
where the buyer selected the coal as was done In the case at bar. 3 Bender's
Uniform Commercial Code, § 7.01[3][a]; Torpey v. Red Owl Stores, 228 F2d
II 7.

Another matter for jury consideration with regard to the existence of
an lmpl led warranty in connection with the qua I tty intended rs the price to
be paid for the coal In question. The evidence of both the plaintiff and the
defendant is uncontradicted that the price was from $2.25 to $2.50 a ton,
which is lower than the standard price for coal to be used for coking purposes.
The price of such coal from the evidence Is around $5.00. Therefore, the
jury could consider this matter in connection with the obligation under the
contract for the sale and purchase of the coal. See Offlclal Comment 7,
Michie's West Virginia Code 46-2-314, which points out that the nature and
scope of an Implied warranty of merchantabi llty, which Is a concept relating
to overal I quality rather than fitness for a partlcular purpose, are excellently outlined by consideration of the selling price.
The implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose under Code
46-2-315, as amended, does not come Into being unless the buyer rel !es on
the sel ler 9 s ski I I or judgment In connection with the matter or goods

purchased. The evl dence In th Is case clearly shows that Mr. Ph 111 lps had no
experience In the sale of coal to make coke or for any other purpose and his
experience was only In the production of coal and that Mr. Fortney was
experienced and skilled in the purchase of coal, especially for his coke
company, and he in no way rel led on the judgment of the seller in the selection
of the coal involved in the case at bar. Furthermore, Mr. Phi I lips, the seller,
was not a merchant for the sale of coal and In such case the Implied warranty
of fitness for a particular purpose Is not ordlnari ly applicable. See Official
Co~ment 4, Michievs West Virginia Code 46-2-315.
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The evidence of the plaintiff, If believed, indicates that there was
no implied warranty of merchantabtllty in connection with the contract for
the sale of the coal. Mr. Phi I lips asserts that he told Mr. Fortney that
the coal which was sold to him was substandard quality, and Mr. Fortney
examined the coal and agreed to have tt cleaned of rock and slate and
delivered without analysis. Later he stated that he wanted the delivery
stopped unti I an analysis could be made but immediately agreed to the purchase
and delivery of more of the coal which contained the same ash content. Under
these circumstances thts would tend to prove the exclusion of lmpl led warranties as al lowed by Code, 46-2-3163(a) and (b), as amended.
At I of the evidence detat led herein makes this case one for Jury
determination as to whether or not the coal In question was sold with or
without express or lmpl led warranty. The jury having found for the plaintiff
that under the evidence there was no express or Implied warranty and having
been properly Instructed, we find no reversible error In the disposition of
this case by the trial court.
It Is contended by the defendant that instruction number 2 of the plaintiff, which was the only instruction given In behalf of the platntlff and which
was amended by the court, ts reversible error. It Is contended that tt ls
a binding instruction, but this is not correct. It states instead that the
Jury may find for the plaintiff, which makes It a permissive Instruction and
al lows the jury to find under the evidence whether there were express or
implied warranties that would prohibit the plaintiff from recovery If breached.
Walker v. Robinson, 141 W Va 563, 91 SE2d 468; Davis v. Fire Creek Fuel Co.,
144 W Va 537, 109 SE2d 144. Although this instruction did not define in
detal I the elements of express and Implied warranties, the Instructions of
defendant that were given did instruct the jury with regard to the details
of Implied and express warranties and what each consisted of and fully supplemented Instruction number 2 of the plaintiff in connection with this matter.
Hesson v. Penn Furniture Co., 70 W Va 141, 73 SE 302; Lawrence v. Nelson,
145 W Va 134, 147, I 13 SE2d 241. We find no error In the Instructions given
to the jury and its disposition of the case.
For the reasons stated herein the judgment of the Circuit Court of
Preston County is affirmed.
Affirmed.
The Sylvia Coal Co. case involves a commercial dispute: a controversy
between two businessmen over a business deal. Consider the following case.
Does it have a different flavor? Are the Code sections on warranties
serving a somewhat different function?
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ANDREA MARIE McCORMACK, by Donald
McCormack, her father and natural
guardian, Appellant,

v.
HANKSCRAFT COMPANY, Inc.,
Respondent.
No. 39627
Supreme Court of Minnesota.
Nov. 17, 1967
Rehearing Denied Dec. 12, 1967.
278 Minn. 322, 154 N.W.2d 488 (1967)
Syllabus by the Court
I. A manufacturer is subject to ltabl I ity for fal lure to exercise
reasonable care In designing its product to protect users or those endangered
by Its probable use from unreasonable risk of physical harm while Its product
ls being used for Its Intended purpose. liability also may be predicated upon
failure to exercise reasonable care in the adequacy of its Instructions as to
the use of its product and a warning as to any dangers reasonably foreseeable
in its intended use.
2. Where the evidence permitted the jury to find that plaintiff, a 3-yearold chi Id, sustained third-degree burns by contact with the undisclosed
presence and rapid discharge of near-boiling water from an electric steam
vaporizer manufacturered by defendant which plaintiff upset while ft was being
used In the manner prescribed and for the purpose Intended by defendant, and
that defendant, who knew or should have reasonably foreseen that a chi Id might
be severely burned by scalding water upon upset, failed to warn of such danger,
which it should have realized was neither obvious nor likely to be apprehended
by users, or failed to protect against the danger by exercising due care in
adopting a safe, alternative design to make the vaporizer safe for use
unattended in a chi Id's room, the evidence justified the verdict finding that
defendant's negligent lack of warning and defective design caused plaintiff's
injuries.
3. In an action for personal injuries caused by a defective product, a
manufacturer also may be subject to llabl llty for breach of an express warranty
despite the nonexistence of privlty between the manufacturer and the Injured
person and the fal lure to give notice of the breach. Held, the evidence
justified the verdict finding defendant liable to plaintiff for breach of
an express warranty.
4. Abolishing the requirements of privity and notice in personal Injury
actions sounding In breach of warranty Is only a transparent device to eliminate
bars to recovery imposed by the law of sales. Preferably, a manufacturer
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of a defective product should be held liable to a user or those endangered by
its probable use under the now tested and developing rule of strict tort
liability, imposed by law, as a matter of policy, without the limitations
of any illusory contract defenses.

5. Where, pursuant to a blended motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict or a new trial, a conditional order granting a new trial is based in
whole or in part upon the insufficiency of the evidence and such issue is
also raised and determined on review of the order granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the order granting a new trial is subject to discretionary review by this court.
Robins, Davis & Lyons, and John F. Eisberg, St. Paul, for appellant.
Murnane, Murnane, Battis & DeLambert, St. Paul, for respondent.
OPINION
ROGOSHESKE, Justice,
Plaintiff appeals from the judgement entered upon an order of the district
judement n.o.v. and a conditional new trial in favor of defendant, Hankscraft Company, Inc.
oou1.t: gr.ant.ing

Plaintiff, Andrea McCormack, brought this action for damages by Donald
McCormack, her father and natural guardian, alleging that defendant's negligence and breach of implied and express warranties in the manufacture and
sale of a steam vaporizer caused her to suffer substantial personal injuries.
During the 3-week trial, defendant's motions for a directed verdict following
the submission of plaintiff's evidence and at the close of all the evidence
were denied. The court submitted the case to the jury on the questions of
negligence and breach of express warranties, refusing to instruct on inplied
warranties. The jury returned a verdict against defendant, awarding plaintiff
$150,000 damages.
Defendant's motion for judgment n.o.v. and in the alternative for a new
trial was granted. The motion alleged multiple grounds, including that the
verdict was 11 not justified by the evidence, 11 was "contrary to law," and that
there were 11 excessive damages,:, but the court in its order merely declared
that the motion Pis in all things granted 11 without expressly specifying the
grounds upon which the relief was granted.
Understandably, the briefs comprehensively attack or seek to justify
the court's order; but, as the parties apparently agree and as we view it,
the primary issue is whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain the jury's
verdict of liability upon a theory either of negligence or breach of express
warranty.
Viewing, as we must, the evidence and all permissible inferences most
favorably to the sustaining of the verdict, the jury reasonably could have
found the following facts.
In October 1957, Andrea's father, Donald McCormack, purchased from a retail
drugstore an electric Hankscraft steam vaporizer manufactured by defendant.
It was purchased pursuant to the advice of a doctor to be used as a humidifier
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for Andrea, then 8 months old, who had just returned from being hospitalized
for croup and pneumonia. After unpacking the vaporizer, Andrea's parents
read the instruction booklet accompanying the unit from ::cover to cover. 11
Then9 following defendant's printed instructions, they put the vaporizer to
use in the treatment of Andrea. Thereafter, from time to time as the need
arose, it was used for the young children of the family in the prescribed
manner, including the use of it unattended throughout the night, without any
problem.
The vaporizer was used exclusively in the treatment of the children of
the family. After its initial use, Andrea's mother invariably took charge
of filling it, setting it up, plugging in the electric cord, replenishing the
water in the glass jar, and occasionally, as directed by the booklet, cleaning
the heating unit. In using the vaporizer, she relied upon defendant's printed
representations that the unit, except for cleaning, needed no attention, could
be left unattended in a child's room, would "run all night on one filling of
water, 11 and was ;,safe0 and "Practically foolproof. 11
In the spring of 1960, the children had colds and Mrs. McCormack desired
to use the vaporizer but found it ,iwasn • t working." She went to the same
self-service drugstore and purchased another Hankscraft vaporizer similar to
the first unit. She personally selected it without the aid or recommendation
of any clerk because it was a Hankscraft, knowing defendant to be a manufacturer
of a number of products for children and relying upon defendant's prior
representations contained in the booklet accompanying the first vaporizer
that its vaporizers were "safe'" and 11 practically foolproof" as well as advertisements representing them to be atip-proof. 11 This second vaporizer, purchased
in a sealed carton, was known as Model 202A, and its general appearance as
to size and shape and its method of operation were identical with the first
unit. It was accompanied by an instruction booklet substantielly identical
to that furnished with the first vaporizer, which Mrs. McCormack again completely
read.
This second vaporizer had been used about a half dozen times without incident when, on November 20, 1960~ it was again set up for use in a small bedroom in the northwest corner of the house, occupied by Andrea, then 3 years
and nine montha old, and her baby sister, Alison, 1 year and 10 months old.
Andrea slept in a regular single bed and Alison in a crib. To the east of
the doorway of this bedroom is an adjoining bathroom, which Andrea frequently
used during the night. The doors of the bedrooms and bathroom were habitually
left open and a light was usually burning in the bathroom. Andrea's bed was
loca.ted in what might be described as the southwest corner of the room with
the headboard against the doorway wall. The crib was in the northeast corner.
A chifforobe stood next to the crib against the north wall. Andreais mother
set up the vaporizer at about 8 p.rn. on a seat-step-type metal kitchen stool
about 2-1/2 feet high. She placed the stool in front of and against the
chifforobe, The electric cord was extended behind the chifforobe and plugged
into an outlet located there. The stool was about 4 feet from the foot of
Andrea's bed. When steam started coming from the hol~ in the top of the unit,
Mrs. McCormack left the room. After visiting a neighbor until about 11 p.m. ~
she did some ironing, and at about 1:30 a.m.t she returned to the room to
replenish the water s1.tpply in the vaporizer. Using some type of "mitt, 11 she
lifted the cap and poured water from a milk bottle into the jar. She then
went to bed.
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At about 2: 30 a.m., Mrs. McCormack heard a terrible scream and got out
of bed. She found Andrea lying on the floor of her bedroom, screaming. The
metal stool was upright, but the vaporizer was on the floor and the water had
come out of the jar. The vaporizer had separated into its three component
parts--a glass jar, a metal pan~ and a plastic top-heating unit. The electric
cord was still plugged into the electric outlet. In some manner, Andrea,
while intending to go to the bathroom, had tipped over the vaporizer, and
caused the water in the jar to spill upon her body.
Andrea was rushed to the hospital for treatment. More than 30 percent
of her body had severe burns; she was suffering from shock; and her condition
was critical for some time. She had third-degree burns on her chest, shoulders,
and back. Skin-graft surgery was performed on her twice. She was hospitalized
for 74-1/2 days. Ten days later she was admitted to the Kenny Institute for
treatment. She remained there 102 days and thereafter was taken to the Mayo
Clinic, where she had further surgery in August 1961. At the time of the
trial, Andrea had heavy scar tissue on her chest, stomach, legs, arms and
neck; a deformed jaw; restricted movement of her head~ an irregular posture;
and the prospect of 6 to 12 more surgical procedures during her lifetime.
Her condition is largely permanent.
The :'automatic-electric11 vaporizer in question is of normal design and
consists of three component parts--an aluminum pan which serves as a base, a
1-gallon glass jar or water reservoir which is inserted into the pan, and a
black plastic cap to which is fastened a black plastic heating-chamber tube.
The glass jar, 6-5/G inches square and 8 inches high, is a so-called
"standard gallon pickle jar" not specially manufactured as a component part.
The top opening is 4-1/2 inches in diameter and its outer neck has a male-type
glass thread. To fill the jar to a designated fill mark requires .73 gallon
of water.
The aluminum pan, which is made to fit the bottom of the jar, is 4 inches
high. It has two plastic lifting and carrying handles. Four projections,
3/4 inch in diameter and 1/8 inch in height, are regularly spaced on the
bottom of the pan and serve as feet for the unit.
The plastic cap and heating chamber assembly has a dome-like appearance
in its upper portiont which is 5 inches in diameter and 2-3/4 inches high.
Enclosed in a plastic tube which attaches to the upper portion are two narrow,
8-inch-long steel electrodes which extend from the underside of the cap and
are fastened to terminals which connect to an electric plug-in type cord. This
cord, about 6 feet long, is attached to the terminals through a hole in the
cap. Opposite the electric cord is a round steam hole 3/16 inch in diameter.
Directly below this there is moulded into the top a "medicament hollow. 1: The
heating cha~her tube enclosing the electrodes is about 7-5/8 inches long. It
consists of a lower section 5-1/8 inches long, which tapers upward from 1-1/2
'· inches to 1-7/8 inches in diameter, and an upper section 2-1/2 inches long
and 3 inches in diameter. The upper section has a flange 3-3/4 inches in
diameter through which three screws are used to fasten both sections to the
cap. A hole 1/8 inch in diameter is in the bottom of the lower section through
which water in the jar reaches the electrodes. Eight holes 1/4 inch in
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diameter are in the bottom of the upper section. They are intended to
relieve any steam pressure that might build up inside the lower tube or the
jar should the steam hole become obstructed and also to guard against "any
chance of water spitting out the steam hole. n The cap and heating chamber
assembly, by its own weight, rests loosely upon the glass jar with the black
tube extending down into the jar. There are no threads inside the plastic
cap or any other means provided to fasten the cap to the threaded neck of
the jar. This design and construction were intended by defendant to serve
as a safety measure to avoid any buildup of steam in the glass jar, but it
also has the result of allowing the water in the jar to gush out instantaneously when the vaporizer is tipped over. This unit can be tipped over
easily by a child through the exertion of about 2 pounds of force.
To operate the vaporizer in accordance with the instr~~tions contained
in defendant's booklet, the ' 1entire plastic cover11 is removed, the glass jar
is filled to the filling marker with tap water containing minerals, and the
cord is plugged into an electric outlet, whereupon "[t]he vaporizer will
produce a gentle cloud of steam within a few minutes." The heating unit
is designed so that it automatically turns off whenever the water in the jar
decreases to a certain level. As the booklet pictorially illustrates, the
water from the jar enters the lower section of the heating chamber through
the small hole at the bottom. Here it is heated until it boils and is
vaporized into steam, which passes out of the unit through the-hole in the
cap.
Tests made of the unit established that after about 4 minutes of operation the water in the heating chamber reaches 212 degrees Fahrenheit and
steam emanates from the steam port. Although the water in the jar outside
the heating chamber does not reach the boiling point, the upper portion of
this water does reach 211 degrees within 35 minutes of operation and the
middle portion reaches 211 degrees within 3 hours. The temperature of the
outside of the jar ranges from 172 degrees after about 1 hour to 182 degrees
after 5 hours. Thus, during most of the 6- to 8-hour period in which the
unit is designed to operate without refilling, the water in the reservoir is
scalding hot, since water of 145-degree temperature will burn and 180-degree
water will cause third-degree burns on a child 5 years old.
By touch, a user can determine that the water in the jar outside the
heating unit, as well as the jar and the plastic cap, becomes hot during
the operation of the vaporizer. However, there is no movement of the water
in the jar and no means by which a user could discern by sight or touch that
this reserve water in the jar became and remained scalding hot. Plaintiff's
parents, relying upon their understanding of what defendant represented in
its instruction booklet, were reasonably led to believe up to the time of
plaintiff's injury that, since steam was generated only in the heating unit,
the temperature of the water in the jar during the entire operation of the
vaporizer remained the same as when put in. At all of the times when
replenishing the water in either the first or second vaporizer, plaintiff's
mother followed the routine of removing the entire plastic cover by using
some nglove 11 or i;mitt' 1 as a precaution against the steam. She would leave
the cord plugged in, add water to the jar, replace the cover, wait until
steam appeared, and then leave the unit unattended in the room. As her
testimony implied, she at no time discovered by touching or handling the
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unit when it was in use that the temperature of any part of the water in
the jar became hot.
The instruction booklet furnished by defendant did not disclose the
scalding temperatures reached by the water in the jar, nor was any warning
given as to the dangers that could result from an accidental upset of the
unit. While plaintiff's mother realized that the unit could be tipped over
by a sufficient external force, she justifiably relied upon defendant's
representations that it was ,isafe, ,: !'Practically foolproof, and "tip-proof. 11
She understood this to mean that the unit 11was safe to use around [her]
children11 end that she ''didn't have to worry" about d .gers when it was left
unattended in a child's room since this was the primary purpose for which it
was sold.
In its booklet and advertising, defendant in fact made the representations relied upon by plaintiff's mother. In addition to the simple operating
instructions and a pictorial 11 cut-away 0 indicating how the steam is generated
by the electrodes in the heating chamber, the booklet stated:
"WHY THE HANKSCRAFT VAPORIZER IS
SUPERIOR TO OTHERS IN DESIGN.
"Your vaporizer will run all night on one filling of water,
directing a steady, gentle flow of medicated steam exactly
where it is needed. No attention is necessary.
nit's safe, too, and practically foolproof. Since the
water itself makes the electric contact 9 the vaporizer shuts
off automatically when the water is gone. The electric unit
cannot burn out. 11
The booklet also had a picture of a vaporizer sending steam over a baby's
crib, alongside which was printed:
"For most effective use 9 the vaporizer should be placed at
least four feet away from the person receiving treatment,
and should not be placed above the patient's level."
Defendant's officers realized that the vaporizers would be primarily
used in the treatment of children and usually would be unattended. They had
knowledge that the water in the jar got scalding hot; that this water would
cause third-degree burns on a small child; that the water in the jar would
gush out instantaneously if the unit were tipped over~ that the unit was not
:;tip-proof"; that the combination of the unsecured top and the hot water in
the jar was dangerous because of the possibility that a child might tip it
ever during operation; and that, prior to plaintiff's injury, at least 10 to
12 children had been burned in this manner. Furthermore, defendant's officers
realized that the fact the water in the jar got hot was not discernible
during operation except by touching or handling the unit and that a user
could conclude from their booklet that steam was generated in the plastic
core and be led to believe that the reserve water in the jar did not itself
become scalding hot.
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Plaintiff called two expert witnesses, whose qualifications in the
field of product design were unquestioned. Both testified that the design
of the vaporizer was defective principally in that it failed to provide a
means for securing the plastic cover to the jar in a manner which would
prevent the water in the jar from instantaneously discharging when the unit
was tipped over. In the opinion of both, the unit could be tipped over with
little force and this defective design created a risk of bodily harm to a
child if the unit were left operating and unattended in the room. This defect
could have been eradicated by the adoption of any one of several practical
and inexpensive alternative designs which utilized simple and well known
techniques to secure the top to the jar. Any of these alternative designs
could have been employed by defendant prior to its production of the second
vaporizer by the application of sound product-design principles current at
that time. Among these alternative designs was that of making threads on the
inside of the plastic top so it could screw onto the jar and the putting of
two or three small holes in the top, which would take care of any danger that
steam would build up inside the jar. Both witnesses stated that such a change
in design was essential to make the unit safe for its intended use because the
presence of near-boiling water in the jar was not discernible by sight or
touch and no warning of the risk of harm was contained in defendant's instruction booklet.
Plaintiff contends that the evidence not only raised jury issues as to
negligence, breach of warranties, and causation but also is more than
sufficient to support the jury's finding of liability on the two theories
submitted. Defendant contends the evidence presented was so deficient to
establish its liability on any ground that it is entitled to a judgment on
the merits as a matter of law.
At this late date in the development of the law relating to the tort
liability of manufacturers of all types of products for injuries caused by
their products, there can be no doubt that a manufacturer is subject to
liability for a failure to use reasonable care in the design of its product
to any user or consumer, including any person who may reasonably be expected
to be in the vicinity of its use, to protect against unreasonable risk of
physical harm while the product is used for its intended purpose. Such
liability may equally be predicated upon a failure to use reasonable care
in giving adequate and accurate instructions as to the use of the product
and a warning as to any dangers reasonably foreseeable in its intended use.
Lovejoy v. Minneapolis-Moline Power Imp. Co., 248 Minn. 319, 79 N.W.2d 688.
Plaintiff urges that defendant was negligent both in its failure to
give any warning of the dangers inherent in the use of the vaporizer and in
its adoption of an unsafe design. Plaintiff claims among other things that
defendant, in undertaking to instruct as to the use of its vaporizer, violated
its duty to use due care when it failed to inform that the water in the jar
got scalding hot with tempeTatures up to 211 degrees Fahrenheit and to warn
of the dangers of serious injury if the unit were upset during operation.
Defendant concedes it gave no such warning but vigorously argues that a
warning was not necessary since the fact that the water in the jar becomes
and remains hot should be obvious to any user.
In support of its position, defendant claims that anyone touching the
jar or plastic top after the vaporizer had been working for some time would

123.

•

realize they are hot and conclude the water in the jar is also hot, and
that because the instructions indicate that steam is produced in the plastic
heating chamber, a reader would necessarily conclude the water in the jar
is bot since the beating unit obviously comes into direct contact with such
water. Plaintiff, on the other hand, contends that a warning is necessary
because the average user would not realize that this water becomes hot,
much less that it becomes scalding hot. Plaintiff relies upon the undisputed
evidence that there is no boiling activity of the reserve water in the jar
and that there is no way short of actual temperature measurements to discern
by sight or touch that this water reaches the dangerous temperature of 211
degrees. Further, plaintiff relies upon the evidence that the instructions
furnished by defendant served to allay any suspicions a user might otherwise
have as to the near-boiling temperature of the water or any apprehension of
danger by indicating that the vaporizer was safe to use unattended in a
child's room throughout the night. Moreover, both of plaintiffvs parents
testified that neither had in fact become aware of the temperature of the
water nor realized the danger that, if the unit were upset while in use,
the water could scald and inflict third-degree burns on a child.
We have very little difficulty in reaching the conclusion that the
evidence justified the jury in finding that defendant failed to exercise
reasonable care to inform users, including plaintiff's parents, of the scalding temperatures of the water and to warn of the dangers reasonably foreseeable in the use of the vaporizer. Hartmon v. National Heater Co., 240
Minn. 264, 60 N.tt.2d 804. Surely the evidence does not as a matter of law
compel a conclusion that the true nature and gravity of the dangers which
could result from the scalding water in the jar were sufficiently obvious
ta most potential users as to preclude the jury frore finding that due care
required an appropriate warning. Under the court 9 s instruction, the jury
could, and quite likely did, conclude that defendant knew or should have
reasonably foreseen that the primary use of its vaporizer involved the danger
that a child might be severely burned by the rapid discharge of near-boiling
water upon an intentional or accidental upset, and that a substantial number
of users would not become aware of the scalding temperature of the water nor
realize the potential dangers of using the vaporizer unattended in a child's
room unless adequate information and an appropriate warning were given so
that parents would take extraordinary precautions. These findings, together
with defendant's utter failure to warn, and the finding that the dangers
inherent in the vaporizer's use were not obvious and were outside the realm
of common knowledge of potential users (especially in view of defendant's
representations of safety)l are, we hold, supported by the evidence and
alone justified the jury's verdict of liability.
We similarly conclude and hold that the evidence is also sufficient
to support the jury's verdict of liability on the ground that defendant was

negligent in adopting an unsafe design. It is well established that a
manufacturer, despite lack of privity of contract, has a duty to use reasonable
care in designing its product so that those it should expect will use it are
protected from unreasonable risk of harm while the product is being used for
1.

Restatement, Torts (2d) §388, comment b.
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its intended use. A breach of such duty renders the manufacturer liable.
Rosin v. International Harvester Co., 262 Minn. 445, 115 N.W.2d 50. 2 Clearly,
such a duty was owed to plaintiff for defendant admitted that the primary,
intended use of the vaporizer was for the treatment of children's colds and
croup.
The proof is sufficient to support plaintiff's claim of defective
design in that, among other defects,3 defendant failed to exercise reasonable
care in securing the plastic cover to the jar to guard against the reasonably
foreseeable danger that a child would tip the unit over when it was in use
and be seriously burned by coming in contact with the scalding water that
would instantaneously gush out of the jar.
This'· proof of a specific defect which, under the circumstances, the jury
could find caused the plaintiff's injuries distinguishes this case from the
factual situations present in Jessen v. Schuneman's, Inc., 246 Ninn. 13, 73
N.W.2d 786, and Wallace v. Knapp-Monarch Corp. (6 Cir.) 234 F.2d 853, relied
upon by defendant.
To urge that a vaporizer is not a dangerous instrumentality is not
persuasive to a reviewing court when the evidence reasonably permits a finding
that a simple, practical, inexpensive, alternative design which fastened the
top to the jar would have substantially reduced or eliminated the dangers
2.

See, also, Johnson v. West Fargo Hfg. Co., 255 itlnn. 19, 95 N.W.2d 497;
Lovejoy v. Minneapolis-Moline Power Imp. Co., 248 Minn. 319, 79 N.W.2d
688; Hartmon v. National Heater Co., 240 Ninn. 264, 60 N.W.2d 804; Restatement, Torts (2d) § 398.

3.

Plaintiff claimed there were two other defects in design, but we believe
the evidence insufficient to predicate liability upon either. It was
argued that the water in the jar was rendered too hot because the design
permitted steam and its condensate to escape from the eight 1/4-inch
holes in the upper section of the heating chamber into the water reservoir. But, plaintiff's experts failed to testify that if suggested
changes had been adopted the water's temperature would have been reduced
sufficiently so that it would not have caused third-degree burns to
plaintiff. Plaintiff also argued that the vaporizer could be tipped
too easily. While it was established that an alternative design would
substantially increase the amount of force necessary to tip it over, the
experts failed to testify as to how much force plaintiff likely would
have exerted when she tipped the vaporizer over and therefore there was
no indication whether the suggested changes would have prevented her
from doing so. The matters which were omitted are not subjects of comm.on
knowledge, and in the absence of expert testimony, the jury could only
speculate as to whether these suggested changes in design could have
prevented plaintiff's injury. This constituted a failure of proof
as to proximate cause. See, e.g. Miller v. Raaen, 273 Minn. 109, 139
N.W.2d 877; Ericksen v. Wilson, 266 Minn. 401, 123 N.W.2d 687.
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which caused plaintiff's injuries.4 Defendant's experts testified that the
design adopted was to guard against an explosion because of a buildup of
steam in the heating unit and jar~ but the jury could have accepted the
testimony of plaintiff's experts which indicated the use of defendant's design was not necessary to accomplish this purpose. Moreover, the fact that
at the time the second vaporizer was purchased many other brands of vaporizers on the market were designed in basically this same manner, while
certainly relevant, did not necessarily bar the jury from concluding that
the exercise of due care required the adoption of a different design. 5
We also find no merit in defendant's contention that it was not negligent
because any defect caused by its failure to secure the heating unit to the
jar was obvious. Clearly the jury could have justifiably found that users,
particularly children such as plaintiff who was a mere child of 3 years of
age, are incapable of meaningfully comprehending the true nature and gravity
of the risk to them that results from a product's design and of effectively
acting so as to avoid the danger.6 The jury could have concluded that
protection of this class of persons required that defendant in the exercise
of due care should have adopted one of the safe alternative designs. While
the evidence with respect to this issue required a resolution of the conflicts
in the testimony of expert witnesses 9 the jury was free to adopt the opinions
of plaintiff's witnesses and to reach a verdict of liability on this ground
of negligence also.
We also conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support a finding
of liability upon a breach of an express warranty.
We are persuaded that whether the previously quoted language of the
booklet, particularly in combination with the picture of a vaporizer sending
steam over a baby's crib, amounted to an express warranty that it was 11 safe 11
for a user to let this vaporizer run all night in a child's room without
attention was a jury question. No particular words are required to constitute an express warranty, and the representations made must be interpreted
as an ordinary person would understand their meaning, with any doubts
resolved in favor of the user.7 Since parents instinctively exercise great
care to protect their children from hann, the jury could justifiably conclude
that defendant 1 s representations were factual (naturally tending to induce
a buyer to purchase) and not mere 11 puffing 11 or •:sales talk. 11 8
4.

Evidence of the existence of a feasible alternative design eliminating
the unattached top renders the holding in Blissenbach v. Yanko, 90 Ohio
App. 557, 107 N.E.2d 409, inapplicable to this case.

5.

See, 65A C.J.S. Negligence§ 232.

Cf. Hartmon v. National Heater Co.,

240 Minn. 264, 60 N.W.2d 804.

6.

See, 2 Harper & James, Torts, § 28.5. Cf. Schipper v. Levitt & Sons,
Inc. , 44 N. J. 70, 207 A. 2d 314; Wright v. Massey-Harris, Inc. , 68 Ill.
App.2d 70, 215 N.E.2d 465.

7.

See, McCormack Harvesting Mach. Co. v. Fields, 90 Minn. 161, 95 N.W.886.

8.

Minn. St. 1961, § 512.12; Corporation of Presiding Bishop, etc. v.
Cavanaugh, 217 Cal.App.2d 492s 32 Cal.Rptr. 144.
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The finding, in compliance with the court's instruction, that "plaintiff's
parents justifiably relied 11 on the representations is also supported by
the evidence. Neither parent became aware of the high temperature of the
water in the jar nor apprehended any danger from using the vaporizer in the
prescribed manner. Plaintiff's mother specifically testified that she
relied on defendant's representations. The jury properly may have viewed
this testimony as inherently probable and true and concluded that plaintiff's
mother placed substantial reliange upon defendant's express warranty in
purchasing the second vaporizer.
That she did not rely sole~y upon the
warranty but also was motivated by her own favorable past experience with the
first vaporizer is not determinative.lo Nor does the fact that the representations in the bookle·t which accomparsied the first vaporizer were not
made simultaneousely with the purchase of the second prevent the conclusion
reached by the jury .11
As previously indicated, there was adequate support for the finding that
defendant breached its warranty, since the facts which the jury could find
established that the vaporizer was not ''safe" for its primary intended use.

Defendant argues that plaintiff is barred from recovery for breach of
express warranty because of failure to give notice of such breach within a
"reasonable time" as required by Minn.St.1961 § 512.49, of the sales act.
We cannot agree. This argument, not unlike defendant's suggestion that the
ebsence of privity of contract between defendant, and plaintiff should likewise bar recovery, does not appeal to our sense of justice, It can be disposed
of by adopting the rule of some jurisdictions that in personal injury actions
alleging breach of warranty no such notice need be given because, as here,
plaintiff is not a "buyer" within the contemplation of the statute. 12 But
such disposition, and similarly the elimination of privity,13 is only a
transparent device to reach a desired result by eliminating bars to recovery
imposed by the law of sales. Since the recent and often-cited cases of
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69, 75 A.L.R. 2d
1, and Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57, 27 Cal.Rptr. 697,
377 P.2d 897, a host of decisions by many courts have adopted the view, first
9.

See, Schilling v. Roux Distributing Co., Inc., 240 Minn. 71, 59 N.W.2d
907; Hansen v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (6 Cir.) 276 F.2d 254; Marko
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 24 N.J.Super. 295, 94 A.2d 348; Silverstein v.
R. IL Macy & Co. 266 App.Div. 5, 40 N.Y.S.2d 916; Rogers v. Toni Home
Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612, 75 A.L.R.2d 103.

10.

Marshall v. Gilman, 52 Minn. 88, 53 N.W. 811.

11.

See,Vitro Corp. of America v. Texas Vitrified Supply Co., 71 N.Mex.
95, 376 P.2d 41.

12.

See, LaHue v. Coca-Cola Bottling, Inc., SO Wash.2d 645, 314 P.2d 421;
Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co 01 375 Mich. 85, 133 N.W.2d 129; Wights
v. Staff Jennings, Inc., 241 Or. 301, 405 P.2d 624, which hold, without
adopting the rule of strict tort liability discussed in the opinion~
that the notice requirement is not applicable to nonpurchasers.

13.

This requirement has been expressly abolished by§ 2-318 of the Uniform
Commercial Code as to any person 11 in the family or household of his
buyer/' enacted after this action arose. Minn.St. 336, 2-318
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urfed by Dean Prosser14 and now embodied in Restatement. Torts (2) § 402
A, 5 that the liability of a seller to persons injured by its defective
product is not one governed by the law of contract warranties but by the
law of strict liability in tort. This rule of strict tort liability~ as
it is appropriately called, qualifies as a tested legal theory along with
the traditional theories of negligence and breach of warranty where the
latter meet the purpose for which liability should be imposed upon a supplier
of a product. However, in our view, enlarging a manufacturer 9 s liability
to those injured by its products more adequately meets public-policy de~ands
to protect consumers from the inevitable risks of bodily harm created by
mass production and complex marketing conditions. In a case such as this,
subjecting a manufacturer to liability without proof of negligence or privity
of contract, as the rule intends, imposes the cost of injury resulting from
a defective product upon the maker, who can both most effectively reduce or
eliminate the hazard to life and health, and absorb and pass on such costs,
instead of upon the consumer, who possesses neither the skill nor the means
necessary to protect himself adequately from either the risk of injury or
its disastrous consequences.
If traditional commercial contractual limitations, such as the requirement of notice or the doctrine of privity, were applied to this case, defendant's liability upon the ground of breach of an express warranty could not
be upheld. Plaintiff would be denied recovery despite adequate proof that
the vaporizer was 11 in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user 11 ; that plaintiff was i.njured thereby; and that defendant represented
the vaporizer as "safe 11 and did everything by advertising and
otherwise to induce that belief while creating the risk and reaping the profit
from its sales. Recovery would be denied unless, as here, the injured plaintiff
is able to investigate fully 1 hire experts, and marshal evidence sufficiently
persuasive to convince a jury that evidence of elaborate precautions employed
by the manufacturer to make its product safe did not measure up to the standard
of reasonable care.
Without attempting to discuss the.many cases adopting the rule of strict
liability and the many articles testifying to the remarkable shift toward
its adoption16 we hold that neither notice nor privity need be alleged or
14.

Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer),
69 Yale L.J. 1099, and Prosser, T}:le Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability_
to the Consumer), 50 Minn.L.Rev. 791, where the cases are comprehensively
and critically analyzed.

15.

Restatement, Torts (2d § 402A, provides: ,:(1) One who sells any product
in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer
or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused
to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if (a) the seller
is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and (b) it is expected
to and does reach the user or con.sumer without substantial change in the
condition in which it is sold. 11 (2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although (a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and (b) the user or consumer has not bought
the product from or entered into any contractual relation with the seller. 11
Brown v. General Motors Corp. (4 Cir.) 355 F.2d 814 (Ohio law); Putnam v.
Erie City Mfg. Co. (5 Cir.) 338 F.2d 911 (Texas law): Greeno v. Clark
Equipment Co. (N.D.Ind.) 237 F.Supp. 427 (Indiana law); Greenman v. Yuba
Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57, 27 Cal.Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897, 13
A.L.R.3d 1049; Garthwait v. Burgio, 153 Conn. 284, 216 A.2d 189; Suvada
v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill.2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182; Dealers Transport

16.
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proved in cases like the one before us. We do so not simply to eliminate
these contractual limitations upon a claim for personal injury against a
manufacturer based upon a breach of an express warranty (as was done long
ago with respect to implied warranties)17 but, more importantly, to declare
our agreement with the principles underlying the rule of strict tort liability and to record our intention of applying that rule in this type of case.
That this view is consistent with sound public-policy considerations is
indicated by our previous decisions disclosing the active role of this court
in the development of the rules respecting a manufacturer's liability. Thus,
in Schubert v. J. R. Clark Co., 49 Ydnn. 331, 51 N.W. 1103, 15 L.R.A. 818,
we substantially abolished privity in negligence actions by a consumer against
th~ manufacturer. In Beck v. Spindler, 256 Minn. 543, 99 N.W.2d 670, we
eliminated this requirement in actions by a purchaser against a manufacturer
based upon implied warranties and expressly questioned whether the concept
of privity ought not to be completely abrogated in product liability actions
resulting in personal injuries.
We are fully mindful that plaintiff did not directly plead the theory
of strict tort liability 7 request the court to instruct on it, nor urge this
theory until this appeal. However, we perceiven0 prejudice to defendant,
as its liability is adequately established on the ground of negligence.
We have discussed a manufacturer's liability sounding in warranty to answer
defendant's arguments and to disclose forthrightly the basic reasons for
eliminating the defenses urged. Moreover, we desire to set at rest such
future arguments which seek to raise various illusory contract defenses to
a rule of liability which we believe should be imposed by law, in tort, as
a matter of policy in cases such as this.
We also hold the evidence adequate to support a reasonable inference
that defendant's negligence and breach of warranty proximately cs.used
plaintiff's injury. From the fact that plaintiff sustained third-deg~ee
burns by coming in contact with near-boiling water, the obvious and reasonable
inference is that her injuries were directly caused by the undisclosed
Co. v. Battery Distributing Co. (Ky.App.) 402 S.W.2d 441; Meche v.
Farmers Drier & Storage Co. (La.App.) 193 So.2d 807; State Stove Mfg.
Co. v. Hodgesi Miss., 189 So.2d 113~ Shoshone Coca-Cola Bottling Co.
v. Dolinski, 82 Nev. 439, 420 P.2d 855; Williams v. Ford Motor Co.
(Mo.App.) 411 S.W.2d 443; Santor v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J.
52, 207 A.2d 305; Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432,
240 N.Y.S.2d 592, 191 N.E.2d 81; Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., 1
Ohio App.2d 374, 205 N.E.2d 92; Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424 220 A.2d 853;
Ford Motor Co. v. Lonon, 217 Tenn. 400, 398 S.W.2d 240; Lascher, Strict
Liability in Tort for Defective Products: The Road to and Past Vander.mark, 38 So.Cal.L.Rev. 30; Keeton, J,>roducts Liability--Liability Without
Fault and the Requirement of a Defect, 41 Tex.L.Rev. 855; Traynor, The
Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 Tenn.L.
Rev. 363; Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw.L.J. 5;
Note, 55 Georgetown L.J. 286; 2 Frumer & Friedman, Products Liability,
pp. 3-173 to 3-226.
17.

Beck v. Spindler, 256 Minn. 543, 99 N.W.2d 670.
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presence and rapid discharge of the scalding water in the vaporizer jar.
At best, under the court's instructions, defendant was permitted to argue
that the negligence of plaintiff's mother was a superseding cause, for it
is clear that the failure of plaintiff's parents to discover the defect or
any other negligent conduct on the part of plaintiff's mother under any
theory of liability cannot be imputed to plaintiff.19 The jury found against
defendant on this issue, and we doubt that a contrary finding could be
sustained. We discover no evidentiary basis for a claim that the vaporizer
was abnormally used or, indeed, was so placed in plaintiff's room that the
propensity of children to tip things over when going to the bathroom at
night was deliberately or negligently ignored, amounting to unforeseeable
negligent conduct or assumption of risk by plaintiff's mother. Foreseeable
intervention by a third party is not a superseding cause.20
Finally, we come to the troublesome question of reviewability of the
order conditionally granting a new trial. Plaintiff urges that we review
and reverse, and defendant insists that, since judicial discretion was
exercised in granting the order, Minn.St. 605.09(e); Satter v. Turner,
257 Minn. 145, 100 N.W.2d 660; and Gothe v. Murray, 260 Minn. 181, 109 N.W.2d
350, require a dismissal of this portion of plaintiff's attempted appeal.
It is at once evident that if we agree with defendant we are placed in
the untenable position of laving held the evidence adequate to sustain the
verdict while at the same time permitting a new trial on all issues to occur
because the trial court in the exercise of discretion, as urged by defendant,
presumably found the verdict not justified by the evidence. Complicating
the matter is defendant's omission to assert before this court any claim
that the order could be sustained on the ground that it was based exclusively
upon errors of law prejudicial to defendant or that the damages awarded were
excessive for reasons requiring a retrial on all issues; that the court did
not specify the grounds for the order either in the order or an explanatory
memorandum; and that Rule 59.01(8), Rules of Civil Procedure,21 provides
18.

Standafer v. First Nat. Bank, 243 Minn. 442, 68 N.W.2d 362; Paine v.
Gamble Stores, Inc., 202 Minn.462, 279 N.W. 257 116 A.L.R. 407; Lindroth
v. Walgreen Co., 329 Ill.App. 105, 67 N.E.2d 595, affirmed, 407 Ill.
121, 94 N.E.2d 847.

19.

Peterson v. Richfield Plaza, Inc., 252 Minn. 215, 89 N.W.2d 712.

20.

Knutson v. Hielsen, 256 Minn. 5Q6, 99 N.W.2d 215. See, also, Prosser
The Fall of the Citadel (Strict !...i.:c~:-ility to tl1e Consumer), 50 Minn.
L.Rev. 791, 826, for his treatment of intervening conduct to relieve a
supplier of strict liability in tort.

21.

Rule 59 .01, Rules of Civil Procedure, provides:
granted*** for any of the following causes:
11

*

*

*

*

11

A new trial may be

*

(8) The verdict, decision, or report is not justified by the evidence

or is contrary to law; but, unless it be so expressly stated in the
order granting a new trial, it shall not be presumed, on appeal, to
have been made on the ground that the verdict, decision, or report
was not justified by the evidence.:.
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that, if it was based on insufficient evidence, 11 It shall not be presumed
on appeal to have been made on that ground unless "it be so expressly stated
in that order."
It is true that the cases relied upon by defendant hold that a court's
order conditionally granting a new trial entered pursuant to a blended
motion is not reviewable of right upon an appeal from an order granting
judgment n.o.v. if it is based upon any ground enumerated in Rule 59.01
requiring the exercise of discretion and there is even the slightest doubt
that judicial discretion was exercised. However, here the basis for the
order is not disclosed and cannot be ascertained. The recent case of Ginsberg
v. Williams, 270 Minn. 474, 135 N.W.2d 213, would permit us to hold that
the order is beyond the power of the court and therefore void. In that event,
the procedural status of the motion is that upon the remittitur the trial
court would be required to reconsider and rule on the motion for a new trial. 22
Were a new trial ordered upon grounds other than uerrors of law occurring at
the trial," Minn.St. 605.09(e) would deny plaintiff an appeal of right. 23
By strict adherence to this statutory limitation, it is conceivable that
plaintiff would be denied an appeal even though, despite our contrary holding,
the court were to base its order upon the ground that the verdict was not
justified by the evidence. A mere recital of this procedural dilemma demonstrates its absurd conflict with the responsibilities vested in a reviewing
court.
We believe the situation presented compels us to exercise our discretionary authority provided by the Constitution, if not, indeed, intended by
§ 605.05, subd. 2, of the new Civil Appeal Code.24 This amendment, enacted
subsequent to the cases relied upon, surely intends that once a case has
been properly brought before us on appeal we may, in our discretion "review
any other matter as the interests of justice may require." In exercising
this discretionary power, we are for all practical purposes overruling our
decisions in Satter v. Turner, supra, and Gothe v. Murray, supra, wherein
we held we could not review conditional orders granting a new trial despite
22.

Waldo v. St. Paul City Ry. Co., 244 Minn. 416, 70 N.W.2d 289.

23.

Minn.St. 605.09 provides:
1

*

*

11

An appeal may be taken to the supreme court:

*

*

*

(e) From an order refusing a new trial, or from an order granting
a new trial if the court expressly states therein, or in a memorandum
attached thereto, that the order is based exclusively upon errors of
law occurring at the trial, and upon no other ground; and the court
shall specify such errors in its order or memorandum, but upon appeal,
such order granting a new trial may be sustained for errors of law
prejudicial to respondent other than those specified by the trial court. 11
'

24

Section 605.05, subd. 2, provides: non appeal from an order the supreme
court may review any order affecting the order from which the appeal
is taken and on appeal from a judgment may review any order involving
the merits or affecting the judgment. It may review any other matter
as the interests of justice may require. 11
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our review of the orders granting judgment n.o.v. Even though there are
statutory limitations on a litigant's right to a review of an order granting
a new trial, the order granting judgment n.o.v. is clearly reviewable of right
on an appeal from the judgment and both the amendment to the code and common
sense dictate that we should review the whole order.
We hold therefore that
where, as here, a conditional order granting a new trial is bss~d in whole
or in part upon the insufficiency of the evidence and such issue is also
raised and determined on review of the order granting n.o.v. 1 we will, if we
deem the interests of justice require, review the order in its entirety.
Perhaps future cases may require broadening this exercise of discretionary
review, but this holding is sufficient for this case.25
In reversing the order, we are unable to find a ground upon which it can
be upheld. As we have stated, the evidence justified the verdict of liability
and also, we believe, the award of damages. We find no errors of law occurring
at trial which were prejudicial to defendant. Defendant did not specifically
assign any such errors in its motion in the trial court or assert any by brief
or argument before this court. Nor is it claimed on this appeal that the
damages are excessive. We appreciate that defendant may have refrained from
arguing prejudicial error or excessive damages because of its position that
the order for a new trial was not reviewable, but we have scrutinized the
record with great care, resolving any doubts most favorably to defendant, and
we are unable to find any procedural, evidentiary, or other errors which
adversely affected defendant's substantial rights and upon which the conditional order granting a new trial could be sustained.
Reversed with directions to enter judgment upon the verdict.
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See Ginsberg v. Williams, 270 Minn. 474, 476, note 3, 135 N.W.2d 213,
216, note 3, citing cases which "emphasize[d] the view that appeals
pursuant to stature are rights granted to litigants by the legislature,
not limitations on the 'appellate jurisdiction of this court [which] is
not derived from the legislature, but from the constitution (article
§ 2).'" See, also, proposed amendment to Rule 50.-02 (4, 5, 6), Rules
of Civil Procedure and Rule 103.04 subd. 2, of the proposed Rules of
Civil Appellate Procedure.
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McCormack v. Ha.ndscraft is a typical "products liability"
case. It is indicative of a rather recent development in this area:
a blurring of the line between warranty and negligence theories and
the development of a "new" theory of strict liability. See Prosser,
The Assault Upon the Citadel {Strict Liabilty to the Consumer), 69
Yale L.J. 1099, See also §402A of the Restatement, Torts, 2d, quoted
in footnote 15 of the McCormack opinion. Although there may be no
reason for the existence of a warranty theory in products liability
cases if Restatement, Torts

2d, §402A is accepted by all courts, the

distinction between negligence theories, warranty theories and strict
liability is important to the present day lawyer. Statutes of limitation,
the type and quantum of proof, rights of third parties, and conflict
of laws rules may differ, depending upon whether an action in brou~ht
in warranty {contract?)

OT'

tort. The court in McCormack is quite

liberal in allo'l;lring the plaintiff to prove his case in strict liability
even though this wasn't pleaded. but other courts might not be so
tolerent.
Return, for a moment, to the question posed at the beginning
of this case. Is Sylvia Coal Co. basically a different type of legal
problem than McCormack?

Are the interests of the plaintiff that are

being protected at all similar? In Sylvia, the plaintiff was seeking
to enforce a contract for the sale of goods and defendant was defend1ng
on the ground that the plaintiff had not himself performed. It is a
real contract case! In McCormack, the plaintiff was seeking recovery
for personal injuries. Was plaintiff really trying to enforce a contract?
Was the court, in McCormack, concerned with the business deal between
plaintiff and defendant, or with compensating a consumer for in.juries
caused by the neglect of the plaintiff.
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Doe:., th.::\ irnpo:::it'tori of w;_1.:rranty JJphtJlty
liabi 1 i ty on a seller or producer improv

0

or strict

tr·P. qua.li ty and safety

of produ~ts by putting pressure or:i a seller? If a seller knows that
he will be liable if his p·roducts do not conf'orm to his promises,

iGn 1 t he more lik~1y to {nsne~t more dlligently for defective

on Prnduct Safety which w~s printed in thA Senternber, 1970 issue
Cons11mer Report::·:

Perspective on Product Safety
Americans-20 million of them-are injured each year
in the home as a result of incidents ('Onnccted 11 ith consumer products. Of the total, 110,000 are permanently disabled and :~o,ooo are killed. A Si;!.nificant number could
have been ,;pared if more attention had been paid to hazard
reduction. The annual cost to the nation of product-rdated
injuries may exceed .~5.5 billion. The expo~ure of consumers
to unreasonable consumer product hazards is excessive by
anv standard of measu1·ement.
\Vithin the following categories of products. we found a
number of makes, models, or types harboring u11n•aso11able
hazards to the American consumer: architectural glass, color
television sets, fire11 orks, floor furnace;;, glass bottles, high·
rise bicycles, hot-water vaporizer,-. household chemicals,
infant furniture, ladders, po11er tools. proiPctirn headgear.
rotan· lawn mowers, to\s, unvented )!1.l, heater;;. and wringer
11 ashers. Not all products in each cale;!.OI'\ are unreasonably
hnza rdous. Still other categoric;; which nrn 1· harbnr un reasonable hazards II en! not investigat,•tl in .,ullid,·nl depth to
warrant a speci lie linding that u11rca~o11abl,· hazards exist.
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As related to product safety, self-regulation hv trade associations and standards groups, drawing upon ti1e resources
of professional associations and independent testing laboratories, is legally une1,forceable and patently inadequate.
Competitive forces may require management to subordinate
safety factors to cost considerations, styling, and other marketing imperatives. There is a dearth of factors motivating
producers toward safety. Only a few of the largest manufacturers have coherent, articulated safetv engineering programs . .\tlanufacturers' efforts to obtain data on injuries and
on the costs and benefits of design changes that will reduce
unreasonable hazards can he charitablv described as sketchv
and sporadic.
'
.
Industry activities to develop safety standards can provide
an important forum for marshaling the technical competence necessary for this work, but their voluntary nature
inherently inhibits the development of optimal standards.
The consensus principle. which is at the heart of all voluntary
standards making, permits the least responsible segment o.f
an industry to retard progress in reducing hazards.
The protection afforded by various seals of approval is
no better than the technical competence, product-testing
protocols. and indepemlence of the certifier. When an in·
dustry association awards the seal, or when it is awarded in
return for paid advertising, the seal may convey a deceptive
implication of third-party independence. Consumers ap1)ear
to attribute to such endorsements a significance beyond
their specific meaning.

Protection hy Law
Consumers assume that the Federal Government exercises
hroad rep:ulatory authority in the interest of their safety.
And yet the short answer to this question is that Federal
authority to curb hazards in consumer products is virtually
nonexistent. Federal product safety legislation consists of a
series of isolated acts treating specific hazards in narrow
product categories. No Government agency possesses general
authority to ban products which harbor unreasonahle risks
or to require that consumer products conform to minimum
safety standards.
·
Such limited Federal authority as does exist is scattered
among many agencies. Jurisdiction over a single category
of products may be shared hy as many as four different de·
partments or agencies. Moreover, where it exists, Federal
product safety regulation is burdened Ly unnecessary pro·
cedural ohstacles, circumscribed investigative powers, in·
adequate and ill-fitting sanctions, bureaucratic lassitude,
timid administration, bargain-basement bmlgets, distorted
priorities, and misdirected technical resources. Nevertheless,
where there is adequate authority and administrative sup·
port, Federal safety standards programs have dernonslrated
a capacity for substanlially upgrading safety practices.
The Federal Government operates no injury data center
and no early-warning system to alert responsible officials of
suspected areas of latent product risk. Data on the number
and nature of injuries from consumer products remain far
from satisfactorv. Federal la\\ now provides no machinery
to enjoin a ma~ufacturer from marketing consumer products that are unreasonably dangerous. There is no 11 ay to
compel the recall of such prnducts for repair or replacement.
No Federal law provides meaningful criminal penalties for
manufacturers \I ho kno\\ ingly or willfully market consumer products that create an unreasonable dangl'r to life
and health.
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Our studies of Stale and local laws show a hodgepod~c ot
tragedy-inspired responses to challenges that cannot be met
by restricted geographical entities. Local prohibitions
against sale of hazardous items cannot he enforced against
the retailer across the city line. Manufacturers of hazardous
products can make and ship out items that cannot be sold
at retail in their 011n community. Balkanized jurisdiction
plagues some manufacturers with diverse manufacturing
specifications that interfere with product distribution.
The common law has been primarily concerned with post·
injury remedies. There are no reports of consumers sue·
cessfully restraining the marketing of potentially hazardous
products. The costs of such litigation would be beyond the
means of citizens or concerned groups.

Injury Factors
There are those who believe that safety, like charity,
begins at home in the behavior of the family-steadying
ladders, storing knives, supervising children. Others believe
that safety begins with the home itself, the environment
where hazardous products find their uses-good lighting,
well-insulated wiring, slip-proof bathtubs and rugs, latched
cabinets for medicine and household chemicals. A third view
is that safety begins in the factory and involves design, con·
struction, hazard analysis, ano quality control. J\one ot
these views is wholly right or wrong. With due regard for
the multiple factors affecting household safety, sound
strategy for a safety program is to seek the weak link in a
chain of events leading to injury and to break the chain
at that point.
After considering the many forces contributing to the
toll of injuries in and around the American home, we have
concluded that the greatest promise for reducing risks
resides in energizing the manufacturer's ingenuity. We
do not mean that manufacturers by themselves can do all
that is needed to achieve an optimal safety record. We mean
that with Government stimulation they can accomplish more
for safety ,~ith less effort and expense than any other body
-more than educators, the courts, regulatory agencies, or
individual consumers.
Manufacturers have it in their po1ver to design, build,
and market products in ways that will reduce if not elimi·
nate most unreasonable and unnecessary hazards. Manu·
facturers are best able to take the longest strides to safety
in the least time. The capacity of individual manufacturers
to devise safety programs, without undue extra cost, has
been demonstrated repeatedly in the course of our short his·
tory: in safety glass, double-insulated power tools, baffles
,on rotary mowers, noncombustible TV transformers, and
releases on wringer washers.
We do not imagine that, even without regard to cost,
safety programs on the manufacturer's level can eliminate
all household hazards. A society which uses energy in the
volume and variety of forms prevalent in ours is certain to
see traces of that energy go astray. Instead of doing the
work intended, the energy can damage property and person.
In whatever form-chemical, mechanical, thermal, electrical,
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nuclear, acoustic-energy which is misdirected cuts,
strangles, burns, bruises, fractures, suffocates, poisons,
shocks, and ruptures.
Danger is a regrettable but unavoidable facet of life. Many
persons are keenly conscious of the hazards and take pains
to control them. But everyone, at one time or another,
suffers from complacency, a certainty that everything is
under control, that injuries happen only to the other fellow.
Then, in that moment of carefree confidence, disaster
strikes. The mower goes over a grade, slips out of control,
and the blades chop at the feet. Many, with utmost care,
commit themselves to handling dangerous instruments
which, for lack of experience, knowledge, or skill, they
r:rnnot manage. An ineradicable minority is careless; they
\\ ill wear a flammable garment near an open tire; use a
p01rnr saw without a guard; work a lathe without safety
glasses.
The majority of American homes contain potential elec·
trical fire and shock hazards: worn or defective wiring,
overloaded circuits, or an absence of grounding. Injuries
result from dim lighting, uneven floors, irregular steps, slip·
pery surfaces, obstacles, steep inclines. poor drainage, or
faulty ventilation. Broken glass and rusty cans litter yards
and alleys. Much of a child's play amounts to running a
gantlet of environmental hazards.

Manufacturer's Responsibility
Prospects for measurable reform of human behavior are
distant. Similarly, there is little hope for an early improvement of the home environment. The limited power of con·
ventional educational methods has been described by our
witnesses. Consequently, while continuing lo educate and
seeking even better ways, there seems little choice but to concentrate on reducing unreasonable hazards by encouraging
additional care in the design and manufacture of products.
The law has tended in r~cent years to place full responsibility for injuries attributable to defective products upon
the manufacturer. But beyond his liability for damages, a
producer owes society-at-large the duty to assure that unnecessary risks of injury are eliminated. He is in the best
position to know what are the safest designs, materials, con·
struction methods, and modes of use. Before anyone else, he
must explore the boundaries of potential danger from the
use of his product. He must he in a position to advise the
buyer competently how to use and how to maintain and
repair the product.
For .the following reasons, we conclude that the Federal
Government, both to protect consumers and to strengthen
manufacturers' efforts, should enact comprehensive legal
measures to reduce hazards:
• In the absence of compulsioh to reduce risks in consumer
products, manufacturers who cut corners on safety have an
unfair competitive advantage over responsible manufacturers.
• Manufacturers have advised us that they seek Government
aid in gathering data which will help to explain injuries and
their causes and Government aid to suggest priorities for
preventing injuries.
• Potentially, the cost of meeting safety requirements may
require sellers to raise prices above a desirable level or may
impose an unwarranted and unacceptable design on a product; accordingly, Government must participate, in behalf
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of the consumer, in making the quasi-politicai decision of
determining how much risk to safety the public should
tolerate under the circumstances.
•_Voluntary safety standards decided upon by an industry
may unfairly penalize some manufacturers, small business·
men particularly, to the advantage of others.
• Although safety standards must be written with the assistance of technical personnel who know most about the
product, Government can best determine impartially whether
a safety standard is sufficient.
• When some manufacturers ignore safety standards, only
Government can assure compliance. Government should
enjoin actions which carelessly put the consumer in jeopardy. And, when voluntary safety standards are absent or
insufficient, Government should insist that industry devise a
sufficient standard or develop and issue its own.

Critical Questions
Having concluded that remedial action was essential to
reduce product hazards to consumers, we faced certain
critical questions:

1. Should Federal authority be extended to new programs
to reduce unreasonable hazards in consumer products and,
if so, what form should such authority take?
2. In view of the frustrations and disappointments characterizing some Federal efforts in behalf of the consumer, what
could be done to strengthen such efforts and bolster the
position of the consumer in the sometimes intricate regulatory processes?
3. What role should mandatory safety standards play in reducing product hazards?
And we concluded, with virtual unanimity, that• Broad responsibility for the safety of consumer products
should be vested in a conspicuously independent Federal
regulatory agency, a Consumer Product S_afety Commission
( CPSC), appointed by the President and confirmed by the
Senate.
• There should be one official appointed hy the President as
a Consumer Safety Advocate, \\hose primary responsibility is to serve as the consumer's spokesman before the CPSC
on all issues within its jurisdiction.
• Extensive authority to issue regulations and develop mandatory safety standards should be granted to the CPSC to
anticipate or reduce unreasonable hazards in a \dde range
of consumer products.
.
Statutory regulatory programs buried in agencies with
broad and diverse missions have rarely fulfilled their mission. The reasons for their weaknesses include lack of ader1uate fundin" and staflina
because of competition with
other
0
•
•
deserving programs within an agency; lack of v~gor m
enforcing the law caused by an absence of authonty and
independence in some Federal administrators; and a low
priority assigned to programs of low visibility.
When a Federal agency must take up substantial and
controversial issues of consumer safety and economics, we
believe it needs independent status. independence can be
furthered by appointment of commissioners on a non·
partisan basis, for staggered fixed terms subject to removal
only for cause, and by designation of a permanent chairman
to serve an entire term in that capacity.
t,
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Another reason for our recommendation of an independent Commission stems from our own experience over the
past two years. As a result of our hearings and public exposure, industry took important steps for safety. Visibility
has aided us in communicating public needs to business. We
believe that a highly visible Consumer Product Safety Commission will have the potential to deal firmly and at arm's
length with the industries it must regulate in behalf of the
public.
The high visibility of a vigorous independent commission
would also be a constant reminder of the Federal presence
and \\ ould itself stimulate voluntary impro\ ement of safety
practices. The issues before the CPSC should be publicly
aired; they are less likely to be smothered in the competition of Federal agencies for public notice. Similarly, CPSC's
needs for staff and funds will receive more public attention
and consideration by the Congress and by the Bureau of the
Budget than those of a section of a branch of a division of a
bureau of a service of an office of a department.
Finally, in developing acceptable safety standards for consumer products, it is important that manufacturers confront
Government officials who, like themselves, are in command
of resources and authority and able to make firm commit·
ments and decisions.

A Consumer Advocate
Contrary to the common concept that "we are all consumers" and the simple assumption that a public agency
·always defends the pt11Jl1c mterest, m reality most II noL au
public decisions represent a compromise among contending
factions. Recognition of the consumer's need for representation in Government decision-making was the motivating
force in the creation of the President's Special Assistant for
Consumer Affairs in 1963 and for the continuance of that
function in the President's Committee on Consumer Interests.
On day-to-day matters of product safety, however, the
consumer has no official champion. The assumption that
Federal officials represent the general public interest breaks
down when, in a bargaining situation, no one bargains for
the consumer. Frequently, instead of serving the consumer,
the Federal agency merely provides the forum where the
consumer is an affected hut helpless bystander.
We believe that the highly complex issues which will
face the Consumer Product Safety Commission require a
specialized Consumer Safety Advocate to make the voice
of the consumer heard. When the agency serves as an arbiter,
seeking to reconcile contending interests, the Advocate will
defend the consumer.
By institutionalizing a focus of consumer representation,
it may no longer be said that "everybody's business is nobody's business."
In the absence of unreasonable risks, Federal action is
unnecessary. Government should avoid needless intervention in private enterprise and the expense of developing
redundant standards. At the same time, the existence of
Federal authority to set mandatory safety standards may
well stimulate improvements in, and compliance with, adequate voluntary standards. We have designed proposed
standard-setting provisions to operate only when an identified product hazard is found and then only after a reasonable
opportunity has been given to private individuals and con-
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sumer and industry groups to develop a draft standard.
The Commission must be selective, limiting its develop·
ment and updating of safety standards to categories of
consumer goods which contain an unreasonable risk or the
threat thereof. When the need for action is apparent, the
writing of safety standards must not drag on for months. A
standard must he completed as quickly as governmental
and private resources permit. We have provided in the pro·
posed system that the Commission may make an interim
product safety standard effective immediately ,, here it finds
an imminent risk to safety.
In the event that private sources fail lo frame a needed
and adequate standard, the CPSC must have its O\\n technical resources and authority to tap personnel and facilities
of the Federal Government and private sources to develop
mandatory safety standards. Safety standards cannot he
deferred until all makers of a product are satisfied; dissatisfied manufacturers will be able to appeal what they
consider unjustifiably stringent standards to the CPSC or,
ultimately, to the courts.

Digest of Recommendations
It is not the number or kinds of injuries but the fact of
injury-the chronic disability, the mental anguish, the
burden of medical costs, and the economic waste-that
demands remedial action to reduce unreasonable product
hazards by the most direct and efficient means.
By way of remedy, our recommendations provide:
That the Consumer Product Safety Commission he directed to secure voluntary cooperation of consumers and
industry in advancing its programs and that, when necessary
to protect consumers from unreasonable risks of death or
injury, the Commission be empowered to• Enforce compliance with consumer product safety standards through a broad range of civil and criminal sanctions.
• Enjoin distribution or sale of consumer products which
violate Federal safety standards or which are unreasonably
hazardous.
• Require notice to consumers of substantially defective
products, and recall of products which violate consumer
product safety standards or which are unreasonably dangerous.
• !\fake reasonable inspections of manufacturing facilities
to implement compliance with safety standards and regu·
lations.
• Conduct public hearings and subpoena witnesses and
documents.
That the Commission be given further responsibility to• Establish an Injury Information Clearinghouse to collect
and analyze data on deaths and injuries associated with
consumer products.
• Disseminate information to. the public about hazardous
con-sumer products and practicable means of reducing
hazards.
• Cooperate with and assist States and localities in pro·
grams germane to consumer product safety.

140.

That the Commission, in cooperation with the Secretary
of Commerce, be authorized to accredit private testing
laboratories which are qualified to test and certify com·
pliance with specific product safety standards, and that the
Commission be empowered to require independent testing
of consumer products which may present an unreasonable
risk.
That the Federal Trade Commission promulgate trade
regulation rules for those who certify or endorse the safety
of consumer products.
That Federal agencies provide industry and standards.
setting groups with relevant technological information which
may be utilized to reduce product hazards.
That the Commission be authorized and afforded funds
for the construction and operation of a facility suitable for
research, development of test methods, and analysis of con·
sumer products for safety considerations.
That the Federal Government, through its purchasing and
insuring agents, look to established safety standards and,
wherever practicable, new safety designs in selecting products for use, and that Federal agencies publicize acquired
information about hazards in consumer products.
That injured consumers be permitted to file claims for
treble damages in the District Courts of the United States
against manufacturers who intentionally violate Federal
safety standards; that Federal class action procedures be
made applicable; and that the princi pies of strict tort liability be adopted by State and Federal courts to assure fair
compensation for injury to consumers in suits at common
law.
That consumer products for import into the United States
be denied entry if they violate Federal safety standards and
that export of consumer products which do not meet Federal
safety standards be prohibited unless waiver is obtained
from a responsible official of the country of destination.
That the United States support the development of inter·
national consumer product safety standards, and assure fair
representation of consumer interests in such proceedings.
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Misrepresentation and Deceit
Restatement of Contracts I
§ 470.

DEFINITION OF MISREPRESENTATION; WHEN
.MISREPRESENTATION Is MATERIAL.

(1) "Misrepresentation" in the Restatement of
this Subject means any manifestation by words or
other conduct by one person to another that, under
the circumstances, amounts to an assertion not in·
accordance with the facts.
(2) Where a misrepresentation would be likely to affect the conduct of a reasonable man with
reference to a transaction with another person, the
misrepresentation is material, except as this definition is qualified by the rules stated in§ 474.
Co1nment:
a. Misrepresentation of itself implies neither conscious error nor negligence on the part of the person
making the misrepresentation. It may be innocent or
known to be false, material or immaterial, negligent or
free from negligence; it may be intended or expected
to influence conduct, or it may not; it may be by words
or any other acts. It never produces legal consequences unless it induces another person to act or refrain
from acting.
b. The word "facts" in the Section is given its
broadest· meaning. In this sense, a rule of law is a
fact; knowledge is a fact and an assertion of knowledge when knowledge does not exist is an assertion
not in accordance with the facts; and indeed any state
of mind is a fact. The limitation in § 474, however,
often makes such misrepresen.tations immaterial.
c. "Transaction" in the Restatement of this Subject includes the formation, performance or discharge
of a contract, the assignment of a right under a contract, and also facts that would have amounted to any
of these if it were not for a mista.ke, or some wrongful
act of one of the parties.

§ 471.

DEFINITION OF FRAUD.

"Fraud" in the Restatement of this Subject unless accompanied by qualifying words, means
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(a) misrepresentation known to be such, or
(b) concealment, or
(c) non-disclosure where it is not privileged,
by any person intending or expecting thereby. to
cause a mistake by another to exist or to continue,
in order to induce the latter to enter into or refrain
from entering into a transaction; except as this
definition is qualified by the rules stated in§ 474.

Comment:
a. "Fraud" is a word used in more than one
branch of the law, and the meaning with which the
, word is used in various branches is not always identical. Fraud as a tort is not here defined. Nor are fraud
against creditors and fraud against subsequent pur~
chasers within the definition in the Section. Where
such fraud is referred to in the Restatement of this
·Subject, the word fraud is always accompanied by
qualifying words.

*******************
"Misrepresentation runs all through the law of torts, as a method of accomplishing various types of tortious conduct which, for reasons of historical development or as a matter of convenience, usually
are grouped under categories of their own. Thus a battery may be
committed by feeding the plaintiff poisoned chocolates, or by inducing
his consent-'l<i_a_ physical contact by misrepresenting its character;
false imprisonment may result from a pretense of authority to make
an arrest; a trespass to land from fraudulent statements inducing another to enter, or a conversion from obtaining goods by false representations; and a malicious lie may give rise to a cause of action
for the intentional infliction of mental suffering resulting in illness. A
great many of the common and familiar forms of negligent conduct,
resulting in invasions of tangible interests of person or property, are
in their essence nothing more than misrepresentation, from a misleading signal by an automobile driver about to make a turn, or an
assurance that a danger does not exist, to false statements, or nondisclosure of a latent defect by one who is under a duty to give warning. In addition, misrepresentation may play an important part in
the invasion of intangible interests, in such torts as defamation, malicious prosecution, or interference with contract relations. In all
such cases the particular form which the defendant's conduct has
taken has become relatively unimportant, and misrepresentation has
been merged to such an extent with other kinds of misconduct that
neither the courts nor the legal writers have found any occasion to
regard it as a separate basis of liability.
"So far as misrepresentation has been treated as giving rise in
and of itself to a distinct cause of action in tort, it has been identified
with the common law action of deceit. The 1·easons for the separate
development of this action, and for its peculiar limitations, are in part
historical, and in part connected with the fact that in the great majority of the cases which have come before the courts the misrepresentations have been made in the course of a bargaining transaction
between the parties. Consequently the action has been colored to a
considerable extent by the ethics of bargaining between distrustful
adversaries. Its separate recognition has been confined in practice
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very largely to the invasion of interests of a financial or commercial
character, in the course of business dealings.
"There is no essential reason to prevent a deceit action from being maintained, for intentional misstatements at least, where other
types of interests are invaded; and there are a few cases in which it
has been held to lie for personal injuries, for tricking the plaintiff into
an invalid marriage [Tuck v. Tuck (1961) 11 N.Y.2d 311, 200 N.E.2cl
551], or marriage with one who is physically unfit, or for inducing
the plaintiff to leave a husband, or to incur criminal penalties. In
general, however, other theories of action have been sufficient to deal
with nonpecuniary damage, and the somewhat narrower theory of deceit is not called into question. The typical case of deceit is one in
which the plaintiff has parted with money, or property of value, in
reliance upon the defendant's representations.
"The law of misrepresentation is, however, considerably broader
than the action of deceit. Liability in damages for misrepresentation,
in one form or another, falls into the three familiar divisions with
which we have dealt throughout-it may be based upon intent to deceive, upon negligence, or upon a policy which requires the defendant
to be strictly responsible for his statements without either. For the
most part, the courts have limited deceit to those cases where there is
an intent to mislead, and have left negligence and strict liability to be
dealt with in some other type of action. There has been a great deal
of overlapping of theories, and no little confusion, which has been
increased by the indiscriminate use of the word 'fraud,' a term so
vague that it requires definition in nearly every case. Further difficulty has been added by a failure to distinguish the requisites of the
action at law in tort from those of equitable remedies, and to distinguish the different forms of misrepresentation from one another,
and misrepresentation itself from mere- migake. Any attempt to
bring order out of the resulting chaos must be at best a tentative
one, with the qualification that many courts do not agree." Prosser,
Torts, 3d ed. (1964) 697-699.
Misrepresentation is thus a very complex field. The complexity
results in no small part from the fact that in most cases the plaintiff
has alternative remedies available, which are based upon different
theories, and have developed along different lines. The more important of these alternatives are as follows:
1. The tort action of deceit, with._whieh-this chapter is primarily ·
e<meertted. (

2. An action for breach of contract, where the representation
is found to be an express or implied term of the contract itself. In
the case of the sale of chattels, this may take the form of an action
for breach of warranty, which, as previously noted, has definite tort
characteristics of its own. The contract liability is of course a strict
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one, and requires no intent to deceive, negligence, or other fault than
the breach of the contract itself.
3. A negligence action, for negligent misrepresentation. This is
now recognized by nearly all courts where tangible injury to person
or property results, and by many of the American jurisdictions where
the only damage is financial loss. It involves distinct problems of the
extent of liability, or "duty" and "proximate cause." It may be open
to the defense of contributory negligence where the deceit action
would not.
4. A suit in equity to rescind the transaction, or for other relief
such as an equitable lien or a constructive trust. The equity courts,
which were not bound by rules adopted at common law, have been
as much concerned with the inequity of allowing the defendant to
retain what he has received through the plaintiff's erroneous belief
in the truth of his statement as with the wrongfulness of the original
conduct. Hence they have afforded a remedy for innocent misrepresentation, or even for mutual mistake as to a basic fact, not induced
by misrepresentation at all. The equity suit is, however, subject to
restrictions peculiar to equity-as that the plaintiff must himself do
equity by restoring whatever he has received, must act without undue
delay, and must do nothing inconsistent with the relief demanded.
5.

An action at law, to recover back what the plaintiff has part-

ed with, or the unjust enrichment which the defendant has received

from it. This type of restitution action developed late in the eighteenth century when the common law courts, seeking to broaden their
jurisdiction into equitable fields, took over principles of equity. By
the fiction of an implied promise to pay what was due in good conscience, the plaintiff· was permitted to rescind the transaction of his
own motion, or, as it, usually .was phrased, to "waive" the tort and
sue in assumpsit. In later cases the principle was extended to permit
the plaintiff to maintain even a property action, such as replevin, for
specific goods surrendered to the defendant. The law courts adhered
to the rules of equity, and the restitution action is, in general, governed by the same principles as the equity suit.
6. The defense of "fraud," or misrepresentation, when the party
deceived is sued on the contract. Two distinct theories are discoverable in the cases. One is an "equitable" defense, by which the party
deceived rescinds the transaction, tenders back whatever he has received, and seeks to avoid liability. The other is something analogous
to a tort action of deceit, set up by way of defense to avoid circuity of
action, by which the party "recoups", or reduces the damages recoverable from him, or even avoids all liability. The two theories are
not at all clearly distinguished, and further confusion has resulted
from rules of pleading, which a.t one time did not permit equitable
defenses to be pleaded in actions at law.
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7. Estoppe1, by which the party misn'1ffescnti11r~ a fart is precluded from denying in court that his representation was 1.nw. J t appears most frequently as a defense to an action brought hr the party
to be estopped; but, while it never has heen recognizct1 as a cause of
action in itself, it may serve as an im110rtant airl to tlw plaintiff's action. Thus where a warehouseman represents to a prospective 1mrchaser of goods that he holds them for the seller, he mar find himself
estopped to deny the truth of his statement when the purchaser seeks
to recover the goods from him.
There has been a great deal of confusion as to th0;-,e various remedies, and rules, concepts, principles, language and ideas appropriate
to one have unfortunately been carried over to o11wrs where they are
not appropriate at all. The cases which follow are primarily concerned with the tort action of deceit; but no clear id(!a of misrepresentation is possible without reference to the <liffPrcnt rules to be
applied in connection with the other remedies.
l!i,story. The action of deceit is of very ancient origin. There
was an old writ of deceit known as early as 1201, which lay only in
cases of what we should now call malicious prosecution. At a later
period this writ was superseded by an action on the case in the nature
of deceit, which became the general common law remedy for any misrepresentation, whether fraudulent or not, which resulted in actual
damage. It was used to afford a remedy for many wrongs which we
should now regard as breaches of contract, such as false warranties
in the sale of goods. Its use was limited almost entirely to direct
transactions beween the plaintiff and the defendant, and it was treated as inseparable from some contract relation. In other words, tort
and contract were not at all clearly distinguished.
The bargaining ethics of that day were low. It was assumed that
all sellers would lie, and if the buyer wanted protection he was expected to exact from the seller an express undertaking to be responsible, such as a warranty. "Caveat emptor"-let the buyer look out
for himself. Thus in the picturesque old case of Chandelor v. Lopus,
(1603) Cro.Jac. 4, 79 Eng.Rep. 3, a goldsmith sold a stone to the plaintiff, falsely stating that it was a bezar stone-a "calcareous concretion
in the stomach of a goat," believed to have medicinal properties, particularly as a remedy against snake-bite. It was held that there was
no liability, even though the seller knew his statement to be false, in
the absence of an express undertaking to be bound.
In 1789, in Pasley v. Freeman, 3 Term Rep. 51, 100 Eng.Rep. 450,
the action of deceit was held to lie in a case where the plaintiff had
had no dealings with the defendant, but had been induced by his misrepresentation to extend credit to a third person. After that date deceit was recognized as purely a tort action, and not necessarily founded upon a contract. At about the same time, in Stuart v. Wilkins
(1778) 1 Doug]. 18, 99 Eng.Rep. 15, the remedy for breach of warnmty wns taken over into the artion of m,sump:at, nnrl it was Urns
established that it had a contract character. '!'hereafter the two lines
of recovery slowly diverge, although some vei:-tige of confiu,ion between the two still remains, even today.
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Restatement of Contracts I
§

474.

MANIFESTATION OF OPINION AS FRAUD OR MISREPRESENTATION.

A manifestation that the person making has no reason to expect to
be understood as more than an expression of his opinion, though made also
with the Intent or expectation stated fn 5 471, ls not fraud or a material
misrepresentation, unless made by
(a)
Cb)

one who has, or purports to have expert knowledge of the matter, or
one whose manifestation ls an Intentional misrepresentation and
varies so far from the truth that no reasonable man In his
position could have such an opinion.

**************
VULCAN METALS CO., INC., v. SIMMONS MFG. CO.
VULCAN METALS CO., Inc., et al. v. SAME.
(Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Clrcuft. January 7, 1918. On Petltron
of Plaintiffs in Error for a Rehearing, February 13, 1918)
248 Fed. 853

In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Southern
District of New York.
Action by the Vulcan Metals Company, Incorporated, against the Simmons
Manufacturing Company, begun In the state court and removed to the federal
court, together with an action by the Sfmmons Manufacturing Company against
the Vulcan Metals Company, Incorporated, and Albert Freeman, who counterclaimed. There was a Judgment for the Smmons Manufactur1ng Company,
defendant In the first action, and 'br It as plaintiff In the second, the
counterclaim of the defendants Vulcan Metals Company, Incorporated, and
Albert Freeman being dismissed, and the Vulcan Metals Company, Incorporated,
and another bring error. Judgment In the action by the Vulcan Metals
Company reversed, and judgment In actfon on notes modified, so as not to
dismiss the counterclaim on the merits, and otherwise affirmed.
"Writ of error to two judgments of the District Court for the Southern
District of New York, entered In the first case upon a verdict directed by
the court dismissing the complaint, and In the second case, upon a verdict
directed by the court in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of $43,423.04.
The complaint In the first action was for deceit, brought In the state
court and removed for diversity of citizenship to the District Court. The
complaint fn the second was orlglnally brought in the District Court, about
a month after the first suit, and was upon three notes, for $15,000, $12,500,
and $12,500, respectively. In the complaint on the second action the
defendants set up the same facts which they laid in their complaint In deceit,
and which they here pleaded as a defense to the action on the notes and as
a counterclaim.
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"The gist of the complaint In the first action was the fraudulent
procurement by the Simmons Manufacturing Company of a contract executed
by the defendant Freeman on behalf of the Vulcan Metals Company, Incorporated, by which he purchased from the Simmons Company for $75,000 al I
the tools, dies, and equipment owned by It for the manufacture of Its
vacuum cleaning machines, all manufactured machines and unassembled parts,
as set forth In a schedule thereto attached, ahd al I Inventions, applications, and letters patent owned by the Simmons Company in vacuum cleaners,
together with certain proposed Improvements to be made thereon. The
complaint further alleges that the officers and agents of the Simmons
Manufacturing Company made false representations as to the character of
the vacuum cleaners so sold and the extent to which they had been used upon
the market, to which the Vulcan.Metals Company, Incorporated, acted to its
prejudice, because the machines and patents were totally Inefficient and
unmarketable. The notes sued on In the second cause of action were three
of those given as part of tl'e Jl.lrchase price. The District Judge directed
a verdict for the Simmons Manufacturing Company In both actions, upon the
theory that no actionable fraud had been made out, and the correctness of
this ruling ls the turning point tn the case.
11

The plaintiff in the first action was a corporation, of which Albert
Freeman, one of the defendants In the second action, was a promoter. He
was an fndorser of the notes, and conducted the negotiations which resulted
in the purchase by him of the vacuum cleaners on behalf of the plaintiff.
He testified to certain representations made to him at the time as an Inducement to his entering into the contract. These representations emanated In
the first Instance from one Flynn, who had been apparently authorized by
the Simmons Manufacturing Company to act as a broker in the sale of the
machines and the patents. Flynn's authority to represent the Simmons
Manufacturing Company In respect of such representations would be a turning
point In the case, except for the fact that Freeman swore that the president
of the company, one Simmons, and its general counsel, Barnes, had repeated
al I of Flynn's statements during the negotiations and that he had relied
upon them. It therefore became essential to determine, since Simmons was
clearly authorized to represent the Simmons Manufacturing Company, whether
the misrepresentations would support an action of deceit. They were of two
classes -- those touching the efficiency of the vacuum cleaner; and, second,
that no attempt had been made to market the machines by the Simmons Manufacturing Company.

•

"The first of these classes is substantially the same as those contained
in a booklet Issued by the Simmons Manufacturing Company for the general
sale of the vacuum cleaners. They include commendations of the cleanliness,
economy, and efficiency of the machine; that It was absolutely perfect in
even the smallest detail; that water power, by which It worked, marked the
most economical means of operating a vacuum cleaner with the greatest
8ffictency; that the cleaning was more thoroughly done than by beating or
brushing; that, having been perfected, it was a necessity which every one
could afford; that It was so simple that a chi Id of six could use It; that
it worked completely and thoroughly; that it was simple, long-lived, easily
o~erated, and effective; that It was the only sanitary portable cleaner on
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the market; that perfect satisfaction would result from its use; that it
would last a lifetime; that It was the only practical jet machine on the
market; and that perfect satisfaction would result from its use, If
properly adjusted. The booklet is In general the ordinary compilation,
puffing the excel fence and powers of the vacuum cleaner, and asserting its
superiority over al I others of asimilar sort. Flynn made a demonstration
of the cleaner to Freeman with borax sprirkled upon the carpet, and al lowed
him to take one for experiment, which he retained for some time.
"The second class of misrepresentations was that the Simmons Manufacturing Company had not sold the machine, or made any attempt to sel I it;
that they had not shown It to any one; that It had never been on the
market, and that no one outside of the company officials and the men in the
factory knew anything about It; that they had manufactured 15,000 of them,
but before making any attempt to market It they had been told by their
agent that it would be a mistake for them to attempt to sel I these along
with their ordinary line, which was furniture; that on that account they
had withdrawn them from the market and had never made any attempt to put
them out. Sweetland, one of the promoters of the Vulcan Metals Company,
Incorporated, swore that Flynn had stated that the machines had been marketed, but marketed successfully. There was therefore a discrepancy between
the testimony of these two representations, but for the purposes of the action
it Is not here material, since the complaint was based upon the representation that the machines had not been sold.
11

There was evidence that the machines, when exploited by the Vulcan
Metals Company, Incorporated, proved to be ineffective and of little or
no value and that their manufacture was discontinued by that company not
very long after they had undertaken It. There was also evidence that
several of the Western agents of the Simmons Manufacturing Company had
had the machines In stock and had attempted to market some of them; that
they had been unsuccessful in these efforts, owing for the most part to
the fact that the water pressures, where they had been sold, had not been
sufficient to establish the necessary vacuum. Just what the vacuum was in
the places where the machines were unsuccessful did not definitely appear
In any of the proof. 11
WI Ison B. Brice, of New York City (Charles H. Hyde, of New York City,
of counsel), for Vulcan Metals Co., Inc.
Sul I Ivan & Cromwel I, of New York City (Clarke M. Rosecrantz and E. H.
Sykes, both of New York City, of counsel), for Simmons Mfg. Co.
Before WARD and HOUGH, Circuit Judges, and LEARNED HAND, District Judge.
LEARNED HAND,* District Judge (after stating the facts as above). [I]
The first question Is of the misrepresentations touching the qua I ity and
*Learned Hand ( 1872-1961) was one of the most famous of American judges.
His father, Samuel, his grandfather, Augustus, and his cousin, Augustus Nobel
Hand, were al I judges. Learned, named after his mother's maiden name, sat on
the U.S. District Court from 1909 to 1924 and on the U.S. Court of Appeals from
1924 to 1951. His books Include The Spirit of Liberty (1952) and The Bi I I of
Rights (1958). Some of his outstanding decisions are contained in Shenks,
The Art and Craft of Judging (1968).
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powers of the patented machine. These were general commendations, or,
in so far as they included any specific facts, were not disproved; e.g.,
that the cleaner would produce 18 Inches of vacuum with 25 pounds water
pressure. They raise, therefore, the question of law how far general
11
puffing 11 or 0 dealers 1 talk" can be the basis of an action for deceit.
The conceded exception in such cases has generally rested upon the
distinction between 11 opinion 11 and "fact"; but that distinction has not
escaped the criticism it deserves. An opinion is a fact, and it may be
a very relevant fact; the expression of an opinion Is the assertion of a
belief, and any rule which condones the expression of a consciously false
opinion condones a consciously false statement of fact. When the parties
are so situated that the buyer may reasonably rely upon the expression of
the sel ler 1 s opinion, It Is no excuse to give a false one. Bigler v.
Flickinger, 55 Pa. 279. And so It makes much difference whether the parties
stand "on an equallty. 11 For example, we should treat very differently the
expressed opinion of a chemist to a layman about the properties of a compcsition from the same opinion between chemist and chemist, when the buyer
had ful I opportunity to examine. The reason of the rule lies, we think,
in this: There are some kinds of talk which no sensible man takes seriously,
and if he does he suffers from his credulity. If we were al I scrupulously
honest, it would not be so; but, as it is, neither party usually believes
what the seller says about his ow, opinions, and each knows It. Such statements, like the claims of campaign managers before election, are rather
designed to al lay the suspicion which would attend their absence than to be
understood as having any relation to objective truth. It is quite true
that they induce a compliant temper in the buyer, but it ls by a much more
subtle process than through the acceptance of his claims for his wares.
So far as concerns statements of value, the rule is pretty wel I fixed
against the buyer. So. Dev. Co. v. Si Iva, 125 U.S. 247, 256, 8 Sup. Ct.
881, 31 L. Ed. 678; Gordon v. Butler, 105 U.S. 553, 26 L. Ed. 1166; Lehigh
Zinc, etc., Co. v. Bamfordi 150 U.S. 665, 14 Sup. Ct. 219, 37 L. Ed. 1215.
It has been applied more generally to statements of quality and serviceability.
Kimbal I v. Bangs, 144 Mass. 321, 11 N.E. 113; Neidefer v. Chastain, 71 Ind.
363, 36 Am. Rep. 198; Warren v. Doolittle, 61 I I I. 171; Hunter v. Mclaughlin,
43 Ind. 38. But this is not always so. Iowa, etc., Co. v. Amer. Heater Co.
(C.C.) 32 Fed. 735. As respects the validity of patents it also obtains.
Reeves v. Corning (C.C.) 51 Fed. 774; DI I Iman v. Nedlehoffer, I 19 I I I. 567,
7 N.E. 88; Huber v. Guggenheim (C.C.) 89 Fed. 598. Cases of warranty present
the same question and have been answered in the same way. Chalmers v.
Harding, 17 L T. (N.S.) 571; Farrow v. Andrews, 69 Ala. 96; Bain v. Withey,
107 Ala. 223; 1 Gaar, etc., Co. v. Halverson, 128 Iowa, 603, 105 N.W. 108;
Bartlett v. Hoppock, 34 N.Y. I 18, 88 Am. Dec. 428. Contra, Elkins v.
Kenyon, 34 Wis. 93.
In the case at bar, since the buyer was al lowed ful I opportunity to
examine the cleaner and to test it out, we put the parties upon an equal lty.
It seems to us that general statements as to what the cleaner would do,
even though consciously false, were not of a kind to be taken literally by
the buyer. As between manufacturer and customer, it may not be so; but
this was the case of taking over a business, after ample chance to investigate.
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Such a buyer, who the sel !er rightly expects wl II undertake an independent
and adequate inquiry Into the actual merits of what he gets, has no right
to treat as material in his determination statements like these. The
standard of honesty permitted by the rule may not be the best; but, as
Holmes, J,, says In Deming v. Darling, 148 Mass. 504, 20 N.E. 107, 2
L.R.A. 743, the chance that the hlggl ing preparatory to a bargain may be
afterwards translated Into assurances of quality may perhaps be a set-off
to the actual wrong al lowed by the rule as It stands. We therefore think
that the District Court was right In disregarding al I these misrepresentations.
[2,3] As respects the representation that the cleaners had never been
put upon the market or offered for sale, the rule does not apply; nor can
we agree that such representations could not have been material to
Freeman's decision to accept the contract. The actual test of experience
In their sale might wel I be of critical consequence In his decision to buy
the business, and the Jury would certainly have the right to accept his
statement that his reliance upon these representations was determinative
of his final decision. We believe that the facts as disclosed by the
depositions of the Western witnesses were sufficient to carry to the Jury
the question whether those statements were false. It Is quite true, as
the District Judge said, that the number of sales was smal I, perhaps not
60 in al I; but they were scattered in varfous parts of the Mountain and
Pacific States, and the Jury might conclude that they were enough to contradict the detailed statements of Simmons that the machines had been kept
off the market altogether.
The Simmons Manufacturing Company Insists that there was no evidence
that Simmons, who was the only party authorized to speak for that company,
knew that the goods had ever been put on sale, and It is quite true that
there was no such direct evidence. It Is at least arguable whether the
evidence was sufficient to al low a Jury to say that Simmons had known of
these efforts. The results of the sales seem to have come to the knowledge
only of the local agents, but we think a Jury might say that the fact of their
sale and the decision of the agents to sel I them might have been authorized
by the home office, and that Simmons might have known of both. While,
therefore, if the case turned only upon Slmmons 1 knowledge of the failure of
the machines upon sale, we should hardly think the evidence sufficient to
Justify any Inference that he did know, yet, since the fraud alleged was
of the fact of sale alone, the evidence did not Justify a directed verdict.
Such a misrepresentation might have been material to Freeman in the execution
of the contract, since, If he did learn that they had been on sale, he might
wel I have insisted that the results of those sales should be disclosed
before he proceeded. Sweetland 1 s testimony to the contrary only discredits
Freeman's statements; it cannot be itself the basis of any recovery.
[4-6] The next question ls as to whether any such misrepresentations
were concluslvely cured by the recital In the contract of purchaEas fol lows:
The party of the first part[the Simmons Company] has been
engaged in the manufacture of a certain type of vacuum cleaning
machines, and the parties of the first and second part [the
National Suction Cleaner Company] have been engaged In the sale thereof.
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We al I agree that an adequate retraction of the false statement
before Freeman executed the contract would be a defense. Whether this
be regarded as terminating the consequences of the original wrong, or
as a correction of ltp is of little Importance. Further, we agree that,
even if Freeman had In fact never learned of the retraction, It would
serve, if given under such circumstances as justified the utterer ln
supposing that he would. For example, a letter actually delivered into
his hands containing nothing but a retraction would be a defense, though
it abundantly appeared that he had never read It. His loss might stl I I be
the consequence, and the reasonable consequence, but for the letter, of the
original fraud; but the writer would have gone as far as necessary to correct
that fraud, and we should not be disposed to hold it as an insurer that Its
correction should be effective. Judge WARD and I, however, do not think
that such a recital in such a place was certain to catch the eye of the
reader, and that therefore neither was the defendant's duty of retraction
inevitably discharged, nor, what is nearly the same thing, did the defendant
shew beyond question that Freeman actual lysaw it. As a retraction the recital was a defense, and the defendant had the burden of proof. As notice
to Freeman actually conveyed, ft may have been only evfdence upon the
causal sequence between the wrong and the injury; but we attach no great
significance to that distinction. The fact that he signed the contract
appears to us to be some evidence upon which the jury might say that he
could not tave seen the recital. That depends upon how much importance they
think he attached to the original representation, and that depends In turn
upon what they thought of his story. If they did believe that the representation was of critical consequence in his decision, they might Infer that
he did not see it, or he would not have gone on without some explanation.
The very silence of the testimony upon the question might be taken to infer
that he had not noticed it, even at the trial, just as it might also be taken
to Indicate that lie had fabricated the whole story, and hoped the recital
would escape the notice of the defendant. In any event, the Interpretation
of the whole transaction appears to us not to be so clear that reasonable
people might not come to opposite conclusions upon it, and that involves
a submission to the Jury. It is perhaps of some Importance that no
al I us ion to the recftal appears in the record.
[7,8] It results from the foregoing that the Judgment In the action
for deceit must be reversed. In the action upon the notes the Judgment
upon the notes wll I be affirmed, because the Vulcan Metals Company, Incorporated, did not make any offer to return the machines, tools, and patents,
which were not shown to be without any value, and consequently It was in
no position to rescind. The judgment in that action dismissing the counterclaim must, however, be reversed, since the counterclaim involved the same
facts as the complaint rn the action for deceit. Flynn 9 s agency appears
in this record only by his declarations, and he was not shown to have any
authority to speak for the Simmons Company. He was at most only a broker,
and as such his representations In the negotiations as to the prior conduct
of the Simmons Company touching sales of machines were not within his
authority. The same applies upon this record to Barnes, the general
counsel of the defendant. The proof of their authority may, of course, be
different upon the next trial, as to which we naturally have nothing to say.
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However, no representations should be al lowed as to the efficiency,
durabl I tty, or economy of the cleaners, and the case should be tried upon
the sole Issue whether the defendant, through duly authorized agents,
represented to Freeman that the goods had not been put on sale when in
fact they had, whether this representation was material to Freeman's
execution of the contract, whether the Insertion of the recital into the
contract was all that was reasonably necessary by way of retraction, and,
If not, whether Freeman did not actually read It in the contract.
Judgment In the action of deceit reversed, and new trial ordered.
Judgment in the action on the notes affirmed so far as It gives judgment
on the notes, and reversed so far as it dismisses the counterclaim, and
new trial upon the counterclaim ordered.
HOUGH, Circuit Judge (dissenting In part). The one point on which
cannot agree with the majority is the effect of the statement Cit makes no
d I ff erence whether It f s ca I Ied a llrec i ta 111 or by some other name) contained In a contract which was signed by Freeman before he suffered any
loss and at the moment he entered Into obligation. The opinion of the
court holds that this retraction or correction cannot be judicfal ly held
adequate or sufficient to conclude Freeman, If 11 in fact [he] did not see
It." But he never denied seeing It; and the majority holding is In effect
that, though signature of contract is admitted, and reading of all of It
not denied, yet, In the absence of a specific admission of reading with
comprehension, a case was made for the jury, because there is no presumption
of reading, or at least of the Intelligent reading, of an admittedly
signed contract.
A man is held to be bound by a contract because he is presumed to
know what it means and says; as the greater includes the less, I should
consider him bound to a comprehension of the ordinary meaning of the words
employed. The present ruling seems to me but a direction as to how to
give evidence upon another trial.
On Petition of Plaintiffs in Error for a Rehearing.
PER CURIAM. We have concluded that the judgment In this action on
the notes should be modified, so as to affirm the money judgment in favor
of the plaintiff below, and to dismiss (but not upon the merits, as was
done below) the counterclaim Interposed. This counterclaim Is substantially
the action for deceit. That It did not constitute a defense was sufficiently
set forth in our previous opinion.
[9] Whether the same allegations of fact can be used as a counterclaim is a question that depends upon the construction of section 501,
Code Clv. Proc. N.Y. The cause of action Is on the contract evidenced by
the notes in suit; the counterclaim is in tort, and therefore the question
is whBther such tort cause of action arises out of the transaction set forth
in the complaint or Is "connected with the subject of the action." Underlying and governing this question of procedure is the legal fact that
this action of deceit presupposes and recognizes a contract val id and
enforceable. If there was not such a contract, this particular action of
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deceit could not exist, and no effort Is or can be made in this proceeding
to set aside, invalidate, or nut Iffy either the contract evidenced by the
notes or the contract out of which the notes arose. That this counterclaim did not, in the language of the statute, arise out of the contract
or transaction set forth In the complaint, ts too plain for argument;
whether it is 11 connected with the subject of the action 11 is a question
which we resolve in favor of platntfff below. The question is often
difficult, but, as was said In Carpenter v. Manhattan, etc., Co., 93 N.Y.
556, "the counterclaim must have such relation to and connection with the
subject of the action that It wil I be just and equitable that 11 the controversy be settled in one action. If a more rigid or formal test be looked
for, the best is that of reciprocity. Adams v. Schwartz, 137 App. Div.
235, 122 N.Y. Supp. 41, and cases cited.
Making application of this test, could the payees of the notes, when
sued in deceit, set up the notes as a proper counterclaim? Certainly not.
The action of the lower court In dismissing the counterclaim on the merits
naturally fol lowed from its disposition of the action of deceit; the writ
of error herein complained of what was done. We sustain the writ only
in so far as the counterclaim was dismissed on the merits, mor"'ylng the
judgment below by striking out those words. The judgment is 01;1arwlse
aff I rmed.
LEARNED HAND, District Judge (dissenting). I think the judgment on
the notes should be reversed, along with the judgment on the counterclaim,
and that both should go back for the new trial.
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HEDIN V. MINNEAPOLIS MEDICAL &
SURGICAL INST. et al.
(Supreme Court of MinneeGta. Aug. 6, 1895)

62 Minn. 146, 64 N.W. 158
Appeal from district court, Hennepin county; Henry G. Hicks, Judge.
Action by Peter Hedin against the Minneapolis Medical & Surgical Institute and others for deceit. There was a verdict for plaintiff, and,
from an order denyin~ their motions for new trial, defendants severally
appeal. Affirmed.
Chas. G. Laybourn, for appellants.
for respondent.

W. A. Lancaster and Lancaster & Bush

COLLINS, J. This is an action for deceit. Defendant institute is a
corporation, while defendant Lawrence is its president, the physician and
surgeon in charge, and the person with whom plaintiff dealt, and to whom he
paid the sum of $500 for medical treatment, which sum he alleges was obtained
by defendants through false and fraudulent representations to him that certain
injuries from ·which he was then suffering were curable, and that at the institute they could and would cure him for that amount of money. No question
has been made as to the sufficiency of the complaint. Plaintiff had a verdict
for $500 and interest, and defendants ~everaily appeal from an order refusing
a new trial. Thirty-seven errors have been specified in appellants' brief,
nearly all relating to the rulings of the trial court when the evidence was
being taken. We have examined these specifications of error with care, and,
notwithstanding the elaborate ar~ument and evident sincerity of defendants'
counsel, we are compelled to say that very few are entitled to special reference. The real question in the case is as to the sufficiency of the evidence
to support the verdict, and this depends mainly on an inquiry as to whether
the statements and representations alleged to have been made, and said to
have been relied upon, were actionable. According to the evidence, these were
made by defendant Lawrence, and to the effect that the plaintiff's injuries
could be cured, and that he could and would be made sound and well if he
placed himself under treatment at the institute. Counsel for defendant contends that, at most, these statements were hut expressions of opinion as to
matters contingent and uncertain in their very nature, not susceptible of
certain determination or of actual ascertainment~ therefore no action as for
deceit can be maintained upon them. To sustain such an action, it must be
shown that a false representation of a material fact has been made, in ignorance relied upon, and that damage has ensued. The representation must be
fraudulently made, an intention to deceive being a necessary element or ingredient. But positive proof that a party knew his rapresentation to be untrue is not essential. The intenti(n may be proved by showin~ that, having
no knowledge of the truth or falsity of his statements, he did not believe
them to be true, or by showing that, having no knowledge of their truth or
falsity, yet he represented them to be true, of his own knowled~e. When the
knowingly false assertion is as to the belief of a party, or is as to his
knowledge of the fact he assumes to announce, intent to deceive is the inevitable inference. If this defendant Lawrence made statements and representations to plaintiff that his injuries were curable, and that ~dth treatment
he could become a well and sound man, having no knowledge of the truth or
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falsity of his statements~ and not believing them to be true, or if he made
such statements, having no knowledge of their truth or falsity, yet representing that they were true, the intent to deceive is as well established as
if positive knowledge of their untruthfulness had been proven. Generally
speaking, the representations must be as to a material fact, susceptible of
knowledge~ and, if they appear to be mere matters of opinion or conjecture,
they are not actionable. There are many cases, however, in which even a false
assertion of an opinion will amount to a fraud, the reason being that, under
the circumstances, the other party has a right to rely upon what is stated
or represented. Thus, the liability may arise where one has or assumes to
have knowledge upon a subject of which the other is ignorant, and knowingly
makes false statements, on which the other relies. Where parties possess
special learning or knowledge on the subject with respect to which their
opinions are given, such opinions are capable of approximating to the truth.
And for a false statement of them, when deception is designed and injury has
followed from reliance on the opinions, an action will lie. Gordon v. Butler,
105 U.S. 553: Robbins v. Barton, 50 Kan. 120, 31 Pac. 686; Eaton v. Winnie,
20 Mich. 156: Hicks v. Stevens, 121 Ill. 186, 11 N.E. 241; Cooley, Torts,
483. Take the facts in the case at bar. The plaintiff, an illiterate man,
badly injured in an accident, and physically a wreck, consulted with the
physician and surgeon in charge of a medical and surgical institute or
hospital as to his condition and the probability of a recovery. After an
examination by the surgeons, he was positively assured, if he told the truth
as to what was said (and the jury found that he did), that he could be cured,
and by treatment at that institute could and would be made sound and well.
Considering the circumstances, and the relations of the parties, there was
something more in defendants' statements than the mere expression of his
opinion upon a matter of conjecture and uncertainty. It amounted to a
representation that plaintiff's physical condition was such as.to insure a
complete recovery. The doctor, especially trained in the art of healing,
having .superior learning and knowled~e, assured plaintiff that he could be
restored to health. That the plaintiff believed him is easily imagined; for
a much stronger and more learned man would have readily believed the same thing.
The doctor, with his skill and ability, should be able to approximate to the
truth when giving his opinion as to what can be done with injuries of one
year's standing, and he should always be able to speak with cert~inty before
he undertakes to assert positively that a cure can be effected. If he cannot
speak with certainty, let him express a doubt. If he speaks without any
knowledge of the truth or falsity of a statement that he can cure, and does
not believe the statement true, or if he has no knowledge of the truth or
falsity of such a statement, but represents it as true, of his own knowledge,
it is to be inferred that he intended to deceive.

The deception being de-

signed in either case, and injury having followed from reliance upon the
statements, an action for deceit will lie.
The evidence in this case was sufficient to warrant the jury in finding
that plaintiff had sustained a f~acture at the base of the skull, and that
his injuries were incurable; that, after examination, defendant Lawrence
stated and represente~ that the plaintiff could and would be restored to
health by treatment; and that he made such statements and representations
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for the purpose of inducing plaintiff to pay over the sum of $500 to himself,
or to the institute, or both. There was evidence from which the jury could
find that he made these statements and representations without knowing whether
they were false or true, not believing they were true, and also that he ma.de
them without knowing their truth or falsity, but represu.ting them to be
true, of his own knowledge. There was also evidence from which the jury could
have found that the physicians and ~urgeons who made the examination at the
institute (Lawrence and another) knew that plaintiff had sustained a basal
fracture of the skull, and that he could not recover his health. The evidence
was abundant in support of the verdict.
Counsel makes the point that, as to defendant Lawrence, the action should
have been dismissed, because he, as the president of the defendant institute,
was simply acting for it as its agent. We are not aware of any rule of law
which will excuse and absolve a person from the consequences of his own wrong
because he happened to be the agent of another at the time of the perpetration
of the wrong. It is also urged that the action cannot be maintained, because
of the written contract between the parties. There is nothing in this; for
the action is not upon the contract, nor is it controlled by its terms and
conditions. It is an action for fraud and deceit practiced upon the plaintiff,
through and by means of which the contract was obtained. Order affirmed.
Reconsider Hawkins v. McGee» p. 97, su:era.
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Normally promises are ~robably not made with a present intent not to
perform. Where they are, Section 473 of the Restatement of Contracts I
provides that thev constitute fraud. What of a misrepresentation that is made
without knowledge. of the falsity of the statement? What about a failure
to disclose somethinr. that you know which would affect the other party's
evaluation of the deal? Consult the following two cases.
Ham v. Hart
58 N.M. 550, 273 P.7d 748 (1954)

LUJAN, Justice.
During the summer of 1949 the defendant (apnellee) had a water well
drilled on the premises referred to in the complaint. She used water therefrom by means of a pump operated by electric current until November of that
year when the electricity was turned off and never used again for approx!- ..
mately four years, or, until it was sold to plaintiff in 1953. A log was
furnished defendant by the well driller in 1949 which indicated that it was
150 feet deep and would produce two gallons of water per minute at that time.
The plaintiff (appellant) instituted this action to recover da.~ages
alleg~d to have been sustained by reason of false and fraudulent representa-

tions mad~ by the defendant to the plaintiff.
the complaint are in the followi.ng words:

The principal ~lle~ations in

"3. That during the negotiations, and in order to induce the plaintiff to purchase said property, the defendant falsely and fraudulently
represented to the plaintiff that the well located on the nremises was a good
one, and that said well would produce and pump not less than two gallons
of water per minute; that the plaintiff, relyinp: on said false and fraudulent
representations of the defendant as to the condition of the well and as to
the amount of water it would produce, a~reed to and did purchase said property! that subsequent to the time that the plaintiff purchased and paid for
said property, he discovered that the well located on said oremises was
worthless and would not produce two gallons of ~tter per minute as represented by the defendant at all material ti.mes hereto.
1:4. That the plaintiff would not have nurchased the property of the
defendant but for the false and fraudulent representations made to him by
the defendant as to the condition and oroductivity of said well.
11

5. That because of the condition of the well on said premises and its
failure to be in the condition as represented by the defendant or to produce
the water as represented by the defendant, it was necessary for the plaintiff, in order to procure the necessary supplv of water on the premises~ to
obligate himself and expend the sum of $2,056.08 to his damage in said
sum. * *"
The cause was tried to the court, who at the conclusion of the entire
case, on motion of defendant~ dismissed plaintiff's complaint and he appeals.
The parties will be referred to as they appeared in the district court.
[1] According to the record, there is abundant testimony to show that
the defendant on three different occasions represented to plaintiff. that the
well in question had ample water capable to producing not
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less than two gallons of water per minute, when in fact it only produced
one-half gallon per minute at the time the property was delivered to plaintiff; and that he relied upon said renresentations.
It is insisted that the trial courtco~mitted error in making the
following finding of fact and conclusion of law:
"Finding No. 14. That the defendant was motivated by neither
bad faith nor dishonesty in her statements to the plaintiff."
"Conclusion No. 4. That the facts uoon which this case is
brought are consistent with honesty on the part of the defendant
and that the presumption of honesty should prevail. 11
[2,3] Whether the defendant acted honestly and in good faith is
immaterial. The culpability which stamps statements as a fraud is in the
assertion of that to be true which is not true, althou~h believed to be true,
when made to be relied upon and which are relied upon to the injury of the
party misled. Becker v. McKinnie, 106 Kan. 426, 186 P. 496; Aldrich v.
Scribner, 154 Mich. 23, 117 N.W. 581, 18 L.R.A., N.S., 379, Rosenberg v.
Cyrowski, 227 Mich. 508, 198 N.W. 905~ Romine v, Thayer, 74 Ind. App.536,
128 N.E. 456; Joyce v. McCord, 123 Ark. 492, 185 s.w. 775; Laney-Payne rarm
Loan Co. v. Greenhaw, 177 Ark. 589, 9 S.W.2d 19, 73 A.L.R. 1117.
In 1 Story, Equity Jurisprudence, 14th Edition, sec. 272, Justice
Story uses this language~
''Whether the party thus misrepresenting a material fact
knew it to be false, or made the assertion without knowing whether
it were true or false, is wholly immaterial~ for the affirmation
of what one does not know or believe to be true is equally in
morals and law as unjustifiable as the affirmation of what is known
to be positively false. And even if the party innocently misrepresents a material fact by mistake, it is eoually conclusive;
for it operates as a surprise and imposition upon the other party."
The statements as to the number of gallons the well would produce were material as a positive assertion of fact, affording a decisive
consideration on plaintiff's willinRness to contract. ·. He relied upon
their truth and accuracy.
[4] We held in Jones v, Friedman, 57 N.M. 361, 258 P.2d 1113, that
irrespective of the good faith with which a misrepresentation of material
fact is made, if it is justifiably relied on by one seeking rescission of
the contract, such rescission should be allowed, and we reaffirm that
holding.
And in Bennett v. Finley, 54 n.M. 139, 215 P.2d 1013, 1015, we said~
"The representation was material in its bearing on defer.ciant's willingness to contract. If untrue, whether made innocently
or with fraudulent intent, it was actionable, when relied upon
by defeudant, as the trial court found it was."
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For other cases holding to the same effect, see Wilson v. Robinson, 21
N.M. 422, 155 P. 732, Ann.Cas. 1918C~ 49• Bell v. Kyle, 27 N.M. 9, 192 P. 512;
and Thrams v. Block, 43 N.M. 117, 86 P.2d 938.
The Jones and Bennett cases, as well as those holding to the same
effect, were in equity, but we can see no difference in the principle involved
in an action at law for damages and a suit in equity for rescission. Trust
Company of Norfolk v. Fletcher, 152 Va. 868, 148 S,E. 785, 73 A.L.R. 1111.
It is true that the weight of authority in actions at law for fraudulent
misrepresentations require proof of knowledge. However, a strong minority
follow the equity view that ~ood faith is immaterial and we believe this view
the better one and here adopt it.
Other errors are assigned and ar~ued, but no additional question need be
decided in view of the disposition we must make of the question just discussed.
For the reasons stated the judgment will be reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings in conformity here~ith.
It is so ordered,
Swinton v. Whitinsville Sav. Bank
311 Mass. 677, 42 N.E.2d 808
(1942)
QUA, Justice.

The declaration alleges that on or about September 12, 1938, the defendant sold the plaintiff a house in Newton to be occupied by the plaintiff
and his family as a dwelling~ that at the time of the sale the house 11was infested with termites, an insect that is most dangerous and destructive to
buildings"! that the defendant knew the house was so infested; that the plaintiff could not readily observe this condition upon inspection; that "knowing·
the internal destruction that these insects were creating in said house", the
defendant falsely and fraudulently concealed from the plaintiff its true
condition'. that the plaintiff at the time of his purchase had no knowledge of
the termites, exercised due care thereafter, and learned of them August 30,
1940~ and that, because of the destruction that was being done and the dangerous condition that was being created by the termites, the plaintiff was
put to great expense for repairs and for the installation of termite control
in order to prevent the loss and destruction of said house.
[1] There is no allegation of any false statement or representation, or
of the uttering of a half truth which may be tantamount to a falsehood. There
is no intimation that the defendant by any means prevented the plaintiff from
acquiYing information as to the condition of the house. There is nothing to
ohow any fiduciary relation between the parties, or that the plaintiff stood
in a position of confidence toward or denendence unon the defendant. So far
as appears the parties made a business d~al at arm's length. The charge is
concealment and nothing more; and it is concealment in the simple sense of
mere failure to reveal, with nothing to show any peculiar duty to speak. The
characterization of the concealment as false and fraudulent of course adds
nothing in the absence of further alle~ations of fact. Province Securities
Corp. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 269 Mass. 75, 92, 168 S.E. 252.
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[2J If this defendant is liable on this declaration every seller is
liable who fails to disclose any nonapparent defect known to hin in the subject of the sale which materially reduces itd value and which the buyer fails
to discover. Similarly it would seem that every buyer would be liable who
fails to disclose any nonapparent virtue known to him in the subject of the
purchase which materially enhances its ,·alue and of which the seller is ignorant. See Goodwin v. Agassiz, 283 Mass. 358, 186 N.E. 659. The law has
not yet, we believe, reached the point of imposing upon the frailties of
human nature a standard so idealistic as this. That the particular case
here stated by the plaintiff possesses a certain appeal to the moral sense
is scarcely to be denied. Probably the reason is to be found in the facts
that the infestation of buildings by termites has not been common in Massachusetts and constitutes a concealed risk against which buyers are off their
guerd. But the law cannot provide special rules for termites and can hsrdly
attempt to determine liability according to the varying probabilities of the
existence and discovery of different possible defects in the subjects of
trade. The rule of nonliability for bare nondisclosure has been stated and
followed by this court in Matthews v. Bliss, 22 Pick. 48, 52, 53; Potts v.
Chapin, 133 Mass. 276; Van Houten v. Morse, 162 Mass. 414, 38 N.E. 705, 26
L.R.A. 430, 44 Am.St.Rep. 373~ Phinney v. Friedman, 224 Mass. 531, 533, 113
N.E. 285; Windram Mfg. Co. v. Boston Blacking Co., 239 Mass. 123, 126, 131
N.E. 454, 17 A.L.R. 669; Wellington v. Rugg, 243 Mass. 30, 35, 36, 136 N.E.
831, and Brockton Olympia Realty Co. v. Lee, 266 Mass. 550, 561, 165 N.E.
873. It is adopted in the American Law Institute's Restatement of Torts,.
8551. See Williston on Contracts, Rev.Ed., 811497, 1498, 1499.
[3] The order sustaining the demurrer is affirmed, and judgment is to
be entered for the defendant. Keljikian v. Star Brewing Co., 303 Mass. 53,
55-63, 20 N.E.2d 465.

So ordered.
What interest is the law protecting under these cases of misrepresentation? Is it the same as that protected by the law of contracts? What should
the damages be? For example, consider the following hypoCetical:
Bob Buyer purchases a house from Sam Seller upon the misrepresentation
that it has a dry cellar. In fact, the cellar is often wet. Buyer
pays $20,000 for the house. The house, with the wet cellar, will bring
$18,000 on the market if the condition of the cellar is known. If the
houoe had a dry cellar, it would be worth $23,000. It will take $5,000
to repair the cellar so that it is dry.
In a senee at least, Buyer is out only $2,000, the difference between what
he paid and what the house was worth. On. the other hand, it can be argued
that he was damaged to the extent of $3,000 (the difference between what he
paid and what the house would have been worth had the cellar been as represented), or that his damage is $5,000 (the amount necessary to make the houne
as it was represented). What is the proper measure of damages?
Consult Section 2-714 of the Uniform Commercial Code. What would be the
measure of damages if the Code applied? Consult also the following case.
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RICE v. PRICE
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 1960.
340 Mass. 502, 164 N.E.2d 891.
[Defendant Price, a registered engineer and a graduate of a technical
institute, controlled two corporations which manufactured and sold an electric steamless heater which he had designed. Price approached Baldwin, a
ceramics salesman, and Rice, an insurance agent, in an attempt to induce
them to undertake the distribution of the heater. He made various representations to them as to the efficiency of the heater, the novelty of the
design and the electrically heated fluid used, his application for a patent,
the cost of operation, and similar matters, all of which were found to be false,
and known to Price to be false when made. In reliance upon these representations, Baldwin and Rice organized the Baldwin-Rice corporation, wh!ch entered
into a contract with defendant's corporation, under which it was to act as the
sole distributor of the heater for a year, with the right of renewal at the
expiration of that time. Because of the matters misrepresented, the heater
failed to sell, and the Baldwin-Rice company was forced out of business. The
trial court referred the case to an auditor, who made findings of the plaintiffs' damages. Defendants moved to exclude these findings, and their bill of
exceptions presented the question whether the judge properly denied this
motion, and a motion for a new trial.]
CUTTER, JUSTICE.*** Baldwin resigned his former position about May 1,
1955, and during the forty-eight weeks of his work for Baldwin-Rice received
$3,840 less than he would have earned in his former occupation exclusive of
certain allowances for life insurance premiums. He made a loan to, and paid
debts of Baldwin-Rice for which he never was repaid a balance of $2,693.23.
Rice's loss of income, as a result of becoming an employee of Baldwin-Rice,
was $2,200. Re paid certain corporate loans and debts of which a "balance of
$1,967.23 was never [re]paid to him." Baldwin and Rice each invested $1,000
in purchasing stock in Baldwin-Rice, which, the auditor found, sustained a
loss of $28,871.67 (excluding certain sums owed to Baldwin and Rice).
The trial judge made findings (a) for Baldwin of $7,530.23 against Price
and in the same amount against Acme; (b) for Rice of $5,167.23 against Price
and in the same amount against Acme; and (c) of $28,871.67 for Baldwin-Rice
against Price and in the same amount against Lincoln Park.
There was ample evidence that Price made misrepresentations of material
facts, susceptible of actual knowledge, in order to induce the plaintiffs to
undertake the distribution of the heaters and that the plaintiffs relied upon
these misrepresentations and suffered damages as a consequence. The defendants'
principal contentions are that no recoverable damages have been shown as
against any of the defendants and that the wrong measure of damages bas been
applied. It is further ccntended that Baldwin-Rice cannot recover at all
against Lincoln Park or Price.
1. The trial judge stated, as the applicable measure of damages in deceit,
the difference in actual value between that which the plaintiff[s] in fact
got and that which they would have received if the representations had been
true.'' Be in effect adopted the auditor's findings on damages. Upon the
auditor's findings, including the finding that Baldwin-Rice "went out of
business*** because*** [the] steamless heaters did not possess the***
11
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attributes represented*** by Acme and Price," the trial judge was warranted in concluding th~t the whole business disaster and all the losses were
caused by the failure of the heaters to come up to the standards stated in the
representations.
The Massachusetts decisions, in awarding damages in actions of deceit,
have followed, at least in appropriate cases, the iubenefit of the bargain 11
rule. Under this rule the olaintiff is entitled to recover the difference
between the value of what he has received and the actual value of what he would
have received if the representations had been true.[citations omitted.] This
rule affords a recovery in deceit closely resembling that for breach of
warranty. [citation omitted.]
The misrepresentations might reasonably have caused the plaintiffs to believe that the heaters were unique. The trial judge thus could have concluded
that the defendants should have foreseen (a) that, relying on the misrepresentations, the individual plaintiffs would leave their former employments,
make loans to and investments in a business or corporation to be formed, and
lose those investments! and (b) that without such a unique heater having the
represented characteristics, Baldwin-Rice would incur substantial losses, in
competition with equally good established heaters.
Doubtless, as was said in Thomson v. Pentecost, 206 Mass. 505, 512-513,
92 N.E. 1021; Id., 210 Mass. 223, 227, 96 N.E. 335, the individual plaintiffs
would have been "content, if the defendant[s'] representations were true, to
run the risk of undertaking this*** [distributorship] and abandoning their
former occupations***· They are indemnified if these representations are
made good" and i f they recover under the benefit of the bargain rule "the
difference between the actual value of this new employment*** and what that
value would have been if the defendant[sv] representations had been true."
[Citation omitted.]
The plaintiffs' just complaint is that, because of the misrepresentations,
the hazards of the distributorship were vastly greater than the plaintiffs had
reason to believe them to be. In the circumstances, the damages awarded conceivably could be fitted into the concepts of the benefit of the bargain rule,
on the theory that the distributorship and heaters received by the plaintiffs
were worth less than represented by at least the amount of the losses caused
by the misrepresentation. The trial judge, however, despite his statement of
the benefit of the bargain rule of damages, has based the damages awarded very
directly on the losses in fact suffered. There were no express findings about
(a) what the value of the distributorship would have been if the representations had been true and (b) its value in the light of the falsity of the
re,resentations, which might be a negative valu~ in view of the losses and liabilities likely to be incurred because the representations were false. Obviously in proving these values the plaintiffs would meet serious difficulties,
which would be only partly overcome by recognition [citation omitted] that th2
"amount of damages seldom can be proved with [mathematical] exactness" and that
much 11must be left to estimate and judgment, sometimes upon meager evidence. 11
Such difficulties of proof, however, can hardly be permitted (under a rule of
damages designed to be generous in comparison with the out of pocket rule, see
footnote 4, supra) to relieve defendants of the responsibility for losses which
their misrepresentations have caused. [Citation omitted.] Accordingly, we
consider whether the Massachusetts rule of damages permits the award of damages in the amount of the losses in fact caused by the misrepresentations, wh~re

160.

only such damages are sought and proved.
The benefit of the bargain rule has not been rigidly followed in this
Commonwealth, and this court has suggested that the rule may be modified or
supplemented to prevent injustice. [Citation omitted.]
As one text writer points out , ,: [ f] ew courts have followed either
rule with entire consistency" and there have been i:proposals ***to introdu.ce some flexibility into the measure of damages." Prosser, Torts (2d ed •)
i 91, pp. 569-570. * * *

A possible reconciliation of the two rules (based on Selman v. Shirley,
161 Or. 582, 85 P.2d 384, 91 P.2d 312) is summarized in Prosser, Torts (2d ed.)
570: "1. If the defrauded party is content with the recovery of only the
amount he has actually lost? his damages will always be measured under that
rule. 2. If the fraudulent transaction also amounted to a warranty, he may
recover for loss of the bargain, because a fraud accompanied by a broken
promise should cost the wrongdoer as much as the breach of promise alone.
3. Uh.ere*** the proof*** [is] so vague as to cast virtually no light
upon the value of the property had it conformed to the representations, damages
will be awarded equal to the loss sustained, and 4. Where the damages under
the benefit-of-bargain rule are proved with reasonable certainty, that rule
will be employed. In addition*** the plaintiff may recover for consequential damages, such as*** expenses to which he has been put, provided that
they are regarded as 'proximate' results of the misrepresentation."
Rulas 1 and 3 tend to prevent the benefit of the bargain rule fron
operating to defeat a just recovery where misrepresentation has caused real
damage but where values cannot easily be proved. All the elements of damage
and loss allowed by the trial judge could have been found to have been caused
proximately by the misrepresentations within these rules. So far as applicable
here, they seem to be consistent with,and to substantiate, the statements in
those Massachusetts casesj already cited 9 which supplement the benefit of the
barga:Ln rule. Although it has been suggested that rigid application of the
benefit of the bargain rule may remove 1tspeculation attendant in attempting
to ascertain what portion of [such a] loss is attributable to the fraud and
what portion*** to bad management or other factors not connected with the
fraud," [citation omitted] the trial judge 0 s findin~s here establish that the
losses of Baldwin-Rice were "direct results of the wrong." In adopting the
auditor's findings, the judge impliedly made similar findings as to Baldwin's
and Rice's losses. There was no error in the assessment of damages***
Exceptions overruled.
The following case in many ways sums up much of what has been touched upon
so far. Why didn't the plaintiff win? Could the result have been any different if he relied upon misrepresentation? I f the court had apnil.:1.ed tte .. Uniform Commercial Code sections on warranties by analogy, would the result
have been different? What do you think of the result?
Anderson v. Backlund
159 Minn. 423, 199 N.W. 90 (1924)
WILSON, C. J. This is an action to recover on a promissory note. Plaintiff's cause of action is not in controversy. The defendant alleged a counter161

claim. Defendant was a tenant on a 640-acre farm owned by plaintiff, and a
written lease defined the terms of this tenancy. He alleges, however, that in
the month of June the parties made a further oral agreement, for the purpose of
more securely assuring plaintiff that he would receive certain case rent acdruing in prior years, wherein defendant agreed to buy 100 head of cattle and
bring upon the fann and consume good pasture thereon, and that plaintiff agreed
to provide, keep, and maintain on the farm a well, watering equipment, and
water ample and sufficient for the needs of such 100 head of cattle, as well
as for 67 head of cattle then owned and kept on the farm by defendant, and
that, relying upon such agreement, and being induced thereby, defendant purchased and placed on the farm 107 head of cattle; that plaintiff violated his
agreement; that the water supply failed, and because thereof all the 174 head
of cattle became wasted, thin and depreciated in value, and defendants were
damaged in the sum of $2,500.
The court directed a verdict for the plaintiff for the amount claimed in
the complaint, and, from an order denying defendant's motion for a new trial,
he has appealed.
Our first inquiry is as to whether the oral contract as alleged by defendant is in fact established by the proofs. The only evidence in support
of this allegation is the testimony of the defendant, John Backlund, which is
as follows:
"Well Mr. Anderson drove on the place, come there the same as always, and
asked how everything was and how we got along. I told him it began to look
pretty blue for me, two years kind of light crop I said, and it looked to me
I can't make both ends meet:; and Mr. Anderson said, ''Well now, John' --I remember the words, 'why don't you get some more cattle on here and make good
use of all that grass and make some money. 1 'Well,' I says, 1 some of my
neighbors tells me if I stock up too heavy in the pasture and there be a
"short spell" I will be short of water, and I will be up against it, and that
is the reason I am waiting for you.' Well he said, 'Never mind the water,
John. I will see there will be plenty of water, because it never failed in
Minnesota yeti' and I say, 'All right, I got it all arranged to get all the
cattle I want from Long & Hanson in Sioux City; all I have to do is to go to
the phone and call them up, and the cattle be here in 2 or 3 days.' And he
said, 'All right.' And then furthermore, Anderson always tole me 1 ! am good
for my word.' 11
If this constitutes a contract, what were the terms? How was he to provide water? Was he to drill a well? If so, when? What was the significance
of the words, ''because it never failed in Minnesota yet"? This rather characterized the talk more as visiting or advice than a contract, and we are forced
to the conclusion that the parties did not make a contract. There is a lack
of mutual assent to the same proposition; and the language is entirely too
indefinite and general as to the usual elements of a contract. The minds of
the parties never met upon the essential terms. Contracts must be certain in
terms, and not so indefinite and illusory as to make it impossible to say just
what is promised. The proof in this respect is insufficient. Because of
such insufficiency the counterclaim falls, and the learned trial court was
right in directing a verdict.
It becomes unnecessary to discuss the assignment of error relating to
the rulings of the court in excluding testimony offered in support of the
measure of damages.
Order affirmed.
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Does the right of action that the average consumer may have for breach
of warranty or for misrepresentation really help him much? The cost of a law
suit is prohibitive in many cases. How do you force a recalcitrant car dealer
to repair your new car under a warranty? How do you get out of a deal, or
get your money back, from the itinerant retailer who has bilked you? There is
some government control of dishonest merchants. The Federal Trade Commission
Act, and similar state acts in some jurisdictions, prohibits 11 unfair and deceptive trade practices," but enforcement is sometimes painfully slow and ineffective.
The National Consumer Law Center at Boston College Law School has drafted
the "National Consumer Act". Initially, this was in response to the Uniform
Consumer Credit Act that was drafted, and is being promoted, by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. The UCCC is designed as a
"uniform act" and, like the Uniform Co::!III1ercial Code, is being proposed in all
state legislatures. The UCCC deals only with consumer credit, but the NCA
go8s far beyond. Consider the following sections which deal with decepti~e
practices. Note carefully the manner in which the Act is to be enforced. Is
governmental intervention a necessary concommitant to the type of commerce that
we have in this country? Is there still a necessity for private remedies?
Is Contract Law as it is presented by the typical textbook or law school
course dead, or at least entering its dotage?

Section 5.401

PART 4
CRil1INAL PENALTIES
WILLFUL VIOLATIONS:

MISDEMEANOR

A person who willfully engages in any conduct or practice in violation
of this Act is guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction may be [sentenced
to a fine not exceeding $2000].
Section 5.402.

DISCLOSURE VIOLATIONS

A person who willfully violates the provisions on disclosure (Part 3) of
the Article on Consumer Credit Transactions (Article 2) is guilty of a
[misden"an.or] and upon con.viction may be sentenced to pay a fine not exceeding $5000, or to imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both.
Comment
These two sections provide criminal penalties for
violation of this Act. The first sect1on provides
a misdemeanor for willful violation of this statute.
The second section provides a penalty for violation
for disclosure provisions which is identical to that
provided in the Federal TRuth-in-Lending Act, Under
the second section, local state enforcing officers
may actually enforce criminal violations of the Federal
statute, since they constitute a violation of this
statute.
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ARTICLE 6
ADHINISTFATION

PART I
POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF ADMINISTRATOR
Section 6.101.

SHORT TITLE

This article shall be known and may be cited as National Consumer Act -Administration
Section 6.102.

APPLICABILITY

This Article applies to a merchant whose activities are directed toward
or affect consumers in this State and to a person who takes assignments of
and undertakes direct collection of payment~ from or enforcement of rights
against consumers, to a person engaged in the business of debt collection or
in the business of reporting agencies.
Section 6.103.

ADMINISTRATOR
Administrator means [

1•

COMMENT
Effective and energetic administration is vital to the Act. Since
each state has a different structure in its executive branch, the
Act does not specifically identify the Administrator. However,
the draftsmen are concerned that traditional regulatory agencies
have often become the servants rather than the policemen of the industries they have been charged with supervising. This has been
particularly true of licensing agencies. Therefore the draftsmen
recommend that where possible the administering agency be a new
office, directly responsible to the Governor, with no duties other
than administration of this Act and other consumer protection legislation. We discoul."a~e extendinti the respons:f.bilities of Banking,
Insurance and other exist1n~ ucpartmon~~ to includP Administration
of this act.
Section 6.104.

POWERS OF ADMINISTRATOR: DUTY TO REPORT

(1) In addition to other powers granted by this Act, the Administrator
within the limitations provided by law shall~

(a)

Receive and act on complaints, take action designed
to obtain voluntary compliance with this Act, or commence proceedinp.s on his own initiative;

(b)

Counsel persons and groups on their ri~hts and duties
under this Act~

(c)

Establish proRrams for the education of consumers with
respect to consumer practices and problems~
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(d)

Make studies appro~riate to effectuate the purposes and
policies of this Act and make the results available
to the public~

(e)

Hold such public or private hearinrs as he deems
necessary or proper to effectuate the purposes and
policies of this Act~

(f)

Subpoena witnesses, compel their attendance, adduce
evidence and require the nroduction of such relevant
matter as he deems necessary or proper to effectuate
the purposes and policies of this Act:

(g)

Adopt, amend, and repeal rules and re~ulations to carry
out the purposes and oolicies of this Act, to prevent
circumvention or evasion thereof, or to facilitate compliance therewith. These rules and regulations may
contain such classifications, differentiations or other
provisions and may provide for such adjustments or exceptions as in the judgment of the Administrator are
necessary or proper to effectuate the purposes of this
Act.

(h)

Maintain such offices as he deems necessary within this
State; and

(i)

Apnoint such attorneys, hearing examiners, clerks, and
other employees and ap,ents as in the judgment of the
Administrator are reasonably necessary to perform his
functions under this Act and fix their compensation, and
authorize attorneys aooointed under this section to
anpear for and represent the Administrator in court.

(2) The Administrator shall report annually [on or before January 1]
to the [Governor and/or Legislature] on the operation of his office, on
practices in consumer transactions, on the use of consumer credit in the
State, on problems attending the collection of debts, on reporting agencies,
on the problems of persons of limited means in consumer transactions, and on
the operation of this Act. For the purpose of making the report, the Administrator is authorized to conduct research and make appropriate studies. The
report shall include:
(a)

a description of the examination and investigation
procedures and policies of his office:

(b)

a statP.ment of policies followed in deciding whether to
investigate or examine the offices of persons subject
to this Act:

(c)

a statement of policies followed in deciding whether
to bring any action authorized under this Act•
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(d)

a statement of the number and percentages of classes
of merchants registered under this Act which are per~·
iodically investigated or examined!

(e)

a statement of the types of consumer problems of both
consumers and merchants which have come to his attention
and the disposition of them under existing law;

(f)

a complete survey of the costs of various types of
credit available in the State to the consumer and the
cost to the ~reditor of each such type of credit, with
a comparison of each to the prevailing rates of charges
for credit, both the maximwns permitted by law and the
amounts actually charged if below the maximums:

(g)

a statement reviewing creditor profits from credit operations~

(h)

a statement of sales and advertising nractices tending
to promote debt in such a way as to jeopardize the
financial sacurity of consumers·

(i)

a list of all persons who have challenged any action of the
Administrator in a public hearing or in a judicial proceeding and a brief description of the facts in each case;

(j)

a list of all persons a~ainst whom complaints have been
filed or investigations commenced along with a brief de.
scription of the facts of each case and the action taken
in each, if such case has not been resolved within three
months from the filing of the complaint or the commencement of the investigation, whichever is earlier.

(k)

such recommendations for modifications or additions to
this Act as in the experience and judgment of the Administrator are necessary; and

(1)

such other statements as are necessary or proper to
achieve the purposes or policies of this section or to
effectuate the purposes or policies of this Act.

(3) Within 10 days following its submission to the [Governor and/or
Legislature], the Administrator shall publish and make available to the
communications media and other interested parties sufficient copies of his

report.
Comrn.ent
The Administrator is required under this section and
sections of this Article to perform a broad range of
To carry out his functions he is given ample general
and some specific powers elsewhere. The granting of
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other
duties.
powers here
specific

powers anywhere in this Article is not intended to diminish
in any way the general grant of powers which should be construed broadly to achieve the purposes of this Act. The Administrator is the watchdog for the consuming public and his
powers must of necessity be equal to the scope of his task.
Section 6.105.

ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS WITH RESPECT TO SUPERVISED
FINANCIAL ORGANIZATIONS

(1) All powers and duties of the Administrator under this Act shall
be exercised by him with respect to a supervised financial organization.
(2) If the Administrator receives a complaint or other information
concerning non-compliance with this Act by a su~ervised financial organization, he shall inform the official or agency having supervisory authority
over the or~anization concerned. The Administrator may request information
about supervised financial organizations from the officials or agencies
supervising them.

The Administrator and any offic:f.al or agency of this State having
supervisory authority over a supervised financial organization are authorized
and directed to consult and assist one another in maintaining compliance
with this Act. They may jointly pursue investigations, prosecute suits, and
take other official action, as they deem appropriate, if either of them
otherwise is empowered to take the action.
(3)

Comment
Although ''supervised financial organizations" are subject to
supervision by an official or agency other than the Administrator,
the purposes for such supervision differ from that of administration
of this Act. There is, therefore, no reason why all of the powers
of the Administrator should not a~plv to all whose conduct is
regulated under this Act. The administration of this Act can best
be accomplished by a single agency, and division of responsibility
will tend to promote uneven and unequal enforcement.
Section 6.106.

INVESTIGATORY POWERS

(1) If the A~ministrator has reason to believe that a person has
engaeed in an act which is subject to action by the Administrator, he may
make an tnvestigation to determine if the act has been committed and, to the
extent necessary for this purpose, may administer oaths or affirmat~ons, and,

upon his o~m motion or upon reouest of any party, may subpoena witnesses,
compel their attendance, adduce evidence, and require the production of any
matter which is relevant to the investigation, including the existence,
description, nature, custody, conditiong and location of any books, documents,
or other tangible things, and the identity and location of persons having
knowledge of relevant facts, or any other matter reasonably calculated to
lea~ to the discovery of admissible evidence, and he shall have the right of
access to and of examination of such books, documents or other tangible tM.ngs.
In any civil action brought by the Administrator following such an ivvestigation, the Administrator may recover his costs of making the investigation if
he prevails in the action.
167.

(2) If 10 or more consumers file a signed com.plaint with the
Administrator alleging that a person has engaged in an act which is subject
to action by the Administrator, he shall immediately commence an investigation pursuant to subsection (1) of this section.
(3) If the perscn's records are located outside this State, the
person at his option shall either "''.·."ke them available to the Administrator
at a convenient location within this State or pay the re~sonable and necessary expenses for the Administrator or his representative to examine them
at the place where they are maintained. The Administrator may designate
representativ~., including comparable officials of the State in which the
records are located, to inspect them on his behalf.
(4) The Administrator may by regulation require that certain records
be kept within this State and that he be notified of their location.
(5) Upon failure without lawful excuse to obey a subpoena or to
give testimony and upon reasonable notice to all persons affected thereby,
the Administrator may apply to [
] court for an order compelling compliance.
Comment
The UCCC permitted the Administrator to coannence an investigation
only if he had probable cause to believe that a violation had
occurred. There is no reason given by the draftsmen of the UCCC,
nor is any apparent, for subjecting the Administrator in an administrative proceeding to the harsh standards of the criminal law.
This section permits the Administrator in his discretion to make whatever investigations are needed for enforcement. Ample protection
is provided for an overzealous administrator in the political and
governmental process, and the history of administrative agenc:1.es at
any governmental level does not support an argument that they harass
or too zealously over-see the industry they regulate. The administrator is also required to make such investigations where he receives
a complaint signed by at least ten members of the consuming public.
Section 6.107.

APPLICATION OF [ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT]
[PART ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AND JUDICIAL REVIEW]

Except as otherwise provided, the [State administrative procedure act]
[Part on Administrative Procedure and Judicial Review (Part 4) of this Article] applies to and governs all administrative action taken by the Administrator pursuant to this Act.
Section 6.108.

ADMINISTRATIVE ENFORCEMENT ORDERS

(1) After notice the Administrator may order a person subject to this
Act or a person acting in his behalf to cease and desist from engaging in
violations of this Act or from engaging in unfair, deceptive, fraudulent or
unconscionable conduct. If, after the order is made, a written request for
a hearing is filed and no hearing is held within 30 days thereafter, the
order is rescinded. A respondent aggrieved by an order of the Administrator
may obtain judicial review of the order and the Administrator may obtain an
order of the court for enforcement of its order in the [
] court. The
proceeding for review or enforcement is initiated by filing a petition in
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the court.
record.

Copies of the petition shall be served upon all parties of

(2) Within 30 days after service of the petition for review upon the
Administrator, or within any further time the court may allow, the Administrator shall transmit to the court the original or a certified copy of the
entire record upon which the order is based, including any transcript of
testimony, which need not be printed. By stipulation of all parties to the
review proceeding, the record may be shortened. After hearing, the court
may:
(a)

reverse or modify the order if the findings
of fact of the Administrator are clearly
erroneous in view of the evidence on the whole
record;

(b)

grant any temporary relief or restraining order
it deems juot, and~

(c)

enter an order enforcing, modifying, and enforcing as modified, or setting aaide in whole
or in part the order of the Administrator, or
remanding the case to the Administrator for
further proceedings.

(3) An objection not urged at the hearing shall not be considered
by the court unless the failure to urge the objection is excused for good
cause shown. A party may move the court to remand the case to the Administrator in the interest of justice for the purpose of adducing additional specified
and material evidence and seeking findings thereon upon good cause shown for
the failure to adduce this evidence before the Administrator.
(4) The jurisdiction of the court shall be exclusive and its final
judgment or decree shall be subject to review by the [
] court in
the same manner and form and with the same effect as in appeals from a final
judgment or decree in a [special proceeding]. The Administrator's copy of the
testimony shall be available at reasonable times to all parties for examination without cost,
(5) A proceeding for review under this section must be initiated
within 30 days after a copy of the order of the Administrator is received.
If no proceeding is so initiated, the order is a lawfully made final order.
Section 6.109.

UNCONSCIONABLE CONDUCT

The Administrator shall promulgate regulations declaring specific
practices in consumer transactions or collection of debts arising therefrom
to be unconscionable and prohibiting the use thereof. In promulgating such
regulations, the Administrator shall consider, among other things:
(1) The degree to which the practice unfairly takes advantage
of the lack of knowledge, ability, experience, or capacity of consumers;
(2) Knowledge by those engaging in the practice of the inability of
consumers to receive benefits properly anticipated from the goods or services
involved;
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(3) Gross disparity between the price of goods or services and their
value as measured . by the price at which similar goods or services a.re
readily obtainable by other consumers, or by other tests of true value;
(4) The fact that the practice may enable merchants to take advantage
of the inability of consumers reasonably to protect their interests by
reason of physical or mental infirmities, illiteracy or inability to understand the language of the agreement, ignorance or lack of education or similar
factors;
(5) The degree to which terms of the transaction require consumers to
waive legal rights:
(6) The degree to which terms of the transaction require consumers
to jeopardize money or property beyond the money or property immediately at
issue in the transaction~.
(7) The degree to which the natural effect of the practice is to
cause or aid in causing consumers to misunderstand the true nature of the
transaction or their rights and duties thereunder.
(8) The extent or degree to which the writing purporting to evidence
the obligation of the consumer in the transaction contains terms or provisions or authorizes practices prohibited by law; and
(9) Definitions of unconscionability in statutes, regulations,
rulings and decisions of legislative, administrative or judicial bodies in
this state or elsewhere.
Comment
This section gives the Administrator the authority to issue regulations which would outlaw certain types of practices where an unconscionable
advantage is taken of the consumer. Moreover, under Article 5, the trier
of fact in a consumer's remedy civil action is directed to consider the
action of the Administrator and the criteria established by this section in
determining unconscionability. The criteria outlined in this section for
the Administrator to consider reflect the most common factors that society
would recognize as constituting probable unfairness in consumer transactions.
Section 6.110.

TEMPORARY RELIEF: INJUNCTIONS

(1) The Administrator or any consumer may bring
restrain a person from violatin~ this act or the rules
gated pursuant thereto, or to restrain a merchant or a
half of a merchant from engaging in unfair, deceptive,
unconscionable conduct.

a civil action to
and regulations promulperson acting on befraudulent, or

(2) The Administrator or consumer may seek a temporary restraining
order without written or oral notice to the adverse party or his attorney.
If the court finds that there is reasonable cause to believe that the respondent is engaged in the conduct sought to be restrained, it may grant a temporary restraining order or any temporary relief it deems appropriate. A
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temporary restraining order granted without notice shall expire by its ter.ms
within a stated time after entry, not to exceed 30 days, as the court fixes,
unless within this time it is extended by the court, or unless the party
against whom the order is directed consents that it may be extended for a
longer period. When a temporary restraining order is granted without notice,
the motion for a preliminary injunction shall be set down for a hearing at
the earliest possible time. On five days notice to the party who obtained
the temporary restraining order without notice, the adverse party may appear
and move its dissolution or modification, and in this event the court shall
proceed to hear and determine such motion as expeditiously as the ends of
justice require.
Section 6.111.

CLASS ACTIONS

(1) Either the Administrator~ or any consumer affected by a violation
of this act or of the rules and regulations promulgated pursuant thereto, or
by an unfair, deceptive, fraudulent, or unconscionable practice may sue,
on behalf of all 1ersons similarly situated, regardless of the amount :d
controversy, for the relief to which such persons would be entitled under the
provisions of this act. A priver·e party filing such an action must give
prompt notice thereof to the Administrator, who shall be permitted, upon
application within 30 days~ to join as a party plaintiff, For purposes of
apportionment of cost, the Administrator need not be a party to the action.
(2) The court shall permit the suit to be maintained on behalf ,;:f
all members of the represented class if~
(a)

the class is so numerous that joinder of all
members is impracticable;

(b)

the questions of law ~nd fact connnon to the
class are substantially similar and predominate
over the questions affecting individual members~

(c)

the claims or defenses of the representative
plaintiffs are typical of the claims or defenses
of the class~

(d)

if the Administrator is not a t,srty plaintiff, the
representative parties will fairly and adequately
protect the ir.te=ests of the class,

(3) As soon as practicable after the commencement of a class action
brought under this section, the court shall hold a preliminary hearing to
determine whether it is to be so maintained. An order following such
hearing may be conditional, and may be altered or amended before the decision on the merits.
(4)' If the action is to be permitted as a class action, the court
shall direct the defendant to serve upon each member of the class the best
possible notice of the action, including individual notice to all members who
can be identified through reasonable effort, which states that:
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(a)

the court will exclude him from the class if
he so requests by a specified date;

{b)

the jud~ent, whether favorable or not, will
include all members who do not request exclusion~

(c)

any member who does not request exclusion, may,
if he desires, enter an appearance through counsel.

(5) When appropriate (a) an action may be brought or maintained as
a class action with respect to particular issues, or (b) a class may be
divided into subclasses and each subclass treated as a class, and the provis1cns of this Section shall then be construed and applied accordingly.
(6) A class action shall not be dismissed, settled, or compromised
without the approval of the court and the best possible notice of the proposed dismisoal, settlement, or compromise shall be given to all members of
the class in such manner as the court directs, and the court shall apportion
all costs of notice between the Administrator and the defendant in such
manner as it deems equitable and appropriate.
(7) The judgment ir. a class action shall describe those to whom the
notice was directed and who have not requested exclusion, and those the
court finds to be members of the class; the best possible notice of the
judgment shall be given in such manner as the court directs to each person
who received the original notice and has not requested exclusion,. if the
judgment is for the plaintiff the court shall direct the defendant to reimburse the Administrator for all costs of notice.
(8) A plaintiff who 11revails in a class action under this act shall
be awarded a reasonable counsel fee, to be specified in the judgt:tent, which
shall equal ten per cent of the gross judgment unless the court finds a
different amount to be more equitable. A legal aid society or legal services program which represents a class shall be awarded a service fee in
lieu of counsel fees, equal in amount to the counsel fee as measured by
this subsection.
(9) The Administrator, whether or not a party to an action, shall
bear the costs of notice extept that he may recover such costs from the
defendant as provided in subsections (6) and (7) of this Section.
CoI!ll!len t
This section allows for genuine class actions to be

commenced on behalf of consumers by either the Administrator or by a consumer. The UCCC permits an extremely
limited action and then only with respect to excess charges.
Class actions are more needed in consumer transactions
than almost anywhere else because the amount of the rec.~very will frequently be so small as to make it an ex:;:>0.:nsive hardship for a single individual to pursue his
legal rights. Under this section, costs of notice are
borne by the Administrator, although he may recover these
from a defendant who does not prevail, and attorney's fees are
awarded to a successful plaintiff.
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Section 6.112.

VENUE

The Administrator or consumer may bring actions or proceedings in a
court in a county in which an act on which the action or proceeding is based
occurred or in a county in which the defendant r£:ides or transacts business.
Section 6.113.

DEBTORS" REMEDIES NOT AFFECTED

The grant of powers to the Administrator in this Article does not
affect remedies available to consumers under this Act or under other
principles of law or equity.

ARTICLE 3
SALES PRACTICES
PART I
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Section 3.101.

SHORT TITLE

This Article shall be known and may be cited as the Natipnal Consumer
Act -- Sales Practices.
Section 3.102.

SCOPE

Th is Article applies to unfair and deceptive sales practices,
warranties and advertising.

PART 2
UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES
Section 3.201.

UNLAWFUL SALES PRACTICES

(1) The following unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices undertaken by a merchant are hereby declared to be
unlawful and prohibited:
(a)

Passing off goods or services as those of another;

(b) Causing likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding as to
the source~ sponsorship, approval, or certification of goods or services;
(c) Causing likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding as
to affiliation, connection, or association with, or certification by,
another;
(d) Using deceptive representations or designations of geographic
origin in connection with goods or services;
(e) Representing that goods or services have sponsorship, approval, characteristics, ingredients, uses, benefits, or quantities that they
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do not have or that a person has a sponsorship, approval, status, affilia-

tion, or connection that he does not have;
(f) Representing that ~nods are original or new if they are
deteriorated, altered, reconditioned, reclaimed, used, or secondhand;
(g) Represecting that goods or services are of a particular standard, quality, or grade, or that goods are of a particular style or model, if
they are of another;
(h) Disparaging the goods, services, or business of another by
false or misleading representation of fact;

(i)
advertised;

Advertising goods or services with intent not to sell them as

(j) Advertising goods or services with intent not to supply reasonably expectable public demand, unless the advertisement discloses a limitation
of quantity;

(k) Making false or misleading statements of fact concerning
reasons for, existence of, or amounts of price rfductions;
(1) Representing that the consumer transaction confers or involv£:.?·
rights, remedies or obligations that it does not have or involve or which.
are prohibited by law;
(m) Representing that a part, replacement or repair service is
needed when it is not;
(n) Representing that the subject of a consumer transaction has
been supplied in accordance with a previous representation when it has not;
(o) Representing that the consumer will receive a rebate discount
or other economic benefit as an inducement for entering into a consumer
transaction if the earning of the benefit is contingent on an event to
occur subsequent to the consummation of the transaction.
(p) Causing likelinood of confusion or of misunderstanding with
respect to the authority of a salesman, representative or agent to negotiate
the final terms of a tr~nsaction with a consumer:
(q)

Engaging in any other conduct which similarly creates a like-

lihood of confusion or of misunderstanding; or

(r) Engaging in any act or practice which is unfair or deceptive
to the consumer.
Comment
1. The Uniform Consumer Credit Code contains no equivalent to Article 3 of this Act. Article 3 of the Credit
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Code deals with consumer loans which, under this
act, are included in Article 2. By failing to provide· protections to the consumer against unfair and
deceptive trade practices, the draftsmen of the
Credit Code eompletely ignored the fact that these
practices often accompany credit transactions. Thus,
the Credit Code is too limiting in its scope. Furthermore, since many credit transactions are in fact
sales of goods, there is need to afford the consumer a
additional warranty protection.
2. This Section contains an exhaustive list of deceptive
sales and trade practices. The list is not exclusive,
and a consumer may establish in court other unfair and
deceptive practices. The Administrator is also entitled
to establish such practices by rule or regulation. Many
of the prohibited practices are already prohibited under
the Federal Trade Commission Act and under State Deceptive
Practices Acts. What this Article does is provide the
consumer with a remedy under State law.
(2) Without limiting the scope of subsection (1), an act or practice
is a violation of this section, if:

(a)

It is oppressive or other wise unconscionable in any respect~

or
(b) It fails to comply with [existing state consumer protection
statutes] the Federal Trade Commission Act, the ~Ed.era! Consumer Credit
Protection Act, or other Federal Consumer Protection statutes.
Conunent
This subsection makes "oppressive and unconscionable"
actions unfair and deceptive within this Article. It
also incorporates by reference existing Federal and
State laws for the protection of the consumer. These
in addition to the obvious would include laws regulating
weights and measures, quantity, labeling, quality of food
stuffs and the like.
Section 3.202,

RULES AND REGULATIONS

(1) It is the intent of the legislature that in construing Section
3.201 due consideration and great weight shall be given to the interpretations of the Federal Trade Commission and the Federal courts relating to
Section 5{a) (1) of the Federal Trade Cornnission Act (15 U.S.C. 45 (a) (1),
as from time to time amended.
(2) The [Administrator] may make rules and regulations interpreting
the provisions of Section 3.201 of this Act. Such rules and regulations
shall not be inconsistent with the rules, regulations and decisions of the
Federal Trade Commission and the federal courts in interpreting the provisions
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of Section 5(a) (1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15
as from time to time amended.
Section 3.203.

u.s.c.,

45(a) (1),

REMEDIES AND PENALTY

In addition to any other remedy provided by law, a consumer who has
been induced to participate in·a consumer transaction as a result of an act
or practice undertaken by a merchant in violation of the provisions on unlawful sales practices (Section 3.201) shall be entitled to a recovery from
the merchant in accordance with the provisions of Section 5.304.
Comment
Rather than allow the consumer trouble dama~es, a
remedy open to merchants under certain Federal
statutes, this Act would give a consumer adversely
affected by an unfair or deceptive practice the
maximum civil penalty allowed under Article 5. This
not only would deprive the offending merchant of his
profit, but would constitute a monetary penalty.

PART 3
WARRANTIES AND ADVERTISING
Section 3. 301.

DEFINITIONS:

"WARRANTY;" ''MERCHANTABLE"

(1) "Warranty 11 means express and implied warranties as defined in
[Sections 313, 314, and 315 of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code]
and expression or action of the merchant which assures or purports to assure
the consumer, directly or indirectly, that the goods have described qualities
or will perform in a described manner.
(2) ''Merchantable!' means, in addition to the qualitii;,.s prescribed in
[Section 314 of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code], that the goods
conform in all material respects to applicable State and Federal statutes
and regulations establishing standards of quality and safety of goods, and,
in the case of goods with mechanical, electrical or thermal compL"nents, are
in good working order and will operate prooerly in nonnal usage for a
reasonable period of time.
Comment
These definitions are intended to expand the warranty
obligations of a seller of merchandise. They incorporate
the definitions and concepts in the uniform commercial
code, but had additional concepts clarified the scope of
the undertakings of sellers. The definition of '1Merchantable'' now includes complit:nce with statutes designed to set
standards for products sold or furnished to consumers. This
could include the safety provisions for automobiles under
the Federal Act, standards of grading for meat and food stuffs,
useful life of products that are so dated, and the like.
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Section 3.302.

DISCLAIMER OF WARRANTIES AND REMEDIES
PROHIBITED.

Notwithstanding any other provisions of law, with respect to goods
which are the subject of or are intended to become the subject of a consumer transaction, no merchant shall~
(1) Exclude, modify or otherwise attempt to limit any warranty,
express or implied by law, including the warranties of merchantability
and fitness for particular purpose; or

Exclude, modify or attempt to limit any remedy provided by law,
including the measure of damages available, for a breach of warranty, express
or implied.
(2)

Comment
1. There are decisions of courts which hold that because implied
warranties are created by law, the partLs are not free to exclude
or modify them. Of course, Section 2-316 of the Uniform Connnercial
Code seems to hold othertn.se. Under this Section, a merchant may
not disclaim either express or implied warranties. Actually, this
changes the law only with respect to the implied warranty of merchantability, since a merchant need not make a warranty of fitness for
a particular purp(se or any express warranty. In short, he may
still disclaim or avoid those warranties simply by not making them.
Ho~~ver, if he does make them, then fie should abide by them,
2. Another provision often appearing in boiler plate forms is
one which limits the remedy a consumer has even for breech of an
express warranty. This Section prohibits any exclusion or modification of the remedies the consumer has at law. Nothing, of
course, prohibits a merchant from giving additional remedies, such
as replacement or repairs. These, however, may not displace
the other remedies. Already in a limitation of remedy for personal
injury is unconscionable under Section 2-718 of the Uniform Commercial Code, so this Section is not as radical as it may first
appear.
Section 3.303.

VIOLATIONS

A violation of the provisions of Section 3.302 shall be subject to the
provisions of Section 5.303.
Section 3.304.

BREACH OF WARRANTY:

PRIVITY ABOLISHED

Notwithstanding any provision of law, no action by a consumer for
breach of warranty or for negligence with respect to goods subject to a
consumer transaction shall fail because of a lack of PRIVITY between the
consumer and the defendant. An action against any person for breach of
warranty or for negligence with respect to ~oods subject to a consumer
transaction shall not of itself constitute a bar to the bringing of an
action against another person.
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Connnent
This Section is designed cleanly and succinctly to "topple
the citadel of privity" once and for all.
Section 3.305.

FALSE, MISLEADING OR DECEPTIVE ADVERTISING

No merchant shall advertise, print, display, publish, distribute or
broadcast or cause to be advertised, printed, displayed, published, distributed or broadcast, in any manner any statement or representation with
regard to the sale of goods or the extension of consumer credit inclttding
the rates, terms or conditions for the sale of such goods or the extension
of such credit, which is false, misleading, or deceptive, or which omits to
state material information that is necessary to make the statements therein
not false, misleading or deceptive.
Section 3.306.

REMEDIES AND PENALTY

In addition to any other remedy provided by law, a consumer who has
been induced to participate in a consumer transaction as a result of advertising in violation of Section 3.305 shall be entitled to a recovery from
the merchant in accordance with the provisions of Section 5.302.
Comment
Many states already have statutes similar to Section 3.305. Often
they are not as inclusive as this Section. Such provisions began
with the old "printer's ink" statutes. The definition of "merchant"
in Section 1.301 is broad enough to include not just the merchant
for whom the advertisement is prepared, but also the agency who is
responsible for violating the statute.
This Section does not and cannot replace the advertising restrictions of the Federal truth and lending Act. They are not
subject to exemption by State action. That Act and the provisions of Regulation Z are rather precise in the requirements
for advertising terms of consumer credit. A violation of the
Federal Act would now constitute a violation of this Section and
this Act as well.

ARTICLE 4
INSURANCE
PART I
INSURANCE IN GENERAL
Section 4.101.

SHORT TITLE

This Article shall be known and may be cited as National Consumer
Act -- Insurance.
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Section 4.102~

SCOPE; RELATION TO CREDIT INSURANCE ACT;
APPLICABILITY TO PARTIES

(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2), this Article applies to
insurance provided or to be provided in relation to a consumer credit
transaction.
(2) The provision on cancellation by a creditor (Section 4.304)
applies to loans the primary purpose of which is the financing or insurance.
[(3)

This Article repeals the Credit Insurance Act.J
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Unjust Enrichment, Quasi Contract, Contracts Implied tn Law 2
Constructive Contracts and the Like
·· Contract law is the law of promises and can, perhaps shouJ i,
be restricted to situations where the parties voluntarily assume an
obligation. Warranties, fraudulent misrepresentations and the lik~
are on the border: not promissory, but aktn to promises. Quasi co~tr~~ts
is something quite different and perhaps the most important fact to
remember in dealing with this a,.,ea of the law is that it has nothi n:·
to do with contract law •.•• or does it?
The material that immediately follows is the introduction
to a book entitled 11 Unjust Enrichment u by Professor ,Tohn Dawson. Af~ -;~~
Professor Dawson's materja} j s the fi r:=:t chanter of e1. muci: older ·,·:o·" r.
Quasi-Contract by Prof e:=-:sor WU.J L':lm Keenr:" whi r.h w:::is nubJJ shed in 1 J , •
The Keener work was the first attempt to organize and systemltize tl
area of the law.
This is a part of the law that i.s generally confusinp: tc
students, lawyers and even to law professors. Perhaps Professor
w:
puts his finger on the reason: we look for rules where we should i·e
concerned general guidelines.
UNJUST ENRICHMENT
John P. Dawson

Introduction
"A person who has been unjustly enriched at the
expense of another is required to make restitution
to that other."
"For this by nature is equitable, that no one be
made richer through another's loss."

HE FIRST of these two statements comprises
Section 1 of the American Law Institute Restatement of Restitution. The second comes from
Pomponius, in the second century A.D. Of the two
I prefer Pomponius. It is not merely that Pomponius is more elegant, for elegance is a minor virtue
in a lawyer. Nor is it that Pomponius' maxim has
had a long and immensely successful career. It is
rather that he combines elegance with exactness.
For his statement, both by the elements he includes
and the form in which it is drawn, requires no
warning to the reader that it is not intended to be
a "rule" but merely "a general guide for the con-

T
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duct of the courts." It is quite true that in the eighteen hundred years intervening there have been
many persons who have tried to make it a universal
rule, but Pomponius should not be blamed for that.
To any careful reader he expressed with great precision the relationship of his principle to any legal
system at any time or place.
The Restatement differs from Pomponius in omitting any reference to "nature" ( implying the law of
nature). This will hardly be considered a fault in
the Restatement. Whatever the views of its authors
may be, it is unlikely that the Institute Council
would have entered willingly into the ancient controversies on this subject and ascribed one of its
black-letter propositions to the law of nature. It is
only fair to Pomponius, however, to state that this
loaded word may not be his at all, and may have
come from some nameless Greek long after he was
dead.1 The attribution to "equity" is essential for
his analysis and seems authentic, not only as a reference that might have been made by a Roman lawyer in the second century A.D. but as a form of literary expression that is acceptable to us. For we have
in Pomponius' statement, more clearly than in the
Restatement, a general principle of justice, at a high
though not the highest level of abstraction. It expresses both an aspiration and a standard for judgment. It has been quoted through the centuries because the aspiration lies deep in human nature and
the standard is one we can use.
We can approach our general problem by invoking some rudimentary psychology. The statement of
Pomponius, like Section I of the Restatement, suggests an element of causation; it imp1ies

a type

of

enrichment that is caused ( and perhaps also measured) by another's loss. To the person who has suffered loss, the loss alone is a grievance. But if this
loss can be located and identified in the gain received by another, the anguish caused by the loss
will be felt as more than doubled. One can see this,
for example, in the system developed by Karl Marx,
who tapped an inexhaustible supply of resentment
with the aid of his labor theory of value. Marx made
181.

it appear that the gains received by economic
groups other than labor - particularly by owners
of land and other capital assets - were unjustified
by their contribution to the economic product and
in the long run were taken from labor. The impact
of the Marxian analysis can be in part attributed to
the skill and ingenuity with which this idea was exploited by him and by his followers. But the same
kind of argument can be used, with different premises, on other broad issues of social justice. When
we come to the narrower issues arising in disputes
between individuals, we often find it possible to
trace much more directly the connection between
losses incurred and gains received. \Vhere the connection can be shown, a similar response can be expected, without any overtones whatever of social or
economic reformism. The translation of Joss by one
individual into gain for another is felt as an aggravation, multiplying both factors in the equation.
When the problem is viewed more objectively, as
a problem of corrective justice, quite similar results
appear. No matter how great the observer's detachment, when the issue is raised in general terms it wiJl
appear incongruous that the legal order permits one
person or group to retain a measurable gain that is
the product of another's loss. This attitude has been
expressed in other legal systems by adopting a legal
technique which in certain large classes of transactions requires justification for retention of the gain.
Even in legal systems like ours that have adopted a
different technique, we find at least the attitude that
a claim asserting enrichment through another's loss
deserves special and more favorable treatment. The
sense of justice supports the conclusion drawn from
simple arithmetic, that a loss translated into an-

other's gain is much more impressive than the loss
would be alone. 2
Yet it is obvious that the adoption of this principle
as a "rule" of law would carry us far afield. By its
terms it might seem to require a review of every
transaction against an arithmetical standard. The
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equating of gains and losses could involve inquiries
into the effects of legal transactions not only on the
immediate parties but on third parties and persons
still further removed. The principle stated by Pomponius and the Restatement therefore moves in a
constantly changing perspective, like the planes in
a modern painting. In some aspects it does take on
the look of a "rule" of law, from which subsidiary
rules or even the solutions of particular cases can be
directly derived. But it is also a standard of judgment which cannot be applied universally in human affairs, and it expresses an aspiration that will
never be realized.
If there is a single problem of unjust enrichment
it arises from this constantly shifting perspective in
which our proposition must be viewed. I hope I am
one of the last to say that ideas walk on legs. Yet in
reviewing the long history and our modem applications of the unjust enrichment idea, one is sometimes tempted to think that this idea does. It would
be simplest of all if we could find the root of the difficulty in the deep-seated tendency of the human
mind to overgeneralize. From the record it appears
that a general principle prohibiting enrichment
through another's loss appears first as a convenient
explanation of specific results; it is an instrument for
quite practical and intelligible purposes. Yet once
the idea has been formulated as a generalization, it
has the peculiar faculty of inducing quite sober citizens to jump right off the dock. This temporary intoxication is seldom produced by other general ideas,
such as "equity," "good faith," or "justice," for these
ideals themselves suggest their own relativity and
the complexity of the factors that must enter into
judgment. The ideal of preventing enrichment
through another's loss has a strong appeal to the
sense of equal justice but it also has the delusive appearance of mathematical simplicity. It suggests not
merely the need for a remedy but a measure of recovery. It constantly tends to become a "rule," to
dictate solutions, to impose itself on the mind.
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LAW o:P QUASI-CONTRACTS.

William Keener

CHAPTER I.
NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE OBLIGATION.

IT is usual to di\·ide Contracts into three classes,1. Simple Contracts.
2. Contracts under Seal.
3. Contracts of Record.
Where this classification is made, Simple Contracts are
subdivided into 1. Express Contracts.
2. Contracts implied in Fact.
3. Contracts implied in Law.
In this classification of Contracts, obligations of a quasicontractual nature are treated either as Simple Contracts or
as Contracts of Record.
This treatment of Quasi-Contracts is, in I the opinion of the
writer, not only unscientific, and therefore theoretically
wrong, but is also destructive of clear thinking, and therefore vicious in practice.
It needs no argument to establish the proposition that it
is not scientific to treat as one and the same thing, an obligation that exists in every case because of the assent of the
defendant, and an obligation that not only does not depend
in any case upon his assent, but in many cases exists not-
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withstanding his dissent. And yet with this wide differencebetween simple contracts and quasi-contracts, the latter are
generally treated to-day as a species of simple contract.
Equally objectionable in principle, though perhaps not so
misleading in practice, is tb classification of such quasicontracts as cannot by any possibility be treated as simple
contracts, as contracts of record.
A true contract, whether it be a simple contract, a specialty, a contract in the nature of a specialty, or a contract
of record, exists as an obligation, because the contracting
party has willed, in circumstances to which the law attaches
the sanction of an obligation, that he shall be bound. Had
he not so willed, he would not be under a contractual obligation. This statement is as true of a contract implied in fact
as of an express contract. Indeed, the division of Simple
Contracts into " express contracts " and '' contracts implied
in fact" does not inrnhe a consideration of the principles of
contracts at all. 1
In the case of a contract implied in fact, as much as in the
case of an express contract, the plaintiff must prove that the
defendant either made or accepted an offer which resulted in
a promise on the defendant's part, and that the promise was
not only in fact made, but that a sufficient consideration was
giYen therefor. If the defendant gave in words a promise
containing all the terms of the contract which the plaintiff
claims that he made, for a consideration expressly requested
in words by him, in exchange therefor, then the contract is
an express contract. Thus, if A should say to B: "I will
promise to sell you my horse X for the sum of $500 in cash if
you will promise to purchase on these terms,'' and B should
so promise, an express contract would be created thereby.
Suppose, however, that A should write to a lfrery-keeper,
1 :Marzetti v. Williams, 1 B. &
Ad. 415; Montgomery u. Water
Works, 77 Ala. 248; Dusenbury v.
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simply requesting him to send a coupe to his house at a cer.
tain hour, and the coupe was sent and used by A., there would
certainly be no express contract, since A has never in words
said that he intended to assume any obligation in favor of B.
And yet A.'s conduct speaks quite as loudly as words, and
leaves no doubt of his intention to enter into a contract with
B for the use of the coupe. No one would question that A.
has communicated such an intention to B, and that he can be
fairly said to have promised to pay him for the '.lse of his
property, and that to allow A. to escape liability would defeat
the intention of the parties quite as much as to allow him
to refuse to be bound by his contract to sell the horse in the
case first supposed.
The difference between the cases is a difference simply in
the kind of the evidence used to establish the contract. In the
• 111
• terms use d , an d
one case tl1e 1anguage of cont rac t 1s
·because of th e expressions
·
• ca11 ed an
use d , th e con t rac t 1s
express contract; whereas in the other case the contract is
established by the conduct of the parties, viewed in the light
of surrounding circumstances, and is called a contract implied
in fact.
The terms, "express contracts " and " contracts implied in
fact," are used then to indicate, not a distinction in the principles of contract, but a difference in the character of the
evidence by which a simple contract is proved. The source
of the obligation in each case is the intention of the parties.
The term "contract implied in law" is used, however, to
denote, not the nature of the evidence by which the claim of
the plaintiff is to be established, but the source of the obligation itself. It is a term used to cover a class of obligations
where the law, though the defendant did not intend to assume
an obligation, imposes an obligation upon him, not,vithstanding the absence of intention on his part, and in many cases
in spite of his actual dissent.
The identity in principle of express contracts and contracts
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implied in fact, and the distinction between a genuine con·
tract, whether express or implied in fact, and a quasi-contract,
commonly called a contract implied in law, is thus stated by
Maine in his "Ancient Law" l :
"The part of Roman law which has had most extensive influence
on foreign subjects of inquiry has been the law of OLligation, or,
what comes nearly to the same thing, of Contract and Ddict. The
Romans themselves were not unaware of the offices which the
copious and malleable termmology belonging to this part of their
system might be made to disd1arge, and this is proved Ly tlwir
employment of the peculiar adjunct qnasi in such exvressions as
Quasi-Contract and Quasi-Delict. 'Quasi,' so used, is exclusively
a term of classification. It has been usual with English critics to
identify the quasi-contracts with implied contracts; but this is an
error, for implied contracts are true contracts, which quasi-contracts
are not. In implied contracts, acts and circmnl'tances are the
symbols of the same ingredients which are symbolized, in express
contracts, by words; and whether a man employs one set of symbols or the other must be a matter of indifference so far as concerns
the theory of agreement. But a quasi-contract is not a contract at
all. The commonest sample of the class is the relation subsisting
between two persons, one of whom has paid money to the other
through mistake. The law, consulting the interests of morality,
imposes an obligation on the receiver to refund; hut the very
nature of the transaction indicates that it is not a contract,
inasmuch as the com·ention, the most essential ingredient of contract, is wanting. This word 'quasi,' prefixed to a term of Roman
law, implies that the conception to which it serves as an index is
connected with the conception with which the comparison is instituted by a strong superficial analogy or resemblance. It docs w,t
denote that the two conceptions are the same, or that they belon;;
to the same genus. On the contrary, it negatin•s the notion of au
identity between them; but it points out that they are sufficiently
similar for one to be classed as the sequel to the other, and that
the phraseology taken from one department of law may be transferred to the other, and employed without violent straining, in
the statement 0£ rules which would otherwise be imperfectly
expressed."
1

3d Am. Ed. 8~2.
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:,; otwithstanding the existence and recognition of this
well-defined line of demarcation between genuine contracts, Confused use
whether express or implied, and quasi-contracts, there exists
the greatest confusion in the application thereof in practice. ~~~~!'~~~~.
Thus Blackstone confuses contracts implied in fact and quasicontracts, when he says : l _

!~tt~~:e of

"This contract or agreement may be either express or implied.
Express contracts are where the terms of the agreement are openly
uttere<l an<l avowe<l at the time of the making, as to <leliver an ox,
or ten load of timber, or to pay a stated price for certain goods.
Jmpl-ied, are such as reason and justice <lictate, an<l which, therefore, the law presumes that every man undertakes to perform. As
if I employ a person to <lo any business for me, or perform any
work; the law implies that I undertook, or contracted, to pay him
as much as his labor deserves. If I take up wares from a tradesman, without any agreement of price, the law concludes that I contracted to pay their real value."

While this definition of an implied contract is, at best, true
only of quasi-contracts, all the cases put are illustrations of
contracts implied in fact. Mr. Justice Lowrie, referring to
the language just quoted from Blackstone, properly says: 2
"There is some looseness of thought in supposing that reason
and justice ever dictate any contracts between parties, or impose
such upon them. All true contracts grow out of the intentions of
fhe parties to transactions, and are <lictate<l only by their mutual
anil accordant wills. '\Vhen this intention is expressed, we call the
contract an express one. '\Vhen it is not expressed, it may be
inferred, implied, or presume<l, from circumstances as really existing; and then the contract, thus ascertainc<l, is called an implied
one. The instances given by Blackstone are an illustration of
this.
"But it appears in another place, 3 Comm. 159-166, that Blackstone introduces this thought about reason and justice dictating
contracts, in or<ler to embrace, under this definition of an implied
1
I

2 Bl. Comm. 443.
Hertzog v. Hertzog, 29 Pa. St. 465, 467.
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contract, another large class of relations which involve no intention
to contract at all, though they may be treated as if they did.
Thus, whenever not our variant notions of reason and justice, Lut
the common sense and common justice of the country, and therefore the common law or statute law, impose upon any one a duty,
irrespective of contract, and allow it to be enforced by a contract
remedy, he calls this a case of implied contract. Thus out of torts
grows the duty of compensation, and in many cases the tort may be
waived, and the action brought in assumpsit.
"It is quite apparent, therefore, that radically different relations are classified under the same term; and this must often give
rise to indistinctness of thought. And this was not at all necessary; for we lrn\·e another well-authorized technical term exactly
adapted to the office of making the true distinction. The latter
class are merely constructive contracts, while the former are truly
implied ones. In one case, the contract is mere fiction, - a form
imposed in order to adapt the case to a gi yen remedy; in the other,
it is a fact legitimately inferred. In one, the intention is disregarded; in the other, it is ascertained and enforced. In one, the Juty
defines the contract; in the other, the contract defines the duty."

Yet the learned Justice, after so intelligently criticising
Blackstone, falls into the same confusion of statement when
he says, in the same opinion : 1 " The law ordinarily presumes or implies a contract whenever
this is necessary to account for other relations found to have existed
between the parties.
"Thus if a man is found to have done work for another, and
there appears no known relation between them that accounts for
such service, the law presumes a contract of hiring. But if a
man's house takes fire, the law does not presume or imply a cn11tract to pay his neighbors for their services in saving his property.
The common principles of human conduct mark self-interest as the
motive of action in the one case, and kindness in the other; anrl
therefore, by common custom, compensation is mutually counted on
in one case, and in the other not."

Plainly, in the case put by Mr. Justice Lowrie, the infer~ce of a contract is one of fact; and in another part of the
1

Hertzog

11.

Hertzog, 29 Pa. St. 465, 468.
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same opinion the learned Justice clearly regards the inference
as one of fact and not one of law, when he says : 1 " E,ery induction, inference, implication, or presumption in
reasoning of any kind, is a logical conclusion derived from and
demanded by certain data or ascertained circumstances. If such
circumstances demand the conclusion of a contract to account
for them, a contract is proved; if not, not. If we find, as ascertained circumstances, that a stranger has been in the employment
of auother, we immediately infer a contract of hiring, because the
principles of individuality and self-interest, common to human
nature, and therefore the customs of society, require the inference."

In the opinion of Lord Justice Lindley, it was the failure of
Lord Justice Brett to recognize the distinction in question,
which led him to doubt 2 that a lunatic was liable for necessaries furnished to him by one knowing of his lunacy. On
this point Lord Justice Brett expressed himself as follows:
" A question bas been flushed, if I may use the word, in this
case which it is not necessary to decide, namely, whether if a
person supplies necessaries to a lunatic, knowing of the lunacy at
the time, a contract on the part of the lunatic to pay for them can be
implied. I give no opinion upon that point. It has not been fully
argued to-day, and it appears to me to involve a very difficult point
of law, which I do not think has ever been settled by authority.
For my part I should doubt whether in favor of a person who
knows of the lunacy you can imply a contract to pay for a supply
of necessaries to a 1unatic."

In Rhodes v. Rhodes,3 Lord Justice Lindley, referring to
the doubt raised by Lord Justice Brett, said : " The question whether an implic,d obligation arises in favor of
a person who supplies a lunatic with necessaries is a question of
eaver, a doubt was expressed whether there is
law, and In re
any obligation on the part of the lunatic to repay. I confess I
cannot participate in that doubt. I think that that doubt has
arisen from the unfortunate terminology of our law, owing to which

,v

1
2
Hertzog v. Hertzog, 29 Pa. St.
In re Weaver, 21 Ch. D. 615,
465, 469.
620.
a 44 Ch. D. 94, 107.
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the expression 'implied contract' has been used to denote, nc t
only a genuine contract established by inference, but also an ohl1
gation which does not arise from any real contract, but which can
be enforced as if it had a contractual origin. Oliligati,rns of tin
class are called by civilians obliglitiones quasi ex contractu."

It was this confusion of ideas that caused the counsel in
Seem v. True 1 to contend that as an insane person was not
able to contract, the defendant was not liaule for ncccssaric s
furnished to her by one knowing her to be insane. The counsel's argument in that case was as follows : " The foundation principle of the entire law (,f co11tracts is, tliat
the parties mn~t ha,·e the capacity to contract, awl must actually
exercise their faculties by contracting. Here then' was 1 >
capacity, for there was but one mind; no coutract was made, and
no attempt was made to make one. The two vital facts, withou•
whi ch no contract, tacit or expreRs, can exi~t, - capacity and its
exercise, - arc wanting. ,vas there an implied contract ? What
does that term mean ? In thousands of cases, in the L,ioks, w ·
know just what it means. The parties have capacity to contract;
facts, circumstancei,,, few or many, clear or complicated, exist, which
lead the minds of the jurors to the conclusion that the minds of the
parties met. l\Iinds may meet by words, a.ct><, or hoth. The wnr<ls
even may negative such meeting; but 'acb; which speak lou<ler
thau words' may concllHle him who tlenies a tacit contract. A~irle
from Cllses where the capacity to contract is wanting, no instance
no\Y occurs to us iu which the implied contract camrnt be !:'uppmte,l
upon th ese principles, all(l the familiar doctriw,~ of wai\·cr m ,1
estoppel. . . . It is another fundamental principle that no one,
by voluntarily performing services for anoth,•r, can make that oth, r
his debtor. If these principles apply to caKeS where the contracting mind is wanting, tl1ey settle this ca,;e. "'e know it is !:lnmetimes said, in such a ca><e, 'the law will imply a contract.' What
does that mean ? As it seem~ to us, only this: tliat where !\., whu
has capacity to contract, furnishes B, who is totally destitute of
such capacity, what is proper for B to hM·e, the judges will tum
the bench into a broker's board, will substitute themselves for B,
make a contract where none existed, cause it to relate back to tho
1

53 N. H. 627.
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v.:,luntary acts of A, and then Eit in jutlgment upon and enforee
their own contract. It is a pen·ersion of language to call such a
..-riormance a contract of at .' kind. It is judicial usurpati< n.
1
J'h,- Cnustitntion gave the court no such power. The conrt ha, no
•. w'-'r to make contracts for peovle: it can 0111 rnter one wln ,_. d
1
1\:H might."

..

Tv this argument the court made the following conclusi \'P
:111:,;wer : l,;

.. ,r,:, regard it as " , 11 "' ttled b.) the ('as1•s , · r, ,] t , in lw
;,·i~ .,f etonn:;l'l, man :. of which l1a, ,, beeu ,· ,m ,111 uted •n, at

]. :.;..:,h L,r )Ir. Shirley for the tlcfendaat, that an iusane per., m, .Jll
n•aso11 by tlie
1,1: .. ;. or a person utterly Lereft of all sense and
,..:.! !,·11 stroke of accitle nt or disease, may be held liable, Ill
a~su1111·~it, for nece~sari i • fnrnish,,d to him in good t:Lith wl11l e in
tliat u11fortunate and helpless condition.
And the rea~on upon
,.. !1:,·:1 this re~ts are too broad, a:s well as too sensil,le and humane,
:.; l•l' tt\'l•rLornc by any deductions which a relined logic may make
ir,,111 th . . circumstances that in such cases there can Le no contract
• r pr•.llni~e in fact, 110 meeting of the minds of the parti<>s. The
ca,1:~ }'lit it on the ground of an implieJ contract; anJ h5 thi · is
1, .. t u1t·ant, as the defendant's counsel seems to suppose, an actual
l""li:raet, - that is, an actual meeting of the rni1uls of th,.• 1 rties,
.: •, aetn,tl mutual understanding, to be iuferre(l from language,
:,. ·,. and circumstances, by the jury, - bnt a contract and promi8e,
, ;•.i·l to he implied by the law, whl're, i11 point of fact, 1hnt> was no
c.-,n~ract. no mutual understanding, an.l so no promi,;e. The
,l.-i.. n,lant\ coun~el says it is m~urpation for the court to hold, as
IJla:t,•r of law, that there is a contract and a promise, when all
: lie (·Yi,lence iu the case shows that there was uot a contract, nor
,h<' H·ml,Jnnce of one. It is doubtless a legal fiction, 111ve11te<l
a:,d Usf>il for the sake of the remedy. U it was originally u~urpa!i.,n. certainly it has now become very inveterate, and firmly fixed
iu the l•ody of the law." 1

Xot only has this identification in classification, of quasicontracts with genuine contracts, led to a confusion of ideas,
1

Furtherillui,trationsofthiscon- found in the discussion of the scope
f'.1~io11 of ideas, which might be mul· of quasi-contract.
t1plied almost indefinitely, will be

•
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but it has also rendered the interpretation of written laws or
statutes exceedingly difficult where the word "contract" is
used; thus, for example, in Dusenbury v. Speir, 1 the legality
of an arrest turned upon the meaning to be giYen to the
phrase "contract express or implied," as used in a statute
regulating arrests in civil actions. The plaintiff had been
arrested in an action, corresponding to the common law
action, for money had and received, brought to recover money
which the plaintiff (the defendant in that action) had fraudulently obtained. The plaintiff was arrested on a warrant
issued on the theory that the action was that of contract,
express or implied, within the meaning oft.he statute. It was
held that his liability was in quasi-contract, and not in contract, and that as the phrase " contract express or implied "
was used in the statute with reference solely to genuine contracts, the arrest was illegal, and the judgment of the lower
court was reversed. And yet the court, whose judgment
was re,·ersed by the Court of Appeals, recognized as fully
as did the Court of Appeals that the obligation to return
the money was a quasi-contractual, and not a contractual,
obligation. 2
77 N. Y. 144.
Probably no clearer statement
of the distinction between a genuine contract and a quasi-contract
can be found than is contained in
the following statement, taken from
the opinion of Mr. Justice Danforth
in this case: " w·e cannot agree with the
learned judge in this construction
of the statute. On the contrary,
we think that the express contract
referred to in the statute is one
which has been entered into by the
parties, and upon which, if broken,
an action will lie for damages, or is
implied, when the intention of the
1

~
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parties, if not expressed in words,
may be gathered from their acts and
from surrounding circumstances ;
and in either case must be the result of the free and bo11a fide exercise of the will. producing the ag.'lregatio mentium, the joining together of
two minds, essential to a contract
at common law. There is a class of
cases where the law prescribes the
rights and liabilities of persons who
have not in reality entered into any
contract at all with one another, but
between whom circumstances have
arisen which make it just that one
should have a right, auJ tlrn other
should be subject to a liability, simi-
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In O'Brien ?". Young,1 the question in rnh·cd was the construction of the statute reducing the rate tif interest from
The statute contained a
5 ._. 1-en per cent tu six per cent.
clause excl'pting from its operations "any contract or obligation" made before the passage 0i the Act. It was contended
that a judgment obtained licfore the passage of the Act waR
exempted from its operations, and thrrt the judgment creditur
wa 5 • tberefore, entitled to seven per cent interl'st.
But the
cut;:·t rc,·ersed the judgment of the 10\rer court. holding that
the clause in question referred, not to quasi-contracts, hut to
::rnninc contracts only, a1Hl that, therefore, the jmlgment
creditor was entitled to only six per cent after the passage of
thl· ~'I.ct.
But in The Gutta Percha Shoe Co. i•. )fa.rnr, etc.,2 it was
li,J,l that although a judgment was uot a µ-rnuine contract,
_rd an attachment could issue in an action brought 011 a
foreign judgment under a section of the code of ci1·il proceJure, allowing an attachment against property, in all aetion
brPught for "Lrcach of contract, express or implied, other
thau a contract to marry." Yet the same euurt held, in Hemill;,:tun Paper Co. v. O'Dougherty,3 that an attadnncnt could
hr to the ri1:;hts and liabilities in
cenain case8 of express contract.
Ti,11,. if one man has ol,tained
mc,ncy from another through the
llledinm of oppression, imp0sitio11,
extortion. or deceit, or by the commission of a trespa,s, such mo11ey
rn;iy \.e recm·ered back, for the law
ir11plies a promise from the wrongdoPr to restore it to the rightful
01vner. although it is obvious that
is the very opposite of his intention.
Implied or constrnctive contracts of
this nature are similar to the constrncti,·e trusts of conrts of cqnity,
~'"! in fact are not contracts at all.
Anti :t somewhat similar ,listinction

is recognize,! in the C'ivil law, "·here
it is said: 'In contracts it is the
con.sent of thi, conlracling parties
which prod11ces the obligation; in
quasi-contrae1s Llwre is not any consent. The law alone. or 11atllrnl
equity, pro,luces the olilig-alion hy
rendering obligatory the fact from
,vhieh it results. Therefore these
fads arn called quasi-rontract.s, hecaus<', without. being contracts, they
pro,luce ohligatio11s in the same
manner as actnal contracts.'"
1 fl:i N. Y. 4:28.
2 108 :N'. Y. 27G.
a !JG X. Y. llCTG, affirming 3:2 Hun,
25,j,
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not issue under the same section of the code, in an action
brought to enforce a statutory liability created by the Legislature of New Y 01·k to pay the cost of an action.
The question naturally arises, why a clussification prnduc•
f
J
• ·
d t J 1'1
t
tl\'e n so 11111c 1 contus10n was erer a op cu.
1e arnnn:r o
I.
.
.
l
It
t · ti
·
l aw, I.uu.t
1c su )JS t an t,l\'e
.t 11s question 1s to )C. soug l , no m
Ill the law of remedies.

The Jaw or
remedies the
reason for the
classification
of
quasi-contracts
with contracts.

The only forms of action known to the common law were
actions of tort and contract. If the wrong complained of
would not sustain an action, either in contract or tort, ihcn
the plaintiff was without redress, unless the facts would support a bill in equity. 1
Although from time to time the judicial view of substanti,·e rights broadened under the lea,·cning effect of cquit_,- and
other considerations, the broadening process did not lead to
the creation of remedies sounding in neither contract nor
tort. The judges attempted, however, by means of fictions,
to adapt the old remedies to the new rights, with the result
usually following the attempt to put new wine into old
bottles. Thus, largely through the action of assumpsit, that
portion of the law of quasi-contract usually considered under
the head of simple contracts, was introduced into our law.
In the action of assumpsit, as the word assumpsit implies,
whether it be special or in<lebitatus ass11111psit, a promise
must always be allegcd, 2 and at one time it was an allegation
which had to be lJl'ovcd. 3 It was only natural, thcl'eforc,
that the courts in using a purely contructual remedy to give
relief in a class of cases possessing none of the elements of
contract, should have resorted to fictions to justify such a
course. This was done in the extension of assumpsit to
quasi-contract; and the insuperable difti(,ulty of proving a
promise where none existed was met b_r the statement that
1

I Spence, Eq. Jur. 243; \Voods

v. Ayres, 39 Mich. 345; Sceva v.

Chitty on Pleading, 301.
Ames, The History of Assumpsit, 2 Harv. Law H.ev. 64.
2

8

True, 53 :'\. H. 627.
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,. the law implied a promise." The statement that the law
imposes tlte obli:Jation would not ham met the difficulties of
the situation, since the action of assmnpsit presupposed the
existence of a promise. The fiction of a promise was adopted
then in this clasr; of caRes solely that the remedy of assump·
sit might be used to cover a class of cases where, in fact,
there was no promise.
It might be asked : Why did the court extend to this class of
obli!!ations the remedies peculiar to contracts rather than the
.... •
•
,
remedies
peculiar
to tort? 1, he right
conferred •m qnas1-.
' l1t, t 11e v10
· Iation
·
' I1 constitutes
·
contract, an d t I1e rig
o f wllie
a tort, undoubtedly possess this common characteristic, that the obligation is irnpoRed br operation of law, regardless of the consent of the defendant. Rut treating a tort
as the ,iolation of a right in rem, the obligations differ in
an important particular; for while to a,·oid committing a
tort, one need only forbear,1 to discharge the obligation
imposed by quasi.contract one must act.2 It is true that the
obligation imposed by a contract may he simply to forbear ;
but the obligation most generally assumed under a contract
requires one to act, and therefore contract rather than tort
would naturally suggest an analogy. Another consideration
would also suggest the analogy of contract rather than of
tort; not only in most cases where a quasi-contractual obligation is imposed has the defendant not acted in violatiou o[
a right in rl:'111, in consequence of which the law could
impose an obligation; but in many case8 he has either not
acted at all,-as, for example, where an absent husband, who
is ignorant of the death of his wife, is obliged to reimburse
one who has defrayed the expenses attendant upon her
burial, - or, if he has acted, has acted with the consent, and
perhaps the co.operation, of the plaintiff; as, for example,
I

Austin, Jurisprudence, Leet.
XIV.
2

IllustratiouH of this proposition

will be given in discussing the scope
of the obligation.

196.
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""here a defendant is obliged to refund money which he
has received from the plaintiff, both parties acting under a
misapprehension.
It remains to consider the scope of quasi-contract.
Sonrces of the
Quasi-contracts may be said in general to be founded,1quasi-contractual obligation.
1. Upon a record.
2. Upon a statutory, or official, or customary duty.
3. Upon the doctrine that no one shall be allowed to enrich
himself unjustly at the expense of another.
The obligation created by a judgment which, as Sir "William
A jurlgment is Anson lias said,2 is unfortunately styled in our law a cannot a contract,
,
tract of record, restmg, not upon the agreement of the parbut a quasicontract.
•
•
1
d
tics, but regardless thereof, 1s a quas1-contractua , an not a
contractual, obligation. 3 In Louisiana v. New Orleans,4 Mr.
Justice Field, delivering the opinion of the court, in support
of the decision that a judgment was not a contract within the
meaning of that word as used in the clause of the Constitution forbidding the enactment by a State of a law impairing
the obligation of a contract, said: " A judgment for damages, estimated in money, is sometimes
callerl by text-writers a specialty or contract of record, because it
establishes a legal obligation to pay the amount recovcrerl; and
by a fiction of law a promise to pay is implicrl where such legal
obligation exists. It is on the principle that an action e:,; contractn lies upon a judgment. But this fiction cannot convert a transaction wanting the consent of parties into one which necessarily
implies it."
Aa obligation
created ·by
statute is
quasi-contractual.

A statutory obligation which docs not rest upon the consent
of the parties, is clearly quasi-contractual in its uature.6 In
1 Ames, The History of Assumpsit, 2 Harv. Law Rev. 64.
2 Anson, Contracts, 6 ed. 7.
8
Biddleson v. Whyte!, 3 Burr.
1545; State of Louisiana v. New
Orleans, 109 U.S. 285; O'Brien v.
Young, 95 N. Y. 428.
4 109 u. s. 285.
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5

Steamship Co. it. Joliffe, 2 Wall.
450; Louisiana v. New Orleans, 109
U. S. 285; Inhabitants of Milford
v. Commonwealth, 144 Mass. 64;
Woods v. Ayres, 39 Mich. 345;
McCoun v. N" ew York Central &
Hartford R. R. Co., 50 N. Y. 176.
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Steamboat Co. v. Joliffe,1 Mr. Justice Field, in discussing the
nature of the claim for half-pilotage fees under a statute allowing such fees, where a pilot's services are offered and declined,
thus distinguishes between a contract liability and· a liability
imposed by statute : " The transaction in this latter case, between the pilot and the
master or owners, cannot be strictly termed a contract, but it is a
transaction to whicl1 the law attaches similar consequences; it is a
qua.~i-contract. The absence of assent on tlie part of the master or
(lwner of the vessel does not change the case. In that large class
of transactions designated in the law as implied contracts, the
assent or convention which is an essential ingredient of an actual
c@tract is often wantiug. . . .
'• The claim of the 1,laintiff below for half-pilotage fees resting
upon a transaction regarded by the law as a quasi-contract, there
is no just ground for the position that it fell with the repeal of the
statute under which the transaction was had."

In Inhabitants of Milford v. Commonwealth,2 the court, discussing the nature of the plaintiff's claim for the support of
a pauper under a statute imposing upon the Commonwealth
an obligation to reimburse the plaintiff for the expenses so
incurred, recognizes the distinction between a contract
liability and a liability imposed by statute, in the following
language : " The law regards the money as expended at the implied request
of the defendant, and a promise to pay the money is said to be
implied from the liability created by the statute. A contract may
he expressly made, or a contract may be inferred or implied when
it is found that there is an agreement of the parties and an inten·
tion to create a contract, although that intention has not been
expressed in terms of contract; in either case, there is an actual
contract. But a contract is sometimes said to be implied when
there is no intention to create a contract, and no agreement of
parties; but the law has imposed an obligation which is enforced
as if it were an obligation arising ex oontractu. In such a case
there is not a contract, and the obligation arises ex lege."
1

2 Wall. 450.

!I

2
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144 Mass. 64.
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Of a quasi-contractual nature, it is submitted, is the duty of
a carrier, founded upon the custom of the realm to receive
and to carry safely. That the liability in such cases arises,
not from contract, but from a duty, is clear. 1 While it is
true that the liability is ordinarily described as one in tort, it
is submitted that it has been so described because of the
usual classification of legal rights into contracts and torts, aud
that since the obligation imposed upon the carrier is to act,
the obligation is really quasi-contractual in its nature, and
not in the nature of a tort. If this be the proper classification of the duties imposed by law upon a carrier, it must necesearily be true of the common law liability of an innkeeper to
receive guests, or to keep their goods safely. 2 The obligation
in these cases seems analogous in principle to the obligation
imposed by the Austrian law upon one in possession under a
fidei comrniss in favor of his successor, as to the care of the
property. That liability is thus described by Lord Justice
Cotton in Batthyany v. Walford: a_
"It appears, as far as I understand the evidence, that the law of
Austria (I will omit Hungary, because the Hungarian law on this
heau is practically the same as that of Austria) is this: The tenant
in possession under a fidei commiss, both of real and personal estate,
is considered in possession in a different way from that in which a
tenant for life or a tenant i 11 tail in England stands. There are no
trustees, and if he loses any portion of the personal estate, which
apparently stands as regards the provision of the fidei conuniss
nearly in the same position as real estate, he must 1{1ake that loss
good. As regard~ the real estate, he is answerable, at the time
when lie surrenders, by death or otherwise, the possession of the
property in the .fidei com miss, for the deterioration of the estate
which has taken place since the time when he took possession. He
is considered as ha\·ing possession of the estate, not only for his
1 Anonymous, 12 Mod. 3; Marll Morgan 1,. Ravey, 6 H. & N.
shall v. York, N. & B. Railway Co., 265, 275.
11 C. B. 655; Austin v. Great
a 36 Ch. Div. 269, 278.
Western Railway Co., L. R. 2 Q. B.
442, 445.
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own benefit, but subject also to an obligation to hand it o,,er to his
successor in as good a conditioI.1. as when he took possession,· subject
onlv to this, that he can excuse himself if he shows that the
det;rioration took place without any fault ('culpa,' as it is called)
on his part. But, as I understand the evidence, the claim according to the law of Austria is not in the nature of damages for
default, but a claim under an obligation to keep the property in as
good condition as the late possessor found it, with liberty to excuse
himself from making good the deficiency if he can show that it was
not caused by any default of his own. That, in my opinion, is not
a claim simply depending on tort, and does not come within the
rule of actio personalis 1no1·itur cum persona. It may be that it is
a "rong which has produced the deterioration; but the claim, in
my opinion, is one depending on the implied contract or obligation
which, by the law of Austria, every possessor under a fidei commiss
takes upon himself when he enters into possession.
"It was contended that there could be no such liability of a
personal representative for anything connected with default, unless
there was an express contract. No authority was referred to in
support of that proposition, and in my opinion it is contrary to
English law. • . . It is not only where there is an express contract
that a suit grounded on iiome default of the person whose representative is sued can be maintained; but if the position of the
parties was such that the law of England would imply a contract
from that position, then on assumpsit the executor might still be
held liable. There are many cases where an action can be brought
upon an obligation implied by law in consequence of the position
which the parties have undertaken one to another."

Of this nature also, it is submitted, is the obligation of a
sheriff to levy execution and pay the proceeds thereof to a
judgment creditor. 1

Sheriff's oblip;ation is quasi.
contractual.

By far the most important and most numerous illustrations
of the scope of quasi-contract are found in those cases where Unjust enrichthe plaintiff's right to recover rests upon the doctrine that. r:~~~~tmost
a man shall not be allowed to enrich himself unjustly at the ~:~:~~ 0°! ~~~t1
expense of another.
ual obligation.
As the question to be determined is not the defendant's
1

Speake v. Richards, Hobart, 206; 3 Bl. Comm. 163.
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intention, but what in equity and good conscience the defendant ought to do, the liability, while enforced in the action of
assumpsit, is plainly of a quasi-contractual, and not contractual nature.
It is on the theory of quasi-contract, founded on the doctrine of unjust enrichment, that an insane man, known to be
insane by the party furnishing necessaries, is held liable therefor. That such is the nature of the liability is evident, not
only from the fact that he has no contracting mind, but also
from the fact that he is equally liable for necessaries furnished at a time when there was no attempt on his part to
contract.I
The nature of the obligation incurred by a lunatic for necessaries was thus stated by Lord Justice Cotton, in Rhodes v.
Rhodes: 2 "Now the term 'implied contract' is a most unfortunate ex.pression, because there cannot be a contract by a lunatic. But whenever necessaries are supplie,l to a person who by reason of disability
cannot himself contract, the law implies an obligation on the part
of such person to pay for 1<nch necessaries out of his own property.
It is asked, Can there be an implied contract by a person who cannot
himself contract in express terms ? The answer is, that what the
law implies on the part of such a person is an obligation, which has
been improperly termed a contract, to repay money spent in rnpplying necessaries."

The liability of
an infant for
necessaries is

~::~:e-

Of a quasi-contractual nature also, is the obligation of an
infant to pay for necessaries. It is usually stated that an
. f
. b oun d by lus
. contract f or necessanes.
.
m
an t· IS
But if, as is
held in many jurisdictions, the infant is bound to pay for
necessaries, not the contract price, but the reasonable value
thereof, it would seem clear that he is not liable on hiR contract. By the terms of his contract he is required to pay a
stated sum, and not the reasonable value for necessaries fur1 In re Rhodes, 44 Ch. D. 94
(semble); S:i~er v. Lufkin, 56 l\Ie.

f'iir( •>
y ·_~;;·

308; Sceva v. True, 53 N. H.
627.
2 44 Ch. D. 94, 105.
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nisbed. If he is bound by his contract to pay for necessaries,
then of course he should he Jiahlc in damages for having, in
violation of his contract, refused to pay therefor ; and if liable
in damages, the amount of the plaintiff's recovery would be
determined, not by the reasonable value of the necessaries,
but by the price agreed upon, - since had the infant performed his contract, the plaintiff would have recei,cd that
amount of money. When, therefore, the infant is required to
pay, not the stated price, but simply the reasonahle value of
the necessaries, the obligation differs from that which he
assumed ; and though the result reached, as to the amount
of the recovery, by a plaintiff in any given case, may he the
same as would ha\·e been reached had the reco,·ery been had
011 the theory of the plaintiff's being entitled to the price
agreed upon, yet such a result is purely accidental. The doctrine, thercfore,1 that while the payee of a note given by an
infant for necessaries can recover on the note, he can recover,
not the amount thereof, but simply the reasonable value of
the necessaries, must be regarded as an anomaly in procedure.
In no other way can the result actually reached in some jurisdictions 2 - that while the payee of the note can recover in
the action on a note the value of necessaries furnished, an
indorsec thereof has no right of action - be explained.
That the liability is really in quasi-contract seems to be
recognized in the jurisdiction which has furnished the leading authority a for the proposition that the payee, while not
allowed to recover the amount of the note, can, in an action
brought on the note, recover the value of the necessaries. In
Trainer v. Trnmbull,4 where the court held an infant liahle
for necessaries furnished in the absence of contract, Allen, J.,
delivering the opinion of the court, said : " The practical question in this case is, whether the food, clothing, etc., furnished to the defendant were necessaries for which he
1

1 Daniel Neg. Inst., 4th ed.,

§ 226.
2

Ibid.
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Earle v. Reed, 10 Met. 387.
• 141 Mass. 527, 530.
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should be held responsible . . . . The question whether or not the
infant made an express promise to pay, is not important. He
is held on a promise implied by law, and not, strictly speaking,
on his actual promise. The law implies the promise to pay, from
the necessity of his situation; just as in the case of a lunatic.
(1 Uhit. Con. 11th Am. ed. 197; Hyman v. Cain, 3 Jones (X. C.),
11 ; Richardson v. Strong, 13 Ired. lOG; Gay ~·. Ballou, 4 "\Ve11<l.
403; Epperson v. :Xugent, 57 :'.\Iiss. 45, 47.) In other words, he
is liable to pay only what the necessaries werP reasonably worth,
and not what he may improvidently have agreed to pay for them.
If he has made an express promise to pay, or has given a note in
payment for necessaries, the real value will be inquired into, and
he will be held only for that amount."

The liability of
a husband for
uecessaries is

:1r':1~;t~;i_n-

Such also, it is submitted, is the nature of the liability of a
husband for necessaries fumished a wife whom he has
.
wrongfully refused to support, where the circumstances do
not justify the party supplying the necessaries in supposing
that the husband in fact authorized the wife to pledge his
credit. In such cases it is settled that one furnishing necessaries can recover against the husband therefor, notwithstanding his knowledge at the time he furnished them that the husband did not intend to pay therefor. It is usually stated that
the wife, in snch circumstances, is authorized to pledge the
credit of the husband. Since, however, the husband may be
liable for necessaries furnished even though the wife made no
attempt to pledge his credit, - as, for example, for necessaries furnished a deserted wife while she is nnconscioi.:.s ;
and since, furthermore, the husband is held liable for necessaries fumishcd a wife while he is incapable of contracting,
- as where necessaries are furnished a wife while the h111,band is insane, 1 - the better form of statement would seem
to be that an obligation is imposed by law upon the lrnsband to pay for necessaries furnished in such circumstances.
That such is the nature of the liability was recognized in
Cunningham v. Reardon,2 where Hoar, J., delivering the opin1

Read v. Legard, 6 Ex. 6:36.

203.

2

98 Mass. 538.
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ion holding the husband liable for necessaries furnished a
wife, said: " The husband, who by his cruelty, compels his wife to leave him,
is considered by the law as giving her thereby a credit to procure
necessaries on his account; and is responsible to any person who
lllav furnish her with them. This responsibility extends not only
tc, ;upplies furnished her while living, but to decent burial when
dead. Its origin is not merely and strictly from the law making
her his agent to procure the articles of which she stands in need.
If it '\Vere so, the consequence would follow for which the defendant
coutends, that the agency would end with the life of the agent.
But it is rather an authority to do for him what law and duty
require him .to do, and which he neglects or refuses to do for
himself; ,and it is applicable as well to supplies furnished to the
wife when she is sick, insensible, or insane, and to the care
of her
1
lifeless remains, as to contracts expressly made by her."

On this ground
ofe.
. must
.
.also be put the l obligation off a father, Liability
father for
where such ob 1gat10n 1s imposed by aw, to pay or neces- nece~saries
l
saries furnished a child whom he has refused to support.2
That the right to recover money paid under mistake rests
upon a quasi-contractual obligation is a self-evident proposi- Quasi-contract
tion, when it is remembered that in the typical cases where
0
money is recovered as paid under mistake, the mind of the ;~i'ri°~ 1J;;tY
plaintiff as well as the mind of the defendant was directed, mistake.

~:::~·e-

~i;!~i~:~;be

not to the creation of, but the discharge of an obligation.a
The theory of holding a hus- sent afterwards, he is liable to this
1
uand liable in quasi-contract to pre- Debt, and the Count shall ue of a
,ent au unjust enrichment, where Receipt by the Hands of the Husthe facts will not warrant the infer- Land. Such manner of Count will
enee of a contract, is of very early serve in Debt in this Case. The
origin in our law. An illustration Reason is, the Wife's Contract is
of this is found in ease V. of Jen-· void; and it ought not to be alleged
kins' Century Cases, p. 4, reported in the Count, but the Count ought to
as follows: be as above. N emo debet locupletari
"The Wife of A. receives £10 to ex alterius incommodo."
2
the Use of A. and this comes to the
Gilley v. Gilley, 79 Me, 292;
Use of her Husband in a. convenient Cromwell v. Benjamin, 41 Barb.
or necessary Way; altho' the Hus- 558.
baud did not command it. nor eona See infra, Ch, II. p. 26, passim,
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That quasi-contract is the basis of liability where a plain,
tiff is allowed to sue a tort-feasor in assumpsit is equally clear,
since it is the want of assent on the part of the plaintiff that
renders the defendant's act tortious. It is idle to speak of
the possibility of contract where there is not even the suggestion of a meeting of minds. For example: A takes B's horse,
believing him to be his own, and sells it. B can reem·er from
A, in a count for money had and receh·ed, the proceeds of the
sale. To speak of a contract in such a case is simply to
attempt to deceive oners self by a form of words.1
Quasi-contractual, of necessity, is the nature of the obligation of the defendant, where a liability exists to compensate
the plaintiff for benefits received under a contract which the
plaintiff cannot enforce because he has failed to comply with
·
the conditions thereof.2
When it is for any reason conceded- e.g. illegality, the statute of frauds, impossibility of performance - that a defendant
is not liable to a plaintiff for a failure to perform a contract
made with the plaintiff, and yet it is held that he is liable in
assumpsit, or other contractual remedy, for benefits conferred
by the plaintiff under the contract, such liability is necessarily quasi-contractual, and rests on the doctrine of unjust
enrichment.a
Of this character also is the liability of a defendant for
benefits receiYed, which, though requested by him, were not
conferred under a contract, because of some misunderstanding
of the parties, or other reason, preventing the creation of a
contract.4
Where the benefit for which the plaintiff seeks a recovery
was conferred without the assent of the defendant, there can,
of course, be no contract, and unless the facts would establish
a liability in tort, the plaintiff must proceed on the theory of
quasi-contract. 6
See infra, Ch. Ill. p. 159, passim. ' See infra, Cb. VI. p. 315, passim.
See infra, Ch. IV. p. 214, passim. 5 See infra, Ch. VII. p. 341, passim.
a See infra, Ch. V. p. 267, passim. and Ch. VIII. p. 363, passim.
1

2
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Where one is compelled to indemnify, or contribute to the
e:xpenses of one with whom he has not consciously entered Indemnitf
. h'
.h h
l l
. I
and contribuinto any re1at10ns 1p, or wit w om 1e 1as not conscious y or tiou.
voluntarily had any dealing, the elements of a contract are
necessarily wanting, and the basis of the liability is that in
equity and good conscience he should either assume or share
a burden which was borne by the plaintiff.I
Where money is paid to another, who demands it as his
right, or as a condition of allowing the plaintiff to exercise Recovery of
,
't
11 be, an d 1s
• m
. many mstances,
.
lieId t l1at t l1e moneypald
a right,
1 may we
u_nder compul
mouey so paid can be recovered ; 2 but to speak of an implied sion.
contract in such a case is idle, if anything more is meant than
that the obligation is imposed by law, and is therefore a quasicontmct. The statement shows the absence of assent on the
part of the defendant, and therefore the absence of a contract.
1
I

See infra, Ch. IX. p. 388, passim.
See infra, Ch. X. p. 411, passim, and Ch. XI. p. 426, passim.
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A cnse quite nppllcahlc to the fnds here
Involved arose ln l•'ogc: v. Athenenm, H N.
II. 115, 82 Am. Dec. J!)l. Thrre the InrleJlendcnt Dcmocrnt new!'pnpcr wns forwnr,IP<l
weekly by mnll to the derendnnt from Mn:Y
1, 1847, to May 1, 18-IO, when a bill wns pre- ·
sented, which defendant objected to paying
on the ground of not bn vlng snbscrihed.
Pnyment waR, however. flnnlly mnde, anc) di·
rectlons given to dlscont.lnne. The pnper
changed ownerf!hlp, nnd the order to stop It
wn11 not known to I.ho new prorrletor11 tor II
:,enr; but, 11fter boln,c notlfled of the order,
t hPY nevcrthelc!'s continued to Rcn<l It to ,te- ]
fr111lnnt until lSGO, a period of 11 ycnrs, and
il<•fl't11lnnt contlnun,1 to reeel,·e It through the ,
pol't ofllce. Pnymcut wns several times de· '
m:11Hlr1l 1lnrlng this time, hut ref1rne1l on the
i:rm1ml thnt there wnR no i;nh,-rrlptlon. The
court r;nld thnt: "During this period of time
the !lefenr]nntR were occrif'lonnlly rcqnestcd,
by the plnlntlff's ngcnt, to pny their hill.
'fhe nmm·rr wM, by tho ,Jefendnnts, 'We arc
uot subscribers to your newspaper.' But tile
C\'ldcuce is the defendn nts used or kept the
J)lalntlff's • • • uewspnpcr1<, and ne,·er
olfrred to returu n numher, ns they rcusonnhly might hnvc douc; If they would hn,•e
nvolrlc<l the llnblllty to pny for them. Nor
,lid they ever decline to tnkc the newspnpers
from the post ofllcc." The llcfcndnnt was
heM to hn,·c accepted the pnpers, and to
ham bceomc llahle for the subscription price
by Implication of lnw.
In Wnrd "· Powell, ,3 IInr. (Del.) 379, It
wns ilcchled thn t nn Implied agreement to
JIOY for n ucw1<11apcr or perlodlcnl nrose hy
thr cm1tlmrnd tnklng- nnu ncccptlng the pn·
per from the post ofllce, nml thnt "If 11 party,
without subscrlhlng to a pnper, declines tJtklng !t out of 1he post office, he cnnnot become llnble to pny for it; nnd a subscriber
rnny c!'ase to be sncll nt the end of the ycnr,
by refusing to tnke the papers from the post
office, nnd rctuminir them to the editor n;;
notice of such determination." In Goodland
v. l.e Clair, 78 Wis. 170, 47 N. W. 268, Jt wns
held that lf a person receives n pnpcr from
the post office for a yenr, without refusing
or ret11rnlng Jt, he wns liable for the year's
Hnbseriptlon. And a like ohllgation was he.Id
to nrlse In the cnse of Weatherby v. DonImm. !'i C. & r. 228.
. ._
The prepnrntlon nnd publlcntlon of a newspaper lm·olves much mental and physical In·
hnr, as well ns nn outlay of money. One
who ncccptl'1 the paper, by continuously taJ,.
Ing It from the post office, receives a benefit
nnd plcnsurc nrli:.lng from such lnbor and
exrcmllturc ns fnlly ns If he hnd approprlntr<l any other proilnct of nnothcr's labor, and
hr snch net he must ho helll liable tor the
i;uhs,'l'lptlon price. On the defendant's own
c1·l,Jc11ee, plnlntll'f f':hould hnve recovered.
The judgment wlll thercrore· he reversed,
nnd the cause remnn<lcd. All concur.

AUS.'.:L'IN v. BURGE.
(Kansas City Court of Appeals.
J\fny 15, 1911.)

Missouri.

156 Mo. App. 286, 137 S.W. 618

F.LLT!";ON, J. Thi:- nrl.lon wn~ 1,mn•,lit •lll
nn ncrotmt for the snh"'crlpt.lon prk1: or II
ncwspnpcr. The jml:::mcnt 111 the trlnl conrt
,w1s for the dcfemlnnt. It np11r:irA 111•!1
plnlntlfl' wns publisher of n ncwi-pnprr In
nntler, J\fo., nnd that defemlant'fl fntlH'r-ln·
law snhscrlhed for the pnper, to be sent to
defendant for two years, 11nrl thnt the fathrrln·lnw pnld for it for that time. It wns tlwn
contlnne(l to be sent to ,1crcnilant. thron,:h
the mall, for 111e,·ernl years mnre. On two 1wcn1,fons defcmrlnnt paid n hill rirr~entc<I for
· the suhi;crlr1t1011 price, but cn<'lt lime 1llrcet.e1l 1t to be stopped. I'lnlnllff !lmile" thP. order to Atop, hut for tl1e pm·poi,,e or tlw <'ll~e
we shnll aRsume thnt !lefe111ln nt Is rorrect.
Ile te11t lflc1l tlin t, notwlth,it.nmllng the or·
rlPr to 11top It, It wnR contlmrnrl to he ~ent to
him, nn<l he contlnnM to receive nnd rcn,1 It,
until flnnlly he remm·c1l to 1111other Rtnte.
1
\Ye hnYe not been cltr<l to n cnse In th!~
' stitte lnvolvlng the llnhlllty of n perimn l\'ho.
i t honf.!'h not hnvlng snhserlhcrl tor n ncwq.
pnpct, continue.'! to nccept It by recehlng It
through the mnll. '£here nrc, howeYer, certn 111 wPll·nmlcrRtoorl prlndplcfl In the lnw
of contracts tbnt ought to solve the qnrl'lt.lon.
It Is certain thnt one <'nnnot he force<l Into
rnntrnctnnl relntlom1 with nnother 111111 thnt
therefore he cannot, ngnlnst his will. b~
m::tde the debtor of a ncwspnper puhllshrr.
Dnt lt ls equnlly certain that be rnny mil~(\
contrnchtal rclntlons to nrl~ hy nerc",nry
Implication from his eonrtuct. The lnw In
rr~pect to contrnctnal lnrfohterlncf's for n
newspaper Is not. different from thnt relating
to other things which have not been m:ulr.
the subject of n.n express ngreemcnt. Tl111~
one rnn.y not have ordered supplies for hi~
table, or other bousehol<l necess:lties, yet If
he continue to receive nnd use t11em, uncler
circumstances where be bad no right to suppose they were a gratuity, he will be hel!l to
have agreed. by Jmpllcntlon, to pny thrlr
value. · In this cnse defendnnt n<lmlts thnt.
notwithstanding he ordered tbe paper dlscontinne<l at the time when be paid n hl11
for It, yet plnlntlfl: continued to send It, nml
he continued to take it fl'om the post office to
bls home. This ,vas an ncccptnnce nml n~e
of the property, and, there heln;:: no preten~e
'tlmt n irrntnlty was Intended, nn ohlh:;atlr,11
arose to pny for It.
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Did the objective acts of Burge evidence a promise to
pay for the newspapers? What should you do if you receive merchandise
that you didn't order? Must you return it? Can you use it? This
may not be a significant Problem, but it can be an annoyance. Such
selling techniques as those employed by the Book of the Month Club ari
similar, but of course you do agree to purchase the current selection
if you fail to return the notice they send you.
Section 392 of the New York General Business Law has the
following provision. Delaware has a similar statute. What do you
think of them? The Federal Trade Commission released an opinion on
June 25, 1938 stating that unsolicited goods need not be paid for.
Were t':_(3Y correct?
.2. No person, fi~m, parti:iership, association or corporation, or ag-ent
-01 employee thereof, 8hall, m. any mamrnr, or hy any means, offrr for
sale goods_, _wares or _merd~:mrhse, where the offer inelndes the ,·oluntarv
and unsohc1ted sendrng of goods, wares or merchandise not adnallv ff;dere_d or requested by the recipient either oralh- or in writirw • Tl
.J
ie
rece1p t o f any sue JI unso 1·1e1· ted _g?ods,' "'.ares or merch:rndise
shall,..,.for all
puri:oses be deemed an_ nnrondrhonal gift to the recipient who mav use
or d!spose of the same m any manner he sees fit without am· ob!i,;, t·
-0n his part to the sender.
•
,...,,1 ion
As amended L.l!J68, c. 428, eff. Sept. ] , 1968.

VICKERY v. RITCHIE
S11pffnw J11dici~I Cn11rt nf .\fa«,1ch11srtts
2r12 :\Lis,. 2~7. 88 :\'.E. 8:Li. 2fi L.R .. \. n.,. 1 Sfn (1909·
KNOWLTON, C.J.
This i,- an action to rrcoW'r a balance of
$10,467.)6, alleged to be due the plaintiff as a contractor, for the
cons.truct1on of a Turki"h bath house on land of the drfrncbnt. The
partH:5 signed duplicate contracts in ,vriting, c-m·erin_g the work. At
the time when the plaintiff signed both copies of the crmtract the
defcndan(s signature was attached, and the contract prirc therein
n~med was $33, 721. \\!hen the defendant ,igned them the rontract
pnce s:at~d in each was $23,200. Cntil the lmilding wa~ completed
the plam_t1ff held a contract under which hr ,vas to recri,r the larger
sun:i, while the defendant held a contrart for the same work, under
which he was to pa, rmly the smaller sum. This resulted from the
fraud of the architect who drew the contracts. and did all the business and made all the pan11ents for the defrnd:mt. The contracts were
o~ typewritten sheets, and it i.s supposed that the architert accompli~hed the fraud b,_- ·~zinging the she,ts on ,vhir:h the price was
wntten, before the .signrng by the plaintiff. and bdore the deliven·
to_ the defendant. __ The pa~tie, did not di.scovcr the discrepancy be·t\\een the two wntmgs imtd after the building was suhstantiallv completed. Each of them _acted h,mestly and in gnod faith, trn,ti~g the
statements of the architect. The architect \\·,1.s indicted. but he left
the Commonwt>alth and e,raped puni,hrnent.
-

T~e auditor found that the market ,·,due of tht' bhor and materials
furmshed _h~ the plaintiff. not including the rirstomary charge for
the supernsion of the "ork, was ST3 ..J.0~l.3(), and that their total r:ost
"" Dal!H' ,-. ,r,.,,,1_ 7.i ).'_II_ :rn. 711 .\. ]fill)
j<i()f1 .
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to the plaintiff was $32,950.96. He found that the land and building
have cost the defendant much more than their market value. The
findings indicate that it was bad judgment on the part of the defendant to build such a structure upon the lot, and that the increase
in the market value of the real estate, hy reason of that which the
plaintiff put upon it, is only $22,000. The failure of the parties to
discover the difference between their copies of the contract was caused
hy the frequently repeated fraudulent representations of the architect
to each of them.
The plaintiff and the defendant were mistaken in supposing that
they had made a binding contract for the construction of this building. Their minds never met in any agreement about the price. The
labor and materials were furnished at the defendant's request and
for the defendant's benefit. From this alone the law would imply a
contract or. the part of the defendant to pay for them. The fact that
the parties supposed the price was fixed by a contract, when in fact
there was no contract, does not prevent this implication, but leaves
it as a natural result of their relations. Both parties understood and
agreed that the work should be paid for, and both parties thought
that they had agreed upon the price. Their mutual mistake in this
particular left them with no express contract hy which their rights
and liabilities could he determined. The law implies an obligation to
pay for what has been done and furnished under such circumstances,
and the defendant, upon whose property the work was done, has no
right to say that it is not to he paid for. The doctrine is not applicable to work upon real estate alone. The rule would be the same
if the work and materials were used in the repair of a carriage, or
of any other article of personal property, under a supposed contract
with the owner, if, through a mutual mistake as to the supposed agreement upon the price, the contract became unenforceable.
This rule, that labor and materials furnished for a person at his
request are to be paid for, prevails unless there is something in the
circumstances or in the relations of the parties to rebut the ordinary
presumption, as when the parties are hmband and wife, or parent
and child, living tog;ether in the same family, or when there is something else to indicate that the sen-ice is gratuitous. In a case like
the present, when the understanding and agreement is that payment
shall be made, it would be absurd to sa\ that nothing should he paid
because of a failure, through a misunderstanding, fully to agree.
The principle has often been applied \vhen the ground for an implication of an agreement to pav W'.lS much 1e~~ strong than in the
present case. In Butterfield v. Byron, 153 ~fa.~s. 517, 27 N.E. fi67,
12 LR.A. 571, 25 :\m. St. Rep. fi54, \\'here the owner was to do a
part of the work in the erection of a building, and a nmtractor was
to do the rest under an express contract for :i.11 agreed price, it was
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held that, when the building was dr~troyed by lightning, so that the
contract became impossible of performance, the contractor might
recover, on a quantum meruit the fair value of the labor and materials that he had furnished. This was on the ground that, when the
contract came to an end without the fault of either party, there was
an implication that what was furnished was to be paid for, and if it
could not be paid for under the contract it should be paid for on a
quantum meruit. The same thing had been held previously in Cleary
v. Sohier, 120 Mass. 210. As was pointed out in Butterfield v. Byron,
at page 524 of 153 Mass., page 667 of 27 N.E. (12 L.R.A. 571, 25
Am. St. Rep. 654), the rule is analogous in principle to the right to
recover on a quantum meruit for that which has been paid or furnished under an express contract, when there is a failure of the consideration. In the present case the labor and materials were furnished
for a consideration supposed by both parties to exist in the form of
an agreement by the defendant to pay a stipulated sum. Through
the mistake of both parties there was no agreement, and that which
was thought to be a valuable consideration failed. What was furnished to the defendant, in accordance with an agreement of both
parties on the faith of this supposed consideration, must be paid for
when the supposed consideration fails. The principle was applied and
restated in Angus v. Scully, 176 Mass. 357, 57 N.E. 674, 49 L.R.A.
562, 79 Am. St. Rep. 318. The rule was said to be "that where one
is to make repairs or do any other work on the house of another,
under a special contract, and his contract becomes impossible of
performance on account of the destruction of the house, without any
fault on his part, then he may recover for what he has done." In
Butterfield v. Byron it was said that under such circumstances "there
is an implied assumpsit for what has properly been done by either of
them, the law dealing with it as done at the request of the other, and
creating a liability to pay for its value, to be determined by the price
stipulated in the contract, or in some other way if the contract price
cannot be made applicable." To the same effect is the decision in
Young v. Chicopee, 186 Mass. 518, 72 N.E. 63. The fundamental
principle was stated in Hebert v. Dewey, 191 Mass. 403-411, 77 N .E.
822, in this language: "It is a general rule that if an implied condition
that fails is of the essence of the contract, and enters largely into the
consideration, in such a way that there can be no substantial performance under the conditions, the whole contract will fail, and the
parties may have reasonable compensation for what they have done
in reliance upon it." In the present case the supposed agreement to
pay for the plaintiff's work and materials was of the essence of the
contract, and its only consideration. This failed, and with it the
whole contract fell to the ground, and the parties may have reasonable compensation for what they have done in reliance upon it . . . .
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If the ia'w implies an agreement to pay, how much is to be paid?
There is but one ans,ver. The fair value of that which was furnished. No other rule can be applied. Under certain conditions the
price fixed by the contract might control in such cases. In this case
there was no price fixed.
The defendant contends that because the erection of a Turkish
hath house on Carver Street was not a profitable inwstment, and
therefore, through a seeming error of judgment on the part of the
defendant, the building did not add to the value of the land so much
by a large sum as it cost, the plaintiff must suffer the consequences
of the defendant's mistake and be precluded from recovery.
It is suggested that Gillis v. Cobe, 177 Mass. 590, 59 N.E. 455,
allows recovery only in reference to the pecuniarv benefit derived by
the owner from the change in the character of his real estate produced
by the contractor, so that if, through his own bad judgment, the
increase in the value of the property from the comtruction of the
building is, as in this case, $10,000 to $15,000 less than the cost of
the building to the contractor, the loss must fall upon the contractor
if he seeks to recover under the rule stated in Hayward v. Leonard,
7 Pick. 181, 19 Am. Dec. 268. [This is an early case ( 182 8) granting
recovery in quasi-contract to a builder who had completed the building but breached the contract by departing from specifications.] The
decision in Gillis v. Cobe was by four justices of the court, while
three others of the justices thought that a part of the statement of law
in the opinion resulted from a misunderstanding of the meaning and
effect of previous decisions of this court. If, in a suit founded on the
law laid down in Hayward v. Leonard, the decision in Gillis v. Cabe
can be construed as largely diminishing the amount which the contractor would otherwise be entitled to recover for the erection of a
building like that in the present case, it is to be noticed that this is
the only decision in this Commonwealth in which there has seemed
to be any practical difference between the vie,•.:s stated in the opinions
in the case, in their application to the facts before the court, and
the only one in which the court has had occasion to consider the
subject. The evidence did not present for consideration the effect of
unwise management by the owner upon a contractor's right to recover. It is also to be noticed that nowhere, so far as we have been
able to discoyer, does the law, as applied to such c;ises in other
jurisdictions, make the right of the contractor depend in any degree
upon the profit or loss to the owner, arising from his wisdom or folly.
or good fortune or bad fortune, in erecting the building upon his land.
Whaterer view may be taken of the law stated in tlrnt decision, it
has no application to the case at bar. In cases of that class the work
is done under an express contract which is binding upon both parties
to the day of the trial. If the contractor ha~ trit'd in good faith to
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perform his contract, and has performed it substantially, the courts
hold that it would be unjust for the owner to stand upon the contract
and refuse to pay anything because of the contractor's failure to
perform it fully. It is therefore held that, on equitable grounds, he
must pay under a rule which will give him all equitable rights
secured by the contract, whether in regard to damages for non-performance or the rate of payment prescribed. If the plaintiff's work
and materials had been furnished under a binding contract which
had been substantially but not perfectly performed, we should be
obliged to determine whether, under the law so often stated in Massachusetts, he could be precluded from recovery by reason of the mistake or misfortune of this defendant in the management of his
property. No such question arises on the facts now before us. In
this case there was no express contract. The plaintiff's right is to
recover upon an implied contract of an owner to pay for labor and
materials used upon his property at his request. Whatever may be
the reason or the measure of the right of recovery in cases like Hayward v. Leonard, in cases of the class to which the present one
belongs the right does not depend upon the ultimate benefit received
by the owner.
In Butterfield v. Byron, ubi supra, the destruction of the defendant's
property by lightning was what terminated the contract and gave the
plaintiff his right to recover. In each of the cases of Cleary v. Sohier,
Angus v. Scully and Young v. Chicopee, ubi supra, the same is true
of the destruction of the owner's property by fire. In all cases to
which this general principle has been applied, the recovery has been
upon a quantum meruit for that which was furnished, subject to
diminution of the amount by the price named in the contract, if that
was very low. The right of recovery depends upon the plaintiff's
having furnished property or labor, under circumstances which entitle
him to be paid for it, not upon the ultimate benefit to the property of
the owner at whose request it was furnished.
It follows that the plaintiff is entitled to recover the fair value of
his labor and materials.
Exceptions sustained.

Why did not the court simply conclude that the
defendant had agreed to pay $23,200 and assess damages in
that amount? What difference did it make that the plaintiff hadn't
agreed? Was there any contract? Was there a promise? What is the
amount of recover approved by the court?
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COTNAM v. WISDOM
Supreme Court of Arkansas
83 Ark. 601, 104 S.\'\i. 164, 12 L.R.A. (n.s.) 1090
J 19 Am. St. R .. J'i;, 13 Ann. Cas. 2.~ ( 1907)

F. L. Wisdom and George C. Abel presented a claim against the
estate of A. M. Harrison, deceased, of which T. T. Cotnarn is administrator, for $2,000 on account of surgical attention to the deceased, who was killed by being thrown from a street car.
The probate court allowed the account in the sum of $400, and the
administrator appealed to the circuit court.
The evidence showed that deceased received fatal in juries in a
street car wreck; that while he was unronscious some person summoned Dr. Wisdom to attend him; that Dr. Wisdom called in Dr.
Abel, an experienced surgeon, to assist him; that they found that the
patient was suffering from a fracture of the temporal and parietal
bones, and that it was necessary to perform the operation of trephining;. that the patient lived only a short time after the operation, and
never recovered consciousness.
Dr. Abel testified, over defendant's objection, that the charge of
$2.000 was based on the result of inquiry as to the financial condition
of deceased's estate. It was further proved, over defendant's objection that deceased was a bachelor, and that his estate, which
amounted to about $18,500, induding $10,000 of insurance, would
go to collateral heirs.
Various physicians testified as to the rnstomary fees of doctors in
similar cases, and fixed the amount at various sums ranging from
$100 to $2,000. There was also evidence that the ability of the patient to pay is usually taken into consideration by surgeons in fixing
their fee.
At the plaintiffs' request the court charged the jury as follows:
"1. If you find from the evidence that plaintiffs rendered professional services as physicians and surgeons to the deceased, A. M.
Harrison, in a sudden emergency following the deceased's injury in
a street car wreck, in an endeavor to save his Iifr, then you are instructed that plaintiffs are entitled to recover from the estate of the
said A. M. Harrison such sum as you may find from the evidence is
a reasonable compensation for the services rendered.
"2. The character and importance of the operation, the responsibility resting upon the surgeon performing the operation, his experience and professional training, and the ability to pay of the person
operated upon, are elements to be considered by you in determining
what is a reasonable charge for the services performed by plaintiff~
in the particular case.'"
In his opening statement to the jury, counsel for claimants stated
that "Harrison was worth $8,000, and had inrnrance, and his estate
was left to collateral heirs, that is, to nephews and nieces." Counsel
for defendant objected to such argument, but the court m·erruled the
objection; and the defendant saved his exceptions.
Verdict for $650 was returned in plaintiffs' farnr. Defendant has
appealed ....
HILL, C.J. ( after stating the facts) The reporter will state the issues and substance of the testimony, and set out imtructions one and
two gi,·en at instance of appellee~. and it will he seen therefrom that
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instruction one amounted to a pcrcm pton· instruction to find for the
appellees in some amount.
The first question is as to the correctness of this instruction. As indicated therein, the facts are that :'.\Ir. Harrison, appellant's intestate,
was thrown from a street car, receiving serious injuries which rendered him unconscious, and while in that condition the appellees were
notified of the accident and summoned to his assistance by some
spectator, and performed a difficult operation in an effort to save his
life, but they were unsuccessful, and he died without regaining consciousness. The appellant says: ''Harrison was never conscious after
his head struck the pavement. He did not and could not, expressly
or impliedlv, as'ient to the action of the appellees. He was without
knowledge or will power. However merciful or benevolent may have
been the intention of the appdlees, a new rule of law, of contract by
implication of law, will have to be established by this court in order
to sustain the recoven· .. , AppeJlant is right in saying that the recovery must be sustained by a rnntract by implication of law, but is not
right in saying that it is a new rule of law, for such contracts are almost as old as the English system of jurisprudence. They are usually
called "implied contracts''; more properly, they should be called
quasi-contracts or constructive contracts. See 1 Page on Contracts,
§ 14; also 2 Page on Contracts, ~ 771.
The following excerpts from Sceva \'. True, 53 N.H. 627, are peculiarly applicable here: "We regard it as well settled by the cases
referred to in the briefs of counsel, many of which have been commented on at length by Mr. Shirley for the defendant, that an insane
person, an idiot, or a person utterly bereft of all sense and reason by
the sudden stroke of an accident or disease, may be held liable, in
assumpsit, for necessaries furnished to him in good faith while in that
unfortunate and helpless condition. And the reasons upon which this
rests are too broad, as well as too sensible and humane, to be overborne by any deductions which a refined logic may make from the
circumstances that in such cases there can be no contract or promise
in fact-no meeting of the minds of the parties. The cases put it on
the ground of an implied contract; and by this is not meant, as the
defendant's counsel seems to suppose, an actual contract-that is, an
actual meeting of the minds of the parties, an actual, mutual understanding, to be inferred from language, acts and circumstances by the
jury--but a contract and promise, said to be implied by the law,
where, in point of fact, there was no contract, no mutual understanding, and so no promise. The defendant's counsel says it is usurpation for the court to hold, as a matter of law, that there is a contract
and a promise when all the evidence in the case shows that there was
not a contract, nor the semblance of one. It is doubtless a legal fiction,
invented and used for the ~ake of the remedy. If it was originally
usurpation, certainly it has now become very inveterate, and firmly
fixed in the body of the law."
... In its practical application, it sustains rernvery for physicians
and nurses who render serYices for infants, imane persons and drunkards. 2 Page on Contract~, ~~ 867, 8~17, 906. And ~en·ires rendered
by physiciam to persons unconscious or helpless by reason of injury
or sickness ,ire in the same situation as those rendered to person:incapable of contracting, such as the clas,es above described. Raoul
v. Ne\vman, 5() Ga. -J.08; ~feyer \·. K. of P._. 70 N.E. 111, 178 N.Y.
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63, 64 L.R.A. 839. The court "as therefore right in g1\·:1~g the
instruction in question.
'
The defendant sought to require the plaintiff to prove, in ?ddition
to the value of the services, the benefit, if any, derived by {\he deceased from the operation, and alleges error in the court refu$ing to
place this burden upon the physicians. The same question wa's jconsidered in Ladd v. Witte, 116 Wis. 35, 92 N.W. 365, wh<;fe the
court said: "That is not at all the test. So that a surgical Orf ration
be conceived and performed with due skill and care, the prier to be
paid therefor does not depend upon the result. The event Jo generally lies with the forces of nature that ;:i]] intelligent men knrw and
understand that the surgeon is not re~ponsihle therefor. In ;absence
of express agreement, the surgeon, who brings to such a ser~ice due
skill and care earns the re;isonahle and customary price t~(!refor,
whether the outcome be beneficial to the p;:itient or the reverst.'1
The court permitted to go to thf' jury the fact that Mr. I;I;frrison
was a bachelor. and that his f'.statf'. would go to his collateJ11l relaestate,
tives, and also permittt"d proof to he made of the value of
which amounted to about $ 18,5nn, including $10,000 from a~cident
and life insurance policies. There is a conflict in the authori ies as to
whether it is proper to prove the value of the estate of a PfrS·i°.· n for
whom medical services were rendered, or the financial con~ition of
the person receiving such services. In Robinson v. Campbell,!47 Iowa
625, it was said: "There is no more reason whv this char~c( should
be enhanced on account of the ability of the defendants t</p.ir)' than
that the merchant should charge them more for a yard ofilpth, or
the druggist for filling a prescription, or a laborer for a day ~ork.''
On the other hand, see Haley's Succession, 50 La. Ann. 8~0, 24
South. 285, and Lange v. Kearney, 4 N.Y. Supp. 14, 51 , Jn 640,
which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, 127 N.Y. 676, \28 N.E.
255, holding that the financial condition of the patient may be co.nsidered.
/
Whatever may be the true principle governing this matter if~ontracts, the court is of the opinion that the financial conditifn, of a
patient cannot be considered where there is no contract and fe•e(,overY
is sustained on a legal fiction which raises a contract in ordtr ~o afford a remedy which the justice of the case requires. In 1Yf.orrissett
v. Wood, 123 Ala. 384, 26 South. 307, 82 Am. St. Rep.1127(, the
court said: "The trial court erred in admitting testimony as t<I the
value of the patient's estate, against the objection of the defenG~m.
The inquiry was as to the value of the professional services rendtl.~ed
by the plaintiff to the defendant's testator, and, as the case was r,(,resented below, the amount or value of the latter's estate could shed
no legitimate light upon this issue nor aid in its elucidation. The
or amelioration of disease is as important to a poor man as it is tfb
':
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a rich one, and, prima facie at least, the services rendered the one are
of the same value as the same services rendered to the other. If there
was a recognized usage obtaining in the premises here involved to
graduate professional charges with reference to the financial condition
of the person for whom such services are rendered, which had been
so long established and so universally acted upon as to have ripened
into a custom of such character that it might be cornidered that these
services were rendered and accepted in contemplation of it, there is
no hint of it in the evidence."
There was evidence in this case proving that it was customary for
physicians to graduate their charges by the ability of the patient to
pay, and hence, in regard to that element, this case differs from the
Alabama case. But the value of the Alabama decision is the reason
given which may admit such evidence, viz., because the custom would
render the financial condition of the patient a factor to be contemplated by both parties when the services were rendered and accepted.
The same thought, differently expressed, is found in Lange v. Kearney,
4 N.Y. Supp. 14, 51 Hun 640. This could not apply to a physician
called in an emergency by some bystander to attend a stricken man
whom he never saw or heard of before; and certainly the unconscious patient could not, in fact or in law, be held to have contem·
plated what charges the physician might properly bring against him.
In order to admit such testimony, it must he assumed that the surgeon
and patient each had in contemplation that the means of the patient
would be one factor in determining the amount of the charge for the
services rendered. While the law may admit such evidence as throwing light upon the contract and indicating what was really in contemplation when it was made, yet a different question is presented
when there is no contract to be ascertained or construed, but mere
fiction of law creating a contract where none existed in order that
there might be a remedy for a right. This fiction merely requires a
reasonable compensation for the services rendered. The services are
the same, be the patient prince or pauper, and for them the surgeon
is entitled to fair compensation for his time, service and skill. It was,
therefore, error to admit this evidence and to instruct the jury in
the second instruction that in determining what was a reasonable
charge they could consider the "ability to pay of the person operated
upon."
It was improper to let it go to the jury that Mr. Harrison was a
bachelor, and that his estate was left to nieces and nephews. This was
relevant to no issue in the case, and its effect might well have been
prejudicial. While this verdict is no higher than some of the evidence
would justify, yet it is much higher than some of the other evidence
would justify, and hence it is impossible to say that this was a harmless error.
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In the following case, GreenSJ2..";1,TI v. Slate, pay particuJ.ar
at tent ion to the use of precedent by ,Judge Vanderbilt.

taki11~~ of X-r:i_y p1;,1r·,, th· arrlicltin:1 of ::i
r:1~t fqr z:. n1n11th :::1:,1 th,_· 11~t~ nf cnitr11(:~
!;:,; p~·(·~t·n1 ;1n cn1cr;:('11cy. r[hc te~t11ra1ny
r f rl:-. r;:.l"'Cn~ p:-1;1 that pcrn1anc11t injury
,·.:r:1< 1 ha, t' Ci1~:,._1_,:d if t~1::rc had not been
r·ri;p( r l'll'";cal c;,rc anrl ;itt('l1tio11 at the
ti1n,,' i.e.; tincnntr:H1ictcd.
<_);: ti:,, com;,k:ion of his scn-ic<'S Dr.
Grc,·1:,·;,;,11 rcmkrcrl a hill tn the parrnts of
~~.=:. ,.\·J~ich they 11~1\"e rcfn~c<i to iiay. ;:1r..
l;;11 fi·._·1<1 1hcr1.·t:p(Jn hr,J::;!:.ht ~u1t ;1~;1.1;:·-t
thct!l on 1h.:i1;tlf of 1)r. c;recn~pzin or hix:·,~eli in the ;:1tcr,:,1tin:. At the cnrl of frr
pbinti:.(/ caoc the trial court granted thf:
<lefen·\i11tc..;' :~1,1tin11 to di~~tniss on the_ g-rriuncl
(i;J.t JJ1·. <_;tt'cn~p:~n had acted "·1tl1011t any

Greenspan v. Slate
12 N.J. 426, 97 A.?.d J90

1

(1953)

c:;ptc~~ :111~;1url;;:;~tlnn frnn1 the d:'.l~C'nd;int~
;lt 1 / f1,,t 1hr: ;1ronfs ,vcrc ins11ffirlc1~t in tl1~
r:·:ci1~.::.1:1nc:<,; tn rs7a1!:!:,-;h an irr1plicd 211.;,.-,,-i?:•t;,;11 hy 1hr;;i. (l'., «ppcal the J\ppe1~;1te 1 );,.-j~i.-.in nf 111c ~11jlt'.t1nr Cn•;rt, con-

li:, earlier rkci~ions
;·cl11chntl:· ;,ffirmrd thc ju,'g-1·,, -:~
i~f 10-.,·.
T~cc;1ti5C nf !i--:c· 1~n:1~1c irnr1,r·~-.111,-,, 0! tlir: (JlH:~:ti,1~: 1,rr,:,-r·~1!('d,
\Ve
f,:r;:i· 1 d C"rt-~fic-:1tio11. 11 ,- T..11('·. n+ 1\.Zd
6~r1 ( J'}33L
(c

\TANPFRDTf.T,

J,

i: "'if hr,u1·d

· :,, ,·,i11rt:0 •

c. J.

Th,· F;icts anr! thr Tcs:1c.

D;:rbar;;_ ~lat•:, the 11-ycar-o:rl rla11;;htcr
of the rlcfcnci;u1ts, injurer! a fon~ "~hilc pl;1ying liaskctball at high school. \Vithin two
or three days it hecame exceedingly
swollen and conspicuomly disco10red so
that she c0tdrl walk on it only with the
greatest difficulty and pain. Iler parents,
thinking it nothing more than a ~rrain, declined to provide her with r:ie<iic;il ;iir!.
The plaintiff, Garfield, a member of the har
of this State, discovered her plight by
chance, when she was on a visit to his home
in company with Berkley Badgett, his
housekeeper's son, who was courtin;:; her.
Mr. Garfield promptly sent young Badgett, his mother and Barbara to the ne,1.rhy
office of the plaintiff, Dr. Sidney Greenspan, who discO\·ered from X-ray plates he
made that a hone of Barbara's foot had
1'een fractured. He applied a cast which
Barbara wore for about a month until it
was removed by Dr. Greenspan. J\Ieantime
she used crutches. Barbara lived at home
with her parents and the presence of the
cast and her use of crutches were thus
known to thqn. Clearly the broken bone
that was causing much swelling, high discoloration and great pain necessitating the
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The question hdnrc 1:,, is whether or
11nt the p:1rcr;t,, of an infant rl1ild arc liable,
in the a1i:-•·11•:r of a c:nnt.ract, express or
impliPrl in f;1ct, fnr nccc0 carics furniohed
their chi,1 in an ( nwrgcncy.
IL

T]1,;

Crmflic:1 ing Views at Law
,~·vl 1n F(Jt1ity.

[ll -'\c,··,:·,:;-,,· ,,, f,!;1ck,tonc, "the duty
of p:1n:nt· :,- v·nYH:C: fri·· 1he m;:iintenance
of t.Lt ir c::=1 1 :rcn i::: a p:·inrlr 11c of natural
l;iw." 1 F'., -,,mm. ·147. J~l;,rkst"nP \\'axe9
eloq11c:1t. r .. ,.,. ti.i 0 princink of "n;:itural
law" and q:11tc. 1>: •1Jlf'r 1v <o .,-J,,,n th~ relati,v1s of p;1:·r~nt· ::ind c1~1irl ;ire 11orn1al, hnt
1mco11Yincin,;·l." in the nnly ra,r~ ,,·ith which
the law shrmlrl he u>11ccrn~rl, i.e., when the
parent faib to perform his natural duty.
His reasoning is unc0m·incing, because in
Blackstone's time the parc'nt's <luty at the
common law was rlra~tica11y restricted with
respect to the meth0d of enforcing it:
"Ko person is houn<l to providc a
maintenance for his iss11e, unlrss where
the children are impotent and unable to
w0rk, either through infancy, disease,

or accident, and then is only obliged to
provide them with necessaries, the
penalty on refusal being- no more than
20s a month." Ihid. 449.

so as to include her funeral expenses, Mondock v. Gennrich, 21 A.2d 611, 19 N.J.Misc.
4'J9 (Dist.Ct.1941).
The impact of these shortcomings of the
common law remedy with respect to the
maintenance of a child in comparison with
that available to a neglected wife inevitably
led the law courts to hold, in an effort to
achieve a measure of justice, that "the authority of an infant to bind the father for
necessaries may be inferred from slight evidence (italics suppliC'd)."
Freeman v.
Robinson, 38 N.J.L. 383, 384 (Snp.Ct.1876).
Thus in Fluck v. Tollcmache, 171 E.R. 1018
(C.P.1823) it was said:

Neither the child nor any third party who
ventured to supply the child with his necessaries had any cause of action against the
parents to enforce the duty of support
which Blackstone termed "a principle of
natural Jaw." The utter inadequacy of the
common Jaw in this stag-e of its development
is especially manifest in meeting cmcrg-cncies involving the life or limb of a child.
A parent might, it is tn:e, make his child
his ag-cnt, exprc~s or implierl in fact, to
make contracts for the child"s necessaries:

"An ;iction can only be maintained
ngaimt a person for clothes supplied
to his son. either when he has ordered
snch clothes, and contracted to pay for
them; or when they have been at first
fnrnis11ed without his knowledge, and
he has adopted the contract afterwards:
such ado;1 tion may be inf erred from his
sct'ing- his son wear the clotbC's, and
not returning them, or making- at, or
soon after the time, when he knows of
their being s11pplir.d, some objection."

"If a father c!ocs any specific act
from which it may reasonably he inferred that he is authorizing his son
to contract a deht, he may he liahlc with
respect to the debt so cont.r;icted; hut
the mere morn! oliligation on the father
to maintain his chilrl ~1,fnrds no inference of a lcg·;i I prnmisc to pay l1is
debts." J\Jortimore v. \\"right, 6 M. &
W. 482 (Exch.Di,·. J ~40).
"If a father turns his snn upon the
world, his son's only resourci:, in the
absence of anything to show a contract
on the father·s part, is t0 apply to the
parish, and t 11en pr,,i,cr stcp~; wi1J he
taken to enforce the pcrformam:e of
the parents' legal duty." Shelton v.
Springctt, 11 C.B. A.~2 (Com.Pl.1351 ).
provided, of course, the child survives in
the meantime! A cl1ild's need in these circumstances is quite as great as that of ;i
neglected wi fc, but his rig-hts and remedies
arc far less dtective than hers, for she has
an absolute right to pledge her hushand's
credit for necessaries, even though there is
no agency in fact existing such as the common law required in the case of a child to
permit recovery. The law imposes the obligation on her husband for the benefit of
the deserted wife without regard to whether
or not there was any agency in fact, Strawbridge & Clothier v. Siglc, 73 N.J.L. 419,
63 A. 865 (Sup.Ct.1906). The quasi-contractual nature of the husband's duty to a
neglected wife is demonstrated by the fact
that at common law it survives her death

Dut any s11ch ;irti:icial basis for a fundamental doctrine as ,;inferences from slight
evirlenc•c" is not only unsound in principle
hut ineffective in 0pcration, because it
docs not re~.ch the cases where no express
promise exists nnd where there is no "slight
evidence" from which to infer a promise,
and the cases not so reached are the ones
whC'rc: in simple justice a legal right and an
;irlrc11.1,d<' remedy ;ire most needed. Tl1ere
is quite as great necessity for the imposition
of i\ q11asi-contr;ictual ohlig·ation by operation of law in favor of a neglected child as
there is in the ca5c nf a neglected wife.
The Court of Chancery within the limit
of its jurisdiction was not content to rcgnrcl
the father's rluty as a mere principle of
natural law, b11t it has sought to enforce it
as a matter of equity. Thus Chancellor
Benjamin Willinmsrm applied the prevailing
American view as enunciated in Van Valkinburgh v. 'A'atson, 13 Johns., N.Y., 480.
7 Am.Dec. 395 ( Sup.Ct.1816), that a parent
is bound to provide his infant child with
necessaries and that if he neglects to do so,
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within the statute of Elizabeth, and by
a third person may supply them and charge
the procedure there pointed out, he is
the parent therefor, in reaching his connot legally compellable to perform this
clusions in Tomkins v. Tomkins, 11 N.J.Eq.
duty.
512, 517-518 (Ch.lf.'iS):
"No action can be maintained against
"The position taken by the coma father for goods purchased on his
plainant's counsel is, that a parent is
credit by his minor child, even though
under no legal ohligatinn to support
they he necessaries, unless the father
his child, and that whnever furnishes
has expressly or impliedly authorized
a child with necessaries, must do it
the purchase on his credit. The augrntuitously: that no r<:covery can he
thority of an infant to bind the father
had for such necessaries, unless they
by contract for necrssaries may be inwere furnished un<ler an express conferred from slight evidence.
But,
tract with the parents. \Vhat was said
nevertheless, where the parent gives no
by the judges in the cases of Urmston
authority, and enters into no contract,
v. N~wcomer, 4 Ad. 81 ElJis 899; 31
he is no more liable to pay a debt conE.C.L.; Mortimore v. \Vright, 6 M. &
tracted by his child even for neces\\'. 48, woulcl sePm to sustain the posisaries, than ;i mere stranger would be.
tion. Such is not the l;iw in New Jer1 Parsons on Contracts 299; 1 Chitty
sey. The Jaw, as it has been arlopted in
on Contracts 210; Mortimore v.
this state, is as Jai<l down hy the court
Wright, 6 M. & W. 482; Raymond v.
in Van Valkinhurgh Y. v\Tatson and
Loy!, 10 Barb. [ 483] 489; Plotts v.
Watson, 13 J[ohns., N.Y.,J 480. A
parent is hound to prm·ide his infant
Roseh[u]ry, 4 Dutcher 146 [28 N.J.L.
children with necessaries; and if he
146]. The mere moral obligation of a
neglect to do so, a third person may
parent to maintain his child affords no
s11nply them, an<l chnrge the parent
Jeg;il inference of a promise to pay a
witl1 the amount. B11t s11ch third perdeht contracted by him even for necesson nmst take notice of wh;it is ncccsancs. Shelton v. Springett, 11 C,B_
sary for the infant, according to J1is
452."
si'.11?.'ion in life; am] ,vhcre the in[2] Not only does this decision ignore·
fan: lives with his parent, and is proAmerican authorities, hut the English eases.
vided for by him, a person furnishing
cited by it were decided after the Rev©lunecessaries cannot charge the parent.
tion and accordingly are not part of our
'\\Then the infant is sub potcstate
common law, In re Vince, 2 N.J. 443,. 452;.
parcntis, there must he a clear and
67 A.Zd 141 (1949). Plotts v. Rosebury,.
palpable omission of duty, in that
28 N.J.L. 146 (Sup.Ct.1859), mo:reover,
respect, on the part of the parent, in
was not in point, involving, as it did, a
order to authorize any other person to
case where a contract implied in fact might
act for, :md charge the expense to the
be inferred from previous transactions beparent.' "
tween the parties with reference to purBut in Freeman v. Robinson, 38 N.J.L. chases made by the defendant's infant son.
383, 384 ( 1876) we have a characteristic The Freeman case, although giving lip
instance of the perennial conflicts especial- service to the doctrine of inferences from
ly in earlic:r da:vs of our c:onrts of law and "slight eviclcnce", (38 N.J.L. at page 384)
of erp1ity. There the former Supreme goes so far as to hold ( pages 385-387)
Court, ,·.-ithnut citing th,: Tomkins case or that not even an express promise hy the deVan Valbnl,11r.r:.·h v. \Yatson, supra, or the frncbnt to pay for the goorls sold to his
wr,;;;·ht of cn,1::nrring a11thority in this son, which certainly is more than "slight
country, held:
eYiclcnce'"-indced, it is the most explicit
"The duty of, a fatl;er to provide
ancl 11namhig11ous evidf'nce imaginable.mainte1p :1ce for his children is a mere
would he supported by the defcndant"i,
moral obligation.
Except in c;iscs
moral obligation to support his child, out
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straints of her previous condition and
her ability to enter upon many pursuits
once closed to her. On the contrary, I
think that, in determining how much
the widowed mother is to be allowed,
[3, 4] In contrast to these technicalities
we must take into consideration, as in
of the common law is Alling v. Alling, 52
all cases, all the circumstances-the
N.J.Eq. 92, 27 A. 655 (Ch.1893). There
mother's capacity and ability and the
Vice-Chancellor Pitney held:
child's fortune. For instance, it would
"The question of the extent of the
be monstrous, I think, to hold that if
duty of a parent to support and maina widowed mother was entitled in her
tain an infant child can be raised in
own right to a fortune of $20,000, or
this court only when the child has a
had a fixed income of $2,000 a year,
fortune of its own. This court has no
and had an only daughter, an infant,
jurisdiction to compel a parent to supentitled to a fortune of $5,000f and
port an infant child. In re Ryder, 11
should educate and support her daughPaige 185; Hodgens v. Hodgens, 4
ter during infancy in a style commenCl. & F. 323. But when the infant
surate with her own fortune, she
child has an estate of its own and the
should be entitled to call upon that
question arises, directly or indtrectly,
child when she came of age for all the
how much, if anything, the parent
expense of her support and education,
shall be allowed out of such estate for
though it might far exceed the child's
the infant's support, the court will confortune.
And I think the remit
sider and determine the parent's duty
would be much the same if the mother
toward the child and his or her ability
had a well-established earning ability
to perform that duty. Such is the
to the same extent."
present case." ( 52 N.J.Eq. at page 96,
In equity, the parents' obligation to sup27 A. at page 656.)
port and educate their children is mwh
The learned vice-chancellor then pro- more than a principle of natural law; it is
ceeded to re,·iew at length the English an obligation enforced wherever equity has
Chancery decisions and the American jurisdiction on equitable principles in the
cases, both legal and equitable, holding that light of the facts of the indi·,·iclual case.
,each parent is liable for the support of his "The physical ability of the child to earn
infant children (52 N.J.Eq. at pages 97- its bare food and clothing is not_ the test
108), and came to the inevitable conclu- or gauge in this court of a parent's duty to
sion that (p. 108) :
support and educate it," ( 52 N.J.Eq. at
page 96), nor does the fact that the child
"For these reasons I must decline to
has an estate of its own excuse the parent
consider Pyatt v. Pyatt, [46 N.J.Eq.
from all obligation to it. In determiniug285 [ 18 A. 1048.1 (E. & A.1889)] as
the
question of support the court will take
binding authority for the position that
into consideration both the parents' ability
a widowed mother is entitled, without
to pay and the child's fortune.
regard to her own ability, to full compensation and indemnity from her
In re Ganey, 93 N.J.Eq. 389, 116 A. Fl
child's estate for sup;iort and main(Ch.1922), affirmed without opinion, 94 N.
tenance rendered to it during infancy.
J.Eq. 502, 119 A. 925 (E. & A.1923), ,vas
Such a rule seems to me not to be
a suit by the sister and brother-in-law of a
warranted by the ancient authorities,
lunatic for reimimrsement out of the Innainfluenced, as they were, by the gentic's estate for the maintenance of her
eral disability of the wife rcsultinf,'
daughter after the death of her husband.
Relying expressly on the statement in
from coverture; much less does it
Alling v. Alling, 52 N.J.Eq. 92, 96, 27 A.
seem in step with the modern status of
655, 657, supra, that "This court has 110
woman under the law and her general
jurisdiction to compel a parent to support
emancipation from the artificial reof deference to technical rules of the law
of consideration, in a situation that should
not be governed by contract at all, but by
th~ equitable principle of quasi-contracts.

•
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an infant child," and on the holding in
Freeman v. Robinson, 38 N.J.L. 383, supra,
that "The obligation of a father to maintain his child affords no legal inference of
a promise to pay for necessaries," the trial
court denied the claim. The reference to
Freeman v. Robinson, however, is mere
dictum, the Court of Chancery being without jurisdiction on the facts of the case under Alling v. Alling, supra. But the court
was in error in supposing that equity
lacked jurisdiction in all cases involving
claims for the support of a child. As we
have seen from our discussion of the Alling
case, "The question of the extent of the
duty of a parent to support and maintain
an infant child can be raised in this court
·only when the child has a fortune of its
own." 52 N.J.Eq. 92, 96, 27 A. 655, 656.
All Vice-Chancellor Pitney implied by the
statement relied on in In re Ganey that
equity had no jurisdiction to compel a parent to support an infant child, as his entire
discussion and conclusion clearly reveals, is
a lack of jurisdiction to enforce a claim
for money damages without the existence
of some special equity.
Nor does the opinion in In re Ganey
mention Tomkins v. Tomkins, 11 N.J.Eq.
512, supra, the first expression of our courts
on the issue under consideration. But
Tomkins v. Tomkins has not yet spent its
force, for in Murphy v. Murphy, 102 N.J.
Eq. 552, 554, 141 A. 774 (E. & A.1928),
Judge vVhite, speaking for a unanimous
court, said :

"The father and mother of a minor
child are equally entitled to its services and earnings. If one of the parents be dead, has abandoned the child,
or has been deprived of its custody by
court decree, the other is entitled to
such services and earnings.
"The parents jointly may maintain
an action for the loss of the wages
or services of their minor child when
such loss is occasioned by an injury,
wrongfully or negligently inflicted upon such child. If one of the parents be
dead, has abandoned the child, has been
deprived of its custorly by court decree
or refuses to sue, the other may sue
alone."
It is unthinkable that the Legislature
would have granted such rights to the parents of a minor child without the implication of the correlative duties of support
and education by its parents.
The question before us has been considered or touched on in a number of other
cases, all of which relate back to the doctrine of the Freeman case, without, however, impugning the holdings in the Tomkins or Alling cases, but it will serve no
useful purpose to discuss or enumerate all
of them; see, e. g., In re Rogers Estate, 96
N.J.Eq. 6, 7, 125 A. 318 (Ch.1924), Meier
v. Planer, 107 N.J.Eq. 398, 152 A. 246 (Ch.
1930) and Cohen v. Cohen, 6 N.J.Super.
26, 69 A.2d 752 (App.Div.1949). Suffice
it to say that it appears that the question to
be resolved here has not yet been passed on
ih fhe court of last resort, but that there
are divergent views at;Jaw and in equity as
to the fundamental nature of a parent's
obligation to m~tntain an infant child
awaiting decision.

"It may well be, although we do not
so decide, that a husband may bd liable,
in a common law suit, to unpaid. creditors who have supplied necessaries for
the support of his minor children
•
whose cns1ody has been awarded to
their mother under any alimony order
The common law rule with reference to
for their support, which, under unexthe support of minor children can only be •·
pected extraordinary circumstances,
understood in the light of the pertinent
has proved insufficient (Tomkins v.
statutes. R.S. 44:4-104, N.J.S.A., is the
Tomkins, 11 N.J.Eq. 512); * * •"
modern counterpart of the statute referred
It is doubtful, moreover, if In re Ganey to in l Bl.Comm. 449, supra; it provides
would have been decided as it was, if it that where a father or mother deserts a
had come up for consideration two years child, the director of public welfare of the
later, after the passage of R.S. 9:1-1, N. co11nty welfare board may apply to the JuJ.S.A. (L.1926, c. 201, § 1, p. 333):
venile and domestic relations court for an
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order for "suitable support and maintenance" to be provided by the husband or
wife. The court may compel the defendant
to give reasonable security and by R.S.
44 :4-105, N.J.S.A., may sequester the property of the defendant, appoint a receiver
at1d apply the personal property and the
rents and profits of the real estate toward
such support and maintenance. By R.S.
30:4-60 and 66, N.J.S.A., similar provisions are made for insane children and by
R.S. 30 :4-176, N.J.S.A., for the indigent
feeble-minded. As part of a matrimonial
cause, an aggrieved wife may by N.J.S.
2A :34-24, N.J.S.A., obtain suitable support
for herself and her children, but if the neglected child is tc1.ken care of by others than
a parent no duty of compensation is created l)V the common law nor is there at
commo~1 law any forfeiture of the parent's
rights in the child.

the wife, or to the guardian, custodian
or trustee of said minor child or children." N.J.S. 2A :100-2, N.J.S.A.
It is interesting to note in passing that
the phrase "without lawful excuse" in the
Uniform Act was omitted in adopting it
here. This statute, insofar as minor children are concerned, is merely declaratory,
for it was common law misdemeanor to
neg-Iect to provide for children where they
suffer injury therefrom, R. v. Friend Russ.
& Ry. 20, 168 E. R. 662 (1802); R. v. Hogan, 2 Den. 277, 169 E. R. 504 (1851); R.
v. Phillpot Dears 179, 169 E. R. 686 (1853);
9 Halsbury's Laws of England (2d ed.)
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[6] The civil statutes seek to enforce
not an obligation of a parent to the minor
child, hut a duty to the public if it becomes
a public charge. The penal and criminal
statutes, on the other hand, aim at coercing
a dcfa11lting parent into performing an
ohligation to a minor child for which the
common law rule provides no civil remedy.
Such a situation is distinctly anomalous
and reflects the shortcomings of the common law in denying a civil recovery to the
minor child or those who come to his aid.
To quote Morris, "The Role of Criminal
Statutes in Kegligence Actions", 49 Col.L.
Rev. 21, 22 (1949):

[5] To these civil oblir;ations are added
penalties and criminal sanctions. By R.S.
44:4-108 and R.S. 44:1-147, N.J.S.A., a
father or mother ,vho deserts a child or
fails or neglects to provide for it may be
adjudged a disorderly person, s11hject to
a commitment for not exceeding 60 days.
By N.J.S. 2A :100, N.J.S.A. (section 1 of
the Uniform Desertion and Nonsupport
Act, 10 U.L.A. 1, 6), such misconduct is
made a misdemeanor:
"Once the legislature has seen fit to
"Any husband or father who deserts
punish conduct that falls within the imand willfully neglects or refuses to promunity of a no-duty rule, there is all
vide for and maintain his wife and
the more reason for reconsidering the
minor child or children, is guilty of a
civil law."
misdemeanor, and shall be punished by
a fine of not more than $100, or by imIII. The Preferable Rule.
prisonment for not more than 1 year."
[7] As we have seen, there are no
N.J.S. 2A :100-l, N.J.S.A.
precedents in our courts of last resort so
"Any h11shanrl "·ho deserts or willwe are free to choose hetween the common
fully negkcts or refuses to prm·ide for
law rule and the Chancery principle in dethe s11ppnrt an,; maintenance of his
ciding the instant case. Normal instincts
wife, in ckstit11~·c or ncec,si:nn~ cirof !111manity and plain common honesty as
cumstances, or a parent who <le~erts
,veil as the snhstantial weight of j11dicial deor will fully nc~lcrts or rd11ses to procisions in this country, the uniform rnle of
vide for the :',1;1port am! maintenance
the civil law in European countries, and the
of his or hrr :n:nor chilr! nr c:1i:r!ren, in
unc1:1imo11s views of the text writers ;ind
destitute or nc1::~:;sit011s c1rc:nm~tances,
the Rcsff!fem1mt of tlzc I.aw al\ comhine to
is
of a rni,•\r,mcanor. If a fine
dcn,onstrnte the superiority of the equitablr
be im;,oscrl, the cnart may cli:-cct the
r11lc. ,~-hatcYer objections may be rai,cil
same to ),,:: r:iirl in "·hn'r: or in rart t0
tiic"ct0 have been lia•ed either on fancied

222.

fears as to its effect in operation, which
long experience with it in ma11y juri.fc1ictions have shown to be altogether groundless, or on procednral misconceptions which
should long since have been discarded.
It shocks one's sensibilities to tbink that
the common law would permit a wealthy
parent to do no more than respo:id to the
minimum demands of the Poor L,nv, while
he himself is living in afilucnce. Jt reflects a point of view which is utterly inconsistent with the common fr,:li'.,gs of
humanity, and which fortnnatcl? i,. fr:1nd
in relatively few inst,mc~s of mna'.11ral
cond,JCt, yet it is against tl,ose i:~,·t,,nces
that the law must safeguard the offspring of
an abnormal human being. The reasons
for the prevailing American rule were well
expressed in the early case of Finch v.
Finch, 22 Conn. 411 ( Sup.Ct.Err.1853) :
"The case clit,closcs nothing from
which we can infer or presume that
the mother is not of equal pecuniary
ability with the father to maintain their
common offspring, nor whether the
father has adequate ability to do it.
There is a law of our universal humanity as extensive as our race, which im·pels parents, whether fathers or mothers, to protect and support their helpless children. It is a duty common to
both, and the consequent obligation is
<:ommon. Blackstone very properly
says that 'the duty of parents to provide for the maintenance of their children is a principle of natural law. By
begetting. them, tli<:refore, they have
entered into a w· 111:1,ary obligation to
endeavor, as f:ir 2~ in them lies, that
the life \\·hid1 t',ey bve bestowed shall
be supportrd ;u:rl ;->'"<'.served. APr1 this
the children ·.<'; l1avc a perfr<:~ r:,J1t
of receiving rr;, i:ot,~nance fro;n : 11eir
parents.' T 11is d11ty and this n),Jigation have bc-::1 nriously modified by
the positive Ja,,,-s of civilized countries,
but fully recog1Jized by all. Connected
with this obligation of maintenance
there is a parental privilege. The parent is entitled to the custody and care
()f the ch:J,! ,,·hich he sustains and to
such sc:·,·:,:c 'lS it can render, and he
11as a right to exercise his own discre-

tinn in determining the fitness and necessity of the allowances to be made
and of the support to he furnished to
his children, for which he is to he made
chargeable. • • * The lrr.al liability of the parent necessarily depcncls
upon his or her ahility to furnish the
maintenance."
The rnbstantial weight of authority supports this equitable, hnmanit;irian view, 4
Vrrnicr, American Family Laws 56 (1936),
46 C.J. 1256, 1262, 1261-, 67 C.J.S., Parent
And Child, ~§ 14, 15, 16, pa,;-es 686, 688,
697, 39 Am.Jnr. 630, 672, 686. See also 7
A.L.n. 1010, 10 A.L.R. 1138. The principles govP.rning the application of the rule
arc set forth in thre<' sections of the Restatement of the Law of Restitution ( 1937) :
"§ 112. A person who without mistake, coercion or request l1as unconditionally conferred a henefit 11pon another is not entitled to restitution, except where the benefit was conferred
under ci rcurnstanccs making such action necessary for the protection of
the interests of the other or of third
persons.

"§ 113. A person who has performed the noncontractual duty of another by supplying a third person with
necessaries which in violation of such
duty the other had failed to supply, although acting without the other's
knowledge or consent, is entitled to restitution therefor from the other if he
acted unofficiously and with intent to
charge therefor.
"§ 114. A person who has performed the duty of another hy supplying a third person with necessaries,
although acting without the other's
knowledge or consent, is entitled to
restitution from the other therefor if
(a) he acted unofficiously and with intent to charge therefor, and (b) the
things or services supplied were immediately ncccss,try to prevent serious
bodily h:irm to or suffering by such
pcrsn:1. ,,

The c1mrsc of the Roman law and the
modern ri,:il law of Western Europe,
which i:; hasccl on it, suggests that the
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common law rule, which we· are now discarding in favor of the equitable doctrine,
may he merely an instance of early undcrelnped law. In 1hc Roman !aw the
d11ty of a father to support his child was
enforced only hy criminal proceedings,
R:vlin, rhn<lhook of .Roman Law 108
(Jt).l7), Lut 1:1 the modern civil law the
ohligatirm of the p;11·n1ts is direct:
"The dnty of taking- care of the

children's s11pp,Jrt 11ntil such tirnc as
they are capalJle of bnpponing- fr, ·n
selves is primarily incumbent on the
father. Their physical care is pr, ..
marily inc:11mhent on the mother. In
the n·cnt that thr: fothc1· is indigent the
duty to t:1kc c:irr of the children's support and i;i ti,,, event of the father's
death f thc duty to take r.are oi] lhe
chil,ln:n's erhtcn.lion in general, is primarily i111:mnbent on the mother. In
the evf'Ht that the mother shall not survive f trie f;,ther] ,)r is indig,;·1t, such
duty i~ i uci11nben t upon the p:iternal
granrlparcnts ,y1\ rnhorcHnately, on the
maternal grandparents.''
Austrian
Civil L,w, sec. 143.
"Spouses are jointly obligated, by
reason of the sole fact of contracting
marringe, to feed, support and educate
their children." French Civil Code,
Art. 203.
"Relatives in the line of direct desce~dants are under the obligation of
supporting each other." German Civil
Code, sec. 1601." Only the one who is
incapable of supporting himself is entitled to support. An infant unmarried
child may require his parents to support him althnngh he own property, to
the extent t11 " hich the income from
his property ;11:'1 from his own work
arc not s1,' , ·1ent for his support."
Ihid., sec. : · ,.·!~
"D11,:c.~' ·,·,.·1 1.0 the Children.--~·frirriagc imnn" ~ 1:prm both sprn1~(', the
rluty '.n ~·1p···--·: :ir0 1 1 to givr: ;1n r·,lnc;,tinn ;0•1rl in,-;t--,,,:~;<1,1 to th,:
Fducatioll :1nrl in:''taction mu~· vi:· 'or:01 •o
moral p6nci;,:es!' Itctli;,,, r:;,nJ Cn,k,

Art. 147.

"Conti·ibution to the Burde11s.·-The
duty of supporting and of gi\•ing an
education and instruction to the issue
is borne by the father and by the
mother in proportion to their property,
including in the mother's contribution
income from her dowry. If the parents
do not have sufficient means, such duty
falls on the other ascendants according
to their order of proximity to the infants." !,bid., Art. 148.
"The father and the mother and the
d1ild riwc each other the c:i.re and assist.? n: c which arc required in the interest of the family." Swiss Civil
Code, A rt. 271. "Th" father and the
motl1er sl1all hear the expenses for the
support and education of tl1e child (and
they shall share in them) according to
their matrimonial regime. If they are
in need or if the child canscs extraordinary expenses or under other cxception:il circumstances, the supervising (julicial] authority may allow the
father :>nd the mother to whjcct the
property of the infant child to contribution for his support and education
to the extent fixed by it." Ibid., Art.

272.
The reason for the early common law
rule is to be found in part in the procedural limitations of the common law. The
common law ,vas slow in permitting the use
of assumpit in suits other than our express
contr.icts nr cnntracts impb,rJ in fact,
Ames, Implied As~11mpsit, i:i Lrctnrcs on
Legal History, 149.
m
which the oblig-ation was crcatrd
J,m·,
ibid. 160, were rrcog-niz<'d very grar!ually.
ibid. 162, and their trllf: 11at11r0 wa,: CYcn
slower in being: percein~d. OH<'n obligations imposC'd in law ,nTc conccin:d of a~
true contrncts implied in fact ;,w! c-radu,11!,·
cxtcndul hy the 11,c nf a fiction tn ~(H'c·r oJ;_
Jigati0;1;:.: in1ph1 •T i·1 la"~~ Thn~. j~- vrcts: n111ch
in

Lt\\~ ;111

c1;~·cncy in f? vnr

of a
,,,,: ,, ifc ;i~;iin~t her hn~hand.
from th,; ';«:t tk1t win:~ were cnmr.ionlv
agents of
11 nsband~ in vc1ri0us affair.;;
than it w;, ~n imply an obligatirm in bw
for suppqr'· ;11 fa,·or of children, wlio 1•,c,I'!
fa.:- less fr1;quently agents of thci;- parcpf~.

It was not until the appearance of Keener
on Quasi Contracts in 1889 that the theory
of that subject was elaborated, although
Dean Ames outlined the subject in the article above mentioned. There is no reason
why the pareP.ts' right to the services and
earnings of a child should not have supported the parents' obligation to support
and educate him, Osborn v. Allen, 26 N.J.
L. 388, 391 ( Sup.Ct.1857), to the same degree that the wife's obligation to her husband is deemed in law to support her
agency to bind him for nccc·ssaries, when
he <lcserts her or cnnscnts to their separation, Emery v. Ncighl,onr, 7 N._T.L. 142, 146
(Sup.Ct.1824): Vmkr v. Cox, 53 N.J.L.
516, 51~. 22 A. 347 IS•m.Ct.11''ll), or otherwise nrg-Jects to furnish hc:r ,vith necessaries, Sterling v. Potts, S K ..T.L. 773 (Sup.
Ct.1820). Tlwrc is no g-n';itcr danger nf
injury to the family in the rase of the child
than in the casr· of t'.,c wi 1 e, an<l the need
of a child may be just as g:·cat as hers or
even greater.

tees were necessary and that a physician
would expect payment for his services.
Here the defendants permitted their daughter not only to use the cast and crutches
for a month, but to rctnrn to the doctor at
the encl of the month to have the cast remove<l. Having retained the benefit of the
physician plaintiff's services and permitted
their daughter to return to him for further
services, they are in no position in the circumstances of the case to complain that he
acterl without notice to them. He did not
act officio11s1y, and as a physician in practice
of his profession he naturally intended
to charge for his scn·ices. All the necessary clements are present to impose on the
defendants the legal obligation to pay for
medical expenses rendered to their child
in an emergency.
The judgment below is reversed. Judgment will be entered here in favor of the
plaintiff, Dr. Sidney Greenspan, for $45.
Fnr reversal: Chief Justice V ANDER-

K orm:i lly snits for the rccon:ry of J3TLT, and Justices OLIPHANT, BUR-

[81
neces,aries forni,hcd a child will he
broug-ht in ,1,e Law Divi,ic,n, hut if the
issne of st1p[l(1rt inn,1'·e~ ,w·r:ial equities
such as a cail rm t11e minor's ~e;>aratc e~tate
for contrih11+;,,n, ,\lh1g v. A "'ing, 52 N.J.
Eq. 92, 27 A. 6S.=. ,,1rra, nr is part of a
matrimonial action 1F1dcr N.J.S. 2A :34-24,
N.J.S.A., supra, t],c pror-r-cding- will be
brought in the Chancery Division as heretofore.
an Emergency.
IV. Services Rendered

in

[9) There can be no donht that the
physician plaintiff comes. within the terms
of sections 113 and 114 of the Restatement
of the J ,aw of Re~tit11tion above (]Unted.
The defrnc1ants were under an obligation as
part of their d11t_v tn s1mp(l1·t and educate
their danghtcr, tn proYide her with medical
services bnth under normal circumstances
and in emergencies.
The evidence is uncontrnrlirtecl tha.t an
emergency e:ci steel. The parents harl refused to prov1r1e their chilrl with medical
attention with the rc~,,Jt that. perm;i.nent injury would ha,·e en,ucd bnt for the immediate treatnw1°~ rPncle··1:ri hy the physician
plaintiff. Clea!"l~· tl1ey knew tl1at the ~erv-
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L]i\;G, JACOBS and DRENNAN-5.
For ;,Jfii-mancc: Justices REHER and
WA CHEN fiELD-2.

OLWELL v. NYE & NISSEN CO.

Supreme Court of Washington
2fi Wash. 2d 282, 173 P.2d fi!)2, 169 A.LR. 139 (1946)

MALLERY, Justice. On May 6, 1940, plaintiff, E. L. Olwell, sold
and transferred to the defendant corporation his one-half interest in
Puget Sound Egg Packers, a Washington corporation having its principal place of business in Tacoma. By the terms of the agreement,
the plaintiff was to retain full ownership in an "Eggsact" egg-washing
machine, formerly used by Puget Sound Egg Packers. The defendant
promised to make it available for delivery to the plaintiff on or before
June 15, 1940. It appears that the plaintiff arranged for and had
the machine stored in a space adjacent to the premises occupied by
the defendant hut not covered by its lease. Due to the :;carcity of
labor immediately ;ifter the outbreak of the war, defend;int's treasurer,
without the knowledge or consent of the plaintiff, ordered the egg
washer taken out of storage. The machine was put into operation
by defendant on May 31, 1941, and thereafter, for a period of three
years, was used approximately one day a week in the regular course
of the defendant's business. Plaintiff first discovered this use in
January or February of 1945, when he happened to be at the plant
on business and heard the machine operating. Thereupon, plaintiff
offered to sell the machine to defend,rnt for $600 or half of it'l
original cost in 1929. A counteroffer of $50 was ref med, and, approximately one month later, this action ,vas commenced to recover
the reasonable value of defendant's use of the machine, and praying
for $25 per month from the commencement of the unauthorized use
until the time of trial. A second cause of action was alleged, hut was
not pressed and hence is not here involved. The court entered judgment for plaintiff in the amount of $10 per week for the period of
156 weeks covered bY the statute of limitations, or $1,560, and gave
the plaintiff his costs.
Defendant has appealed to this court, assigning error upon the
judgment, upon the trial of the cause on the theory of unjust enrichment, upon the amount of damages, and upon the court's refusal
to make a finding as to the value of the machine, and in refusing to
consider such value in meflsuring damc1ges.
The theory of the respondent was that the tort of conversion could
be "waived" and suit brought in quasi-contract, upon a contract implied in law, to recover, as restitution, the profits which inured to
appellant as a result of its wrongful use of the machine. With this
the trial court agreed and, in its findings of facts, found that the
use of the machine "resulted in a benefit to the users, in that said use
saves the users approximately $1.43 per hour of use as against the
expense which would be incurred were eggs to be washed by hand;
that said machine was used by Puget Sound Egg Packers and defendant, on an average of one day per week from l\fay of 1941, until
February of 1945 at an average saving of $10.00 per each day of use."
In substance, the argument presented by the assignments of error
is that the principle of 11njust enrichment, or quasi-contract, is not
of universal application but is imposed only in exceptional cases because of special facts and circumstances and in favor of particular
persons; that respondent had an adequate remedy in ;m action at
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law for replevin or claim and delivery; that any damages awarded
to the plaintiff should be based upon the use or rental value of the
machine and should bear some reasonable relation to its market
value. Appellant therefore contends that the amount of the judgment
is excessive.
It is uniformly held that in cases where the defendant tort/easor
has benefited by his wrong, the plaintiff may elect to "waive the
tort" and bring an action in assumpsit for restitution. Such an action
arises out of a duty imposed by law devolving upon the defendant
to repay an unjust and unmerited enrichment. Woodward, The Law
of Quasi-Contracts § 272 ( 2), p. 439; Keener on Quasi-Contracts,
p. 160. See also, Professor Corbin's articles, "Waiver of Tort and
Suit in Assumpsit," 19 Yale Law Journal, p. 221, and "Quasi-Con·
tractual Obligations," 21 Yale Law Journal, p. 533.
It is clear that the saving in labor cost which appellant derived
from its use of respondent's machine constituted a benefit.
According to the Restatement of Restitution, § l ( h), p. 12,
"A person confers a henefit upon another if he gives to the other
possession of or some other interest in money, land, chattels, or choses
in action, performs services heneficial to or at the request of the other,
satisfies a deht or a duty of the other, or in any way adds to the
other's security or advantage. H(! omf(!rJ a benefit not only where he
adds to the property nf annther. hut aim where he saves the other
from expcme or loss. The word 'benefit,' therefore, denotes any form
of advantage." ( Italics by the court.)
It is also necessary to show that, while appellant benefited from its
use of the egg-washing machine, respondent thereby inrnrred a loss.
It is argued hy appellant th.it, since the m;ichine was put into storage
by respondent, who had no prei;ent nsc for it, and for a period of almost three years did not know that .ippcllant w;is operating it and
since it was not injured hy its operation and the appellant never .id·
verscly claimed any title to it, nor contested respondent's right of repossession upon the latter's discovery of the wrongful operation, that
the respondent was not dam;iged, because he is as well off as if the
machine had not been used by appellant.
The very essence of the nature of property is the right to its exclusive use. Without it, no beneficial ri,r;ht remains. However plausible, the appellant cannot he heard to say that its wrongful invasion
of the respondent's property right to exclusive use is not a loss compensable in law. To hold otherwise would he suhversivc of all property rights, since its use was admittedly wrongful and without claim of
right. The theory of unjust r:nrichment is applic.ihle in :mch a case.
We agree with appellant that re1-pondent conld have dected a
"common garden variety of action," ;is he calls it, for the recovery
of damagci;. It is also tmc th:,t cxct:pt whr:rc provided for hy statute,
punitive damages arc n0t allowed, the hasic measure for the recovery
of damages in this state heing compensation. If, then, respondent hnd
been limited to redress in tnrt for damage:-, as appellant contends, the
court below wrmld be in ermr in refusing to make a finding as to the
value of the machine. Jn such case the award of damage, must hear
a reasonable relation to the ,·alne of thc property. Hoff v. Lester,
Wash., 168 P.2d 409.
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But respondent here had an election. He chose rather to waive his
right of action in tort and to sue in assumpsit on the implied contract.
Having so elected, he is entitled to the measure of restoration which
accompanies the remedy.
"Actions for restitution have for their primary purpose taking from
the defendant and restoring to the plaintiff something to which the
plaintiff is entitled, or if this is not done, causing the defendant to pay
the plaintiff an amount which will restore the plaintiff to the position
in which he was before the defendant received the benefit. If the
value of what was received and what was lost were always equal,
there would be no substantial problem as to the amount of recovery,
since actions of restitution are not punitive. In fact, however, the
plaintiff frequently has lost more than the defendant has gained, and
sometimes the defendant has gained more than the plaintiff has lost.
"In such cases the measure of restitution is determined with reference to the tortiousness of the defendant's conduct or the negligence
or other fault of one or both of the parties in creating the situation
giving rise to the right to restitution. If the defendant was tortious in
his acquisition of the benefit he is required to pay for what the other
has lost although that is more than the recipient benefited. If he was
consciously tortious in acquiring the benefit, he is also deprived of
any profit derived from his subsequent dealing with it. If he was no
more at fault than the claimant, he is not required to pay for losses in
excess of benefit received by him and he is permitted to retain gains
which result from his dealing with the property."' ( Jtalics by the
court.) Restatement of Restitution, pp. S95, S9fi.
· Respondent may recover the profit rkrived by the appellant from
the use of the machine.
Respondent has prayed "on his first came nf actinn for the sum
of $25.00 per month from the time defendant first cor;m~nced to use
said machine subsequent to May l 040 ( 1()41 ) until precent time."
In .computing jud.;mcnt, the ,ourt lv~ 1ow computr:d rr:cov(~ry on
the basis of $10 per week. This m;,kes th0 _iudg,rwnt n ce~ci,·e, ~incr
it cannot exceed the amount pr.-=wed for ....
\Ve therefore direct the trial court t,1 ruJuce the: _iudgnit:nt, based
upon the prayer of the compl;iint. vi $'." per month fnr thirty-six
months, er $900.
The judgment as modified i~ afTi ··rnf'cl. :\ rrir!la '1' will rf'cover its
costs.
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HART v. E. P. DUTTON & CO.
Supreme Court of l\ew York
197 Misc 274, 93 XY.S.2d 87 l
Afj'd, 277 App. Div. 93:,, '18 N.Y.S.2d 773
Reargument and af1f1ea/ denied. 277 App. Di". 962. <19 N.Y.S.2d !014 ( 1949)

MALPASS, Justice. A motion has been made by the defendant for
judgment dismissing the complaint upon the grounds that the causes
of action alleged in the complaint are barred by the statute of limitations and that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute
a cause of action.
The complaint set5 forth two separate causes of action based upon
alleged libelous statements claimed by the plaintiff to have been contained in a book entitled "Under Cover" which, according to the
complaint was published by the defendant on or about July 18, 1943.
It is alleged in the complaint that the book contained statements which
were libelous and defamatory of the plaintiff and numerous other
persons, the names and identities of some of whom are unknown to
the plaintiff. The plaintiff has brought the action "on behalf of himself and all other persons falsely and unjustly held out to the public
as traitors to America in time of war, and/or agents of the Axis enemy,
in time of war, in the hook 'Under Cover', similarly situated." In the
first cause of action set forth in the complaint the plaintiff alleges
''that solely by reason of the aforesaid libelous publication, the plaintiff and those similarly situated, have suffered great humiliation and
loss of reputation; have been held out to great hatred and contempt;
have been exposed to mob hysteria; and have been placed in great
fear for the safety of themselves and their families; and in other respects have suffered damage." It is further alleged in the first cause of
action that the defendant sold a large number of copies of the book
and has received in sales from the book, royalties, etc., proceeds which
amount to the sum of $2,450,000 "which money defendant had and
received to the use of the plaintiff, and those similarly situated; and
further, that five years have elapsed, between the receipt of said monies
and the commencement of this action," and "that on or about March
15th, J949, the plaintiff demanded of the defendant that it pay
the said proceeds of the book 'Under Cover', to the plaintiff for himself and for those similarly situated, but the defendant neglected and
refused, and still neglects and refuses to pay the said proceeds, or any
part thereof." The second cause of action is a repetition of the allegations contained in the first cause of action and in addition alleges that
the defendant maliciously contrived to convey to the public the idea
that the plaintiff and those similarly situated were enemies ·of, or
traitors to the United States of America in time of war; that he was
understood as meaning that thev were traitors, and/ or agents of the
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enemy, by those who read the hook; and further, that the defendant
intended to profit through the sale and circulation of this libelous
matter, and did so profi't, to the extent already set forth.'" The prayer
of the complaint is for judgment in favor of the plaintiff and those
similarly situated for the sum of two million, four hundred and fifty
thousand dollars ( $2,450,000), the amount alleged to have been
received by the defendant, together with interest from March 15,
1944, which it may be assumed, is the date when the plaintiff claims
the defendant received the profits derived from the publication of the
hook.
The defendant urges that the complaint fails to allege facts sufficient
to constitute any cause of action except one to recover damages for
libel and that such an action is barred by the statute of limitations.
Section 51 of the Civil Practice Act provides that an action to recover
damages for "libel or slander" must be brought within one year after
the cause of action has accrued. :\ cause of action for libelous statements contained in a book accrues when the hook is released by the
publisher for sale in accord with trade practice. Gregoire v. G. P.
Putnam's Sons, 298 N.Y. 119-125, 81 N.E.2d 45, 48. The complaint states "That on or about the 18th day of July, 1943, while
America was at war with Germany and Japan, the defendant published, distributed, advertised, and circulated a book entitled 'Under
Cover.'" The action was begun in March, 1949. Bevond doubt, if
plaintiff's action is deemed to be one to recover damages for libel,
the action is barred by the statute.
The plaintiff contends that the action is not an action to recover
damages for libel hut is an action for monev had and received and
that subdivision 1 of section 48 of the Civil Practict" .\rt i~ the
applicable statute of limjtation. This section provides that "an action
[based] upon a contract obligation or liability express or implied,"
must be commenced within six years after the cause of action has
accrued. The plaintiff contends that the plaintiff has the right to
waive his action for the tort and sue the defendant, in assumpsit,
for the moneys which the defendant realized from the sale of the
book and certain rights in connection therewith, on the theory that
the law implies a contract on the part of a tort-feasor to account
to the party injured by the tort for any moneys acquired by the tortfeasor in the commission of the tort. The plaintiff contends that the
law forbids that any person shall profit by reason of a wrongful act
against another and that to permit the defendant to retain the proceeds derived from the publication of the hook containing the libelous
statements would remit in the unjust enrichment of the defendant and
that the law will implv a contract on the part of the defendant to pay

the plaintiff and thme persons similarly situated the monevs so
received.
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The question is squarely presented as to whether one who claims
to have been damaged by the publication of a libel, under the circumstances alleged in this complaint, may waive the tort and maintain an action in assumpsit to recover the proceeds or profits derived
from the publication of the libel. This seems to be a novel proposition
and the briefs submitted by counsel for both parties fail to disclose
any case where the precise question has been adjudicated nor has a
rather extensive research by the Court revealed any such case.
There are certain cases in which a person injured by a tort may
waive the tort and sue for breach of what has been termed implied or
quasi contract. Such right is not allowed in all cases, 1 Cooley on
Torts, 4th ed., ~ 61. "The torts which it has been held can be waived
are usually, conversion, trespass to land or goods, deceit and the
action for extorting money by threats." Salmond on the Law of Torts,
8th ed., p. 194. It is noteworthy that in all of those cases the tort
involved an injury to property. · Section 37-a of the General Construction Law provides that libel is a personal injury.
An action in assumpsit lies against one who has obtained money
from another by a fraud; the tort may be waived and an action may
he brought founded on an implied promise to return the money
wrongfully obtained. Rothchild v. Mack, 115 N.Y. 1, 8, 21 N.E.
726, 728. Also an action in assumpsit lies against one who has converted money or property belonging to another. People v. Wood, 121
N.Y. 522, 528-5'.?9; Terry et al. v. Munger, l'.?1 N.Y. 161, 24 N.E.
272, 8 L.R.A. 216, 18 Am. St. Rep. 803. The right to bring action
in assumpsit ex contractu cannot be created simply by a waiving of the
tort but this right depends upon circumstances existing .from which a
contract will be implied ....
The right to waive a tort and sue in assumpsit is dependent upon
the existence of a contractual relationship either express or implied
and in most cases the question arises as to the existence of an implied
contract. Implied contracts are those implied in fact or implied in
law. In Miller v. Schloss, 218 N.Y. 400, 406-407, 113 N.E. 337, 338,
the court says:
"The courts recognize by the language of their opinions two classes
of implied contracts. The one class consists of those contracts which
are evidenced by the acts of the parties and not by their verbal or
written words-true contracts which rest upon an implied promise in
fact. The second class consists of contracts implied by the law where
none in fact exist-~ quasi or constructive contracts created by law and
not b~· the intentions of the parties. A contract cannot be implied in
fact where the facts are inconsistent with its existence, or against the
declaration of the party to be charged, or where there is an express
contract covering the subject-matter involved, or against the inten-
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tion or understanding of the parties, or where an express promise
would be contrary to law. The assent of the person to be charged
is necessary and unless lie has conducted himself in such a manner
that his assent may fairly be· inferred he has not contracted. . . . A
quasi or constructive contract rests upon the equitable principle
that a person shall not be· allowed to enrich himself unjustly at the
expense of another. In truth it is not a contract or promise at all. It
is an obligation which the law creates, in the absence of any agreement, when and because the acts of the parties or others have placed
in the possession of one person money, or its equivalent, under such
circumstances that in equity and good conscience he ought not to
retain it, and which ex aequo et bono belongs to another. Duty, and
not a promise or agreement or intention of the person sought to be
charged, defines it. It is fictitiously deemed contractual, m order to
fit the cause of action to the contractual remedy.''
The foregoing is cited with approval by Judge Lewis in Grombach
Productions, Inc. v. Waring, 293 N.Y. 609, 59 N.E.2d 425, 428.
Under these decisions it must be held that the complaint in this action
contains no allegations which would establish a contract "implied in
fact." The question then presents itself, as to whether the allegations
of the complaint are such as to create a contract "implied in law" so
as to enable the plaintiff to maintain the action as one ex contractu
rather than in tort.
An action based upon invasion of one's right of privacy may be
said to resemble, in many respects, an action based upon libel. In
Street on Foundations of Legal Liability, Volume I, page 319, it is
stated: "It is supposed that if such a right is to be born it must come
in some way from the law of libel. Those who contend for a right of
personal security broad enough to include a general right 'to be let
alone' would not perhaps admit this, but unquestionably the law of
libel furnishes a nearer approach to the indicated goal than any other
branch of tort."
It would seem, therefore, that any adjudications where damages
for invasion of one'~ right of privaC\' is involved might well be of assistance in determining the instant motion. In Bunnell v. Keystone
Varnish Co., 254 App. Div. 885-886, 5 N.Y.S.2d 415. the Court said:
"The plaintiff ha.r no cause of action on quasi-rontract. An action
under section 51 of the Civil Rights Law is the plaintiff's sole remedy
for the unauthorized use of her name (Binns v. Vitagraph Co. [of
America], 210 N.Y. 51, 103 N.E. 1108, L.R.A. J915C, 839, Ann. Cas.
1915B, J024) and the alleged unjust enrichment of the defendant
is a part of that cause of action. Cf. Franklin "· Columbia Pictures
Corp., 246 App. Div. 35-37, 284 N.Y.S. 96 [98]; affirmed 271 N.Y.
554, 2 N.E.2d 691." (Italics by the court.)
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In Cason v. Baskin, l ~:i Fla. 1<l8, 20 So. 2d 243, p. L'.l4, l o!i
A.L.R. 430, the Supreme Court of Florida, said: "The demurrer to
the fourth count wa-; also properly sustained by the trial court.
That count in rffat claimed ,that the plaintiff was entitled to
share in the profits raeived by the defendant for the publication
and sale of her bonk to the extent of one hundred thousand
dollars . . . that marn copies of the book were purchased ;rnd paid
for by persons of :'\la,hua County and throughout the United States
and that thereby thr, drfendant had received great financial profit, and
has thw berome unjustly enricher! at the r,xfJense of and to the damaf!.e of plaintiff. to the extent of one hundred thou~and dollars ....
In our opinion this count states no cause of action." (Italics by the
court.)
These are the onh cases to which m, attention has been directed
where an attempt has het>n m;1de to recover the profits or proceeds
derived from the invasion of a pt>rson 's right of privacy. The theor;·
of the plaintiff in each of these cases was suh~tantially the same as is
plaintiffs in the instant action. Jn rach case the court held that the
plaintiff ,ould not rc,m·rr profits on the hasis of a quasi contra,t.
The reasons whi,h support this rnk in regard to right of privacy are
applicahk to actions hased upon libel.
.\s was stated in '.\filkr ,·. Schlo~s ( mpra p. 407). "A quasi or construcfrw contrart rests upon the equitahlt> principle that a person
should nnt he allowt>d to enrich himself unjustly at the expense of
another:· and is created when "because I of 1 thr acts of the parties" a
person is possessed of mone~ or property which 111 equitv or good conscience hr sho11ld nnt retain. The applic1tinn of this rule requires
inquin. not onh intn the acts of tht> defendant, hut also thf' acts of
the plaintiff. One whn publishes a libel. especi:1lly if done m;ilicinmly,
as char.e-rd in this complaint. is guilt, of ,nnduct whi,h makes him
liable fnr dam,1ges. .\n action for dam.1gcs affords the plaintiff full
compcw:ition for an, injuries which hr has suffered. Tn .1ddition to
compensator;· dam,,ers he ma, rrcnvn punitive damages if proper
foundation is estahlishrd h, the prnof. The law requirrs that a pbintiff must brine; his artinn tn recnvrr s11ch damages within one ,·ear. It
would seem that it is nnt equitable and just tn permit a person, who
has hem the ~uhjrct of ;i lihdo11s ;irtiilr published in a honk, to
acquies,c in o, prrn1it the sale and distrih11tinn of s11,h book to ,ontinue for a period of nearh· six ,-e;irs w1thn111 taking any ~teps whatsoever to pr:,t,,t or stop the sal<" anc! rl 1-trih11tinn nf the hnok and
thrn to m;iint;iin an ;iction fnr tht> prnlits ,Jn1n'.d frnm the sale and
distrih11'i()n of the honk. The p11hhr;1tinn of a honk entails g-rcat
exp?.ns•~ ;incl efTflrt r,n the part of the pnli'isher and the profits deriwd
thcrefrr,·n ;1rr c1 11e ir LircT rnc.i,11rc tn rlnnl'nts outside of the printf·d
mattrr r-rmtainr'rl tlwrcin. Tn permit ,11,h ,rn action as the pl:iintiff
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has brought, under the circumstances alleged in the complaint, would
have the effect of making the puhlisher for a period of years, the
servant of the plaintiff, who, despite his failure to avail himself of a
complete legal remedy, may now assert a right to the fruits of the
defendant's labor and investment even beyond that which may flow
from the alleged libel. Such a situation wrmld be ineq1Jitable and
would result in the unjust enrichment of the plaintiff. Cnder such
circum~tance~ no contract should be '"implied in law" requiring the
defendant to account to the plaintiff for profits dcrin:d from the
publication of the b()ok . . . .
The plaintiff asserts that the onc-ye1r statute of limitations is not
applicable for the rf'.ason that his action is not for damages but is in
assumpsit for mone~·s had and received and is hasf'.d upon an implied
contract and the ~ix-)·ear statute applies. In hi,- brief, plaintiff's
counsel state,: "To call this an action for 'rlamagei:" for libel, ignores
basic facts. To reiterate, we are waivin,t; the<c clam<1ges, and ming
for money 'h;id and received." rv e mr unr!n-taking to fJrove additional facts nr:ver brfme plrader! in r, liliel n1it: namely, that the
defend;int 'ha<l and received' money h~ virt11e of the publication of
hi'> libelous publicatinn."' \·n1atevcr tlw plaintiff ma, c.ill the action,
it is based uprm the tnrt of lihrl ;md ir1 the ah<cncc nf any statute or
common !av, authority, it must bc considcrrd as ;m action for damages
for libel within the meaning of Section 51 of the Civil Practice Act.
In applying the statute of limitations the Cnurt should look for the
reality and the essence of the action and not its mere n;ime . . . .
The plaintiff sho11ld not he permitted to avoict the effect of the
statute of limitations hy attempting- tn ple;,d ;i GUN'. of ;iction for
which there is no authorit;: in law. L11rci ,·. Engel. Sup., 73
N.Y.S.2d 78.
Libel ha.s .bccn ;i field of much litig;1•ion bnth in England and this
country ;mrl durirn: the course of the ,r.ar., m;iny j11dicial decisions
have been h;inded dnwn in lihel acti()ll". It is ~ignificant that in none
of these cases has :in ar:tion such ;i~ is hrn11;::,;ht h\· the plaintiff in
this c;isc been in,tituted. The phintiff recognizr:, this fact and
<tat:c:s: "'\.r, arc unrkrt;iking to prnve ;1dr!itional far,ts ncver before
plcrtdcd in :1 libel snit, namely, th;1t the dcknd;int had and rccc.ived
money b,· virtue nf hi~, lihclo11s p11hi:r;1tim1... Thc ,1bscncc of attempts to bring an action similar to the in.<tant one i, evidence of
the recognition hy the leii:al profe~~imi and the courts that such an
action would not lir: 11ndcr the comnvin hw. In ;\'"car,. 11inne~ot;1, 28:1
C.S. fin7. ;:·1 ;1. 51 l _ Ct. G2:1. G),~. 7:i L l>i. J 3:i7. the Cn11rt ~aid:
"The fart tfuzt fr»· f!/•/,;·nyimotrlr on,· lu,nrf~·{'(! r/11d fifty yN1r.r there
has been almost an n1firc nh,r:•,u· n_f rl!fr·»i/>tr lo ir'7/1osc f1re::iaus
restraints upon puhlio;tinns rr!otin~ tn th,· m11lf,·r:srrnn· of fmhlic
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officers is significant of thP deep-seated conviction that such restraints
would violate constitutional right." ( Italics by the court.)
The development of the law of libel has been accompanied in this
country with the right of freedom of speech and freedom of the
press which is guaranteed by the Federal and State Constitutions ....
The State which guarantees the freedom, punishes its abuse, and
accords to the individual whose reputation has been attacked, remedies for the injuries sustained. The remediPs thus given at common
law, regulated in certain respects by statute, are called actions of
libel and slander, whose object is the recovery of money for the injury.
Seelman on Law of Libel and Slander, p. 1. It is evident that the
right to recover based upon libel has been limited to the recovery of
damages under the common law and statutes applicable thereto. It
would seem, therefore, that the law is so well established that an innovation such as the plaintiff seeks i.n this action would impose new
and unnecessary hazards upon publishers and would be contrary to
the policy of our law. The reason for such conclusion can no better
be expressed than in the language of the Court of Appeals in Roberson
v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538-556, 64 N.E. 442, 447,
59 L.R.A. 478, 89 Am. St. Rep. 828:
"An examination of the authorities leads us to the conclusion that
the so-called 'right of privacy' has not as yet found an abiding place in
our jurisprudence, and, as we view it, the doctrine cannot now be
incorporated without doing violence to settled principles of law by
which the profession and the public have long been guided."
In my opinion the complaint herein fails to state any cause of action
other than a cause of action to recover damages for libel and such
cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations . . . .
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